JUDGMENT : Harsh Kumar, J. 1. Heard Sri A.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for appellant and perused the record. 2. The instant appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.11.2003 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.2, District Budaun in Civil Appeal No.101 of 1998 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 18.8.1998 of Ist Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Buduan in O.S. No.109 of 1993. 3. The brief facts relating to the case are that plaintiff-respondent filed Civil Suit No.109 of 1993 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Buduan for specific performance of contract with the averments that defendant being owner of property in dispute agreed to sell the same in favour of plaintiff for a sum of Rs.25,000/- and executed a registered agreement for sale in his favour after accepting Rs.13,000/- as earnest money and sale deed was agreed to be executed within 14 months on payment of balance sale consideration of Rs.12,000/-; that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and also served defendant with notice by registered post through his counsel and appeared in the office of Sub Registrar, Budaun on dates fixed i.e. 25.8.1992 and 2.9.1992 and got his presence registered, but defendant did not turn up, hence suit is being filed. 4. The defendant filed written statement denying plaint allegations with the averments that no agreement for sale was executed, rather defendant was in need of Rs.13,000/-, which was paid by plaintiff to the defendant with the condition that he will put his property as security, which condition was accepted by defendant and consequently impugned agreement for sale was got executed from defendant in favour of plaintiff and it was agreed that when defendant will re-pay the amount, the agreement will cease to exist; that Rs.13,000/- was re-paid by defendant to plaintiff, of which receipt was executed by plaintiff on 16.11.1992 stating that he does not want to get sale deed executed and since the agreement for sale ceased to exist, no cause of action arises to the plaintiff. 5. With regard to signatures of plaintiff over receipt of re-payment 32-A dated 16.11.1992, reports of finger print and handwriting experts were produced by plaintiff as well as defendant. 5. With regard to signatures of plaintiff over receipt of re-payment 32-A dated 16.11.1992, reports of finger print and handwriting experts were produced by plaintiff as well as defendant. Sri Vishan Kumar Sharma, the hand writing expert in his report produced by plaintiff stated that the disputed signatures do not tally with the admitted signatures of plaintiff while the other report by Sri Anoop Sinha produced by defendant stated that both signatures are identical. 6. The Trial Court relying on the defence case and considering that the defendant has been a candidate for M.L.A. and M.P. elections and is presently Chairman of Municipal Board, Ujhani held that preparing a forged receipt, may not be imagined from him and moreover since plaintiff has purchased some other property on same date i.e. 16.11.1992 when the receipt 32-A was executed, so also there is every possibility that he would have received back money from defendant and possibility of receipt 32-A to be forged does not arise. The Trial Court accordingly dismissed the suit of plaintiff holding that defendant has succeeded in proving that he had taken a sum of Rs.13,000/- as loan, which has been paid through receipt 32-A. 7. Feeling aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.101 of 1998 under section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure before the District Judge, Buduan, which has been decided by Additional District Judge, Court No.2, Buduan by impugned judgment and decree, allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract. Feeling aggrieved, defendant has preferred instant appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Learned counsel for appellant contends that the impugned judgment is wrong on facts and law and learned Appellate Court acted wrongly and illegally in disbelieving the receipt 32-A of repayment of loan; that the plaintiff had failed to prove his case and lower Appellate Court committed mistake in allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court without holding that findings arrived at by the Trial Court were perverse; that the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside; that the instant appeal involves as many as 06 substantial questions of law, as proposed at page 9-10 of the memo of appeal. 9. 9. Upon hearing learned counsel for appellant at length and perusal of record, I find that as per defence taken by defendant-appellant, he had taken Rs.13,000/- for a short period and executed agreement for sale with the condition that it will cease to exist on re-payment of amount and since the amount was repaid, the plaintiff-respondent agreed that he does not want to get sale deed executed by executing receipt 32-A. Learned lower Appellate Court at internal page 9 of it's judgment has reproduced the matter mentioned in receipt of repayment 32-A dated 16.11.1992 which states that money of advance sale consideration has been returned, so he does not want to get the sale deed executed. Learned lower Appellate Court at internal page 10 has also noticed that in above receipt there is no mention of interest which is alleged to have been paid by defendant at the rate of Rs.400/- per month in his cross examination, without there any pleadings or whisper of rate of interest or any receipt about payment of interest. It is also pertinent to mention that according to agreement for sale, sale deed was agreed to be executed within 14 months from 3.7.1991 i.e. upto 2.9.1992 and when sale deed was not executed by defendant for 13 months, the plaintiff served him with notice fixing 25.8.1992 and 2.9.1992 for execution of sale deed and remained present at the office of Sub Registrar, Buduan on dates fixed, so the question of executing a receipt of repayment 32-A on 16.11.1992 showing unwillingness to get sale deed executed becomes improbable. It is also noteworthy that when defendant-appellant, who is alleged to have contested elections of M.L.A. and M.P., as mentioned in internal page 11 of the judgment of Trial Court and was Chairman of Municipal Board, Nagar Palika, Ujhani, the story of obtaining loan of Rs.13,000/- by him from plaintiff and payment of interest @ Rs.400/- also becomes highly improbable. The lower Appellate Court has rightly held that plaintiff successfully proved the impugned agreement for sale and that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 10. Learned lower Appellate Court has rightly held that when a registered agreement for sale has been executed between the parties, the same may be considered to have ceased to exist by execution of mere receipt and can only be cancelled by executing registered deed of cancellation. 10. Learned lower Appellate Court has rightly held that when a registered agreement for sale has been executed between the parties, the same may be considered to have ceased to exist by execution of mere receipt and can only be cancelled by executing registered deed of cancellation. As far as report of expert is concerned under law the reports submitted by two experts are only an opinion having no binding effect under provisions of Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act. 11. In view of discussions made above, I find that the learned counsel for appellant has failed to show any illegality, incorrectness or perversity in the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Appellate Court. The appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and is being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed. 12. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout. The impugned judgment and decree are affirmed. 13. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 14. Let the lower court record be sent back to Court below along with a copy of this judgment for necessary action, if any.