JUDGMENT : SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI, J. 1. Recording of the deposition of the first witness for the plaintiff, Mr. Harsh Vardhan Lodha, commenced on 28th November, 2018 and continued on the second day, i.e., 28.11.2018. Further examination-in-chief of the witness resumed again for the third day, i.e., 28.11.2018 and it was adjourned till 12th December, 2018. On 12th December, 2018, i.e., on the 4th day, when examination-in-chief resumed Mr. Ghosh asked a question to the witness being question no.80 - "do you know since when your father Rajendra Singh Lodha knew Mr. M.P. Birla?" When this question was raised, Mr. Kapur, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the defendant nos. 1(b) and 1(c) raised an objection that the answer which had gone down with reference to question no.73, should not have been recorded by the Court inasmuch as the statement of the witness is a 'hearsay'. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Advocate, raised his objection to the effect that such an objection raised by Mr. Kapur could not be entertained at a belated stage. The objection, which Mr. Kapur raised, ought to have been raised when answer to question no. 73 was given by the witness on 28.11.2018 but not on 12.12.2018 when question no.80 had been raised. According to Mr. Mitra, the objection should not find place in the deposition. However, according to him, if at all such objection was to be raised, the same should be bracketed 'subject to objection' meaning thereby, the objection can be dealt with at the final hearing of the suit. This Court, having regard to the gravity of the objection that the witness could not continue had the Court stopped him to answer any question after question no.73. This Court, therefore, attempted to finally decide the substance and the impact of the objection. As a result, recording of evidence had to be stopped and parties were heard at length on the issue of the objection particularly when it was the submission of Mr. Kapur that Court should not have recorded the answer to question no.73 being 'hearsay' and he further prayed for 'expunction' of the said answer from the evidence. 2. As a result, recording of evidence had to be stopped and parties were heard at length on the issue of the objection particularly when it was the submission of Mr. Kapur that Court should not have recorded the answer to question no.73 being 'hearsay' and he further prayed for 'expunction' of the said answer from the evidence. 2. On this contention, whether or not the said answer should remain or be deleted, requires a decision before the witness is called on again to depose further and in particular, this is necessary to warn the parties not to disrupt the normal flow of evidence by raising unnecessary objection, the ultimate effect of which is that the object of speedy trial gets frustrated, when it is evident that this case was instituted by filing a probate petition on 17.08.2004 in P.L.A. 242 of 2004. 3. In support of his contention that the answer recorded under question no.73 should be expunged and that further question based on question no.73 should not be allowed to be asked to the witness, Mr. Kapur submits that the quality of the evidence as recorded under question no. 73, is inadmissible in evidence being the same is an hearsay evidence. Now, we have to discuss various aspects of hearsay evidence and the question and answers already given by this witness earlier and to weigh the nexus between the answer given by the witness in question no.73 and the earlier answers given by the same witness. It is also to be decided whether the objection raised by Mr. Kapur, even if the same has got substance, whether the same should have been entertained by this Court at this stage, that is, at the stage when almost few questions thereafter have already been answered by the witness. 4. Mr. Kapur, in support of his contention, has relied on the following decisions:- Musammat Atkia Begum Vs. Muhammad Ibrahim Rashid Nawsab reported in, (1916) AIR PC 250; Nanak Chand Vs. Mian Mohammad Shahbaz Khan and Ors. reported in, (1936) AIR Lahore 114; Dwijen Chandra Roy Chaudhuri Vs. Naresh Chandra Gupta and Ors. reported in, (1945) AIR Calcutta 492; Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr. reported in, (2011) 2 SCC 532 ; Sakatar Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana reported in, (2004) 11 SCC 291 ; Vijender Vs. Mian Mohammad Shahbaz Khan and Ors. reported in, (1936) AIR Lahore 114; Dwijen Chandra Roy Chaudhuri Vs. Naresh Chandra Gupta and Ors. reported in, (1945) AIR Calcutta 492; Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr. reported in, (2011) 2 SCC 532 ; Sakatar Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana reported in, (2004) 11 SCC 291 ; Vijender Vs. State of Delhi reported in, (1997) 6 SCC 171 ; Pawan Kumar -Vs.- State of Haryana reported in, (2003) 11 SCC 241 ; Miller Vs. Babu Madho Das reported in, (1896) 23 IndApp 106; Lim Yam Hong Vs. Lam Choon & Co. reported in XXIX The Law Weekly Page-520; Amarjit Kaur Vs. Kishan Chand reported in, (1980) 17 DLT 225 ; Queen Vs. Kali Churn Gangooly reported in,1867 7 WeeklyReporter 2; Queen Vs. Pittambur Sirdar and Ors. reported in,1867 7 WeeklyReporter 25 and Abbas Peada Vs. Queen Empress reported in, (1898) 2 CalWN 484 5. All the decisions cited by Mr. Kapur in support of his contention that the evidence recorded subsequent to question no.73 should be expunged from the evidence, does not appear to be on the line of the argument he advanced. Decision in Musammat Atkia Begum (supra) is a decision of Privy Council in an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature which reversed a judgment and decree of the Court of the subordinate Judge where questions arose for determination- (1) Whether the appellant and respondent were legally married according to the Mahommedan Law at Mecca on a particular date? (2) Whether the appellant did, in fact, give her consent to this marriage? and (3) Whether the appellant was, at the time of marriage, adult and competent to give her consent thereto? 6. The Court considered if the appellant on the specified date (20th July, 1907) was a minor, the ceremony then performed between these two people, who were Mahommedans, would, however, regular in other respects, have been ineffectual to create a valid marriage unless the guardians of the minor have previously consented to the marriage. Therefore, consent of the guardian was an essential fact. If the appellant was on that day a major, guardians' consent would be unnecessary and she would have been legally entitled to marry the man. The burden of proving that the girl reached her majority rests upon those who alleged. Therefore, consent of the guardian was an essential fact. If the appellant was on that day a major, guardians' consent would be unnecessary and she would have been legally entitled to marry the man. The burden of proving that the girl reached her majority rests upon those who alleged. These propositions were not questioned in either of the Courts in which this case was litigated. 7. On this context, a witness Bashir Ahmed, who was a party to the reading of the Nikah, had taken upon himself to state, in answer to a question asked, no doubt on cross-examination, that he knew the appellant was of age by certain signs of puberty recognized by Mahommedan Law. When he was asked how he knew this fact, he replied - "through her father." The Privy Council held - "It is difficult to believe that the girl's father can ever had bestowed this confidence upon the witness; but even if he had done so, the repetition of what the father said was no evidence whatsoever of the substantive fact of the girl's puberty." Therefore, the Privy Council held that such an evidence is not reliable that the evidence of Bashir Ahmed is no evidence as it is unbelievable that the father could bestow such a confidence on a third party. The Privy Council held that the answer given by Bashir Ahmed on cross-examination is a hearsay evidence and, therefore, if such an evidence is admitted, the same might prolong the litigation. 8. The issue involved in the case is quite different from what has been recorded in our case. In the cited decision the Court was concerned more about the quality of the evidence than whether it is hearsay or otherwise. Question which was considered by the Court is whether the father can bestow the confidence on a third party about a very private matter which even the father did not know or was not supposed to know. On this seriousness the Court discarded the admission of such an evidence but it is undisputed that such a question has been decided by the Court in a second appellate stage. Therefore, ratio of this decision no way suggests that the question which has been recorded at the time of examination-in-chief of the very first PW in our case should be expunged. 9. Therefore, ratio of this decision no way suggests that the question which has been recorded at the time of examination-in-chief of the very first PW in our case should be expunged. 9. In the cited decision the appellant in whose favour, Subordinate Judge passed the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, reversed by the First Appellate Court, was under challenge in the appeal filed before the Privy Council and which reversed the judgment and decree so passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the decree of the Subordinate Court. Therefore, the ratio of the judgment is not applicable in the present case save and except the fact that recording of the evidence was considered to be a hearsay evidence and Court held that it should not have been admitted into evidence for the reasons aforesaid. 10. The decision in Nanak Chand (supra) is also a decision of the Appellate Court and does not whisper about the expunging of the evidence. The said decision is on the quality of the evidence whether the Court below ought to have relied on the evidence which was recorded without objection or not. 11. The decision in Dwijen Chandra Roy Chaudhuri (supra) question arose whether a map prepared in a suit between the defendant and the third party in which there was no dispute about the disputed lands, is admissible or not in evidence without examining the maker of the map or otherwise proving its correctness. The decision has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case save the finding that irrelevant evidence cannot be admitted and considered, although, the party affected did not object to the mode of proof at the time of its admission. It is nobody's case that simply because a statement of the witness has been recorded, the Court will go by the same without examining its veracity compared to the other materials on record. 12. Kalyan Kumar Gogoi (supra) is a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of election dispute. It is nobody's case that simply because a statement of the witness has been recorded, the Court will go by the same without examining its veracity compared to the other materials on record. 12. Kalyan Kumar Gogoi (supra) is a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of election dispute. The suit was filed by the candidate having second highest votes challenging that because of the change of notified venue of a polling booth he lost election battle and in the said decision where the trial Court, based on the evidence tendered by the witnesses of the appellant, held that big number of voters returned back without casting their votes because the polling station was initially arranged at a non-notified place and was subsequently shifted to the notified place. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the person who heard that many persons could not cast their vote because of shifting of venue, should be a direct evidence and in absence of direct evidence simply on a hearsay evidence if Court comes to a finding and took it for granted that this change of venue as has been discussed by people was the cause for defeat of the appellant, could not be recorded in evidence and, therefore, in this decision the Hon'ble Apex Court held that this type of evidence is inadmissible. 13. There is no doubt that oral evidence should be a direct evidence and Court should not rely on a hearsay evidence but the quality of evidence so adduced, has to be judged at the final hearing of the case. 14. Shakatar Singh & Ors. (supra) is a decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in appeal and the Hon'ble Apex Court held that evidence is not admissible because the witness had no personal knowledge about the fact in issue and if on the basis of such a poor quality of evidence the decision against which appeal preferred could not be sustained. This case has also no bearing in the present case. 15. The decision in S.S. Vijender (supra) is in the same line where in appeals the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed about the quality of the evidence which a Court should rely on. Court has held that if the evidence is not direct evidence and based on hearsay, penalty should not be imposed on the basis of hearsay evidence. 15. The decision in S.S. Vijender (supra) is in the same line where in appeals the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed about the quality of the evidence which a Court should rely on. Court has held that if the evidence is not direct evidence and based on hearsay, penalty should not be imposed on the basis of hearsay evidence. However, in the decision of Vijender (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court held that hearsay evidence may not be admissible but when the said evidence is corroborated by other evidence becomes admissible under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. 16. The decision in Pawan Kumar (supra) is also on the same line and the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in a criminal case hearsay evidence may be admissible if the same has got corroborative value. 17. Decision in Miller (supra) deals with a question at the appellate stage whether the erroneous omission before the Commissioner and the district Court to object to the admission of a particular evidence whether or not, the Appellate Court should disregard it. In the said decision, the Court held - "irrespective of objection or no objection, the Court should disregard it as the admission of the evidence was held to be improper." The evidence which is not relevant on the fact in issue has to be disregarded by the Court but question is if it is disregarded at the stage of the trial, whether Court can do it at a later stage. The Court has arrived at a finding that an erroneous omission to object to such evidence does not make it admissible. 18. There are no two opinions about the said settled proposition of law. Simply because a statement has been admitted in evidence Court is not bound to regard this as a valid evidence. However, at appropriate stage, Court can deal with the same. 19. The case in Lim Yam Hong (supra) is a decision of Privy Council. This decision relates to the suit filed by the plaintiff for the alleged breach of contract. The defendant denied that he ever made such a contract. The only issue is whether defendant made the agreement or not. The evidence given by Mr. Green for the plaintiffs, although, accepted entirely by the learned Chief Justice, was declared by him to be of itself quite insufficient to prove the making of the contract. The defendant denied that he ever made such a contract. The only issue is whether defendant made the agreement or not. The evidence given by Mr. Green for the plaintiffs, although, accepted entirely by the learned Chief Justice, was declared by him to be of itself quite insufficient to prove the making of the contract. For that purpose, therefore, reliance was placed on the testimony of one Cheng Kee, a clerk or broker employed by the plaintiffs. Evidence of this witness was admitted, although, Court held that he was not a very bad witness and added that if he could get definite corroboration of his story, the denials of the defendant and his witnesses would not have availed of to displace the evidence called on behalf of the plaintiffs. All these evidence were relied on by the two learned Judges who allowed the appeal and especially by Mr. Justice Deane who found sufficient corroboration of another witness Cheng Kee's testimony to justify the reversal of the judgment of the Chief Justice. 20. The Privy Council held - "it is true that the evidence of what Ah Choon who was not alleged to have any authority to represent the defendant had said in his absence was not objected to by the defendant's counsel, but still the fault of an advocate cannot so alter the character of testimony as to convert into corroborative evidence that which the law regards as merely fit for rejection as hearsay. Yet this was also accepted as good evidence of the contents of a written document: since the paper, said to have been delivered to Ah Choon, was treated as a note confirming a contract. Moreover it was impossible to treat statements by Cheng Kee as corroborating his own evidence, for these were merely parts of that very evidence itself." 21. The Privy Council further held that the admission which was irrelevant, should not have been admitted. If it was disregarded it was rightly disregarded. 22. This judgment, although, says that hearsay evidence should not be admitted but at the same time, indicates that corroboration, if available, that should not be overlooked. 23. The decision in Amarjit Kaur (supra) is based on the fact where the respondent/landlord brought a petition for eviction of his tenant, Bhagwan Singh. If it was disregarded it was rightly disregarded. 22. This judgment, although, says that hearsay evidence should not be admitted but at the same time, indicates that corroboration, if available, that should not be overlooked. 23. The decision in Amarjit Kaur (supra) is based on the fact where the respondent/landlord brought a petition for eviction of his tenant, Bhagwan Singh. The ground of ejectment was that the tenant, Bhagwan Singh, has sublet the suit premises without the consent in writing of the landlord. In this background, whether admissions of one co-defendant were reasonable or not against another, merely by virtue of his position as co-party in the litigation was the subject-matter in issue. In the said decision, it has been dealt elaborately that depositions of witnesses in other litigations carry little weight. They have weak evidentiary value. Even the depositions of parties, though admissible as admissions against persons making them, are not admissible against persons who are not parties to the previous litigation in which they were made. On this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court says that when there is no other evidence to support the finding of subletting the statement of Budh Singh, a co-defendant, is inadmissible and ought not to have been received in evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the Judge to disallow such inadmissible evidence even when 'No Objection' is taken. The fact involved in the decision is distinguishable from our case. 24. The decisions in Queen Vs. Kali Churn Gangooly (supra), Abbas Peada Vs. Queen Empress (supra) and Queen Vs. Pittambur Sirdar and Ors. (supra) are the decisions as an outcome of Jury trial. Since the parties have relied on very recent Supreme Court decisions on the fact in issue, I need not rely on such decisions to decide the issue in question, more so, when the Juries were not required to give reasons in support of their suggestion. 25. Opposing the contention raised by Mr. Kapur, Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra has submitted that this is an age-old practice of this Court that if any objection is raised by any of the parties, the said objection is noted down and, ultimately, the Court decides the objection after consideration of the totality of the evidence on record. The Court may or may not rely on such evidence depending on its quality. In support of his contention Mr. The Court may or may not rely on such evidence depending on its quality. In support of his contention Mr. Mitra learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff has relied on the following decisions to contend that it is the practice of the Court followed since long that whenever objection with regard to the admissibility of any evidence is raised by the other side the Court ordinarily keeps the objection pending for being considered at the final hearing. According to him there may be several occasions for the parties to raise objection with regard to the admissibility of any statement at the time of examination of the witnesses and each time if the Court has to give a ruling on the admissibility then the trial will be delayed. Therefore, he submitted that instead of keeping the matter pending to decide the objection made by Mr. Kapur the trial should proceed and the objection which has been made may be decided at the hearing of the suit. In support of such submission Mr. Mitra has relied on the following decisions:- Subramaniam Vs. Public Prosecutor reported in, (1956) 1 WLR 965 (Privy Council); Umrao Singh Vs. State of M.P reported in, (1961) AIR M.P. 45; J.D. Jain Vs. The Management of State Bank of India and Anr. reported in, AIR 1982 SC 673 ; Mukhtiar Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab reported in, AIR 2009 SC 1854 ; Pratap Kumar Ganguly Vs. Anindita Ganguly reported in, (1992) 97 CalWN 53 ; Arup Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal (unreported) in CRA No. 218 of 1997; Samar Das Vs. The State of Tripura (unreported) in Crl. A. (J) 09 of 2014; Kamal Krishna Deb and Anr. Vs. Birju Kumvakar & Anr. reported in, 0 72 CalWN 279; Regina Vs. Willis reported in, (1960) 1 WLR 55; Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in, (2001) 3 SCC 1 . Harjyoti Agwarwalla Vs. Poonam Kejriwal & Ors. reported in,2012 ICC 699. 26. Out of these decisions cited by Mr. Mitra J.D. Jain (supra) is on the question of domestic inquiry and there the rule of hearsay evidence has been discussed. Indisputably, rule of evidence is not strictly applicable in case of domestic inquiry. Therefore, the findings in the said case are not applicable. Poonam Kejriwal & Ors. reported in,2012 ICC 699. 26. Out of these decisions cited by Mr. Mitra J.D. Jain (supra) is on the question of domestic inquiry and there the rule of hearsay evidence has been discussed. Indisputably, rule of evidence is not strictly applicable in case of domestic inquiry. Therefore, the findings in the said case are not applicable. Out of the remaining decisions only the decisions in Kamal Krishna Deb (supra) and Regina (supra) deals with civil proceedings. All the decisions cited by Mr. Mitra gives an ultimate conclusion that either the Court has to decide the question without wasting time or the question should be kept for decision at the final hearing. There is some distinction in the application of evidence in civil proceedings and criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings the prosecution has to prove the guilt beyond any reasonable doubt but in civil proceedings the evidence is not applicable in such a strict sense where rule of preponderance of probability is applicable. The decision in the civil proceedings are conveniently considered first. 27. In Kamal Krishna Deb (supra) Court has sought to discuss what is hearsay evidence and what is not on the factum of a statement. The said decision relates to a suit for ejectment. While examination of witnesses on the defendant's side one Manglu would have been the right person to bring on record the origin of the tenancy because the tenancy originated with him, according to the written statement filed by the defendant. Unfortunately, he was dead at the time of trial. He died on 4th October, 1942 as per the averment in the plaint. The only oral evidence before the Court was that of the 1st defendant Birju says that "his father Manglu lived in the suit premises over about 90 years as a perpetual tenant and died here too, at the age of 112, in the latter part of 1942. Since the exact date of Manglu's death is given in the plaint as 4th October, 1942, calculating backwards there from a period of 90 years, one reaches 1852 when Birju, aged about 60 years in 1966. If that be so it can be assumed that Birju was not even born at that time. His year of birth would be 1906. Court held that he is, therefore, a singularly unfit person to speak about the origin of the tenancy. If that be so it can be assumed that Birju was not even born at that time. His year of birth would be 1906. Court held that he is, therefore, a singularly unfit person to speak about the origin of the tenancy. Similarly, the 1st plaintiff Kamal Krishna Deb, aged 46 in 1966 was also unfit to depose. In this case Court considered the truthfulness of the witness and, therefore, came to a conclusion that "evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay." Court says it is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. But it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by evidence, not a truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. 28. In Regina (supra) it has been held that it is hearsay evidence and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement but it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but the fact it was made. Court holds that the fact that the statement was made, quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or of some other person in whose presence the statement was made. 29. The two other decisions relied on by Mr. Mitra in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) decided by three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court and which has been followed by a Hon'ble Single Judge in Harjyoti Agwarwalla (supra) are the guiding principle to be followed in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Justice Datta dealt with a case where by the order impugned the learned Trial Court rejected the application of a party seeking expunging of the evidence which were recorded and so tendered by a party and marked as Exhibits. Justice Datta dealt with a case where by the order impugned the learned Trial Court rejected the application of a party seeking expunging of the evidence which were recorded and so tendered by a party and marked as Exhibits. While dealing with such a situation, Justice Datta in Harjyoti Agwarwalla (supra), following the ratio in the decision of Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) rendered by the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court should be principally followed in order to ensure speedy trial of under trial prisoners and it has been held that failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document and the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the said decision paragraphs 13 to 16 of Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) have been relied on and those paragraphs are set out below: "13. It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed.) 15. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when the same objection is re-canvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses. 16. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence." 30. In our case when question no.80 was asked by Mr. 16. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence." 30. In our case when question no.80 was asked by Mr. Ghosh - "Do you know since when your father Rajendra Singh Lodha knew Mr. M.P. Birla?" objection was raised by Mr. Kapur. We are dealing with such objection. The question has some nexus with previous two questions, that is, question no.62 where it was asked "Was your father, Rajendra Singh Lodha acquainted with Mrs. Priyamvada Devi Birla and her family?" and it was answered again "Yes. My father, Rajendra Singh Lodha was acquainted with Barima and her husband, Madhav Prasad Birla." In question no.73 it was asked by Mr. Ghosh "What was R.S. Lodha's relationship with M.P. Birla - do you know?" In answer, the witness said "I was not personally present when M.P. Babu used to discuss business and other matters with my father but 'Bari Ma' had told me on several occasion that M.P. Babu was fond of my father and had, in fact, introduced him to 'Bari Ma' and as a person she could rely on for advice and trust him." Whether this answer made by the witness in question no.73 read with question no.63 and, of course, other answers given earlier particularly, question nos.43 to 46, whether the answer in question no.73 can be said to be a hearsay evidence? If such answer is considered to be hearsay evidence, then the witness cannot be allowed to proceed any further with regard to his relationship with P.D. Birla or her husband M.P. Birla or his father's relationship with 'Bari Ma' (P.D. Birla) and her husband M.P. Birla. So far, the answer given by the witness in question no.73 that "Bari Ma had told me on several occasion that M.P. Babu was fond of my father and had, in fact, introduced him to 'Bari Ma' ..."- if 'Bari Ma' told the witness something, whether this can be construed to be hearsay or not. Mr. Kapur's contention is that whether or not 'Bari Ma' told him anything cannot be proved as she is dead, then such a statement cannot be admitted into evidence as it is hearsay. Mr. Kapur's contention is that whether or not 'Bari Ma' told him anything cannot be proved as she is dead, then such a statement cannot be admitted into evidence as it is hearsay. But this is too early to hold such a view that this witness should not proceed any further on this issue as he has heard it from a person who is no more in this world and cannot be proved. This is a stage when only the first witness has come to depose. We do not know whether any other witness, if available, can throw any light on this issue with regard to the acquaintance of the witness (PW 1) and 'Bari Ma' (P.D. Birla) or M.P. Birla. Therefore, this is too early to take a decision that such a statement made by the witness will never be corroborated. For example, when a person claims to be A's daughter and states that the said 'A' used to conduct himself as her father, she is speaking us from her personal knowledge and her testimony should not be rejected being hearsay. 31. The word 'corroboration' connotes support or confirmation and indicates in relation to the law of evidence that certain evidence (the evidence to be corroborated) is confirmed in its tenor and effect of other admissible and independent evidence (the corroborating evidence). 32. Corroboration is a rule of prudence and evidentiary value of a deposition which is otherwise admissible, is not just wiped out in the absence of corroboration. For example, the statement of an eye-witness can well be corroborated by the medical evidence. Before the entire evidence is concluded, how at this stage Court can presume that the statement which has been made by the witness cannot get support from other corroborating evidence. 33. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. Evidence of a statement made to an witness who is not himself called as a witness, may or may not be hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. Evidence of a statement made to an witness who is not himself called as a witness, may or may not be hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made, as has been discussed in J.D. Jain (supra) by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Therefore, "Bari Ma had told me" may be substantiated by some other evidence or may or may not be substantiated by some other evidence which is yet to come and this evidence cannot be hearsay evidence because the witness claims that he himself was told by 'Bari Ma' since 'Bari Ma' is dead, this may be proved by any other witness in future which we cannot presume at this stage. Therefore, this evidence - "Bari Ma had told me" cannot be brushed aside only on the question that it is hearsay and that Court should expunge the subsequent statement of the witness recorded in question no.80. Whether the witness would be able to prove the relationship of his father and M.P. Birla, is a question yet to be gathered from other evidence if made available. Even by giving answer to this question the witness can falsify himself and if a witness takes such a risk to destroy his own evidence by putting it in suspicion, why the Court should stop him at this stage, when the Court has every right to consider the totality of the deposition made by the witness or to be made by him. However, the witness will never be allowed to answer to a question which is not to be considered as a question on the fact in issue or irrelevant in the fact of the present case. Until that is not proved, in my view, the witness should not be stopped at this stage. Therefore, the examination should be resumed and it should continue without interruption as far as possible. 34. With the deepest of respect to him I disagree with Mr. Kapur that in a civil case no amount of corroboration can be relied on or corroboration has got no value, I hold that even in a civil proceeding corroboration has got a greater important value in some cases. 34. With the deepest of respect to him I disagree with Mr. Kapur that in a civil case no amount of corroboration can be relied on or corroboration has got no value, I hold that even in a civil proceeding corroboration has got a greater important value in some cases. For example, evidence of conversion of a member of a Scheduled Caste to Buddhism in a case may be corroborated by evidence of his conduct subsequent to conversion. Therefore, there is no absolute rule that in a civil case corroboration has no role. 35. The Court is not concerned how the evidence was gathered or from where it is secured. It is concerned only whether the evidence is relevant to the matters in issue and if so, whether admissible. 36. From the affidavit dated 30th July, 2004, affirmed by Laxmi Devi Newar, who claimed to have filed a caveat on July 19, 2004 in her affidavit stated that after death of M.P. Birla in or about July, 1990, the deceased (testatrix), who had no formal education, relied and continued to rely on the petitioner and reposed and continued to repose complete trust and confidence in the petitioner in many matters. If such a statement on oath is taken into consideration, then it is apparent on the face of the record that M.P. Birla had good acquaintance with the propounder. Therefore, in this context, it cannot be said that the question no.80 which was asked by Mr. Ghosh to the witness that since when his father knew Mr. M.P. Birla, cannot be held to be irrelevant. Since the defendants have admitted good amount of acquaintance with the propounder, in my view, the question on the same acquaintance even without both of them are dead, cannot be held to be absolutely inadmissible. The question has got some relevance in the facts and circumstances pleaded by both the parties. Therefore, I decline to accept the prayer of Mr. Kapur appearing for the defendant nos.1(b) and 1(c) to expunge the said question no.80 from the record. The reasons I have already given earlier that simply by saying that the witness heard it from 'Bari Ma' that his father had good acquaintance with the testatrix, cannot be said to be hearsay. Unless the entire evidence is pleaded, no inference can be drawn that the statement made by the witness is false and inadmissible in evidence. The reasons I have already given earlier that simply by saying that the witness heard it from 'Bari Ma' that his father had good acquaintance with the testatrix, cannot be said to be hearsay. Unless the entire evidence is pleaded, no inference can be drawn that the statement made by the witness is false and inadmissible in evidence. Hearsay evidence cannot be relied on for the reason that this cannot be proved. But here, the situation is different. The defendants themselves admitted the fact which the witness has stated in the box regarding his acquaintance with 'Bari Ma' and his father's acquaintance too with the testatrix. This is not the appropriate time to infer that the evidence is a bogus evidence and not admissible. 37. Therefore, this is too early to hold such a view that the statement made in course of deposition in question nos.73 or 80, should be expunged. 38. Applying the principles laid down in the decision of Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra) decided by Three-Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court and followed by Our Court in Harjyoti Agwarwalla (supra) and in view of the forgoing discussions and reasons I hold without any hesitation that the objection made on behalf of defendant nos. 1(b) and 1(c) cannot be sustained and those are overruled. The prayer on their behalf for expunging the evidence is also refused save that this Court will consider the totality of the evidence at the conclusion of the trial.