JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. Since identical question of law is involved in batch of writ petitions, the same are being decided by this common order. 2. By way of filing these writ petitions, the petitioner-CIMMCO Ltd. has challenged the award dated 08/05/2017 passed by the Labour Court, Bharatpur by which the learned Labour Court has allowed the application filed by the respondents-workmen under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. Brief facts of the case as noticed by this Court are that the petitioner-Company was declared as a sick industry on 21/08/2002 under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985. The BIFR sanctioned the revival scheme vide order dated 11/03/2010. The petitioner-Company was locked out on 13/11/2000. 4. In the meanwhile, during pendency of the proceedings before the BIFR, the co-promoter M/s. Titagarh Wagons Ltd. agreed to take up the administration of the petitioner-company and the factory was reopened on 14/9/2008 after tripartite agreement dated 05/03/2008 entered into by co-promoter, Labour Unions and Deputy Labour Commissioner, Labour Department, Govt, of Rajasthan. The agreement was to the extent that the workers were to be treated not in employment w.e.f. 13/11/2000. 5. Mrs. Anita Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner-Company makes twofold submissions; firstly that in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court, if there is a revival scheme, then the same shall apply and the relief could not have been under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in support of the same, she relies upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in "M/s. Kanpur Fert. & Cement Ltd. Vs. State of UP & Anr." (Civil Appeal No. 4742/2017 arising out of Special Leave Petition(Civil) No. 2913/2014), decided on 31/03/2017, the relevant portion of which provides as follows:- 3. The core ground of challenge to the aforesaid order is that the aforesaid relief could not have been granted under Section 33-c(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in view of the settlement by and between the Management and the Representative Union of the workmen under which the workmen were entitled to an honorarium i.e. 25% of the basic wages plus D.A. for the period of special leave (during the period of closure of the unit). 4. We have perused the Memorandum of Understanding/Settlement, Particularly, the clause relating to the payment of honorarium as referred to above. 4. We have perused the Memorandum of Understanding/Settlement, Particularly, the clause relating to the payment of honorarium as referred to above. The memorandum of Understanding/Settlement became a part of the revival scheme approved by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) by its order dated 16th January, 2012 in terms of which the Company got revived. 5. Evidently, all the other workmen got benefit in terms of the settlement and the respondent workman herein is the lone employee who has been granted higher benefits in terms of the order of the Labour Court as affirmed by the High Court. 6. If the settlement by and between the Management and the Representative Union of workmen is to be construed to be one under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which we are inclined to do the same would bind the respondent workman. In this regard, we have perused the evidence of the respondent workman wherein he does not deny that the Representative Union which was a party to the settlement did not represent his cause. A more statement in the evidence of the workman that he is not a member of any specific union will not suffice. 7. That apart, if the Memorandum of Understanding/Settlement is a part of the revival scheme approved by the BIFR, the same would also be binding on the workmen under Section 18(8) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 8. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that the Labour Court as well as the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order. Instead of full wages for the period from July 2008 to March 2011 with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum, the respondent workman would be entitled to 25% of the wages as per the settlement from the date of special leave till the date of reporting back to duty i.e. July 2008 to March 2011. In the peculiar facts of the case, we are of the view that the workman should be paid interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the said amount. We order accordingly." 6. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner-Company is that the computation made by the learned Labour Court itself was contrary to law and apparently on the face of it not confirming to the parameters of law. We order accordingly." 6. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner-Company is that the computation made by the learned Labour Court itself was contrary to law and apparently on the face of it not confirming to the parameters of law. She submits that 11 pairs of shoes, travel allowance, house rent allowance, washing allowance etc. were being considered by the learned Labour Court which was contrary to law. 7. On the other hand, Mr. JP Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents-workmen submits that at the stage of application under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947, particularly when the award had been upheld by the Single Bench as well as Division Bench of this Court, then the Court may not go into merits of the case and therefore, the order passed by the learned Labour Court on 08/05/2017 is justified. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, this court notices that the learned Labour Court had categorically observed regarding the amount mentioned and there would no cross-examination by the petitioner-Company and virtually, there was no rebuttal by the petitioner-Company to the amount in question. On perusal of the order dated 08/05/2017, this Court finds that the order is reasoned and the amount determined by the learned Court below is perfectly in accordance with law and does not call for any interference by this court at this stage. The other submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-Company are not tenable. 9. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed as having no merit. All pending applications also stand dismissed.