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2019 DIGILAW 2288 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Ram Singh

2019-08-26

GOVERDHAN BARDHAR, SABINA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Goverdhan Bardhar, J. 1. State has filed the present appeal challenging the order dated 11.01.2013 passed by the trial Court whereby the accused respondents were acquitted of the charges framed against them. 2. FIR No. 121 dated 28.04.2011 (Ex. P42) was registered on the basis of written report (Ex. P7) by the complainant Kalyan Sahay s/o. Hardevat (PW8) at Police Station Laxmangarh, District Alwar under section 460 IPC. The case of complainant, as per the written report (Ex. P7), in brief, was that on 27.04.2011 he was on duty at Tijara but in the night he came to Alwar. In the morning at about 6:00 a.m. his grandson informed him on telephone that his grandmother had been murdered by some miscreants in the night. Upon this, he went home and found that his wife Rukmani who was sleeping on the roof had been murdered by some miscreants by slitting her throat. In the room downstairs, one pot was affixed in the wall for its use as a locker and out of the pot, gold bangles weighing 8 tolla, silver waist weighing half kilogram, silver necklace weighing half kilogram, anklet etc. were taken away and Rs. 1500/- in cash was also stolen from another room. Some jewelry of his son's wife Kamlesh had also been stolen. 3. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the respondents. 4. Learned trial court vide impugned judgment/order dated 11.01.2013 has ordered the acquittal of the accused respondents. Hence, the present appeal by the State against the order of acquittal. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that despite evidence to prove the charges, the accused respondents have been acquitted for the offence under Sections 302 read with Section 120B, 302/34, 460, 380, 411 IPC and Section 3(2)(vi) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 by discarding all the evidence, which includes, recovery of blood stained pant of accused Ram Singh and ornaments at the instance of accused apart from the weapon used for causing incident. The weapon and pant recovered from the accused were blood stained and containing human blood but only for the reason that it was not disclosing blood group, the Court below discarded the said evidence. The other evidence has also been discarded, which strongly make a chain of circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. 6. The weapon and pant recovered from the accused were blood stained and containing human blood but only for the reason that it was not disclosing blood group, the Court below discarded the said evidence. The other evidence has also been discarded, which strongly make a chain of circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the accused/respondents opposed the appeal and supported the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court. 7. We have heard the learned State Counsel, the learned counsel for the accused respondents and have gone through the record available on the file carefully. 8. The prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. 9. Learned trial court while ordering the acquittal of the respondents has taken into consideration the fact that there was no eye witness with regard to murder of Rukmani. There were several missing links in the prosecution story. The prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. At the instance of respondent-Pinki, recovery of axe (tanchiya) was made from an open place. Complainant Kalyan Sahay (PW8) had lodged the FIR by placing reliance on the statement of PW3-Vishal Kumar Baswal. However, PW3-Vishal Kumar Baswal admitted in his cross-examination that he did not tell the police that Ram Singh used to come to his 'Mausi'. PW3 further admitted that when he saw the dead body of his grand-mother, there was jewelry on her body and no weapon was lying in the nearby place. 10. Complainant Kalyan Sahay (PW8) admitted that his family members namely; Vishal, Harsh and Kamlesh did not have any doubt on the accused who were present in the Court. PW8 admitted that there was jewelry on the dead body of deceased. PW8 further admitted that as and when he used to come his village, he had neither seen Ram Singh resident of Khohra coming and going from home nor he was told by anyone in this regard. Written report (Ex. P7) was not prepared by him and the same was got written from some other person. PW8 further admitted that at the time of death, the deceased on her person had silver anklets in the legs, gold earrings, gold bangles etc. 11. Written report (Ex. P7) was not prepared by him and the same was got written from some other person. PW8 further admitted that at the time of death, the deceased on her person had silver anklets in the legs, gold earrings, gold bangles etc. 11. PW15 Sitaram posted as Constable deposed that on all the 'memos' which were prepared by the police, he and Nahar Singh (PW17) were the witnesses and no independent witnesses were called by the police. The statement of this witness is corroborated by PW17-Nahar Singh. 12. PW22-Manno Ram Meena, Investigating Officer admits that axe (tanchiya) was recovered from the room used as fodder storage but no fodder content was found on the axe (tanchiya) and the axe (tanchiya) was recovered from the place where easy access of all could not be denied. No foot moulds were taken from the place of occurrence. 13. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002 (1) RCR (Criminal) 748, has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. 14. Similarly, in Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, 2011 (9) SCC 479 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: "It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed". 15. In view of above discussion, the trial court has taken a reasonable view on the basis of the evidence on record. Thus, interference of this Court in the order of acquittal is not warranted. 16. In the result the appeal by the State is without any substance and accordingly dismissed.