JUDGMENT/ORDER Abdul Moin, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent nos. 1 to 3. 2. The petitioners admittedly have all been appointed by the private service provider. They contend that despite the contract having been entered into between the State and the service provider i.e. respondent no.4, the service provider is not giving the pay as has been specified in the said contract and hence the petition. 3. Upon a specific plea being put to learned counsel for the petitioner as to how the present petition is maintainable as it is the service provider who is not adhering to the contract entered into between the State and the service provider and admittedly the petitioners are the employees of the service provider and no writ would be maintainable against the service provider, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and others vs. Union of India and others, (1982) AIR SC 1473 to contend that in similar circumstances the Apex? Court has entertained the petition. 4. Reliance has also been placed upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rekha Singh vs. Union of India, (2018) 6 ADJ 37 (DB) as well as on the judgment of Single Judge in the case of Smt. Karma Devi vs. State of U.P. and others, (2012) 7 ADJ 62 . 5. Placing reliance on another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South Central Railways and others vs. S.C.R. Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juice Stalls Welfare Association and another, (2016) 3 SCC 582 , learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in all these matters the employees of the service provider had approached the Court and the Court had entertained the petition and had granted them reliefs prayed for and hence the present petition would be maintainable. 6. This Court has perused the judgment in the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights (supra). The said case was a public interest litigation filed before the Apex Court to ensure the observance of the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games. 6. This Court has perused the judgment in the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights (supra). The said case was a public interest litigation filed before the Apex Court to ensure the observance of the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work of various projects connected with the Asian Games. Instant petition is not a public interest litigation and hence the aforesaid judgment by which the public interest litigation had been entertained by the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India would not be applicable in the present facts of the case. 7. So far as the Division Bench judgment in the case of Rekha Singh (supra) is concerned, the same was a matter in which Assistant Director of Institute of Correspondence Course and Continuing Education of Allahabad University (hereinafter referred to as ICC & CE) had filed a petition commanding the University to pay arrears of salary to her on the post of Assistant Director and to continue to pay the same on monthly basis. This Court after considering the various provisions of the Constitution of India including "Begar" held that since ICC & CE is a Self-Financing Institute of the University, entertained the matter and directed the University to make immediate arrangement for payment of salary and emoluments to the petitioner for the period for which the petitioner was claiming the same. Again, the petitioners, as already indicated above, are the employees of the service provider and the service provider has got nothing to do with the working of the State Government and consequently the said judgment would also not come to the rescue of the petitioners. 8. As regards the judgment in the case of Smt. Karmakar Devi (supra), the said case was a matter in which a Class IV employee working as Sweeper in Junior School had approached for payment of regular pay scale as well as for her regularization. As already indicated above the petitioners are not employees of the State Government rather they are the employees of the service provider and consequently even the said judgment is distinguishable and is not applicable in the facts of this case. 9. As already indicated above the petitioners are not employees of the State Government rather they are the employees of the service provider and consequently even the said judgment is distinguishable and is not applicable in the facts of this case. 9. So far as the judgment of Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South Central Railways (supra) is concerned, the same was a matter which arose against the Division Bench of the High Court whereby the writ Court had held that the S.C.R. Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juice Stalls Welfare Association was entitled to get their licenses renewed under the catering policy of 2010. In the present case, there is no issue of renewal of license. 10. Even otherwise, the maintainability of writ petition of an employee of the service provider has been considered threadbare by this Court in the case of Veena Mathur vs. State of U.P.,MANU/UP/2086/2019 wherein this Court after considering the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and Ors.,MANU/SC/0364/2019; Balwant Rai Saluja vs. Air India Ltd.,MANU/SC/0732/2014; General Manager (OSD), Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnandgaon vs. Bharat Lal and Anr.,MANU/SC/1054/2010, and International Airport Authority of India vs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Anr.,MANU/SC/1063/2009 had held as under:- 12. The question thus to be decided by this Court is whether the petitioner, a contractual employee appointed by respondent no. 4, can be said to be having employer-employee relationship with UPSRLM so as to maintain the petition before this Court? 13. This question has been decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. (supra) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various judgments upon the point in issue of contractual worker being appointed by a Contractor and whether he can be said to be an employee of the Company, has held as under:- "19. The expression 'control and supervision' were further explained with reference to an earlier judgment of this Court as follows: "12. The expression "control and supervision" in the context of contract labour was explained by this Court in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union thus: (SCC p. 388, paras 38-39) "38. The expression 'control and supervision' were further explained with reference to an earlier judgment of this Court as follows: "12. The expression "control and supervision" in the context of contract labour was explained by this Court in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union thus: (SCC p. 388, paras 38-39) "38. if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor. 39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor." 20. From this judgment, it is clear that test No. 1 is not met on the facts of this case as the contractor pays the workmen their wages. Secondly, the principal employer cannot be said to control and supervise the work of the employee merely because he directs the workmen of the contractor 'what to do' after the contractor assigns/allots the employee to the principal employer. This is precisely what paragraph 12 explains as being supervision and control of the principal employer that is secondary in nature, as such control is exercised only after such workman has been assigned to the principal employer to do a particular work. 21. We may hasten to add that this view of the law has been reiterated in 'Balwant Rai Saluja and Another v. Air India Limited and Others , (2014) 9 SCC 407 , as follows: "65. 21. We may hasten to add that this view of the law has been reiterated in 'Balwant Rai Saluja and Another v. Air India Limited and Others , (2014) 9 SCC 407 , as follows: "65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration to establish an employer-employee relationship would include, inter alia: (i) who appoints the workers; (ii) who pays the salary/remuneration; (iii) who has the authority to dismiss; (iv) who can take disciplinary action; (v) whether there is continuity of service; and (vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists complete control and supervision. As regards extent of control and supervision, we have already taken note of the observations in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case, (2011) 1 SCC 635 , International Airport Authority of India case, (2009) 13 SCC 374 and Nalco case, (2014) 6 SCC 756 ]." ....... 15. Accordingly, a perusal of the aforesaid six parameters as have been laid down by Apex Court conclusively establish that for all purposes, the petitioner was an employee of respondent no. 4., which Company is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. As such, the preliminary objection as raised by learned Standing Counsel is upheld and the writ petition is dismissed. However, dismissal of the writ petition would not preclude the petitioner from pursuing other remedies that may be available to her before appropriate Court for her grievances." 11. When the facts of the instant case are tested at the touchstone of the recent judgment of this Court in the case of Veena Mathur (supra) as well as the Apex Court judgment in the case of Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola (supra), it clearly comes out, though not argued by learned counsel for the petitioners but as per pleadings made in paragraphs 8, 13 and 14 of the petition that the respondent no.4 has been granted permission for providing man power in the hospitals/traumas/blood banks, that the appointment orders of the petitioners have been issued by the said service provider i.e. respondent no.4 and the said offer of appointment was also containing certain terms and conditions. A close perusal of the appointment orders, copies of which have cumulatively been filed as Annexure-4 to the petition, would indicate that they are in the nature of letter of contract being issued by the service provider i.e. respondent no.4 duly indicating that the services of the petitioners are also terminable at any time by the Company/principal employer i.e. respondent no.4. All these terms and conditions including the appointment order thus lead to the irresistible conclusion that the petitioners are the employees of respondent no.4, a private service provider. Thus, taking into consideration the judgment of Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola (supra) which in turn had considered the judgment of Apex Court in the case of International Airport Authority of India (supra) wherein it has been held that if the contract is for supply of labours necessarily the labours supplied by the Contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by the Contractor. 12. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed. However, the petitioners would have a liberty of pursuing their grievance before the appropriate Court.