ORDER : These petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, raise an interesting issue as to whether the period of limitation provided in the Service Rules for initiation of judicial proceedings would apply in cases where criminal proceedings are sought to be launched against retired public servants, especially to proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘P.C. Act for short’). 2. The petitioners in these batch of petitions were working in the Regional Transport Offices at various places in the State and in various capacities such as First Division Assistant, Office Superintendent etc. It appears that Sri B.N.Jagadeesh (one of the respondents) presented a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 06.08.2012 against unknown persons, alleging that many Officers in the Department of Customs, Regional Transport Offices in Karnataka had nexus with dealers of vehicles, middlemen and owners of imported vehicles and were involved in multi-crore racket causing loss to the exchequer. It was alleged in the complaint that vehicles are brought to India by illegal means by fabricating and manipulating the Bill of Entry, Bill of Lading etc. and are presented before the Custom officials and in collusion with the Custom officials, such imported vehicles were brought into India on short payment of custom duty and thereafter with the connivance of the officials in the RTOs again short payment of duty/taxes were made, thereby causing huge revenue loss to the exchequer. Therefore, criminal prosecution was sought to be initiated under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Indian Penal Code. 3. The learned Magistrate/Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption referred the complaint for investigation to the Superintendent of Police, Lokayukta under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. Pursuant to the order of investigation, the Deputy Superintendent of Police registered FIRs under Sections 8 and 12 of P.C. Act. The petitioners were asked to appear before the Lokayukta Police and submit their reply with reference to the vehicle, along with particulars where it was alleged that there was short levy of penalty/duty/tax. 4. The petitioners were asked to appear before the Lokayukta Police and submit their reply with reference to the vehicle, along with particulars where it was alleged that there was short levy of penalty/duty/tax. 4. The petitioners seem to have given a reply denying the allegations and raising various grounds including the fact that they were not the authority to collect tax, the internal audit department would have raised objections if there was short levy, it was found after verification that on detection of short levy the owners of the vehicle were called upon to make good the short payment and the short payment was made good subsequently etc. However, the Investigating Officer proceeded to file chargesheets against the petitioners for offences under Section 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act read with Sections 120B and 420 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). It is under these circumstances that the petitions are filed seeking quashment of the chargesheets and all further proceedings before the Special Judge. 5. Learned Counsels for the petitioners would submit that chargesheets against 28 RTO officials were filed by the Lokayukta Police. Since it was found that five officials of the RTO were still in service, the Lokayukta Police sought for sanction of prosecution against such Officers. The State Government, by Government order bearing No. xxxx 2016, Bangalore dated 19.09.2016 declined to sanction prosecution on the ground that two of the Officers had already retired and with respect to the three serving Officers, it was found that it is not a case where sanction could be granted for prosecution. It is pertinent to note that Petitioners No.1,2,3,12 and 14 in the connected Writ Petition are the persons against whom the State Government declined to sanction permission to prosecute. The State Government further held that if there is short collection of penalty/duty/tax, the same could be collected under Section 8(a) of The Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (for short ‘Taxation Act’). The State Government specifically noticed that Section 21 of the said Act would also provide that no suit, prosecution, or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything done in good faith or intended to be done under the Act. The State Government specifically noticed that Section 21 of the said Act would also provide that no suit, prosecution, or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything done in good faith or intended to be done under the Act. The State Government further held that if it was found that any of the serving Officers were found guilty of misconduct, departmental enquiry could be initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. 6. The learned Counsels for the petitioners would therefore submit that prosecution against five of the Officers was dropped since sanction to prosecute was not granted by the State Government. When prosecution against five Officers was dropped, for the reasons assigned by the State Government, prosecution against the petitioners should also have been dropped for the very same reason. The learned Counsels submit that continuation of the prosecution against the petitioners who stand on the same footing as the five Officers against whom prosecution was dropped, is a clear violation and discrimination. In the same breath it was contended that since prior sanction as contemplated under Section 19 of the P.C. Act and Section 197 of Cr.P.C. has not been obtained to prosecute the petitioners, the chargesheet and all further proceedings are required to be quashed. 7. Most importantly, it was submitted that Rule 214(3) of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘KCSRs’ for short) prohibits any judicial proceedings being initiated whether before retirement of a Government servant or during his reemployment with respect to a cause of action which arose or in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution. While referring to the Government Order dated 19.09.2016 (supra), it was submitted that the State Government had noticed that the incidents had occurred more than 816 years ago and therefore, sanction to prosecute was declined. It is submitted that in view of the express provision of Rule 214(3), it was impermissible to allow judicial proceedings against the petitioners herein. The learned Counsels have further submitted that Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 214 of the K.C.S. Rs clarifies that judicial proceedings include criminal proceedings. It is submitted that in view of the express provision of Rule 214(3), it was impermissible to allow judicial proceedings against the petitioners herein. The learned Counsels have further submitted that Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 214 of the K.C.S. Rs clarifies that judicial proceedings include criminal proceedings. According to the said provision, judicial proceedings in respect of criminal proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the complaint or report of a police officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance is made. Having regard to the said provision, it is submitted that the initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners was clearly barred. It is submitted that the private complaint was registered on 06.08.2012 and FIR was registered on 14.08.2012, while the incidents are said to have taken place between the years 2003 and 2006. 8. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent Lokayukta Police would submit that the criminal prosecution is initiated under the P.C. Act, for offences punishable both under the P.C. Act as well as the IPC. It is submitted that Rule 214 of the K.C.S. Rs will not come to the rescue of the petitioners. It is submitted that Rule 214 protects a Government servant from recovery of pecuniary loss from pension. It is submitted that since the criminal proceedings are initiated under the P.C. Act and IPC, punishment is sought to be imposed if the petitioners are found guilty and no recovery is sought to be made from the pension which have accrued to the petitioners. In this regard, the learned Counsel places reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.K.Chowdekar Vs. State of Karnataka in W.P.No.101291/2013 which was disposed of on 21.08.2013 at Kalaburagi Bench. The learned Counsel submits that Rule 214(3) fell for consideration before the Division Bench. It is submitted that in the said case, action was sought to be initiated against the Government servant in the year 2011 with respect to alleged misappropriation of funds between 1995 to 2000. It was submitted that the Division Bench held that the words ‘judicial proceedings’ appearing in Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 214 was applicable to civil proceedings only and not criminal proceedings. 9. At this juncture, the learned Counsels for the petitioners would point out to two decisions of another coordinate Division Bench in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. It was submitted that the Division Bench held that the words ‘judicial proceedings’ appearing in Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 214 was applicable to civil proceedings only and not criminal proceedings. 9. At this juncture, the learned Counsels for the petitioners would point out to two decisions of another coordinate Division Bench in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. V.H.Agarkhed And Another in RFA No.200041/2016 decided on 30.05.2017 and in the case of G.R.Muttagi and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others in RFA No.200024/2017 which was decided on 09.08.2017. The learned Counsels would submit that the Division Benches have noticed Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 214 which would define ‘judicial proceedings’ to include both civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings. It is therefore submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of A.K.Chowdekar (supra) was rendered without noticing Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 214. In this regard, while placing reliance on Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur reported in (1989) 1 SCC 101 , it was submitted that a decision should be treated as given perincuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of the statute or of a Rule having the force of a statute. However, learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that the decisions in the cases of V.H.Agarkhed and G.R.Muttagi have been rendered in civil proceedings where recovery was sought to be made. It is submitted that there is no extensive consideration of Rule 214 in the context of a criminal proceedings initiated under the P.C. Act. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that there is no limitation prescribed in the P.C.Act for initiation of criminal proceedings and rightly so, because corruption is a crime against the society and there cannot be a situation where such acts of corruption are detected long after the acts have been perpetrated and State is prevented from prosecuting perpetrators of crime. 11. On the question of immunity available to the Government servants, as noticed in Section 21 of the Taxation Act, it was submitted with reference to Narayan Diwakar Vs. C.B.I, a decision of the Delhi High Court reported in 129 (2006) DLT 258, that the expression ‘good faith’ in such provisions clearly bring out the mind of the legislature that the protection granted to Government servants are for acts done by them in discharge of their official duties. C.B.I, a decision of the Delhi High Court reported in 129 (2006) DLT 258, that the expression ‘good faith’ in such provisions clearly bring out the mind of the legislature that the protection granted to Government servants are for acts done by them in discharge of their official duties. Converse of good faith is bad faith or mala fide and therefore, if a question arises as to whether the action taken against a Government servant was on the ground that he or she has acted in bad faith, the immunity of the provision will not be available and the question can be gone into by any competent authority in the course of trial. 12. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that insofar as the period of limitation for offences punishable under the IPC is concerned, the same stands covered by Section 468 of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that Section 468 of Cr.P.C. provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Subsection (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. Sub-section (2) of Section 468 provides that if the offence is punishable with fine only, the limitation shall be six months; if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, then the period of limitation is one year; whereas if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation is three years. The learned Counsel submits that the punishment for offences under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 to 12 of P.C. Act are in excess of three years and therefore, no period of limitation is prescribed and applicable for taking action with respect to the provisions under the P.C. Act. 13. Heard the learned Counsels for the petitioners, respondent and perused the petition papers. 14. The issue seems to be covered by a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath reported in (1989) 1 SCC 321 . The respondent therein was posted in the Industrial supply section of the Directorate of Industries, where various types of raw materials including wax and important licences were dealt with. A First Information Report was lodged against the respondent on 19.06.1980. The respondent approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for quashing of the FIR. The respondent therein was posted in the Industrial supply section of the Directorate of Industries, where various types of raw materials including wax and important licences were dealt with. A First Information Report was lodged against the respondent on 19.06.1980. The respondent approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for quashing of the FIR. When the petition was dismissed, the final report was filed on 28.08.1985. In the meantime, the respondent retired as Superintendent, Directorate of Industries, Punjab, on 30.09.1983. The respondent once again approached the High Court for quashing of the final report and prosecution against him. The prayer was allowed by the High Court and the prosecution was also quashed relying on a decision in the case of Des Raj Singal Vs. State of Punjab (1986) 1 Punj LR 82 (P&H). When the State of Punjab filed an SLP calling in question the decision of the High Court, leave having been granted and when the Appeal was heard, the Apex Court noticed that Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules had been interpreted by the High Court that the said Rule placed an embargo on initiating judicial proceedings for prosecution of a Government servant on the expiry of four years of the cause of action or the event referred to in the said Rule. 15. It is noticeable that Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules are pari materia with Rule 214 (2) and (3) of the KCSRs. Therefore the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with similar submissions as are made in the present case. The Apex Court observed that the Rules were framed by the Governor in exercise with the powers conferred on by him by Article 309 of the Constitution and Rule 2.2 which occurred in Chapter II of Volume II of the Rules dealt with ‘Ordinary Pension’. 16. The Apex Court held that Article 309 empowers making of Rules relating to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State. 16. The Apex Court held that Article 309 empowers making of Rules relating to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State. Further, while dealing with the question as to whether the said Rule, if it is to be interpreted as one placing an embargo on institution of judicial proceedings as against a person referred to therein for prosecution in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution, the Apex Court held that in the normal course what falls within the purview of the term “conditions of service” may be classified as salary or wages including subsistence allowance during suspension, the periodical increments, pay scale, leave, provident fund, gratuity, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service, compulsory or permanent retirement, superannuation, pension, changing the age of superannuation, deputation and disciplinary proceedings. Whether or not a Government servant should be prosecuted for an offence committed by him obviously cannot be treated to be something pertaining to conditions of service. 17. It was further held that making a provision that a Government servant, even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or P.C. Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counterproductive. It was held that it is likely to be an incentive not for efficient work but for committing offences including embezzlement and misappropriation by some of them at the fag end of their tenure of their service and making an effort that the offence is not detected within the period prescribed for launching prosecution or manipulating delay in the matter of launching prosecution. It was also noticed that a Government servant may escape prosecution at the initial stage for want of evidence but during the course of prosecution of some other person, evidence may be led or material may be produced which establishes complicity and guilt of such Government servant. It was also noticed that a Government servant may escape prosecution at the initial stage for want of evidence but during the course of prosecution of some other person, evidence may be led or material may be produced which establishes complicity and guilt of such Government servant. By that time period prescribed, if any, for launching prosecution may have expired and in that event on account of such period having expired the Government servant concerned would succeed in avoiding prosecution even though there may be sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by him. Therefore, the Apex Court went on to hold that such a situation cannot be created by framing a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution laying down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service. 18. The Apex Court also dealt with the contention that the embargo aforesaid is a condition of service calculated to ensure a person mentioned in the said Rule, peace of mind after retirement. It was held that such a submission would on the face of it be discriminatory and thus arbitrary inasmuch as if peace of mind in old age can be a good ground for immunity from prosecution for offences committed by a person, there seems to be no reason why such immunity may not be available to all old persons and should be confined only to Government servants. It was held that the Government servants cannot constitute a class by themselves so as to bring their case within the purview of reasonable classification, if the purpose of granting immunity from prosecution is ensuring peace of mind in old age. 19. The Apex Court also dealt with the contention that since the immunity is granted under a proviso, the scope of a proviso was also required to be dealt with. It was held that even though the proper function of a proviso is to expect or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause which but for the proviso would be within that clause, it was held that even if in a give case a proviso may amount to a substantive provision, making of such a substantive provision will have to be within the framework of Article 309, under which the Rules have been enacted. If a Rule containing an absolute or general embargo on prosecution of a Government servant after his retirement for grave misconduct or negligence during the course of the service does not fall within the purview of laying down conditions of service under Article 309, such a provision cannot in the purported exercise of power under Article 309 be made by either incorporating it in the substantive clause of a Rule or in the proviso thereto. 20. Keeping in mind the above discussion, the Apex Court held that the third proviso to Rule 2.2 cannot be interpreted as laying down an absolute or general embargo on prosecution of a Government servant if the conditions stated therein are satisfied. It was held that even if on first impression the said Rule may appear to be placing such an embargo it has to be interpreted by taking recourse to the well-settled rule of reading down a provision so as to bring it within the framework of its source of power without, of course, frustrating the purpose for which such provision was made. It was therefore held that Rule 2.2 which can be called a substantive clause reserves to the Government the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government, if, in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement. 21. The decision in State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath (supra) has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Keshav Ramchandra Pangare And Another, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 479 . 22. However, what is noticeable is that the Apex Court, in Kailash Nath, finally dismissed the Special Leave Appeal filed by the State of Punjab while noticing that the FIR in that case was lodged on 27.08.1985, i.e., after about six years of the accrual of the cause of action or taking place of the events in 1979 and after about three years even from 31.10.1982 when the respondent retired from service, therefore held, it would be futile to pursue a stale matter. Therefore, the Apex Court was of the opinion that the order of the High Court quashing the first information report as against the respondent therein deserved to be maintained, though on a different ground. 23. In that view of the matter, as already noticed, the occurrence of the events and accrual of cause of action in the present set of matters were between the years 2003 and 2006. The private complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. was registered on 06.08.2012, while the FIR was registered on 14.08.2012. It is an admitted fact that except petitioners No.6 and 7, in Crl.P.No.5130/2016, who retired in the year 2013 and 2015 respectively, the other petitioners had already retired, way back in the year 2006-2007. Some of the petitioners continue to serve. However, as noticed earlier the State Government had declined to sanction prosecution against the serving employees. It was also observed in the Government Order that two of the employees had already retired and therefore the State Government declined to sanction prosecution. Further more, the State Government, while pointing out to Section 8(a) of the Taxation Act, had observed that if there was short collection of tax, the difference could be collected from the owners of the vehicles. It is an admitted fact that the owners of the vehicles were called upon to pay the difference amount and the same has been paid by them. Consequently, the criminal proceedings against the owners of the vehicles were quashed by this Court. Further, as held by the State Government, since Section 21 of the Taxation Act protects the Officers who acted in good faith, and since sanction to prosecute was declined by the State Government, the same benefit is required to be granted to the petitioners who are similarly placed. Some of the petitioners have already got the benefit of the order passed by the Government. 24. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitions deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. Consequently, the order passed by the Special Judge in Spl.C.C.No.315/2016 taking cognizance of the private complaint and all further proceedings in that regard, as against the petitioners herein, stand quashed and set aside.