JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking the following reliefs: "(a) the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-9) and the Appellate Authority (Annexure-11) may kindly be declared as illegal, unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional and the same be quashed and set aside. (b) the respondents may be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits including back wages and other allowances attached to his post. (c) the petitioner may kindly be granted any such other relief which this Hon'ble Court may consider fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case with a view to protect and safeguard the fundamental and constitutional rights of the humble petitioner. (d) cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded in favour of the humble petitioner." 2. The petitioner was a member of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) since 1st May, 1986 recruited on the post of Constable. While the petitioner was posted at Jahanbad (Bihar) with his Battalion, he was suspended vide order dated 13th July, 2001 by the respondent No. 3 while exercising the power conferred under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. The petitioner was thereupon served the memorandum of charges on 20th August, 2001. While the petitioner was posted at Jahanbad (Bihar) with his Battalion, he was suspended vide order dated 13th July, 2001 by the respondent No. 3 while exercising the power conferred under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. The petitioner was thereupon served the memorandum of charges on 20th August, 2001. The charges levelled against the petitioner reads as under: ^^en&1 esa vfHk;qDr ij vkjksi yxk;k x;k gS fd mlus fnukad 01-07-2001 dks dEiuh dekaMj dh vuqifLFkfr esa 'kjkc dk lsou fd;k vkSj dEiuh dekaMj ds vkokl ds vUnj ?kql dj rksM+&QksM+ dh tks fd fjŒiqŒcyŒ ds fu;eksa rFkk vuq'kklu ds fo:} gSA en&2 esa fnukad 05-04-2001 dks M~;wVh ij IykVwu ys tk jgs mifujhf{kd thou jke ;kno ds lkFk xkyh&xykSp fd;k vkSj le>kus dk Á;kl djus ij xksyh ekjus dh /kedh nh tks fd fjŒiqŒcyŒ ds fu;eksa o vuq'kklu ds fo:} gSA en&3 esa vfHk;qDr ij vkjksi yxk;k x;k gS fd fnukad 01-07-2001 dks 'kjkc ihdj dEiuh dekaMj dks dk;kZy; VhŒlhŒ,pŒ,eŒ dks cksfDlax eksj vkSj le>kus dk Á;kl djus ij tku ls ekj Mkyus ds mn~ns'; ls Hkkxdj jkbQy mBk fy;k ftls ckn esa dEiuh ds vU; tokuksa }kjk Nhu fy;k x;kA bl Ádkj dh dk;Zokgh fjŒiqŒcyŒ vf/kfu;e 1949 dh /kkjk 11¼1½ ds v/khu xEHkhj vijk/k gSA en&4 esa vfHk;qDr flikgh eghiky flag ij vkjksi yxk;k x;k gS fd mlus fnukad 01-07-2001 dks vukf/kd`r O;fDr;ksa ds lkFk cSBdj M~;wVh ds nkSjku 'kjkc dk lsou fd;k vkSj vc mls fpfdRlh; ijh{k.k gsrq ÁkFkfed LokLF; dsUæ dqFkZ ¼fcgkj½ ys tk;k jgk Fkk rks xkM+h esa cSBus ls badkj fd;kA xkM+h esa cSBk nsus ds ckn mrj Hkkxus dk ,oa dEiuh ds vU; tokuksa o dEiuh dek.Mj ij geys dk Á;kl fd;k] vc fpfdRldh; ijh{k.k ftlesa dh og 'kjkc ih;k gqvk ik;k x;kA rks mDr flikgh us mxz :i /kkj.k dj fy;k] ftlds ifj.kkeLo:i mls flfoy iqfyl ds lqiqnZ djuk iM+kA iqfyl }kjk mDr dkfeZd dks jkr Hkj Fkkus esa cUn j[kk x;kA bl Ádkj mDr flikgh }kjk fd;k x;k vijk/k ds fjŒiqŒcyŒ vf/kfu;e 1949 dh /kkjk 11¼1½ ds rgr ,d n.Muh; vijk/k gSA** 3. After conducting the enquiry, charge nos. 3 and 4 stood proved and charge No. 2 was not proved. The enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner on 13th October, 2001 and the petitioner replied to the same on 17th October, 2001. The respondents passed the order of removal of petitioner from service on 21st October, 2001. After conducting the enquiry, charge nos. 3 and 4 stood proved and charge No. 2 was not proved. The enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner on 13th October, 2001 and the petitioner replied to the same on 17th October, 2001. The respondents passed the order of removal of petitioner from service on 21st October, 2001. Being aggrieved by the order of removal, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 2-appellate authority. The Appellate Authority affirmed the order of removal dated 21st October, 2001 vide his order dated on 20th June, 2002. 4. Counsel for the petitioner-Mr. Madhukar Tiwari submits that there was a contradiction between charge No. 1 and other charges as it has been shown in the charge No. 1 that the petitioner entered in the house of company Commander while being intoxicated in the absence of the company commander and caused the act of indiscipline in question. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that either the act happened in the absence or in the presence of the company commander there is a contradiction in the charges. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the second notice given to the petitioner was not in accordance with law and did not fulfill the requirement of law. Counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner was not given copy of the complaint which was necessary for the petitioner to take proper defence in the matter thus, depriving the petitioner from his rights of natural justice to prepare a proper defence. Counsel for petitioner also submitted that the respondents have not clarified the exact details of the police custody of the petitioner as it would have corroborated the fact that charge level was not correct. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that during the enquiry the petitioner was not permitted to make the cross-examination thus, depriving him of his valuable rights to try to demolish the prosecution case. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the punishment has been awarded while invoking Rule 10 and 11 which prescribed for minor punishment whereas the penalty of major punishment has been awarded. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that at best even if the petitioner was intoxicated then also the punishment awarded is grossly disproportionate to the Act attributed to him. 5. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that at best even if the petitioner was intoxicated then also the punishment awarded is grossly disproportionate to the Act attributed to him. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment in the matter of State of Punjab vs. Dewan Chuni Lal, AIR 1970 SC 2086 . The relevant paras 19 and 25 reads as under: "19. In our view the High Court arrived at the correct conclusion and on the facts of this case it is impossible to hold that the respondent had been given reasonable opportunity of conducting his defence before the enquiry officer. From what we have stated it is clear that if the enquiry officer had summoned at least those witnesses who were available and who could have thrown some light on the reports made against the respondent the report might well have been different. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that charges based on the reports for the years 1941 and 1942 should not have been leveled against the respondent. 25. In our opinion the above observation regarding the limit of the right to cross-examine dissociated from the context in which it was made cannot help the appellant. Although the case is governed by Art. 311 as it stood prior to its amendment in 1963 the respondent could not be deprived of an effective right to make representation against the action of dismissal. In our opinion, refusal of the right to examine witnesses who had made general remarks against his character and were available for examination at the inquiry amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action." 6. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 (SC) 471 . The relevant paras 15 and 18 reads as under: "15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd Amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position. 18. We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter." 7. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Khem Chand vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 (V45 C 48). The relevant paras 13, 19 and 22 reads as under: "13. Clause (1) of Art. 311 is quite explicit and protects government servants of the kinds referred to therein by providing that they cannot be dismissed, or removed or reduced in rank by a lesser authority than that which appointed them. The relevant paras 13, 19 and 22 reads as under: "13. Clause (1) of Art. 311 is quite explicit and protects government servants of the kinds referred to therein by providing that they cannot be dismissed, or removed or reduced in rank by a lesser authority than that which appointed them. Likewise clause (2) protects government servants against being dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. As has been explained by this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (A), the expressions, dismissed and reduced in rank are technical words taken from the service rules where they are used to denote the three major categories of punishments. 19. To summarise the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes: (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges leveled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence. (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant. In short the substance of the protection provided by rules, like r. 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 so as to give a statutory protection to the government servants and has now been incorporated in Art. 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constitutional safeguard. 22. It is on the facts quite clear that when Shri J.B. Tandon concluded his enquiry and definitely found the appellant guilty of practically all the charges he for the first time suggested that the punishment of dismissal should be the proper form of punishment in this case. 22. It is on the facts quite clear that when Shri J.B. Tandon concluded his enquiry and definitely found the appellant guilty of practically all the charges he for the first time suggested that the punishment of dismissal should be the proper form of punishment in this case. Shri J.B. Tandon was not, however, the competent authority to dismiss the appellant and, therefore, he could only make a report to the Deputy Commissioner who was the person competent to dismiss the appellant. When the Deputy Commissioner accepted the report and confirmed the opinion that the punishment of dismissal should be inflicted on the appellant, it was on that stage being reached that the appellant was entitled to have a further opportunity given to him to show cause why that particular punishment should not be inflicted on him. There is, therefore, no getting away from the fact that Art. 311(2) has not been fully complied with and the appellant has not had the benefit of all the constitutional protection and accordingly his dismissal cannot be supported. We, therefore, accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge and decree the appellant's suit by making a declaration that the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 17 December 1951, purporting to dismiss the appellant from service was inoperative and that the appellant was a member of the service at the date of the institution of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. The appellant will get costs throughout in all courts. He must pay all court fees that may be due from him. Under order XIV, Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules were direct that the appellants could be paid his fees which we assess at Rs. 250." 8. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Ved Prakash vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 914 . The relevant para 13 reads as under: "13. The finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was fair and proper in the light of its own finding that the enquiry officer failed to summon the necessary witnesses and rejected the request of the appellant for challenging the witnesses could not be stated to be correct. The relevant para 13 reads as under: "13. The finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was fair and proper in the light of its own finding that the enquiry officer failed to summon the necessary witnesses and rejected the request of the appellant for challenging the witnesses could not be stated to be correct. On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side of the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K. Bagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi Chand, MW-5 an Accountant of M/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has deposed about the appellant abusing Durg Singh who according to the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Union while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union. MWs-3 and 4 are stated to have corroborated the evidence of MW-2. MW-5 is the only independent witness examined on the side of the management. It is seen from the judgment of the Labour Court relating to the merits of the case that MW-5 who has deposed about the challans Exts. M-7 and M-8 having been returned to the person who accompanied him from the maintenance department had not supported the management that the appellant abused Durg Singh or any other person within the premises of the factory. It is also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that though the appellant had produced before the Enquiry Officer 5 sheets of papers with the signatures of about 100 workmen of the factory in support of the statement that the appellant had not abused anyone in the factory during the course of his service and the management had produced Exts. M-6, a list of 90 persons before the Enquiry Officer, he had not called any of those persons to ascertain the truth regarding the alleged abuse of Durg Singh and S.K. Bagga by the appellant. It is also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that the appellant was not given a list of the management's witnesses before the commencement of the domestic enquiry. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Labour Court that the Enquiry Officer had not acted properly in the proceedings and that he had not given full opportunity to the appellant as required by law does not call for any interference. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Labour Court that the Enquiry Officer had not acted properly in the proceedings and that he had not given full opportunity to the appellant as required by law does not call for any interference. The charge levelled against the appellant is not a serious one and it is not known how the charge even if proved would result in any much less total loss of confidence of the management in the appellant as the management would have it in the charge. It was argued in the Labour Court that there was no previous adverse remark against the appellant. There is nothing record to show that any previous adverse remark against the appellant had been taken into consideration by the management for awarding the extreme penalty of dismissal from service to the appellant even if he had in fact abused in filthy language Durg Singh and S.K. Bagga. We are therefore of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him. We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances the punishment of dismissal to the employee and that victimization or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the management in awarding the extreme punishment of dismissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of the factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellant's service is invalid and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service. The appeal is allowed accordingly with costs quantified at Rs. 1,000. The writ petition is dismissed without costs." 9. Counsel for the respondent - Mr. Gaurav Jain submits that the charge sheet was given under Rule 11(1) which entitles the respondent to award the major punishment. Counsel for the respondent further submits that notice was given to the petitioner which entitled him to file reply and the petitioner filed a reply in pursuance of the notice which confirms to the parameters of natural justice. Counsel for the respondent submits that if the petitioner choose not to make any cross-examination then it was up to him. Counsel for the respondent further submits that notice was given to the petitioner which entitled him to file reply and the petitioner filed a reply in pursuance of the notice which confirms to the parameters of natural justice. Counsel for the respondent submits that if the petitioner choose not to make any cross-examination then it was up to him. Counsel for the respondent submits that the respondents are Disciplined Armed Force and any kind of in discipline particularly the facts in which the petitioner has been charged has to be viewed seriously as it affects the moral of the force as well as the general discipline. Counsel for the respondents has taken this court to the evidence rendered by Musyan Rajja PW-1, Birsa Gudia PW-2, Bhagchand PW-3, Jaikaran Singh PW-4, Jeevan Ram Yadav PW-5, Ayub A.N. PW-6, Devraj Singh PW-7, D. Deka PW-8, Chittarlal PW-9, Mukesh Singh PW-10, Vinod Kumar PW-11, Ratiram Rath PW-12, Ram Singh PW-13. Counsel for the respondent submits that there is consistency in the aforementioned evidence rendered by these persons and the act of petitioner to have assaulted the fellow colleagues in an intoxicated position in the premises in question was proved beyond reasonable doubt. 10. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon judgments in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Diler Singh, 2016 (13) SCC 71 . The relevant paras 21 and 26 reads as under: "21. We respectfully agree with the said view and opine that under the scheme of the Act, in exercise of power Under Section 11(1) of the Act punishment of dismissal can be imposed. As is seen from the impugned order, the High Court, to reverse the conclusion of the first appellate Court, has extensively quoted from the decision of the Calcutta High Court rendered in Akhilesh Kumar (supra). Be it stated that the charges levelled against the delinquent officer therein was the same. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, analysing the Act, especially Section 10(m) and various clauses of the CRPF Manual, came to hold thus: 8. It is an admitted position from the factual matrix of the departmental proceedings that the writ Petitioner/delinquent was posted in a camp. As per Rule of such positing in a camp/lines the concerned personnel is not free to move as per his choice even during the period when he is not on actual duty. It is an admitted position from the factual matrix of the departmental proceedings that the writ Petitioner/delinquent was posted in a camp. As per Rule of such positing in a camp/lines the concerned personnel is not free to move as per his choice even during the period when he is not on actual duty. The discipline of a camp is completely different in comparison with the posting of an individual in an office and or in other places outside of the camp. It is true, by rotation of 8 hours duty is allotted to the respective personnel who are attached to the camp and staying in the camp but that does not mean that when he will not be in active duty, he would be allowed to go outside of the camp without prior permission. From the relevant provision of Clauses 7.2 and 6.23 as already quoted it appears that absence without leave or permission from the camp would invite initiation of judicial trial of the delinquent if there is a serious and grave situation or otherwise a departmental enquiry. Hence, finding of the learned trial judge that as the delinquent/writ Petitioner was not on active duty, the aforesaid clauses got no effect, is not appealing us for its applicability to quash the order of dismissal. However, from the aforesaid provision of maintaining discipline while a personnel is posted in a camp which requires a prior permission to leave the camp even for a short period from the Company Commander, we are of the view that the charge Under Article No. 1 was proved. Now, on the question of quantum of punishment, namely, dismissal from service as imposed on such charge, we are of the view that as under Clause 6.23 there is a provision for initiation of the departmental enquiry and as per decision only a minor punishment could be imposed and as Section 10(m) of CRPF Act provides the minor punishment issue in that field, we are of the view that dismissal being a major punishment should not have been passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 9. 9. Considering all the issues, we are quashing the order of dismissal as well as the order of confirmation of such by the Appellate Authority and remanding the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority under the service Regulation of the delinquent to decide the quantum of punishment as would be commensurating with the charge of misconduct as admitted, which invites only minor punishment. 26. We are inclined to think so as a member of the disciplined force, the Respondent was expected to follow the rules, have control over his mind and passion, guard his instincts and feelings and not allow his feelings to fly in fancy. It is not a mild deviation which human nature would grant some kind of lenience. It is a conduct in public which has compelled the authority to think and, rightly so, that the behavior is totally in-disciplined. The Respondent, if we allow ourselves to say so, has given indecent burial to self-control, diligence and strength of will-power. A disciplined man is expected, to quote a few lines from Mathew Arnold: "We cannot kindle when we will The fire which in the heart resides The spirit bloweth and is still In mystery our soul abides: But tasks in hours of insight will Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled." Though the context is slightly different, yet we have felt, it is worth reproducing." 11. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Vinod Kumar and Another vs. Union of India and Others, 2011 (14) SCC 306, The relevant paras 10 and 11 reads as under: "10. The High Court undoubtedly did not deal with the matter elaborately, however, we do not see any reason to interfere with the order of punishment. We cannot ignore the fact that the incident occurred in the operational area of Jammu and Kashmir wherein the militant groups are always on the look out to inflict heavy casualties on the security forces deeply in trail and adjoining areas. The inquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with law. We do not find that there has been violation of any statutory provision or principles of natural justice. 11. The inquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with law. We do not find that there has been violation of any statutory provision or principles of natural justice. 11. Considering all the circumstances, particularly the facts that the Appellants had been members of the disciplined force; place of incident; and the manner in which the Appellants committed the delinquency, it cannot be held that punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate to the charges proved against them In such a fact-situation, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the orders impugned." 12. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Central Industrial Security Force vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 (SC) 200 . The relevant para 8 reads as under: "8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 , this Court held as follows: 7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory Regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous considerations. B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil." 13. After hearing counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the material available on record, this court is of the opinion that the respondents are Disciplined Forces and the enquiry has been done strictly in accordance with law and the charges levelled are of very serious nature. The enquiry officer has examined the thirteen independent witnesses who have consistently deposed substantiating the fact of the charges proved. This court finds that the act of insubordination, intoxication and causing hurt to the colleagues as proved are very serious issues for a personnel who is otherwise armed and uniformed and are doing critical duties of law and order. The discipline in such force has to be maintained. The precedent law is consistent that the factual matrix of the discipline enquiry need not be revisited in writ jurisdiction. The precedent law cited by the respondent is applicable. No cause of interference is made out. 14. The writ petition is dismissed.