JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. The writ petitions and the civil revisional applications under consideration (hereafter the 'said matters', wherever referred to jointly) were assigned to the Division Bench presided over by one of us (Dipankar Datta, J.) by an order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice dated August 23, 2018. Subsequently, a writ appeal [FMA 1475 of 2018] arising out of W.P. 1248 (W) of 2017 upon being listed before a Division Bench presided over by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, it was submitted on behalf of the appearing parties that W.P. 1248 (W) of 2017 itself had been assigned to a Division Bench. Hearing such submission, an order dated November 19, 2018 was passed directing such appeal to be placed before the presiding judge of this Bench resulting in listing thereof together with the said matters. 2. Assignment of the said matters by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice ensued because of an order dated March 7, 2014 passed by a learned Judge of this Court in C.O. 2440 of 2011 (Kamala Properties Limited v. Miss Suchismita Roy & ors.). Noticing the divergence of opinion expressed by several single Judges, two on one side holding that the remedy made available by the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter the CP Act) to a purchaser having a grievance against a promoter is excluded in view of the West Bengal Building (Regulation of Promotion of Construction and Transfer by Promoters) Act, 1993 (hereafter the Building Act), and one on the other holding to the contrary, His Lordship referred the said revisional application to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for decision by a larger bench. 3. Upon the said matters being posted for hearing, it appeared to us that no question of law had been formulated for our answer. However, from an order dated September 21, 2016 passed by a coordinate bench, to which the said matters had been assigned previously, it appeared that Their Lordships had expressed as follows: "In all these petitions, the main question involved is as to whether the fora constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 have jurisdiction over disputes between promoters/developers and purchasers of residential buildings or flats, having regard to the provisions of the West Bengal Building (Regulation of Promotion of Construction and Transfer by Promoters) Act". 4. 4. The parties not having disputed that this was the precise question requiring an answer to dispose of the reference, we called upon them to address us. 5. Despite the reference arising in connection with the said matters, we have been addressed on behalf of the promoters only in W.P. 23027 (W) of 2017 and W.P. 1248(W) of 2017 by Mr. U.C. Jha and Mr. Arijit Bardhan, learned advocates, respectively. 6. Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan have endeavoured to impress upon us that either of the three fora constituted under the CP Act for receiving a complaint regarding deficiency of service would be a 'civil court' within the meaning of section 12A of the Building Act and hence the provisions of the CP Act, providing for a remedy, stand excluded qua its operation to a purchaser-promoter dispute. 7. Citing the decision in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India reported in, (1994) 6 SCC 731 , Mr. Jha initiated his address by seeking to enlighten us on what a 'Court' means. It has been held therein that a 'Court' is an agency created by the sovereign for the purpose of administering justice and is a place where justice is judicially administered. It is a tribunal presided over by one or more Judges on whom are conferred judicial powers for administering justice in accordance with law. When a Judge takes his seat in Court, the Court is said to assemble for administering justice. Although the words 'Court' and 'Judge' are frequently used interchangeably because a Judge is an essential constituent of a Court, that is not to say that when a Judge demits office the Court ceases to exist. 8. Mr. Jha further argued, relying on Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. N.K. Modi reported in, (1996) 6 SCC 385 , that the fora created by the CP Act to resolve disputes brought forth before it by consumers are judicial authorities and proceedings before them are legal proceedings. Relying on Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Birla Yahama Ltd. reported in, (2000) 4 SCC 91 , he contended that a proceeding before a consumer forum is a suit. 9. The decision in M/s. SBP and Company v. Patel Engineering reported in, (2005) 7 Supreme 610 , was also referred to by Mr. Jha to show that the decision in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has been approved. 9. The decision in M/s. SBP and Company v. Patel Engineering reported in, (2005) 7 Supreme 610 , was also referred to by Mr. Jha to show that the decision in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has been approved. 10. Incidentally, the decision in Patel Roadways Ltd. (supra) holding that a proceeding before the consumer forum is a suit, has been approved in Ethiopian Airlines v. Ganesh Narain Saboo reported in, (2011) 8 SCC 539 . 11. In support of the contention that the jurisdiction of a forum created by the CP Act would stand excluded if the jurisdiction of a 'civil court' is barred under the provision of any special enactment, Mr. Jha sought to draw inspiration from the decisions in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon reported in, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , Trans Mediterranean Airways v. M/s Universal Exports reported in, (2011) 10 SCC 316 , and UP Power Corporation Ltd. v. Anis Ahmad reported in, (2013) 8 SCC 491 . 12. It was, accordingly, urged by Mr. Jha that in respect of a purchaser-promoter dispute arising in this State, it is the authorized officer under section 6 of the Building Act who alone is empowered to decide such dispute and the forum created by the CP Act would have no jurisdiction to try such dispute. 13. Mr. Bardhan while adopting the submissions of Mr. Jha relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi reported in, (2002) 6 SCC 635 , in support of his submission that since decision in a civil suit takes years and that despite the enactment of the CP Act the fora created there under were unable to grant expeditious relief to the consumers, the Building Act had been enacted creating a special forum only to examine disputes arising under the Building Act and, therefore, it is such forum created by the Building Act which alone has the jurisdiction to entertain any dispute between a purchaser and a promoter. He further relied on the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Biswajit Lahiri reported in, (2006) AIR Calcutta 95, where section12A of the Building Act was held to create an explicit bar on the jurisdiction of the 'civil court'. He further relied on the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Biswajit Lahiri reported in, (2006) AIR Calcutta 95, where section12A of the Building Act was held to create an explicit bar on the jurisdiction of the 'civil court'. Reliance was also placed by him on the decision in Department of Telecommunications v. M. Krishnan reported in, (2009) 8 SCC 481 , where a complaint before the consumer forum in respect of disconnection of a telephone line arising out of alleged non-payment of telephone bills was held to be not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the rules framed there under. 14. On behalf of the purchasers in the said matters, we were addressed by Mr. N.R. Mukherjee, Mr. P.K. Drolia, Mr. L.K. Pal, Mr. T.K. Rakshit and Mr. Sandipto Bose, learned advocates. 15. All the learned advocates contended in unison that having regard to the mischief that the CP Act seeks to remedy as well as the provisions in section 3 thereof, read with the decisions relied upon by them, the conclusion is irresistible that the Building Act cannot operate as a bar for the consumer forum created by the CP Act to entertain a complaint there under by such forum at the instance of a purchaser. Referring to certain orders passed by the National Commission, Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that disputes between purchasers and promoters having its genesis in this State were being entertained notwithstanding the decisions of this Court that the consumer forum has no jurisdiction to resolve purchaser-promoter disputes. He also contended that an attempt was made to amend the provisions of section 3 of the CP Act and if such amendment were effected, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum would have been curtailed substantially; however, that the Parliament in its wisdom did not take a step in that direction is pointer to retention of the jurisdiction of the consumer forum as it has been since its inception and by a strained interpretation of the Building Act, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum cannot be ousted. 16. We also had the benefit to hear Mr. Kaushik Chanda, learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. T.K. Mukherjee, learned Additional Government Pleader. 17. Mr. 16. We also had the benefit to hear Mr. Kaushik Chanda, learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. T.K. Mukherjee, learned Additional Government Pleader. 17. Mr. T.K. Mukherjee, on instructions, submitted that the National Commission constituted under the CP Act has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint from a purchaser notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 read with section 12A of the Building Act. 18. Inviting our attention to section 145 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 (hereafter the 2006 Act), Mr. Chanda urged us to hold that the appropriate forum under the CP Act was competent to receive a complaint from a purchaser against a promoter for a perceived deficiency in service and to decide it, and also that ouster of the jurisdiction of the 'civil court', ordained by section 12A of the Building Act, could not be called in aid to oppose maintainability of a complaint lodged under the CP Act. It was also submitted by Mr. Chanda that the learned judges of this Court, who ruled that the consumer fora have no jurisdiction in view of section 12A of the Building Act, did not have the benefit of considering the decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it has been categorically laid down that the fora created by the CP Act are not 'courts' but are quasi-judicial bodies or authorities or agencies. 19. The decisions relied upon by the learned advocates opposing Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan shall be referred to later. 20. Having heard the parties at length and on consideration of the decisions cited at the bar, we now venture to answer the reference. Hereafter the purchaser of a flat/apartment shall be referred to as 'homebuyer' and the developer/promoter as 'promoter'. 21. At the outset, the divergent views giving rise to the reference may be noted. 22. By a judgment and order dated December 14, 2012, a learned Judge of this Court while deciding Rita Das v. Jayashri Ghosh reported in, (2012) 1 CalHN 272 (Cal), held that the Building Act was a special Act and in view of the specific embargo created there under, "the Consumer Forum or the State Commission" was not competent to entertain a complaint under the CP Act against a promoter and/or to pass an order on such complaint. 23. 23. Another learned Judge while deciding Bithi Das v. Debabrata Majumdar reported in, (2014) 1 CalHN 50 (Cal), on August 2, 2013, noticed the decision in Rita Das (supra) and, inter alia, held that since the district forum constituted under the CP Act has no authority to pass orders for execution and registration of the deed in favour of the complainants, the complaint before the district forum and the appeal before the appellate authority are not maintainable at all for which the revisional application deserved to be allowed. However, the remedy of the complainants to take recourse to the Building Act in accordance with law was reserved. 24. Concurrence of the aforesaid views expressed in Rita Das (supra) and Bithi Das (supra) is found in two other subsequent decisions of this Court rendered by another learned Judge. The first one is dated November 7, 2014 in Krishna Abason Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishna Sarkar reported in, (2015) 2 CalHN 82, and the other is dated November 27, 2014 in Khurshid Ahmed Ansari v. Md. Afzal, (2015) 1 CalHN 468 (Cal). 25. Significantly, apart from generally relying on Rita Das (supra), Bithi Das (supra), Krishna Abason Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Khurshid Ahmed Ansari (supra), neither Mr. Jha nor Mr. Bardhan sought to contend that the maxim leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later laws repeal earlier laws inconsistent therewith) would have application here. 26. In contrast to the aforesaid four decisions, decisions of two other learned Judges (which are unreported) strike discordant notes. The first is a decision dated July 4, 2013 in C.O. 1378 of 2012 (Narayan Chandra Ghosh & anr. v. Biswajit Lahiri) and the other is dated April 28, 2016 in C.O. 1480 of 2014 (Md. Akbar Kamal v. Tabraiz Alam Siddiqui). In both these decisions, we find consideration of the decision in Rita Das (supra); however, for the reasons assigned in the decisions, the respective learned Judges declined to follow Rita Das (supra) and arrived at the concurrent conclusion that the fora under the CP Act have the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint from a home buyer if he were aggrieved by the deficiency in service rendered to him by a promoter. 27. 27. It is because of such divergence of views for and against applicability of the CP Act to a dispute between a purchaser of a flat/apartment and a promoter that the reference was initially made by the learned Judge while hearing C.O. 2440 of 2011 (supra). Subsequently, when other revisional applications/writ petitions on the same point came up for consideration before other learned single Judges having determination, the same were also referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger bench to resolve the apparent conflict in views. 28. It may, however, be placed on record that the initial reference that was made in C.O. 2440 of 2011 (supra) does not survive because such revisional application has been dismissed as not pressed on the joint prayers of the parties who at a later point of time arrived at an amicable settlement of their inter-se disputes. 29. It is, therefore, required to be decided whether on the face of sections 6 and 12A of the Building Act, a complaint by a home buyer against a promoter in respect of any dispute pertaining to a flat purchased by the former from the latter could be entertained by the appropriate forum constituted under the CP Act or not. 30. We propose to answer the reference by looking at the issue at hand from three different aspects. The first is, whether the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (hereafter the District Forum) or the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereafter the State Commission) or the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (hereafter the National Commission), created by the CP Act, is comprehended within the meaning of 'civil court', the jurisdiction of which to entertain or decide any question relating to matters arising under any provision of the Building Act and the rules framed thereunder is barred by section 12A thereof? The second is, whether it is the legislative intent that jurisdiction of the fora created by the CP Act should be excluded from resolving disputes between a home buyer and a promoter? The third and final is, whether despite the explicit bar that section 12A engrafts, a 'civil court' could still be approached by a purchaser of a flat/apartment if he has any grievance against a promoter? 31. Before examining the crux of the controversy, it is considered appropriate to note certain salient features of the Building Act. The third and final is, whether despite the explicit bar that section 12A engrafts, a 'civil court' could still be approached by a purchaser of a flat/apartment if he has any grievance against a promoter? 31. Before examining the crux of the controversy, it is considered appropriate to note certain salient features of the Building Act. It is evident from the preamble that the Building Act was enacted to provide for the regulation of promotion or construction and transfer of building by promoters in West Bengal. As is customary, section 2 of the Building Act defines terms used therein which would have to be attributed such meaning as appears there from unless of course the context otherwise requires. It is not required to examine in great detail the expressions 'apartment', 'block', 'building' and 'flat' at this stage since it is not disputed that one of the parties to the dispute is a 'purchaser' and the other a 'promoter' within the meaning of clauses (h) and (g) respectively of section 2 of the Building Act. It is not required to examine in great detail the expressions 'apartment', 'block', 'building' and 'flat' at this stage since it is not disputed that one of the parties to the dispute is a 'purchaser' and the other a 'promoter' within the meaning of clauses (h) and (g) respectively of section 2 of the Building Act. The terms 'promoter' and 'purchaser' are defined in the Building Act as follows: "(g) 'promoter' means a person who constructs or causes to be constructed a building on a plot of land for the purpose of transfer of such building by sale, gift or otherwise to any other person or to a company, co-operative society or association of persons, and includes- (i) his assignee, if any, (ii) the person who constructs, and the person who transfers by sale, gift or otherwise, the building, if the two are different persons, (iii) * * * (iv) * * * (v) any board, company corporation, firm or other association of persons, established by or under any law for the time being in force: Provided that notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, a person shall be deemed to be a promoter if he constructs or causes to be constructed, a building with a height of 9.5 metres or more and on a plot of land measuring three hundred square metres or above or if he constructs or causes to be constructed a building consisting of flats in excess of the requirements of the members of his family; (h) 'purchaser' means any person who, under section 7, enters into an agreement with the promoter for the purchase of a flat;" 32. The regulatory measures that the Building Act envisages, inter alia, are to be found in section 3 (providing for registration of the name of the promoter and for permission to construct a building, by making an application before the authorized officer appointed by the State Government), section 4 (providing for the period of validity of certificate of registration and cancellation thereof), section 4A (providing for the period of validity of permission for construction of a building), section 7 (mandating a promoter, before he takes any advance payment or deposit to enter into a written agreement for sale with an intending purchaser), section 8 (prohibiting a promoter to make alteration or addition without the consent of the purchaser), section 9 (providing for certain prohibition and the consequences for violation thereof), etc. The original section 13 of the Building Act has been omitted and replaced by sections 13A and 13 B. The former provides what would constitute an offence under the Building Act whereas the latter contains penal provisions if any promoter is convicted of an offence. Significantly, violation of provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Building Act mandating a promoter to obtain registration as well as permission to construct has been made an offence which, if proved, could make the promoter liable to punishment with imprisonment as well as fine as mentioned in subsection (1) of Section 13B. 33. The Building Act further provides an appellate remedy to a promoter in section 5. An appeal would lie either against an order of the authorized officer refusing registration and permission to construct under section 3(5), or cancelling a registration under section 4(2). 34. It is now time to read sections 6 and 12A of the Building Act. The same are quoted below: "6. Adjudication of disputes.- Any purchaser may, if he has any dispute regarding the purchase of any flat, make an application in such form as may be prescribed to such officer as the State Government may appoint for adjudication of the dispute in such manner as may be prescribed." "12A. Bar on jurisdiction of court.-(1) No civil court shall have any jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question relating to matters arising under any provision of this Act or the rules made there under. Bar on jurisdiction of court.-(1) No civil court shall have any jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question relating to matters arising under any provision of this Act or the rules made there under. (2) Every order passed by the authorized officer is subject to appeal or revision, every order passed by the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 5, and every order passed by the officer referred to in section 6, which is subject to revision, and every order passed by the State Government in revision, shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law." 35. Section 6 of the Building Act, on a bare reading, makes a forum available for a home buyer to approach if he has any dispute regarding the purchase of any flat (which would include an apartment), in the manner ordained. An application is required to be made in the prescribed form to such officer that the State Government may appoint for adjudication of the dispute in a manner to be prescribed. In exercise of the power conferred by section 15 of the Building Act, the West Bengal Building (Regulation of Permission of Construction and Transfer by Promoters) Rules, 1995 (hereafter the Building Rules) have been framed. An application for adjudication of a dispute under section 6 of the Building Act is to be preferred in Form 'G' before the authorized officer and the officer is required in terms of rule 7 to decide the application in compliance with the rule of audi alteram partem. In terms of rule 6, an authorized officer means an officer not below the rank of Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, or other officer as may be appointed by the State Government by notification in the official gazette. Clause (e) of rule 2 provides that the State Government would mean the Government of West Bengal in the Department of Housing. 36. Adverting attention to section 12A of the Building Act, we find sub-section (2) thereof to make it clear that orders passed under various provisions of the Building Act would be final and binding. What emerges from a reading of subsection (1) of section 12A is that it bars a 'civil court' from exercising jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question relating to matters arising under any provision of the Building Act or the Building Rules. What emerges from a reading of subsection (1) of section 12A is that it bars a 'civil court' from exercising jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question relating to matters arising under any provision of the Building Act or the Building Rules. In other words, a grievance that a home buyer has against a promoter relatable to any of the provisions of the Building Act and/or the Building Rules would be barred from being resolved by a 'civil court'. 37. In course of hearing, Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan conceded that the respective promoters they represent have not obtained the registration as a promoter as mandated by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Building Act. This aspect of the matter would be of some significance in our thought process for the reasons that would be evident from our discussions to follow. 38. It would be appropriate at this juncture to note what the CP Act provides. It provides for an alternative system of consumer justice by summary trial, as held in Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital reported in, (2000) 7 SCC 668 . 39. By reason of the definition of 'service' in section 2(o), 'consumer' in section 2(d), 'defect' in section 2(f) and 'deficiency' in 2(g) of the CP Act read with the definition of 'consumer dispute' in section 2(e) thereof, there can be no two opinions that if a grievance of a home buyer against a promoter is covered by the provisions of the CP Act, a complaint would invariably be maintainable before the consumer forum. The decision in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta reported in, (1994) 1 SCC 243 , is an authority for the proposition that even when the promoter is a statutory authority and not a private entity, a complaint against it would lie before the consumer forum at the instance of an aggrieved home buyer. 40. Constitutionality of the provisions of the CP Act was examined by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society reported in, (2003) 2 SCC 412 . While repelling the challenge, the object and purpose of the CP Act, laid down in previous decisions, were noted. Pertinent observations from such decision, in this behalf, read as follows: "17. Society reported in, (2003) 2 SCC 412 . While repelling the challenge, the object and purpose of the CP Act, laid down in previous decisions, were noted. Pertinent observations from such decision, in this behalf, read as follows: "17. The provisions of the said Act clearly demonstrate that it was enacted keeping in view the long-felt necessity of protecting the common man from wrongs where for the ordinary law for all intent and purport had become illusory. In terms of the said Act, a consumer is entitled to participate in the proceedings directly as a result whereof his helplessness against a powerful business house may be taken care of. 18. This Court in a large number of decisions considered the purport and object of the said Act. By reason of the said statute, quasi-judicial authorities have been created at the district, State and Central levels so as to enable a consumer to ventilate his grievances before a forum where justice can be done without any procedural wrangles and hyper-technicalities. 19. One of the objects of the said Act is to provide momentum to the consumer movement. The Central Consumer Protection Council is also to be constituted in terms of Section 4 of the Act to promote and protect the rights of the consumers as noticed hereinbefore." 41. It is also not disputed before us that but for the enactment of the Building Act containing sections 6 and 12A, the present controversy may not have emerged, for, in such case, the home buyer could complain before the appropriate forum under the CP Act and such complaint would be maintainable without any question being raised. 42. Section 3 of the CP Act, importantly, provides as follows: "3. Act not in derogation of any other law. The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force." The plain reading of the aforesaid provision would suggest that the remedy made available by the CP Act to an aggrieved person is preserved, notwithstanding that other remedies are available to him under any other valid law. 43. The decision in Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. 43. The decision in Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (supra) in authoritative terms lays down that the remedy made available under the CP Act supplements and does not supplant the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory authorities and also that the provisions of the CP Act are required to be interpreted as broadly as possible. It was held in paragraph 48 that the consumer forum has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the fact that other forums/courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. 44. In Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha reported in, (2004) 1 SCC 305 , the Supreme Court upon considering section 3 of the CP Act held as follows: "12. As per Section 3 of the Act, as already stated above, the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act and purpose sought to be achieved to protect the interest of the consumers better, the provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively and purposefully in the context of the present case to give meaning to additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act in addition to other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar." 45. Not too long ago, the Supreme Court once again in Virender Jain v. Alaknanda Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited reported in, (2013) 9 SCC 383 , reiterated that the remedy under the CP Act is in addition to the remedies available under other statutes and the availability of alternative remedies is not a bar to entertaining a complaint filed under the CP Act. 46. Having dwelled on the Building Act and the CP Act, to the extent relevant, it is time to enter into the arena of the bar created by section 12A of the former Act. The discussion following would relate to the first aspect mentioned above. 47. The marginal note of section 12A though uses the term 'court', the text of the main provision is that a 'civil court' is barred from receiving and trying a suit involving matters arising under any provision of the Building Act or the rules made there under. The discussion following would relate to the first aspect mentioned above. 47. The marginal note of section 12A though uses the term 'court', the text of the main provision is that a 'civil court' is barred from receiving and trying a suit involving matters arising under any provision of the Building Act or the rules made there under. Law is well settled that a marginal note can neither override the text of the statutory provision nor control the specific meaning of a word in the text. Therefore, the bar referred to in section 12A is referable to a 'civil court' and not to a 'court'. 48. This being the unambiguous position, the contentions of Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan that the fora created under the CP Act are 'civil courts' and an original proceeding initiated before it by lodging a 'complaint' is in the nature of a suit are required to be examined now. 49. We start with Black's Law Dictionary. There, it is said that 'Court' is an organ of the Government belonging to the judicial department whose function is the application of the laws to controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice. It further appears there from that courts may be classified and divided according to several methods. Of them, civil courts are established for the adjudication of controversies between individual parties, or the ascertainment, enforcement and redress of private rights. 50. In S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas reported in, (1965) AIR SC 1818, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was seized of the question as to whether a proceeding taken for recovery of a tax is 'other proceeding' or a 'civil proceeding' under Article 132(1) of the Constitution. It was held that the concerned proceeding is a 'civil proceeding' within the meaning of such provision. It was further held that a proceeding in which relief is claimed against action of Revenue Authorities is included in 'civil proceeding' and not in 'other proceeding' within the meaning of Article 132(1). A passage from such decision, providing useful guidance on different kinds of proceedings, is quoted below: "8. *** The expression 'civil proceeding' is not defined in the Constitution, nor in the General Clauses Act. A passage from such decision, providing useful guidance on different kinds of proceedings, is quoted below: "8. *** The expression 'civil proceeding' is not defined in the Constitution, nor in the General Clauses Act. The expression in our judgment covers all proceedings in which a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil law or by statute, and claims relief for breach thereof. A criminal proceeding on the other hand is ordinarily one in which if carried to its conclusion it may result in the imposition of sentences such as death, imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of property. It also includes proceedings in which in the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of the peace, orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and order, or orders aimed at preventing vagrancy are contemplated to be passed. But the whole area of proceedings, which reach the High Courts is not exhausted by classifying the proceedings as civil and criminal. There are certain proceedings which may be regarded as neither civil nor criminal. For instance, proceeding for contempt of court, and for exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction against lawyers or other professionals, such as Chartered Accountants may not fall within the classification of proceedings, civil or criminal. But there is no warrant for the view that from the category of civil proceedings, it was intended to exclude proceedings relating to or which seek relief against enforcement of taxation laws of the State. The primary object of a taxation statute is to collect revenue for the governance of the State or for providing specific services and such laws directly affect the civil rights of the taxpayer. If a person is called upon to pay tax which the State is not competent to levy, or which is not imposed in accordance with the law which permits imposition of the tax, or in the levy, assessment and collection of which rights of the tax-payer are infringed in a manner not warranted by the statute, a proceeding to obtain relief whether it is from the tribunal set up by the taxing statute, or from the civil court would be regarded as a civil proceeding. The character of the proceeding, in our judgment, depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed. A civil proceeding is, therefore, one in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief the alleged infringement of his civil rights against another person or the State, and which if the claim is proved would result in the declaration express or implied of the right claimed and relief such as payment of debt, damages, compensation, delivery of specific property, enforcement of personal rights, determination of status etc." (underlining for emphasis by us) 51. It thus seems to be clear that an action brought to enforce, redress or protect private rights conferred by the civil law or by statute is a 'civil action'. Therefore, a civil action once brought before a 'Court' and received by it for decision is regarded as a 'civil proceeding'. 52. There can, thus, be no doubt that a proceeding brought before a forum created by the CP Act would be a civil proceeding but the all-important question is whether such forum is a 'Court' or not. 53. The authority to create 'Courts' is an attribute of sovereignty; such power to create 'Courts', in India, can be exercised under the Constitution or under a constitutionally valid statute. "Court" is a generic term and other terms like 'Constitutional Courts', 'Civil Courts', 'Criminal Courts', 'Revenue Courts', 'Labour Courts', etc. are species of this term. 54. At this stage, a brief reference ought to be made to 'civil courts' functional in this State. The relevant enactment governing 'civil courts' is the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (hereafter the Civil Courts Act). Section 3 of the Civil Courts Act classifies courts into courts of (i) District Judge; (ii) Additional Judge; (iii) Civil Judge (Senior Division); and (iv) Civil Judge (Junior Division). Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act is relatable to the local limits of jurisdiction of any such civil court. The power of these courts to take cognizance of civil suits and to try and decide the same flows from the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the CPC). Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act is relatable to the local limits of jurisdiction of any such civil court. The power of these courts to take cognizance of civil suits and to try and decide the same flows from the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the CPC). It is of some significance to note that once it is decided according to law that there is requirement of more 'civil courts', such courts are created and notified by the Government of West Bengal in the Judicial Department which is the controlling department. It is the same department that issues notification appointing judges to preside over the 'civil courts'. However, the notifications by which creation of the State Commission and the District Fora had been made known to the public were not issued by the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal but by the Government in the Food and Supplies Department which was then the controlling department. Presently, it is the Consumer Affairs Department of the Government, the controlling department, which has been issuing notifications with regard to filling up of vacancies in the State Commission and the District Fora as well as creation of additional benches/circuit benches thereof. If indeed the fora created by the CP Act were to be regarded as "courts", we doubt whether any department of the Government other than the Judicial Department could have issued such notifications. 55. This is one reason for which we are not persuaded to agree with Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan that the consumer fora available in this State, created in terms of the CP Act, are 'Courts'. 56. There is one other weighty reason. If the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission created by the CP Act are not 'courts', what then is their status? We have to take a few steps backward in point of time to find the answer. With the increase of population over the years, disputes increased manifold. The 'civil courts' that were available were insufficient to cater to the need of the litigants who approached it. With passage of time, realization having dawned on the Government of the day that proceedings brought before 'civil courts' in respect of civil actions take a long time to conclude, thereby benefiting a wrong doer and frustrating the party seeking justice, the idea of constituting special tribunals to deal with specified subjects developed. With passage of time, realization having dawned on the Government of the day that proceedings brought before 'civil courts' in respect of civil actions take a long time to conclude, thereby benefiting a wrong doer and frustrating the party seeking justice, the idea of constituting special tribunals to deal with specified subjects developed. This resulted in creation of specialized tribunals ostensibly to accelerate delivery of justice to the justice seeker. Having regard to the special nature of dispute that is brought before a tribunal, the proceedings before it could well partake the character of civil proceedings which, in the absence of such tribunals, could have been received and tried by the civil courts. Since reducing the burden of the 'civil courts' was the paramount object, the competent legislature invariably engrafted a provision in the enactment providing for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the 'civil courts' in respect of any matter which under such statute is required to be received and tried by the specialized tribunal. The fora created by the CP Act, without doubt, are such special tribunals which were brought into existence to achieve its avowed objects. In Charan Singh (supra), law has been laid down that the authorities under the CP Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is one of the postulates of such a body that it should arrive at a conclusion based on reason. 57. In Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute reported in, (1995) 3 SCC 583 , views have been expressed that the CP Act has created fora for decisions in respect of consumer disputes, which are not 'Courts' but quasijudicial bodies or authorities or agencies invested with some of the powers of a 'civil court'. 58. There are, however, certain fundamental differences between a 'civil court' and a 'tribunal' of the nature created by the CP Act. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Madras Bar Association reported in, (2010) 11 SCC 1 , traced the differences between courts and tribunals and held as follows: "45. Though both courts and tribunals exercise judicial power and discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised differences between courts and tribunals. They are: (i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the State's inherent judicial power for administration of justice in general. Though both courts and tribunals exercise judicial power and discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised differences between courts and tribunals. They are: (i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the State's inherent judicial power for administration of justice in general. Tribunals are established under a statute to adjudicate upon disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a specified nature. Therefore, all courts are tribunals. But all tribunals are not courts. (ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or can have a combination of a judicial member and a technical member who is an 'expert' in the field to which the tribunal relates. Some highly specialised fact-finding tribunals may have only technical members, but they are rare and are exceptions. (iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act, requiring an elaborate procedure in decision-making, tribunals generally regulate their own procedure applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict rules of the Evidence Act." 59. A few months prior to the aforesaid decision, while rendering its decision in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn. reported in, (2009) 8 SCC 646 , the Supreme Court was in seisin of the question as to whether it or the High Court has the power to transfer a suit pending in a 'civil court' situated in one State to a Debts Recovery Tribunal situated in another. Upon consideration of such question, it was observed, inter alia, as follows: "67. The terms 'tribunal', 'court' and the 'civil court' have been used in the Code differently. All 'courts' are 'tribunals' but all 'tribunals' are not 'courts'. Similarly all 'civil courts' are 'courts' but all 'courts' are not 'civil courts'. It is not much in dispute that the broad distinction between a 'court' and a 'tribunal' is whereas the decision of the 'court' is final the decision of the 'tribunal' may not be. The 'tribunal', however, which is authorised to take evidence of witnesses would ordinarily be held to be a 'court' within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It includes not only Judges and Magistrates but also persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. The 'tribunal', however, which is authorised to take evidence of witnesses would ordinarily be held to be a 'court' within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It includes not only Judges and Magistrates but also persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. It is an inclusive definition. There may be other forums which would also come within the purview of the said definition. *** 69. Civil court is a body established by law for administration of justice. Different kinds of law, however exist, constituting different kinds of courts. Which courts would come within the definition of the civil court has been laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. Civil courts contemplated under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure find mention in Sections 4 and 5 thereof. Some suits may lie before the Revenue Court, some suits may lie before the Presidency Small Cause Courts. The Code of Civil Procedure itself lays down that the Revenue Courts would not be courts subordinate to the High Court." *** 71. Civil courts are constituted under statutes, like the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the civil courts are fixed in terms thereof. Jurisdiction to determine subject-matter of suit, however, emanates from Section 9 of the Code. *** 73. *** the word "civil court" vis-a-vis a court must be construed having regard to the text and context of the statute. *** 88. We have noticed hereinbefore that civil courts are created under different Acts. They have their own hierarchy. They necessarily are subordinate to the High Court. The appeals from their judgment will lie before a superior court. The High Court is entitled to exercise its power of revision as also superintendence over the said courts. For the aforementioned purpose, we must bear in mind the distinction between two types of courts viz. civil courts and the courts trying disputes of civil nature. Only because a court or a tribunal is entitled to determine an issue involving civil nature, the same by itself would not lead to the conclusion that it is a civil court. For the said purpose, as noticed hereinbefore, a legal fiction is required to be created before it would have all attributes of a civil court." (underlining for emphasis by us) 60. Reference made by Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. For the said purpose, as noticed hereinbefore, a legal fiction is required to be created before it would have all attributes of a civil court." (underlining for emphasis by us) 60. Reference made by Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. Drolia to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Malay Kumar Ganguli v. Sukumar Mukherjee (Dr.) reported in, (2009) 9 SCC 221 and Kishore Lal v. Chairman Employees State Insurance Corporation reported in, (2007) 4 SCC 579 , respectively, appear to offer useful guidance for the purpose of deciding the reference. 61. Paragraph 43 of the decision in Malay Kumar Ganguli (supra) reads as follows: "54. ***** The proceedings before the National Commission are although judicial proceedings, but at the same time it is not a civil court within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may have all the trappings of the civil court but yet it cannot be called a civil court." 62. In Kishore Lal (supra), a Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court was considering whether the subject dispute could be resolved by the civil court despite a forum made available by the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereafter the ESI Act). After noticing previous decisions, it had the occasion to observe as follows: "17.***** The trend of decisions of this Court is that the jurisdiction of the consumer forum should not and would not be curtailed unless there is an express provision prohibiting the consumer forum to take up the matter which falls within the jurisdiction of Civil Court or any other forum established under some enactment. The Court had gone to the extent of saying that if two different fora have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in regard to the same subject, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum would not be barred and the power of the consumer forum to adjudicate upon the dispute could not be negated." In paragraph 21 of the said decision, it was also held by the Court that the jurisdiction of the consumer forum is not ousted by virtue of sub-sections (1) or (2) or (3) of section 75 of the 1948 Act. Significantly, sub-section (3) of section 75 prohibits a 'civil court' to decide or deal with any question or dispute as in subsections (1) and (2) or to adjudicate any liability which by or under the 1948 Act is to be decided by a medical board, or by a medical appeal tribunal or by the Employees' Insurance Court. 63. In view of our discussion as above as well as the authorities that we have noted, the conclusion is inescapable that the consumer fora created by the CP Act are not 'courts', far less 'civil courts', and its jurisdiction to receive a complaint from a home buyer against a promoter is not barred in view of the provisions of section 12A of the Building Act. 64. Having so concluded, we move on to the second aspect, i.e., to ascertain the legislative intent upon comparison of the provisions of section 12A of the Building Act and section 145 of the 2006 Act. 65. In M. Lalitha (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the complaint lodged before the district forum was maintainable having regard to the provisions of Sections 90 and 156 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983. Upon consideration of the provisions of the CP Act, the Court proceeded to observe as follows: "18. The decision in Dhulabhai case, (1969) AIR SC 78, also does not help the appellant. The present case is not one where the question to be considered is as to the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court in view of the provisions of Section 90 read with Section 156 of the Act. Provisions of the 1986 Act, as already made clear above, apply in addition to the other provisions available under other enactments. It follows that the remedies available under the 1986 Act for redressal of disputes are in addition to the available remedies under the Act. Under the 1986 Act we have to consider as regards the additional jurisdiction conferred on the forums and not their exclusion. In Dhulabhai case consideration was whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was excluded. Propositions (1) and (2) indicate that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, the jurisdiction of civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Propositions (1) and (2) indicate that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, the jurisdiction of civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Further, where there is an express bar on the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. The remedies that are available to an aggrieved party under the 1986 Act are wider. For instance, in addition to granting a specific relief the forums under the 1986 Act have jurisdiction to award compensation for the mental agony, suffering etc. which possibly could not be given under the Act in relation to dispute under Section 90 of the Act. Merely because the rights and liabilities are created between the members and the management of the society under the Act and forums are provided, it cannot take away or exclude the jurisdiction conferred on the forums under the 1986 Act expressly and intentionally to serve a definite cause in terms of the objects and reasons of the Act, reference to which is already made above. When the decision of Dhulabhai case was rendered, the provisions similar to the 1986 Act providing additional remedies to parties were neither available nor considered. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it leads to taking away the additional remedies and forums expressly provided under the 1986 Act, which is not acceptable. 19. The question of conflict of decisions may not arise. If the parties approach both the forums created under the Act and the 1986 Act, as indicated in the case of Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. it is for the forum under the 1986 Act to leave the parties either to proceed or avail the remedies before the other forums, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case." (underlining for emphasis) 66. The decision in M. Lalitha (supra) was rendered on December 11, 2003. At that point of time, the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (hereafter the 1983 Act) was in force. The decision in M. Lalitha (supra) was rendered on December 11, 2003. At that point of time, the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (hereafter the 1983 Act) was in force. Section 95 of the 1983 Act provided for reference of disputes of the nature mentioned therein to the Registrar for reconciliation, whereas section 134 thereof created the bar of jurisdiction exercisable by a Civil Court or a Revenue Court in regard to anything done or any action taken or any order passed under such Act including a dispute required to be referred to the Registrar under section 95. The 1983 Act was repealed by the 2006 Act. The provision regarding reference of disputes to the Registrar for decision has now been engrafted in Chapter 11 titled 'Statement of dispute'. While section 102 of the 2006 Act requires disputes to be filed before the Registrar, section 103 thereof mandates the State Government to constitute a board of arbitrators. Section 145 of the 2006 Act has the marginal note 'Indemnity and bar to jurisdiction of Courts'. Sub-section (2) thereof, to the extent relevant, reads as follows : "Save as provided in this Act, no Civil Court or Revenue Court or Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum shall have jurisdiction in regard to anything done or any action taken or any order passed under this Act and, IN particular, in regard to........." 67. With the introduction of the words "Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum" in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the 2006 Act, the appropriate consumer forum in the State of West Bengal would be denuded of the jurisdiction to try a dispute of the nature mentioned therein notwithstanding the decision in M. Lalitha (supra). 68. The language of 12A of the Building Act is, however, clear as crystal. The jurisdiction of the 'civil court' is barred thereby, and not that of the fora created by the CP Act, although Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan have urged, as noted above, that the fora created by the CP Act are 'civil courts' within the meaning of section 12A. It is because of such contention that section 12A calls for an appropriate interpretation. In so interpreting, the legislative intent has to be ascertained. Jha and Mr. Bardhan have urged, as noted above, that the fora created by the CP Act are 'civil courts' within the meaning of section 12A. It is because of such contention that section 12A calls for an appropriate interpretation. In so interpreting, the legislative intent has to be ascertained. The legislature, in its wisdom, did not include the words "Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum" in section 12A of the Building Act, though the same words are to be found in the subsequent legislation, i.e., the 2006 Act. That the subsequent legislation deals with a different subject is not really of any consequence. What is important and relevant is that both legislations, enacted by the legislative assembly of this State, while excluding jurisdiction have expressed clear intentions of what exactly is excluded. Inclusion of the words "Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum" in sub-section (2) of section 145 of the 2006 Act clearly suggests the legislative intent to exclude the jurisdiction of the consumer fora in relation to disputes arising under the 2006 Act from the purview of the CP Act. If indeed the legislative intent were such that the fora created by the CP Act would not be empowered to entertain a dispute between a home buyer and a promoter under the Building Act, such intent could have been clearly expressed in section 12A in the same manner as expressed in section 145 of the 2006 Act. The legislative intent being clearly discernible qua the bar created by section 12A of the Building Act on the one hand and section 145 of the 2006 Act on the other, it can safely be held that the net of bar created by section 12A of Building Act cannot be spread so wide and high that it would preclude the consumer fora to entertain, try and decide a dispute between a home buyer and a promoter which additionally, but not simultaneously, could be a subject matter of decision before the appropriate forum under the CP Act notwithstanding the remedy available before the authorized officer under section 6 of the Building Act. 69. The time is now ripe to consider the decisions in Rita Das (supra), Bithi Das (supra), Krishna Abason Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Khurshid Ahmed Ansari (supra) as well as the decisions cited by Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan. 70. In Rita Das (supra), the learned Judge was seized of two questions, viz. 69. The time is now ripe to consider the decisions in Rita Das (supra), Bithi Das (supra), Krishna Abason Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Khurshid Ahmed Ansari (supra) as well as the decisions cited by Mr. Jha and Mr. Bardhan. 70. In Rita Das (supra), the learned Judge was seized of two questions, viz. (i) whether the consumer forum is competent to grant the decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale of an immovable property and (ii) whether section 12A of the Building Act creates an embargo for the consumer forum to receive a complaint. Considering the decision of the Supreme Court in France B. Martins v. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues reported in, (1999) 6 SCC 627 , and a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mandira Mookerjee v. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum reported in, (2005) 4 CalHN 694, as well as other decisions, the learned Judge answered both the questions, as aforesaid, in the affirmative. Placing reliance on the decision in Arvind Mills Limited v. Associated Roadways Limited reported in, (2004) 11 SCC 545 , the learned Judge observed in paragraph 25 as follows: "Thus even if the remedies under the Consumer Protection Act is in addition to and not in derogations with any other law but while granting such remedy, the forum cannot bypass the relevant provisions of the special statute and usurp unlimited jurisdiction. Upon being excluded expressly if the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction, the consumer forum cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 3 of the said Act." The learned Judge further held the decision of another learned Judge of this Court in In Re: State Transport Authority, reported in 1991 (2) CHN 131 , to the effect that neither the District Forum nor the State Commission has the trappings of a civil court, not to be good law in view of SBP Company (supra). Considering the decision in M. Krishnan (supra) and upon quoting a particular paragraph there from, the learned Judge held in paragraph 30 as follows: "Thus, in view of the specific embargo created under the Special Act, the Consumer Forum or the State Commission was not competent to pass the order and/or entertain the said complaint. ***" 71. We find it difficult to agree with the learned Judge on the point of exclusion of the CP Act to a dispute covered by the Building Act. ***" 71. We find it difficult to agree with the learned Judge on the point of exclusion of the CP Act to a dispute covered by the Building Act. Arvind Mills Limited (supra) is an authority for the proposition that notwithstanding section 3 of the CP Act, a notice under section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865 is a pre-condition for lodging a complaint under the CP Act. Such decision could not have been relied upon to record the conclusion in paragraph 25, extracted supra. Further, M/s. SBP Company (supra), is not a direct decision dealing with the CP Act. Decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the CP Act, referred to above, have authoritatively laid down the law that despite having the trappings of a civil court, the fora created by the CP Act are not civil courts. In our considered opinion, State Transport Authority (supra) correctly decided that the complaint before the District Forum was not maintainable at the instance of a person seeking to obtain a permit from the relevant transport authority to operate a stage carriage service; the complainant was neither buying goods nor hiring any service, hence he was not a consumer and grant of permit does not amount to service rendered by the authority, within the meaning of the CP Act. In M. Krishnan (supra), the Telegraph Act, 1885 was under consideration and not the CP Act. When there are decisions of the Supreme Court in the field that the remedy under the CP Act is an additional remedy, which the consumer as defined in section 2(d) of the CP Act may pursue notwithstanding remedies provided by other statutes, the decision in M. Krishnan (supra) could have easily been distinguished. The embargo created by section 12A of the Building Act at the highest is applicable so far as civil courts are concerned, but in our view would not extend to the remedy made available by the CP Act. 72. Bithi Das (supra) is also a decision which proceeded on the basis that the Building Act is a special statute and that it "has an overriding effect". The learned Judge also held that the dispute arising for decision was fully covered by the Building Act thereby rendering the complaint before the appropriate consumer forum not maintainable. 72. Bithi Das (supra) is also a decision which proceeded on the basis that the Building Act is a special statute and that it "has an overriding effect". The learned Judge also held that the dispute arising for decision was fully covered by the Building Act thereby rendering the complaint before the appropriate consumer forum not maintainable. In paragraph 14, the learned Judge held as follows: "The Court of Forum shall not pass a decree which cannot be executed at all. From that angle also the said complaint before the District Forum and its appeal before the Appellate Authority, in my view, are not maintainable at all. So, both the District Forum and the State Commission have acted without jurisdiction. In such a situation, this Hon'ble Court can well interfere ***" We do not find in Bithi Das (supra) proper consideration of section 3 of the CP Act. Moreover, it was not considered that the authorized officer acting under section 6 of the Building Act has not even been conferred powers akin to powers conferred on the consumer fora by sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of section 13 of the CP Act. Also, the learned Judge did not consider the aspect of relief (that could be extended to an aggrieved home buyer upon his establishment of the claim before the authorized officer under the Building Act and the rules framed there under) to be woefully inadequate qua the relief that could be extended under the CP Act by the consumer fora. However, we need not dilate much on the topic of relief that could be had under the provisions of the Building Act since under the provisions of the CP Act, as held in Rita Das (supra) upon considering France B. Martins v. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues (supra) and Mandira Mookerjee (supra), the consumer forum is competent to grant the decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale of an immovable property. 73. In Krishna Abason Private Limited (supra), the learned Judge referred to the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra) and observed that the ratio thereof had been considered in Rita Das (supra). The learned Judge also observed that M/s SBP and Company (supra) ruled that the district forum has the trapping of a civil court. 73. In Krishna Abason Private Limited (supra), the learned Judge referred to the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra) and observed that the ratio thereof had been considered in Rita Das (supra). The learned Judge also observed that M/s SBP and Company (supra) ruled that the district forum has the trapping of a civil court. Having regard to the explicit bar created by section 12A of the Building Act, the complaint before the relevant consumer forum was held to be not maintainable. 74. The learned Judge who decided Khurshid Ahmed Ansari (supra) was also the author of the decision in Krishna Abason Private Limited (supra). In view of the reasons assigned in the latter decision, the complaint in question was held to be not maintainable. 75. For the reasons we have assigned to express our inability to concur with the decision in Rita Das (supra) on the point of exclusion of jurisdiction, we record our inability to agree with the other decisions too which followed the same. 76. Pertinently, it does appear on reading of all these decisions that the learned Judges' attention were not drawn to Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra), where it was specifically held that the National Commission may have all the trappings of civil courts, yet, it is not a civil court and Kishor Lal (supra) which recognises the authority of the fora under the CP Act to receive complaints notwithstanding availability of a forum under any other enactment and the absence of any express bar in such enactment prohibiting the consumer fora to entertain any complaint. 77. In our view, the maxim leges posteriores priores contraias abrogant postulates an inconsistency between two statutes, one which is a general statute and the other a special statute, and in case of such inconsistency that cannot be reconciled, the general statute would have to yield to the special statute. 77. In our view, the maxim leges posteriores priores contraias abrogant postulates an inconsistency between two statutes, one which is a general statute and the other a special statute, and in case of such inconsistency that cannot be reconciled, the general statute would have to yield to the special statute. Apart from the legal position that emerges on a reading of the Building Act and CP Act that there is no inconsistency and that the two statutes provide different fora for resolution of a dispute between a home buyer and a promoter, ~ and which can co-exist in the absence of a clear indication in the special statute that remedy available under any other statute is excluded, there is absolutely no reason as to why existence of different fora under a general statute and a special statute should ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the forum created by the general statute would stand excluded. There is no warrant for the proposition that the forum created by the CP Act is a 'civil court', and therefore, the bar of section 12A of the Building Act would not be applicable to proceedings before the consumer forum under the CP Act. The decisions in Rita Das (supra), Bithi Das (supra), Krishna Abason Private Limited (supra) and Khursid Ahmad Ansari (supra) holding, to the contrary, do not lay down correct law. 78. The decisions in Fair Air Engineers Private Limited (supra), M/s SBP and Company (supra) and Ethiopian Airlines (supra) have been duly perused and the ratio decidendi thereof noted. Such decisions do not aid Mr. Jha at all for a decision on the present controversy for the reasons aforesaid. 79. In SBP and Company (supra), the question arising for decision of the Constitution Bench, upon divergence of views expressed by two benches, is noted in paragraph 2 reading as follows: "2. What is the nature of the function of the Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is the question that is posed before us. ***" The majority concluded that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Courts and the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) is a judicial power. 80. This decision was cited by Mr. ***" The majority concluded that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Courts and the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) is a judicial power. 80. This decision was cited by Mr. Jha to show that the view expressed in Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. (supra) to the effect that a 'court' defined in section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act would include a special tribunal like the consumer forum, was approved. The said decision did not directly deal with the CP Act and hence any observation therein with regard to the fora created by the CP Act may not constitute a binding precedent within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 81. The central questions referred for the decision of the larger bench in Ethiopian Airlines (supra) were whether the appellant could claim sovereign immunity as also whether proceedings before the consumer forum are suits. The question was answered in the affirmative considering the provisions of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 as well as several foreign and Indian decisions. However, it was also held that section 86 of the CPC does not apply to proceedings under the CP Act and hence, the complaint of the respondent before the State Commission is maintainable, as held by the National Commission. 82. Similarly, the decisions in Satyawati Tondon (supra), Trans Mediterranean Airways (supra) and Anis Ahmad (supra) turn on the facts before the Courts and are distinguishable having regard to the relevant statutory provisions under consideration there. 83. Our conclusion in regard to the decisions cited by Mr. Bardhan is also the same. Such decisions do not persuade us to hold otherwise. 84. Now we move on to consider the last aspect as to whether in respect of any question relating to matters arising under any provision of the Building Act, the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' is barred or not. Obviously, on a plain reading of section 12A of the Building Act, an impression is likely to be created that the jurisdiction to approach the 'civil court' would be barred in respect of a matter arising out of any provision of the Building Act and the Building Rules. 85. Obviously, on a plain reading of section 12A of the Building Act, an impression is likely to be created that the jurisdiction to approach the 'civil court' would be barred in respect of a matter arising out of any provision of the Building Act and the Building Rules. 85. In fact, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra), was of the view (on reading the plaint as a whole) that the relevant civil court had rightly not entertained the dispute raised by the plaintiffs in their plaint having regard to the bar created by section 12A of the Building Act, which was an explicit bar. The plaint revealed that in terms of the agreement entered into by and between the parties, the plaintiffs had made full payment of the consideration money to the promoter but the promoter was not complying with the terms of the agreement. 86. While there can be no disagreement with the view expressed in Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra) since the pleaded case in the plaint there led to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable before the 'civil court', and it is a course of action that is to be adopted whenever an objection of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' is raised, we are left to wonder what would be the position if a building is sought to be constructed by an individual/company, comprehended within the meaning of promoter as defined in section 2(g) of the Building Act who/which either fails to obtain registration and/or permission to construct under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Building Act? Would the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' be still excluded even though there has been non-compliance with the provisions of the Building Act by the promoter? Can a promoter who defaults in complying with the provisions of the Building Act by not obtaining registration/permission to construct, have any right to object to the 'civil court' receiving and trying a suit which could have been a subject of dispute before the authorized officer under section 6 provided the promoter is not a defaulter? What would be the effect of an omission or a failure of the promoter to obtain registration or permission to construct under the Building Act, if pleaded in the plaint as a factor to overcome the bar created by section 12A of the Building Act? What would be the effect of an omission or a failure of the promoter to obtain registration or permission to construct under the Building Act, if pleaded in the plaint as a factor to overcome the bar created by section 12A of the Building Act? These are questions arising incidentally in course of the reference and we propose to answer it here. 87. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' is not to be readily inferred, is settled law. However, law is also well settled that if the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' is barred by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication, the bar in section 9 of the CPC would come into play. 88. In view of the proviso to clause (g) of section 2 of the Building Act, any person who constructs or causes to be constructed a building consisting of flats in excess of the requirements of the members of his family would be deemed to be a promoter and such promoter is bound to obtain registration and permission for construction. If he fails to so obtain, he commits an offence within the meaning of section 13A and is liable to punishment, on conviction, under section 13B of the Building Act. The Supreme Court in Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi reported in, (1967) AIR SC 781, while reiterating that under section 9 of the CPC the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or implied barred observed immediately thereafter that it "is a well settled principle that a party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall establish the right to do so". This observation raises a couple of questions. The first is, can this observation of establishing "the right to do so" be read as requiring the objector not only to show that he has a right to object to a civil court receiving a suit under the particular statute, but also that whatever is required of him by such statute has been performed by him thereby enabling him to raise such objection? Secondly, since any person who either does not obtain registration or does not obtain permission to construct in terms of the Building Act is a violator of the statute, can such a violator (to escape a determination by the civil court of the rights and liabilities of the parties) urge that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be excluded if a civil suit is instituted by a home buyer complaining of such violation and with an allegation that he has been duped into purchasing a flat/apartment construction of which might have commenced or even concluded without even the requisite permission? We venture to answer these questions based on our understanding of the subject. If a statute casts an obligation on a person, it is the duty of such person to discharge such obligation. In our view, if such person does not discharge the obligation that is required of him by the statute, to the extent of such non-discharge, the person is deprived of the protection conferred upon him by the statute in question. In such a case, the violator (read the promoter) will make himself liable to the remedies available to an aggrieved (read the home buyer) before any forum including the civil court. We draw support for this proposition of law from the decision of the Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal reported in, (2013) 9 SCC 363 , where in the context of a wrong statement made by an aspirant for a post in the verification roll, it has been held as follows: "25. *** A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent court. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. (Vide Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127 and Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 .) Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrongdoing (jus ex injuria non oritur)." Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Eureka Forbes Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank reported in, (2010) 6 SCC 193 , and Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah reported in, (1996) 6 SCC 342 , and the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria has been held to be one of the salient tenets of equity. 89. More so, if a case of fraud is set up against the promoter, and relief is claimed based on such pleading, we see no reason as to why the civil court's jurisdiction should be excluded in such a situation. It is true that the Building Act while creating a forum under section 6 and barring the jurisdiction of the 'civil court' under section 12A does not provide, either expressly or impliedly, that a dispute brought by a home buyer against a non-registered promoter or a promoter who has not obtained the permission to construct would not be maintainable under section 6 but nothing really turns on it. It is up to the home buyer to choose his forum in such a case which would, in terms of the conclusions reached by us, include a 'civil court'. 90. We, accordingly, rule that the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh (supra) would hold the field in a case where it is not pleaded in the plaint that the promoter has violated the provisions of section 3(1) of the Building Act; however, in a case where the violation of section 3(1) is pleaded, a promoter may not have the right to claim ouster of the jurisdiction of the 'civil court', and a breach of the agreement between the parties by such a promoter could give rise to a right of action in a 'civil court'. Ultimately, it would be for the court before whom the suit is instituted to judiciously exercise its powers of receiving a suit. 91. Ultimately, it would be for the court before whom the suit is instituted to judiciously exercise its powers of receiving a suit. 91. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the fora under the CP Act is competent to receive a complaint from a home buyer against a promoter if the former has any grievance against the latter in respect of services provided pertaining to purchase of a flat/apartment. 92. The reference is answered accordingly. Let the records of the individual writ petitions/civil revisional applications/writ appeal be placed before the appropriate Bench having determination for final decision. 93. Before parting, we ought to place on record that the decision in Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory reported in, (2012) 8 SCC 524 , was cited on behalf of the home buyers to urge that the civil revisional applications/writ petitions at the instance of the promoters before this Court were not maintainable in view of the alternative remedy of appeal/revision provided by the CP Act that could be pursued by them. Having regard to the caution sounded in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) and circulation of the decision amongst the learned Judges of the High Courts the country over, a word or two about the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution on the High Courts and discussion of certain relevant decisions in relation thereto, may not be inapt. From the discussions that follow hereafter, it may not be understood even impliedly that the decision in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) should not demand the deference that is so very intrinsically associated with pronouncements of the Supreme Court but as far as its applicability is concerned, the party relying on it might have to justify his point with the support of established principles of law. 94. The basic issue in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) was whether the Kerala High Court did have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the judgment and order passed by the National Commission, since such order could be challenged before the Supreme Court in view of the provisions of the CP Act. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the High Court impugned before the Supreme Court was a nullity for want of jurisdiction. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the High Court impugned before the Supreme Court was a nullity for want of jurisdiction. So far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, the Bench ruled in paragraph 3 that the "learned counsel for the petitioner is right that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter against the order of the Commission" (underlined for emphasis by us). This was followed by observations in paragraph 4 that read: 4.***, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ***" (underlining for emphasis by us) 95. It is further found from paragraph 9 of the said decision that the Bench sought to make it clear that the orders of the National Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as a statutory appeal in terms of section 27-A(1)(c) lies to the Supreme Court. The direction of caution, referred to earlier, was accordingly issued that it would not be appropriate in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against the orders of the National Commission and copy of the judgment of the Court was directed to be circulated to all the High Courts. 96. It has been contended by learned advocates for the home buyers that what applies to orders passed by the National Commission should ex proprio vigore apply to orders passed by the State Commission and the District Forum. In view of appellate remedies made available by the CP Act, no challenge to the orders passed by the State Commission or the District Forum should be entertained by a bench of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 97. In view of appellate remedies made available by the CP Act, no challenge to the orders passed by the State Commission or the District Forum should be entertained by a bench of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 97. The decision in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) states in absolute terms that no challenge to an order passed by the National Commission should be entertained by any High Court. Why? The reason, as can be culled out by us there from, is that a remedy of appeal to a higher court, i.e., the Supreme Court is available, and a litigant aggrieved by an order of the National Commission must pursue the statutory remedy of appeal before the Supreme Court instead of invoking the jurisdiction of judicial review by the High Courts. 98. Normally, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a High Court hearing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or an application under Article 227 thereof may decline to entertain the same if the relevant statute makes an alternative appellate remedy available. Exhaustion of such remedy is insisted upon or else the purpose of providing such appellate remedy could be frustrated. Moreover, an appeal would entitle a party to raise both questions of facts as well as law, whereas the scope of judicial review or superintendence is limited in the sense that in the former, scrutiny would be confined to the decision making process only and not the decision, and in the latter interference could be made only if there occasions a grave miscarriage of justice. If indeed the decision in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) has to be read (in the manner the learned Judges of the Bench have required learned Judges of the High Courts to read it) as foreclosing the remedy of judicial review against an order of the National Commission, no High Court should entertain a writ petition wherein an order of the National Commission is under challenge. This is so, because an appeal lies to a court higher than the High Courts and hence the latter have no jurisdiction. 99. Thus read, it may not follow from the decision in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) that the High Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions/applications under Article 227 of the Constitution questioning orders of the State Commission or the District Forum. 99. Thus read, it may not follow from the decision in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) that the High Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions/applications under Article 227 of the Constitution questioning orders of the State Commission or the District Forum. The State Commission and the District Fora in a particular State are quasi-judicial bodies inferior to the relevant High Court and therefore, the special reason for which orders passed by the National Commission were held in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) to be immune from challenge before the High Courts would not apply. Therefore, Cicily Kallarackal (supra) cannot be pressed into service unless an order of the National Commission is challenged in a writ petition before the High Court. 100. Be that as it may, in our humble view, the ruling in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) raises more questions than what is answered. Since the oath we have taken ordains us to uphold the Constitution and the laws, we cannot forget principles of law supported by decisions of high authority. The dicta in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) having appeared to us to be in stark contrast to the law on the point of entertainability of a writ petition when an alternative remedy is available but not exhausted by the party approaching the High Court, it made us embark on a study/research in relation to the scope of writ jurisdiction that the High Courts of the country exercise, having been conferred the power of judicial review of decisions of administrative authorities/quasi-judicial bodies not by an ordinary law but by the Constitution itself, as well as reference to decisions of the Supreme Court rendered earlier than Cicily Kallarackal (supra) which, unfortunately, do not appear to have been placed before the relevant Bench for consideration by the respondents. 101. Under Article 227(1) of the Constitution, the High Courts have the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 contains provisions empowering the High Courts to exercise control over the courts subordinate to it in the manner as ordained. 102. Reading Article 227 as it is, it admits of no doubt that the National Commission is not a tribunal over which the High Courts can or may exercise its power of superintendence. Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 contains provisions empowering the High Courts to exercise control over the courts subordinate to it in the manner as ordained. 102. Reading Article 227 as it is, it admits of no doubt that the National Commission is not a tribunal over which the High Courts can or may exercise its power of superintendence. Any application under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order of the National Commission would, therefore, not be maintainable before a High Court. 103. To our mind, it has never been the law at least prior to Cicily Kallarackal (supra) and till this date that a writ petition would not be maintainable if the alternative remedy that is available is not exhausted. The relevant question is that of entertainability, and not maintainability. We need not dilate on the fine distinction here, but nonetheless Cicily Kallarackal (supra) opens up new vistas. Keeping aside our understanding of the law of writs, it has to be re-read and reunder-stood. On such re-reading, we find no provision in the Constitution that excludes a High Court from exercising jurisdiction and/or its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution if an order passed by any quasijudicial tribunal having its seat beyond the territorial limits of such High Court but where the cause of action in part has arisen within such limits, is challenged. Although elementary, it is to be restated that on a plain reading of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226, what appears is that a writ can be issued by a High Court to any Government or authority or person (i) if the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is within such court's territorial limits, or (ii) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limits in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority, or the residence of such person, is not within such territory. 104. Article 226 of the Constitution does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on a High Court from entertaining a writ petition if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the party approaching it. 104. Article 226 of the Constitution does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on a High Court from entertaining a writ petition if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the party approaching it. That a High Court ought not to entertain a writ petition where an efficacious alternative remedy is available to such party is part of the several 'self-imposed restrictions' evolved by the Supreme Court in its various pronouncements. Requiring a party to exhaust the alternative remedy prior to approaching the court of writ is not a rule of law but a rule of convenience and discretion which, at any rate, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. If any authority for this proposition is necessary, reference may usefully be made to the decision in Ram & Shyam Co. v State of Haryana reported in, (1985) 3 SCC 267 . In such decision, the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh reported in, (1958) AIR SC 86, was relied on wherein the Constitution Bench had observed "that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy". 105. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks reported in, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , almost all the precedents on the point of entertainability of a writ petition where a statutory remedy by way of appeal or revision was available, were considered. The observations of the Court read thus: "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for 'any other purpose'. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." (underlining for emphasis by us) 106. One may not also overlook the decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in, (2003) AIR SC 3044, for a limited purpose. Therein, the robust view of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Govind v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in, (2003) 6 IndLD 468, was approved. It was held in Govind (supra) as follows: "The power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be whittled down, nullified, curtailed, abrogated, diluted or even taken away by judicial pronouncement or legislative enactment or even by amendment of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is an inherent part of the basic structure and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution". (underlining for emphasis by us) 107. Although Surya Dev Rai (supra) has been overruled on the point that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable against a judicial order passed by a 'civil court' and Article 227 thereof provides a remedy to challenge such order, the discussions on the point of wide and expansive powers exercisable under Article 226 have not been overruled. 108. 108. The question of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 has also to be viewed in the broad perspective of what the Constitution says and its interpretation by the Supreme Court in its decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India reported in, (1997) AIR SC 1125, and not from any perceived narrow or constricted view that one might choose to take to shield decisions of tribunals set up at the national level from judicial scrutiny under Article 226 on the specious ground that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court. Provisions inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976, i.e., Articles 323A and Article 323B, seeking to exclude inter alia the power of judicial review of the High Courts under Article 226 was struck down as ultra vires on the ground that it violates the basic structure of the Constitution. If indeed, the Parliament, the supreme authority to enact laws in the nation lacks the power to introduce any provision in the Constitution by amendment that seeks to exclude the power of judicial review by the High Courts (which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution), a fortiori, does it not follow that such power cannot be excluded by the judicial pronouncement of the apex judicial authority? The core principle of the rule of law "be you ever so high, the law is above you" applies as much to the Supreme Court as to any other constitutional authority as held in State of UP v. Jeet S. Bisht reported in, (2007) 6 SCC 586 . Viewed in such context, can it be held that the jurisdiction of the High Courts is barred when power of judicial review is urged to be exercised to interfere and set aside an order/decision of the National Commission on the specious ground that an appeal lies to a higher court? Interestingly, the provisions of the CP Act were held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (supra) where one of several contentions raised was that the provisions of the CP Act strike at the independence of the judiciary. The contention was repelled and constitutional validity of the CP Act upheld. What the Supreme Court inter alia held is reflected thus: "41. Society (supra) where one of several contentions raised was that the provisions of the CP Act strike at the independence of the judiciary. The contention was repelled and constitutional validity of the CP Act upheld. What the Supreme Court inter alia held is reflected thus: "41. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, the power of judicial review of the High Court, which is a basic feature of the Constitution, has not been nor could be taken away." (underlining for emphasis by us) 109. In terms of the CP Act, an appeal lies under section 23 to the Supreme Court from an order passed by the National Commission under section 21(a)(i), i.e. an order in exercise of original jurisdiction. An appeal also lies under section 27- A(1)(c) of the CP Act against an order passed by the National Commission under section 27 thereof, i.e. an order imposing penalties. If indeed an order passed by the National Commission is not open to challenge before a High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action may have arisen and the appellate remedy before the Supreme Court is the only remedy that is made available by the CP Act, thereby excluding the power of judicial review of the High Court, does it not erode the very basis on which the decision in Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (supra) is structured? The Supreme Court while considering the issue of constitutionality of the CP Act having held in unambiguous terms that the power of judicial review is not taken away, the dicta in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) seems to us to be in conflict therewith. Thus, the said decision loses much of its efficacy as a binding precedent. 110. Society (supra) is structured? The Supreme Court while considering the issue of constitutionality of the CP Act having held in unambiguous terms that the power of judicial review is not taken away, the dicta in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) seems to us to be in conflict therewith. Thus, the said decision loses much of its efficacy as a binding precedent. 110. In an appropriate case, where a party without exhausting the alternative remedy that is available to him/it, invokes the writ jurisdiction of a High Court and while challenging an order of the National Commission sets up a case of any of the exceptional situations to exist (the writ is claimed (i) for enforcement of a Fundamental right, or (ii) to remedy a breach of natural justice, or (iii) for quashing an act/order that is wholly without jurisdiction), there ought to be no valid reason as to why the High Court may not look into the petition to ascertain whether what is claimed is correct, instead of dismissing it at the threshold on the ground that the impugned order has been passed by the National Commission. Incidentally, if in such a writ petition constitutionality of a provision of the CP Act is under challenge along with an order of the National Commission and the petition contains dual prayers to declare the impugned statutory provision as ultra vires the Constitution as well as a writ of certiorari to quash such order, would the remedy of an appeal being available before a higher court, i.e., the Supreme Court, be of any immediate significance and relevance? We doubt whether the Supreme Court would declare a provision unconstitutional while exercising its appellate power under the CP Act. Any declaration on the vires of a statute/statutory provision ideally would come from the Supreme Court exercising original writ powers (Article 32) or writ powers while hearing a civil appeal arising out of a writ petition after grant of special leave (Article 136). On the other hand, if the High Court is satisfied that there has been gross miscarriage of justice and also that the provision impugned is unconstitutional, should the High Court stay at a distance and say that the dicta in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) has to be shown respect since the decision itself has been circulated for ensuring compliance and not the other decisions of high authority which went unnoticed in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra)? 111. 111. Access to justice is now regarded as a guaranteed Fundamental Right. We need not refer to decisions of the Supreme Court holding so. However, the decision in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) could result in rendering such right illusory for a party. Take for instance a party (not covered by section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987), who is based in Campbell Bay, Nicobar Islands and does not have the financial as well as other resources to carry an order passed by the National Commission adversely affecting his interest to the Supreme Court in appeal. Perceiving that the order, which is alleged to have been passed behind his back, would intrude upon any of his Fundamental Rights, he seeks to have such order effaced from the record and impugns such order before the Circuit Bench of the High Court at Calcutta at Port Blair complaining of observance of the principles of natural justice in the breach by the National Commission and prays for a writ of certiorari. In such a scenario, should such a party be relegated to the appellate forum in New Delhi in terms of an ordinary law enacted by the Parliament for no better reason than that an appeal is available before a court higher than the High Court? Would the High Court be denuded of its jurisdiction although the Constitution may have conferred upon the party the liberty to move the court of writ? We are inclined to believe that the answers, on the basis of all the precedents on the point [but not considered in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra)], ought to be in the negative. Whether such writ petition would be entertained or not having regard to the pleaded case as well as the existence of the remedy of a statutory appeal before the Supreme Court is entirely the discretion of the concerned learned Judge. Whether such writ petition would be entertained or not having regard to the pleaded case as well as the existence of the remedy of a statutory appeal before the Supreme Court is entirely the discretion of the concerned learned Judge. The discretion may be declined acting judiciously but to hold that the writ court would have 'no jurisdiction' to entertain the grievance voiced in the writ petition and that it is the appellate power of the Supreme Court conferred by the provisions of the CP Act that is to be invoked, if it were intended in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra), we must say with the greatest of respect at our command that Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) is a judicial pronouncement that whittles down, nullifies, curtails, abrogates, dilutes and takes away the power conferred on the High Courts by the Constitution to enforce the Fundamental Rights and other rights that can validly be claimed by a party which, in terms of the several previous decisions of the Supreme Court itself, the Supreme Court cannot. 112. The principle underlying Article 141 of the Constitution is very clear. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. Technically speaking, we are as much bound by Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) as all other decisions rendered prior to it that we have referred to above. In such a situation, dismissing a writ petition or a civil revisional application wherein an order of the State Commission or the District Forum is under challenge without even looking into the ground of challenge and the nature of right sought to be enforced by blindly following the decision in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) may not be a proper exercise of discretion. Showing respect to Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) should not be seen as showing disrespect to the other decisions of high authority of the Supreme Court in any manner. If an attempt were made to reconcile the conflicting views, the decision in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) should be read as one which lays down the law that interference with the orders of the National Commission under sections 21(a)(i) and 27 of the CP Act would not be permissible in the absence of any of the exceptions summarized in Whirlpool Corporation (supra) being satisfied. The National Commission, which is a creature of the CP Act, would not have the power to decide on a question of constitutionality of a provision of the CP Act and if such question incidentally arises while the order of the National Commission is under challenge in any writ petition, would it not be proper to hold that the High Court should decide the same at the first instance? The National Commission does not enjoy any exalted status that its orders would not be subject to judicial review, whatever be the nature of grievance that a party may have in relation to it. 113. There is one other important aspect, sight of which cannot be lost. The decision in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) does not appear to have dealt with the same. Apart from the power that the National Commission is empowered to exercise under sections 21(a)(i) and 27 of the CP Act, it can exercise appellate power under section 21(a)(ii) and revisional power under section 21(b) thereof. No doubt, an appeal would lie before the Supreme Court against an order passed by the National Commission either under section 21(a)(i) or section 27 of the CP Act. What would be the legal position if a writ petition is presented before a High Court challenging an appellate order under section 21(a)(ii) or a revisional order under section 21(b), against which a statutory right of appeal before the Supreme Court is not provided in the CP Act? Answer to this question would not be found in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra), since the order under challenge there was not passed in exercise of either appellate or revisional power by the National Commission. Having regard to the special reason for which the High Courts were held not to have any jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions against the orders of the National Commission (an appeal is available to the Supreme Court against orders passed there under), the said decision cannot be read as an authority laying down the law that no order passed by the National Commission, irrespective of the power exercised by it, would be amenable to challenge before the High Courts. Given the limited right that the CP Act confers for presenting appeals to the Supreme Court and that an appeal cannot be presented against an order passed by the National Commission either under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) or under clause (b) of the CP Act, we are inclined to the view based on the reason given in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) itself that the High Courts would have the jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions against appellate and revisional orders of the National Commission. 114. On a cumulative assessment of the decisions of the Supreme Court, we find it difficult to persuade ourselves to agree with the proposition of law that if in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the order of the National Commission is under challenge, the High Court must dismiss the petition irrespective of the ground(s) on which such order is challenged. Indeed, notwithstanding the availability of an appellate remedy before the Supreme Court, such remedy would be illusory for many and if such a reason were assigned to dismiss a writ petition, it is justice that could be the casualty. In a given case where a party attempts to bypass a statutory redressal mechanism without any of the exceptional situations being shown to exist, most certainly the dicta in Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) would apply but such decision may not be relied upon by a respondent at the admission stage of every case to have his opponent's case dismissed as if the High Courts have no jurisdiction to receive writ petitions against any order that the National Commission is empowered to pass under the CP Act. 115. The preceding analysis is based on our own understanding of what the law is, which a Judge ought to bear in mind while deciding an objection to the maintainability of a writ petition that is raised relying on Cicilly Kallarackal (supra). This analysis has been necessitated in view of a decision of the Supreme Court of recent origin in State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. reported in, (2018) 3 SCC 85 . There the relevant High Court had interfered with measures taken by a secured creditor without abiding by the caution sounded in previous decisions of the Supreme Court including Satyawati Tondon (supra). Relevant paragraphs from Mathew K.C. (supra), read as follows : "15. There the relevant High Court had interfered with measures taken by a secured creditor without abiding by the caution sounded in previous decisions of the Supreme Court including Satyawati Tondon (supra). Relevant paragraphs from Mathew K.C. (supra), read as follows : "15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. ***" *** 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engg. Works (P) Ltd, (1997) 6 SCC 450 , observing: '32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.' 116. Under the Constitutional regime, each High Court judge is duty bound to apply the law that is well-settled by judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have stood the test of time. Any departure from Cicilly Kallarackal (supra) must be supported by cogent reasons, after giving it the respect the same deserves but such decision may not be preferred to other decisions of high authority, which we have referred to above, mechanically. 117. We end our discussion expressing hope and trust that the individual writ petitions/civil revisional applications/writ appeal shall be heard on its own merits by the appropriate Bench having determination in the light of all the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and bearing in mind that the National Commission's orders are not under challenge in any of these proceedings. 118. We record our sincere appreciation for the able assistance rendered by each learned advocate for their address to enable us answer the reference appropriately.