JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. G.P. Bhowmick, the learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. P. Kalita, the learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. A.K. Gutpa, the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. By this appeal under section 299 of the Succession Act, 1925, the appellant has challenged the judgment dated 6.2.2012 passed by the learned District Judge, Tinsukia in T.(P) Suit No. 24/2003, thereby dismissing the suit instituted by the appellant for granting of letter of administration in connection with the Will dated 16.3.1995 executed by Baleswar Prasad Gupta, who died on 24.11.1995. 3. The brief facts of the case is that on the death of Baleswar Prasad Gupta, he left behind 5 sons and 1 daughter, namely, (i) Saligram Gupta, (ii) Jagadish Gupta, (iii) Jagamath Gupta, (iv) Ganesh Gutpa, (v) Sanjay Gupta, and (vi) Smt. Rajkishori Devi. In the written objection filed by the opposite party No. 5, namely, Sanjay Gupta, he had disclosed that Baleswar Prasad Gupta had nine other successors and legal heirs, namely, (i) Smt. Thakuri Devi, (ii) Smt. Kamla Devi Gupta, (iii) Smt. Premlata Gupta, (iv) Rajesh Prasad Gupta, (v) Dilip Kumar Gupta, (vi) Ashok Kumar Gupta, (vii) Ajay Kumar Gupta, (viii) Amit Kumar Gupta, and (ix) Mukesh Prasad Gupta. While, the testator, namely, Baleswar Prasad Gupta was having a Rolling Shutter factory, he had engaged the appellant-propounder, namely, Sri Pundev Sharma as a Mistry. It is projected that for the housing of the propounder, the testator had allowed him to construct a room on the roof of the second floor. Accordingly, a room measuring 65.5 ft. × 30 ft. was constructed by the propounder on the second floor of the building situated over a plot of land covered by Dag No. 3020/3021 of P.P. No. 1669 situated at Ward No. 13, GNB Road, Tinsukia. In course of time, the testator died on 24.11.1995. It was projected that while cleaning the office room of the deceased testator on 12.1.2003, a Will was discovered inside an envelope and coming to know about the said Will, only on 12.1.2003, the propounder filed a probate petition before the court of the learned District Judge, Tinsukia, which was numbered as Misc. (P) Case No. 14/2001 and on contest, the said probate case was converted to Title (P) Suit No. 24/2003. The respondent Nos. 2 to 5 herein had contested the probate case. The respondent Nos.
(P) Case No. 14/2001 and on contest, the said probate case was converted to Title (P) Suit No. 24/2003. The respondent Nos. 2 to 5 herein had contested the probate case. The respondent Nos. 2 and 4 had filed their joint written statement and the respondent Nos. 3 and 5 had filed their separate written statement. 4. On the basis of the pleadings, following issues were framed by the trial court: 1. Whether the petition is maintainable in law and on facts? 2. Whether the Will dated 16.3.1995 is the last Will and testament of deceased Baleswar Prasad Gupta? 3. Whether the Will under challenge is a false and fabricated document? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree of probate, as prayed for? 5. To what other relief, the parties are entitled? 5. In support of the case, while the appellant examined 3 witnesses including himself as PW 1, one Sri K.P. Agarwalla, the learned counsel, who had prepared the Will, was examined as PW 2 and Sri Bir Bahadur Sharma, one of the attending witness of the Will was examined as PW 3. 6. The respondents examined one Jyotish Pandey as DW 1, who is stated to be the priest by profession and was engaged in the house of Baleswar Prasad Gupta. The respondent No. 4 examined himself as DW 2. 7. In this context, the learned trial court took up issue Nos. 1 to 3 together. The learned trial court did not find any infirmity insofar as the verification under sections 280 and 281 of the Succession Act, 1925. It was further held that the verification under section 281 of the Succession Act was directory but not mandatory. Referring to the cross-examination of PW 1, the learned trial court held that the cross-examination of PW 1 revealed that he had discovered the Will after about 6/7 months back after the death of the testator but he could not explain the reason for the delay in filing the case. The propounder admitted that he had filed an affidavit in probate case, i.e., Misc. (P) Case No. 14/2001 instituted by Saligram Gupta stating that the propounder had not informed the court about the Will executed in his favour. Therefore, the learned trial court disbelieved the case projected by the propounder that the Will was discovered after 6/7 years after the death of the testator.
(P) Case No. 14/2001 instituted by Saligram Gupta stating that the propounder had not informed the court about the Will executed in his favour. Therefore, the learned trial court disbelieved the case projected by the propounder that the Will was discovered after 6/7 years after the death of the testator. As per the evidence of propounder, he had stated that he had discovered the Will in a closed envelope in a rack wherein files, diaries, etc., are kept and after ? days of such discovery, he got the Will read over by a student of Hindi High School, who had explained the contents to him. However, the propounder stated in his cross-examination could not state the name and other particulars of the said student and said student was also not examined. Hence, the said part of the evidence was found questionable by the learned trial court. The learned trial court further noticed the fact that there was no material on record that the testator had not maintained relationship with his sons, daughters, grand children, etc., or that his legal heirs did not look after him during his life time. Therefore, when the testator had bequeathed RCC Building in favour of his sons by executing a Will, there was no way that after sometime the testator executed another Will in respect of a small room at the roof of the 2nd floor of the building in the name of the propounder by keeping all his legal heirs in dark. Taking note of the presence of other legal heirs, the trial court held that non-impleadment of 9 additional legal heirs of the testator, resulted in the case being bad for non-joinder of said parties. In this connection, the learned trial court had relied on the case of G. Gopal v. G. Bhaskar, (2008) 10 SCC 489 . 8. The learned trial court by relying on the case of Kamakhya Prasad Gupta v. Jibon Lal Gupta, (2010) 6 Gau LR 467 and taking note of the statement made by the propounder in his cross-examination that he came to know about the Will after 6/7 months of the death of the testator, the probate petition, filed on 4.3.2003 held to be barred by limitation having not being instituted within the 3 years from the date of knowledge. 9.
9. The learned trial court had doubted the physical and mental soundness of the testator and by relying on the evidence of respondent No. 4 took note that the testator was in bed-ridden condition and not in a condition to move due to suffering from brain cancer, stone kidney for which he was under medical treatment for about V/2 years prior to his death and he could not even recognize the respondent No. 4. On discussing the entire matter, all the three issues were decided against the appellant and resultantly, the probate petition was rejected. 10. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has pressed all the grounds of the appeal. He has submitted that it was the pleaded case of the appellant that the Will was discovered on 12.1.2003, which was about 7/8 years after the death of the testator. Therefore, it is submitted that, according to him, it appeared that the discovery of Will was 6/7 years after the death of the testator, which was incorrectly recorded as “6/7 months” back, by the learned trial court. Hence, the said part of the cross-examination ought not to have influenced the learned court below in its decision. It is submitted that the learned trial court had viewed the Will with suspicion while appreciating the evidence in the case. In this case, it is submitted that after the death of the testator, the factory in question was closed and the learned trial court had misread the evidence to disbelieve that how could the appellant discover the Will on 12.1.2003 as he had left service of the factory after 8 months from the death of the testator. In this connection, it is submitted that the learned trial court had misread and misconstrued the statements made in the petition of probate and wrongly understood the facts as if the Will was discovered from the factory premises, whereas it was the case of the appellant that the Will was found in the office of the testator situated at GNB Road, Tinsukia at Sabita Market, wherein the appellant was working. It is further submitted that as per the ratio laid down in the case of Krishna Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma, (2009) 11 SCC 537 , it is well settled that article 137 did not apply in a case for grant of probate.
It is further submitted that as per the ratio laid down in the case of Krishna Kumar Sharma v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma, (2009) 11 SCC 537 , it is well settled that article 137 did not apply in a case for grant of probate. In that context, it is submitted that in the probate petition, the appellant had explained the delay by projecting that the Will was discovered only on 12.1.2003 and, as such, it constitutes sufficient explanation for condoning the delay in terms of the decision of this court in the case of Kamakhya Prasad Gupta (supra). Hence, it is submitted that the learned trial court had erred in law as well as on facts in rejecting the petition for probate and the said prayer is liable to be granted by allowing this appeal. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent in support of the impugned judgment has submitted that in categorical terms the propounder as PW 1 had admitted that he knew about the Will after 6/7 months from the death of the testator and that as per the evidence of DW 1 and DW.2, the executor had remained in bed-ridden condition for more than one year prior to his death and, as such, the appellant was not able to dispel the existence of suspicious circumstances that executor of the Will was not in good and sound health to prepare the Will. The said Will was found 7 years after the death of the testator, which would lead to dis-inheritance of the legal heirs of the testator and it would also curtail the rights accrued to the concerned parties in Misc. (P) Case No. 14/2001. 12. In view of the above submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, two points of determination would arise before this court in the case, which are as follows: (1) Whether the provision of article 137 of the Limitation Act applied in a case for grant of probate? And (2) Whether the learned trial court had erred in law in rejecting the application for grant of probate? 13. The point of determination No. 1 is taken up first.
And (2) Whether the learned trial court had erred in law in rejecting the application for grant of probate? 13. The point of determination No. 1 is taken up first. It is seen that in the case of Krishan Kumar Sharma (supra), the hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 9 had referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, AIR 1983 Bom 268 and in para 16 of the said judgment was quoted: “16. Rejecting Mr. Dalapatrai's contention, I summarise my conclusions, thus:— (a) under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made; (b) the assumption that under article 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted; (c) such an application is for the court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed; (d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years form the date of he deceased's death. (e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion; (f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and (g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates.” 14. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur, (2008) 8 SCC 463 was referred. On a perusal of the said case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), it is seen that while pargraph 16 of the case of Basudev Daulatram (supra) was quoted in Krishan Kumar Sharma (supra), but the effective explanation contained in pargraph 17 of the judgment of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), appears to have been left out. Para 17 of the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) reads as follows: “17.
Para 17 of the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) reads as follows: “17. The conclusion ‘b’ is not correct while the conclusion ‘c’ is the correct position of law.” The present appeal involves the issue of an application for grant of probate. But, the facts involved in the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) is that on an earlier occasion, a petition being probate petition No. 22/1996 was filed by Nirman Jeet Kaur (respondent No. 5). The said petition was withdrawn on 9.8.1999 and thereafter, the petitioner therein filed an application for grant of letter of administration on 7.8.2002, which was well within the period of 3 years. In this context, the hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), had held that the proposition (b) held by the hon'ble Bombay High Court was not correct, meaning thereby that the period of limitation was required to be covered under article 137 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of filing of probate petition. 15. This court in the case of Kamakhya Prasad Gupta (supra) had followed the ratio laid down in the case of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra), and had held that if there was any delay in filing the application for grant of probate, is required to be supported by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was further held that where an application for seeking probate was made within the period which is beyond 3 years, the application is barred by limitation and ought not to have been entertained without condoning the delay, as may be done in the given case under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 16. As stated above, in the cross-examination of PW 1, the appellant, i.e., the propounder of the Will has stated that “after 617 months of the date of Basudev Prasad Gupta, I discovered the Will in a close envelope but…… I have not produced the said envelope before the court”. He had further stated that he had filed the case in the year 2003 but he could not explain the reason for delay in filing the case and that he knew that Saligram Gupta had filed a probate case after the death of Baleswar Prasad Gupta. 17.
He had further stated that he had filed the case in the year 2003 but he could not explain the reason for delay in filing the case and that he knew that Saligram Gupta had filed a probate case after the death of Baleswar Prasad Gupta. 17. Under the circumstances, it is not open to this court at the appellate stage to examine on the basis of an oral submission that whether or not there was any fault with the recording of the cross-examination by the learned trial court. In the opinion of this court, it would have to be deemed that the cross-examination of PW 1 was correctly recorded otherwise the appellant would have refused to sign the cross-examination, which is found to be type-written. Hence, the learned trial court is found to have correctly appreciated the issue of limitation and no infirmity is found in rejection of the probate petition on the ground of being barred by limitation. 18. As regards the point of determination No. 2 is concerned, it is seen that the respondent No. 1 had been unable to adduce any evidence to prove that the testator was bed-ridden on the date when the Will was executed. The Doctor, who providing the treatment was not examined. In this case, Jyotish Pandey, who was examined as DW 1 was not a party to the suit and moreover, he was not a proper witness, who could have given a better evidence for illness of the testator and the evidence of the said witness, would make the evidence of respondent No. 5 quite questionable being contrary to the provision of order XVIII, rule 3A, CPC, which requires that the parties must appear before other witnesses. Moreover, although an effort was made to project the existence of a prior Will and a reference to the proceeding of Misc.(P) Case No. 14/2001 was made, the respondent did not prove the same by any documentary evidence about the existence of previous Will. Therefore, the contents of the said prior Will is not known. 19. Nonetheless, on a perusal of the Will in question in original, which is available on record, it is seen that the signature of the testator was originally in ink pen, which has been over-written and/or super-imposed by a writing with a ball pen. The Will is of two pages, but the papers are not similar to each other.
19. Nonetheless, on a perusal of the Will in question in original, which is available on record, it is seen that the signature of the testator was originally in ink pen, which has been over-written and/or super-imposed by a writing with a ball pen. The Will is of two pages, but the papers are not similar to each other. PW.2, i.e., the advocate, who had drafted the Will had offered an explanation in this regard that due to shortage of cartridge, two different cartridges were used. However, there is no explanation that why the original signature appearing in fountain pen had been over-written with a writing in ball pen. The same, according to this court, is the existence of a suspicious circumstance. Moreover, as per the contents of the Will, it has been mentioned in paragraph 2 of the said Will that he had confirmed the rightship of the premises given in the Will by stating that — “I have confirmed this rightship to the said Sri Pundev Sharma for his own”. The relevant part of para 2 of the Will is quoted below: “…That by this indenture, I do hereby declare that after completion of the first floor and second floor of the said building, the said Sri Pundev Sharma has been shifted to the roof of the second floor of the RCC Building aforesaid with the right of ownership of the said floor. That I have confirmed this rightship to the said Pundev Sharma for his own. It is further declared that said Pundev Sharma shall be entitled to use and enjoy the said floor measuring 65'-5? length and 30'0? wide according to his own choice without any disturbance, interruption by me or/and my heirs, successors, legal representatives or/and any other persons claiming through or under me.” 20. Therefore, although this court is not inclined to accept the findings recorded by the learned trial court about the physical and mental soundness of Baleswar Prasad Gupta, the testator, to the effect that he was in bed-ridden and he was suffering from brain cancer and stone kidney and under medical treatment for 11/2 years prior to his death.
Therefore, although this court is not inclined to accept the findings recorded by the learned trial court about the physical and mental soundness of Baleswar Prasad Gupta, the testator, to the effect that he was in bed-ridden and he was suffering from brain cancer and stone kidney and under medical treatment for 11/2 years prior to his death. However, in view of the categorical statement made by PW 1 in his cross-examination that he did not know what was written in Ext.1 (i) and Ext.1 (ii), which is nothing but the signatures of the testator on the Will, this court is unable to accept that those signatures at Ext.1 (i) and Ext. 1 (ii) were proved by the appellant-propounder of the Will. Moreover, on finding that the said signatures, i.e., Ext.1 (i) and Ext.1 (ii) were originally made by ink pen and thereafter, over-written by a writing with a ball pen, the same is sufficient to indicate that suspicious circumstances existed in the execution of the Will in question, which could not be effectively dispelled by the appellant-propounder. 21. Therefore, although for different reasons, but the decision of the learned trial court on all the issues, by which the petition for probate was rejected, is hereby up-held. 22. As a result of the discussions above, the appeal stands dismissed and the rejection of petition for probate by the learned trial court is affirmed. 23. The parties shall bear their respective cost. 24. Let the LCR be returned.