JUDGMENT : 1. These three habeas corpus petitions question detention orders, dated 16th April,2019, separately passed against the petitioners by the District Magistrate, Etah in exercise of powers under Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3) of the National Security Act,1980 (for short the Act,1980). 2. Today, counter affidavit of respondents 2 and 4 have been filed by the learned AGA in each of the three petitions, which have been taken on record. The learned counsel for the petitioners stated that he does not wish to file reply to those affidavits and has prayed that the petitions be heard finally. 3. As the petitioners are co-accused and the detention order separately passed against them are based on identical grounds, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, these petitions are being decided by a common judgment and order. 4. We have heard Sri Upendra Upadhyay for all three petitioners; Sri Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as the other state-officers including the detaining authority; Sri S.K. Srivastava for the Union of India in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 731 of 2019; Sri Surendra Nath Chauhan for the Union of India in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 732 of 2019; and Sri Kameshwar Singh for the Union of India in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 734 of 2019; and have perused the record. 5. A perusal of the record would reveal that detention orders dated 16th April,2019 were separately passed against the petitioners by the District Magistrate, Etah (the Detaining Authority) in exercise of power under Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3) of the Act,1980 with a view to prevent the petitioners from indulging in activity that might be prejudicial to the public order. The grounds of detention, which are common to all the petitioners, reflect that the detention order has been passed with reference to the activity of the petitioners in the company of several other accused persons in an incident dated 22nd March, 2019 which gave rise to case crime No.0056 of 2019 at police station Awagarh, district Etah, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 307, 332, 353, 427, 336, 436 and 188 IPC and Section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. The record reflects that prior to that incident, in a road accident, a person had died. This resulted in mass protest by the public including road blockade. To remove the road blockade, police force was deployed. The record reflects that prior to that incident, in a road accident, a person had died. This resulted in mass protest by the public including road blockade. To remove the road blockade, police force was deployed. The allegation is that a large gathering of persons comprising 12 named accused including the petitioners with 100 odd other persons attacked the police force and damaged / burnt police vehicle. It is stated that the petitioners were duly identified along with twenty-thirty others and their participation in the incident was substantiated from statement of the witnesses. It is alleged that the said road blockade and mob activity disturbed the public order. By citing that the petitioners have applied for bail in the said case and are likely to be released on bail, with a view to prevent the petitioners from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order, the detention order was passed. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners have no previous criminal history; that from a solitary incident of the nature which has given rise to Case Crime No.0056 of 2019 it cannot be presumed that the petitioners on being released on bail would repeat such activity that would be prejudicial to the public order therefore the order of preventive detention is not legally sustainable. It has been submitted that the purpose of preventive detention is to prevent the detenu from indulging in activity that is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or security of the State or maintenance of essential services and civil supplies. It has been urged that since it is to prevent a person from repeating such activity, the past activity has to be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the propensity of that person whether he would repeat such activity. It has been submitted that admittedly there were 12 named accused including the petitioners in the first information report. The list of names, after investigation, expanded to twenty-thirty persons. Otherwise, more than 100 persons were there, who allegedly participated in the incident of road-block and arson, but the detention order has been passed only against three persons, namely, the petitioners, whereas no detention order was passed against the rest of the accused, which clearly suggests that from the nature of the incident it could not have been logically inferred that the persons involved were likely to repeat such act. It was urged that the incident, as narrated in the first information report, did not disclose an organized criminal activity, rather, it appeared to be a mob reaction to an accident. Hence, from such an incident it could not have been inferred that the petitioners had mental pre-disposition to repeat such acts. It has been submitted that mob psychology is spontaneous and such incidents are not planned and there is nothing on record that the incident was planned or orchestrated by the petitioners. More over, the first information report and the other material attributes common role to all. In the alternative it has been contended that even if the detention was justified for a limited period in view of the forthcoming elections, its extension is not justified, post the elections. It has been submitted that the detention order after confirmation was initially for three months only but, unnecessarily, it has been extended up to six months. 7. Learned AGA submitted that the first information report as also the grounds of detention sufficiently demonstrate that on account of mob action the public order was disturbed as police personnel were also injured and police vehicle was burnt. He has submitted that such mob activity needs to be dealt with an iron hand and therefore the detention order is justified even though the petitioners may not have previous criminal history. 8. Having considered the rival submissions, before we address the issues raised, it would be apposite for us to notice the legal position as to when an order of preventive detention can lawfully be passed on a solitary act of the detenu. In this regard, it would be useful for us to notice the decision of nine-judges Bench of the Apex Court in Attorney General For India vs Amratlal Prajivandas and others, (1994) 5 SCC 54 . In paragraph 48 of the judgment, as reported, the apex court has held as follows:- "48. Now, it is beyond dispute that an order of detention can be based upon one single ground. Several decisions of this Court have held that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming the requisite satisfaction for detaining the person. In paragraph 48 of the judgment, as reported, the apex court has held as follows:- "48. Now, it is beyond dispute that an order of detention can be based upon one single ground. Several decisions of this Court have held that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming the requisite satisfaction for detaining the person. In Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. it was observed that while ordinarily-speaking one act may not be sufficient to form the requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case one act may suffice. That was a case of wagon-breaking and having regard to the nature of the Act, it was held that one act is sufficient. The same principle was reiterated in Anil Dey v. State of W. B. It was a case of theft of railway signal material. Here too one act was held to be sufficient. Similarly, in Israil SK v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur. and Dharua Kanu v. State of W.B. single act of theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish-plates respectively was held sufficient to sustain the order of detention. In Saraswati Seshagiri v. State of Kerala , a case arising under COFEPOSA, a single act, viz., attempt to export a huge amount of Indian currency was held sufficient. In short, the principle appears to be this: Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of organised activity. The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon- breaking, theft of signal material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish- plates were held sufficient. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon- breaking, theft of signal material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish- plates were held sufficient. Similarly, where the person tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, it was held that such single act warrants an inference that he will repeat his activity in future and, therefore, his detention is necessary to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activity. If one looks at the acts the COFEPOSA is designed to prevent, they are all either acts of smuggling or of foreign exchange manipulation. These acts are indulged in by persons, who act in concert with other persons and quite often such activity has international ramifications. These acts are preceded by a good amount of planning and organisation. They are not like ordinary law and order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be quashed but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention. (Emphasis Supplied) 9. In Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P and others, (1994) Supp3 SCC 195, the petitioner was already in jail in connection with a murder case. The petitioner had no criminal history though there was a solitary case of broad day light murder registered against him. The argument raised before the apex court was that on the basis of that solitary case against the detenu, there could be no apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority that the detenu on being released would indulge in any such activity that would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The apex court found that there was no cogent material placed before the court or before the detaining authority to enable an inference that the detenu on being released on bail would indulge in such offence that would be a threat to public order. The apex court found that there was no cogent material placed before the court or before the detaining authority to enable an inference that the detenu on being released on bail would indulge in such offence that would be a threat to public order. The apex court, accordingly, quashed the order of detention and, while doing so, in paragraphs 5 and 6, as reported, observed as follows: "5.The question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody has had been engaging the attention of this Court since it first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, 1964 4 SCR 921 . To eschew prolixity we refrain from detailing all those cases except that of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, (1990) AIR SC 1196 wherein a three Judge Bench, after considering all the earlier relevant decisions including Rameshwar Shaw (supra) answered the question in the following words: "The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention: and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." 6. When the above principles are applied to the facts of the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. When the above principles are applied to the facts of the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Though the grounds of detention indicate the detaining authority's awareness of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody at the time of making the order of detention, the detaining authority has not brought on record any cogent material nor furnished any cogent ground in support of the averment: made in grounds of detention that if the aforesaid Surya Prakash Sharma is released on bail 'he may again indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order", (emphasis supplied), To put it differently, the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder, cannot be said to be proper and justified." 10. In Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P. and others, (1988) 4 SCC 559 , the apex court had the occasion to deal with a submission whether the detention order could be considered discriminatory on the ground of non-detention of co-accused in the same incident. Rejecting the claim of discrimination, raised on behalf of the petitioner, in paragraph 9 of the judgment, the apex court observed as follows:- "9. There is no merit whatsoever in the petitioners grievance of discrimination on the ground that the other co- accused persons have not been detained. The role of the petitioner and that of the others are not identical and the reasonable apprehension as to their future conduct must depend on the relevant facts, and circumstances which differ from individual to individual. It would have been wrong on the part of the detaining authority to take a uniform decision in this regard only on the ground that the persons concerned are all joined together as accused in a criminal case." 11. From the decisions noticed above, what is clear is that though ordinarily a solitary act may not be sufficient to sustain an order of preventive detention but where that act is of such a nature that it is reflective of, or has manifestation of, an organized criminal activity, or is so grave that it reflects the propensity of that person to repeat such an act, then even a solitary act could well be made basis for passing an order of preventive detention. 12. 12. In the instant case, we find that the incident reflected a mob activity triggered by a road accident in which a person had died. In this mob action hundreds of persons had participated but no one died. It is not the case in the grounds of detention that the petitioners had with a view to embarrass the administration planned or organized the mob action. The grounds though reflect petitioners' participation in the mob but do not indicate that the mob was organized by the petitioners or that there was anything distinguishable done by the petitioners in that mob action than what was done by other participants. When a mob reacts, the action is triggered by sudden surge of emotions which become uncontrollable. Largely, mob actions are unorganized and therefore by mere participation in a mob the propensity of its participant that he would repeat such act cannot ordinarily be inferred. Had it been a case in the grounds of detention that the petitioners had organized the mob action with a view to disrupt public order or had committed some such act which distinguishes their case from the rest and is suggestive of their mental make up or propensity to repeat such act, things would have been different. But here the petitioners were mere participants who, by chance, were identified along with twenty to thirty more persons though hundreds of persons had participated. Moreover, it is not a case of communal violence. Communal violence stand on a different footing inasmuch as it reflects upon the mental predisposition of its participant. Thus, looking to the facts of the case as also that the petitioners have no previous criminal history, we are of the considered view that there is no cogent material on the basis of which, based on a solitary incident of the nature cited in the grounds of detention, satisfaction could be drawn that the petitioners on being released on bail would indulge in activity that would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As it is well settled that to preventively detain a person, who is already in judicial custody, satisfaction, amongst others, is also to be recorded on the basis of cogent material that the detenu on being released on bail is likely to indulge in activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, in absence of existence of such material, the preventive detention of the petitioners is not justified and is liable to be set aside. 13. Consequently, all the three habeas corpus petitions are allowed. The detention orders, dated 16th April, 2019, passed by District Magistrate, Etah against the aforesaid three petitioners are hereby quashed. The petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case. There is no order as to costs.