JUDGMENT : A.S. BOPANNA, J. 1. The appellant herein was the petitioner in WP(C) No. 641/2013 and WP(C) No. 3853/2012. He is before this Court in this intra Court appeal claiming to be aggrieved by the order dated 6.1.2015 passed in the said writ petitions. Through the said order the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions. 2. The petitioner at the first instance had filed the petition in WP(C) No. 3853/2012 being aggrieved that the respondents had not disposed of the appeal filed on 21.6.2012 against the order dated 29.2.2012 removing him from service. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the appellate authority had disposed of the appeal by the order dated 5.12.2012 upholding the removal order dated 29.2.2012. In that view, the said order was assailed in WP(C) No. 641/2013. Hence, both the writ petitions were taken up together as they related to the same subject matter and the consideration of the subsequent writ petition alone was sufficient. On such consideration, the learned Single Judge has upheld the removal order by dismissing the writ petition. It is in that light, the petitioner is before this Court in this appeal. 3. The brief facts are that the petitioner was working as an Assistant in the Tinsukia Branch Office of the respondent Corporation. He had been confirmed in service on 15.5.90. While working as such, he had submitted his resignation on 18.11.93 claiming that he could not continue in service due to the illness of his mother. The resignation was not accepted by the respondents as a departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings had been initiated against the appellant on the charge of misappropriation of premium amount to the tune of Rs. 2,66,697.22. However, on the submission of his resignation, since he had remained absent from 18.11.93, another departmental proceedings was initiated for unauthorized absence. When this was the position, the appellant was acquitted in the criminal proceedings and through directions issued by the Court he was allowed to join duty on 6.8.2001. When this was the position, the appellant is stated to have unauthorisedly absented himself to duty from 6.9.2004 onwards without obtaining leave and since it was more than 90 days at a stretch it amounted to abandonment of post. When this was the position, the appellant is stated to have unauthorisedly absented himself to duty from 6.9.2004 onwards without obtaining leave and since it was more than 90 days at a stretch it amounted to abandonment of post. In that view, a charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.1.2018 was issued by invoking the Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short, 'Regulations, 1960') alleging that the appellant had abandoned his post. Though no reply had been received, proceedings were held but the appellant did not participate in the same. Since from the date of absence from service on 6.9.2004, the appellant had not returned back either on the date of the show cause notice issued on 12.1.2008 or till the proceedings were held between October and December, 2010 and more than six years had elapsed from the date of unauthorized absence, the same amounted to abandonment of service and, as such, his removal from service under Regulation 36(1)(f) of the Regulations, 1960 was ordered. It is in that background, the removal order was issued which is assailed. 4. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that he had never received the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice and, as such, he could not reply to the same. He alleged that he had received the letter dated 28.1.2011 only after the preliminary hearing in the proceedings had been concluded whereby he had been asked to submit his comments. In that light, he attempted at seeking an opportunity to put forth his contentions in the enquiry, but he was denied an opportunity. On the date fixed on 29.8.2011 he appeared before the enquiry officer and submitted his reply to the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice whereby he denied that he was absent from duties since 6.9.2004 for more than 90 days at a stretch without information. The respondents who had filed their affidavit-in-opposition before the learned Single Judge had referred to the financial irregularity committed by the appellant. It was stated that when the matter was being investigated pursuant to the complaint dated 29.9.93, at that stage, for the first time the appellant had stopped attending his duties unauthorisedly by submitting his resignation letter dated 18.11.93 though the same had not been accepted. It was stated that when the matter was being investigated pursuant to the complaint dated 29.9.93, at that stage, for the first time the appellant had stopped attending his duties unauthorisedly by submitting his resignation letter dated 18.11.93 though the same had not been accepted. In the criminal case registered on 30.8.94 in GR No. 185/94, though he was acquitted through the order dated 25.1.99, it was not an honourable acquittal but was due to benefit of doubt granted to him. Notwithstanding the criminal proceedings, during the pendency of the same a charge-sheet dated 19.4.95 was issued for misappropriation of the premium amount. The said proceedings was, however, stayed pending consideration of the criminal proceedings. Though neither the appellant was relieved by accepting his resignation, nor was he suspended or terminated, he continued to remain absent and, as such, a charge-sheet dated 22.2.97 was issued but the same was not pursued. When this was the position, the appellant re-joined his duty on 6.8.2001 in view of his acquittal in the criminal proceedings and directions issued by the Court. As indicated, though he was acquitted in the criminal proceedings, the disciplinary action relating to misappropriation was pending and, in that light, the appellant once again stopped attending his office from 6.9.2004 without prior information. It is in that background, since even as on the date of issue of the show cause notice dated 12.1.2008 more than 3 years had elapsed, it was treated as abandonment of service in terms of Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the Regulations, 1960. 5. The learned Single Judge having taken note of the rival contentions and on making a detailed consideration, was of the opinion that the appellant had remained absent unauthorisedly from duty for more than seven years from 6.9.2004 even upto 29.2.2012 i.e. the date on which final order was passed and since the appellant had not responded to any official communication, has held that the removal from service is justified. The learned Single Judge in that regard had also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board -vs- T.T. Murai Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken a serious view on unauthorized absenteeism and had upheld the action of the employer. It is in that light, the writ petition was dismissed. 6. It is in that light, the writ petition was dismissed. 6. The learned senior counsel for the appellant as also the learned counsel for the respondents have reiterated the contentions as per pleadings that had been put forth before the learned Single Judge. In that light, though reference is made to the various proceedings between the parties, the consideration in the present context would relate to the removal order dated 29.2.2012 and the validity or otherwise of the same. While taking note of this aspect, since the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to stress on the aspect that there was no detailed enquiry with opportunity to the appellant, the earlier proceedings relating to the allegation of misappropriation and the manner in which the appellant had remained absent from 1993 till reinstatement in the context of acquittal in the criminal proceedings due to which he was directed to be re-instated in the year 2001, would also assume some importance to indicate the manner in which the appellant had conducted himself throughout the earlier part of his service, but at present is seeking to make out a case of lack of opportunity. In that light, reference to the present instance would have to be taken note in the background in which the proceedings for removal from service was initiated. In that regard, a reference to the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.1.2008 would disclose that the same alleges that the appellant has unauthorisedly absented himself from duty since 6.9.2004 without sanctioned leave and without information to the office. It further states that the said absence attracts the provision of Regulation 39(4)(iii) read with explanation of Regulations, 1960. Having stated so, the disciplinary authority has indicated that he is, therefore, inclined to draw an inference that the appellant has abandoned his post in terms of Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the said Regulations and provisionally propose to impose the penalty of removal from service. In that background, the appellant was asked to show cause as to why such inference of having abandoned the post should not be drawn. In the circumstance where penalties are provided under Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 and presently since the provision invoked is 39(4)(iii) of the Regulations, in order to appreciate the contention as put forth with regard to lack of opportunity, it would be appropriate to notice Regulation 39 in its entirety. In the circumstance where penalties are provided under Regulation 39 of Regulations 1960 and presently since the provision invoked is 39(4)(iii) of the Regulations, in order to appreciate the contention as put forth with regard to lack of opportunity, it would be appropriate to notice Regulation 39 in its entirety. For better appreciation, the same is extracted herein-below: "Penalties : 39. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, [any one or more of] the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed [by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I] on an employee who commits a breach of regulations of the Corporation, or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation, or conflicting with the instructions or who commits a breach of discipline, or is guilty of any other act prejudicial to good conduct - (a) censure; (b) withholding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period; (c) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; (e) compulsory retirement; (f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (g) dismissal. (2) No order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in clauses (b) to (g) of sub-regulation (1) supra, shall be passed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I without the charge or charges being communicated to him in writing and without his having been given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such charge or charges and of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. (3) The disciplinary authority empowered to impose any of the penalties, (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) may itself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a board of enquiry or an enquiry officer for the purpose. (3) The disciplinary authority empowered to impose any of the penalties, (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) may itself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a board of enquiry or an enquiry officer for the purpose. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-regulations (1) and (2) above- (i) where a penalty is imposed on an employee on the grounds of conduct which had led to a conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the authority concerned is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in this regulation; or (iii) where an employee has abandoned his post, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." 7. Since the charge-sheet dated 12.1.2008 did not evoke any response from the appellant, the preliminary hearing of the enquiry proceedings was conducted and even in the said proceedings held on 28.10.2010, 23.11.2010 and 15.12.2010, the appellant did not participate. The enquiry officer took note of the documents available on record and based on such proceedings, the disciplinary authority furnished the same to the appellant through the communication dated 22.1.2011 calling for his comments. It is only at that stage the appellant submitted his reply dated 18.2.2011 and sought to put forth the reason of his daughter's examination and the health condition of his wife to seek re-opening of the proceedings. In that circumstance, the enquiry officer through the communication dated 12.8.2011 indicated that the hearing as a final opportunity is fixed on 29.8.2011 and on failure to appear, the matter would be proceeded ex-parte. In that circumstance, the appellant made a detailed reply dated 29.8.2011 seeking to contend that he had submitted a leave application but there is no specific communication rejecting his leave application and, in that light, sought to contend that the absence is not unauthorized. The proceedings were accordingly concluded on 29.8.2011 and on the reply being submitted by the appellant on 16.9.2011, the order dated 29.2.2012 of removal from service was passed. The proceedings were accordingly concluded on 29.8.2011 and on the reply being submitted by the appellant on 16.9.2011, the order dated 29.2.2012 of removal from service was passed. What is also to be noticed herein is that as already indicated, though the proceedings for financial irregularity were pending, in view of his removal from service on 29.2.2012, the said proceedings were also closed through the communication dated 2.3.2012 issued to the appellant. 8. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended that a detailed enquiry proceedings by providing opportunity to the appellant has not been conducted and the only basis on which the order of removal has been passed is the proceedings of the preliminary hearing and the enquiry which does not satisfy the requirement of compliance of the principles of natural justice. In that light, it is contended that the appellant was not unauthorisedly absent and, therefore, an opportunity ought to have been granted to establish this position. It is the contention that the appellant was attending to the duties on all days after he had been put back in service in the year 2001 and he was made to sign his attendance in a loose sheet. He, therefore, contends that the action taken is not justified. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel has relied on the following decisions : (i) in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar -vs- Union of India and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178 , wherein in a case relating to misconduct of unauthorized absence/absenteeism, it was held that for sustaining such allegation it must be proved that the unauthorized absence was willful and if the absence is due to compelling circumstance under which it is not possible to report for or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful and the employee cannot be held guilty of misconduct. In the said case, it was noticed that neither the enquiry officer, nor the appellate authority had found the absence to be willful. The consideration was in a case where the employee was absent for 36 days, 32 days and 234 days during three consecutive periods. In the said case, it was noticed that neither the enquiry officer, nor the appellate authority had found the absence to be willful. The consideration was in a case where the employee was absent for 36 days, 32 days and 234 days during three consecutive periods. (ii) in the case of UCO Bank and Another -vs- Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257 , wherein in respect of a charge-sheet which was issued to the officer under the Regulations of the Bank, it was observed that the said Regulations provide for the mode and manner in which a disciplinary proceeding is to be initiated and it expressly provides for service of charge-sheet and a preliminary enquiry is not contemplated under the 1976 Regulations. It was held that if such preliminary enquiry is held the same is only for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction on the part of the disciplinary authority to initiate a proceeding and not for any other purpose. In that light, it was held that though the employer may resort to a preliminary enquiry, in the absence of statutory Rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceedings has been initiated. (iii) in the case of Roop Singh Negi -vs- Punjab National Bank and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein in a matter relating to a departmental enquiry action was taken against the employee for theft of bank draft book, in the facts it was noticed that the orders of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed will have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should be assigned. Though the provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceedings, principles of natural justice are to be followed. The suspicion howsoever high can under no circumstance be held to be a substitute for legal proof. As the orders passed will have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should be assigned. Though the provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceedings, principles of natural justice are to be followed. The suspicion howsoever high can under no circumstance be held to be a substitute for legal proof. (iv) in the case of Allahabad Bank and Others -vs- Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 , wherein while considering a matter relating to departmental proceedings and the scope for judicial review, it is held that though the writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by departmental authority on the basis of the evidence available on record, it is equally true that in a case where the finding recorded is unsupported by any evidence and if the findings is such that no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. Interference is also to be made in cases where there is violation of the principles of natural justice. (v) in the case of Nirmala Jhala -vs- State of Gujarat and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 301 , wherein it was taken note that a Constitution Bench had held that the purpose of holding a preliminary enquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in the preliminary enquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held. 9. Having noticed the legal position as enunciated in the decisions as referred to above, it is evident that essentially the Regulations governing a particular establishment would guide the manner in which disciplinary proceedings are to be conducted. Even in the absence of the same, the principles of natural justice no doubt is required to be complied. In that background, the nature of the charge and the manner of consideration made would vary from case to case and in the course of judicial review an appropriate decision keeping in view all aspects is required to be taken. Even in the absence of the same, the principles of natural justice no doubt is required to be complied. In that background, the nature of the charge and the manner of consideration made would vary from case to case and in the course of judicial review an appropriate decision keeping in view all aspects is required to be taken. In that background, it would be necessary to also take note of the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of State of Rajasthan and Another –vs. Mohd. Ayub Naz, (2006) 1 SCC 589 , wherein it is held as hereunder: "9. Absenteeism from office for a prolonged period of time without prior permission by government servants has become a principal cause of indiscipline which has greatly affected various government services. In order to mitigate the rampant absenteeism and willful absence from service without intimation to the Government, the Government of Rajasthan inserted Rule 86(3) in the Rajasthan Service Rules which contemplated that if a government servant remains willfully absent for a period exceeding one month and if the charge of willful absence from duty is proved against him, he may be removed from service. In the instant case, opportunity was given to the respondent to contest the disciplinary proceedings. He also attended the enquiry. After going through the records, the learned Single Judge held that the admitted fact of absence was borne out from the record and that the respondent himself had admitted that he was absent for about 3 years. After holding so, the learned Single Judge committed a grave error that the respondent can be deemed to have retired after rendering of service of 20 years with all retiral benefits which may be available to him. In our opinion, the impugned order of removal from service is the only proper punishment to be awarded to the respondent herein who was willfully absent for 3 years without intimation to the Government. The facts and circumstances and the admission made by the respondent would clearly go to show that Rule 86(3) of the Rajasthan Service Rules is proved against him and, therefore, he may be removed from service. ......................................................................................................... 13. Therefore, we do not propose to issue a direction to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. The facts and circumstances and the admission made by the respondent would clearly go to show that Rule 86(3) of the Rajasthan Service Rules is proved against him and, therefore, he may be removed from service. ......................................................................................................... 13. Therefore, we do not propose to issue a direction to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. As pointed out by this Court in the above judgment and in order to appropriately mould the relief and to shorten the litigation, we ourselves impose the punishment of removal from service which was imposed by the disciplinary authority in the instant case which, in our view, is the appropriate punishment.". 10. Further, in the case of Syndicate Bank -vs- General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association And Another, (2000) 5 SCC 65 , it is held as hereunder: "18. The Bank has followed the requirements of clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that Dayananda has voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the Bank to hold any inquiry before passing the order. An inquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contended that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. Assuming for a moment that inquiry was necessitated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to Dayananda and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation of his absence from duty and did not report for duty within 30 days of the notice as required in clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement.". 11. In the instant case, as noticed from the Regulations extracted supra, the provision as contained in Regulation 39(1) refers to the punishments as provided and sub-Regulations (2) and (3) provide with regard to the procedure and manner in which the proceedings are to be taken up before a penalty is imposed. Notwithstanding the same, sub-Regulation (4) provides for the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders in the eventuality of what is indicated therein occurring. Notwithstanding the same, sub-Regulation (4) provides for the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders in the eventuality of what is indicated therein occurring. Such procedure could be followed in respect of cases where (i) an employee is convicted on criminal charge; (ii) in cases where it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the Regulations or (iii) where an employee has abandoned his post. Therefore, in respect of the events as contemplated in Sub-Regulation (4) of Regulation 39, what is required is satisfaction of the disciplinary authority keeping in view the circumstances for which the same is provided. For example, if an employee is convicted in a criminal charge, there would be nothing further to be done by the disciplinary authority and what would be required is only the action. Similarly, in respect of abandonment of service, it would be the act of the employee in not attending the duty for more than 90 days at a stretch thereby abandoning his post and limited to that aspect a consideration would be necessary only to ascertain whether the absence is for more than 90 days, unlike in a circumstance if the charge was of unauthorized absence as a misconduct which may not be similar to abandonment of the post and the enquiry required will be full-fledged. In that background, though it is extensively argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the nature of the enquiry conducted being only preliminary and there being no full- fledged enquiry, the same in our opinion would not vitiate the action taken in the instant facts. As noticed, the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice was not issued to the appellant alleging unauthorized absence as it would be done in other cases as a misconduct i.e. if it was less than 90 days as provided and which may also require a consideration with regard to proportionate punishment to be imposed. However, in the instant case since it is alleged that the appellant had absented himself for more than 90 days, Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the Regulations, 1960 was invoked and the disciplinary authority had drawn an inference that the appellant had abandoned his post which in fact is a self inflicted cessation of jural relationship of employer and employee by a voluntary act on the part of the employee. In that circumstance, in order to bring the jural relationship to an end in accordance with law and formalize the same, the show cause notice is issued and if in fact he had not abandoned the post, it was for the appellant to have replied and shown material to indicate that there was no such abandonment for period contemplated. The repeated notices dated 05.06.2007, 27.07.2007, 23.08.2007 and 27.09.2007 issued to the appellant to resume duty had not evoked any response and even at that point the absence was for about 3 years. It is in that background when the appellant had not chosen to reply to the show cause notice as well, a preliminary hearing was held to enable the disciplinary authority to satisfy himself that there was such abandonment of the post. 12. The very fact that the appellant had not taken part in the proceedings would disclose that he was not attending his duties and also the fact that the appellant has chosen to address the communication dated 18.2.2011 stating that he had not received the charge-sheet only when the communication dated 28.1.2011 was issued, will indicate that the appellant though being aware of the charge-sheet was evading the proceedings and when the process was about to be brought to an end, he has raised the issue with regard to his absence not being unauthorized though the factum of absence is not seriously contested. Even though the reply dated 29.8.2011 was submitted by the appellant, the appellant has sought to contend in the said reply that he had submitted a leave application and that he has not received any specific communication rejecting his leave application and it is deemed to have been allowed by the concerned authority. In that view, he has contended that the allegation of unauthorized absence is not justified. Having contended so in the reply, it is presently being contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that he was attending to the duties and he was signing the loose sheets of the attendance register which is self contradictory. Even if the contention that he had submitted leave application is taken note and when the appellant himself states that there is no rejection communicated to him, there is no approval of the leave application either. Even if the contention that he had submitted leave application is taken note and when the appellant himself states that there is no rejection communicated to him, there is no approval of the leave application either. In the circumstance when he had remained absent from 6.9.2004 and continued so even as on the date of his reply on 29.8.2011, if there is no material to indicate that he was working, his abandonment of the post is to be presumed. Even to substantiate the contention that attendance register was being signed, there is no material to show that salary was being drawn. In that situation when 4 years had elapsed from the date of absence on 6.9.2004 to the date of show cause notice on 12.1.2008 and when 7 years had elapsed on the date of his reply on 29.8.2011, finding out as to whether the absence was willful or not as held in the decisions relied on, by holding a detailed enquiry also does not arise. Hence, none of the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellant would be of any assistance in the present facts. On the other hand, decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent would be more apposite. 13. In the above background, the grievance put forth that action taken is based only on the preliminary enquiry and that the enquiry officer has not recorded a finding would pale into insignificance if the very nature of the show cause notice issued is taken into consideration and the Regulation that was invoked and the manner in which the disciplinary authority had in that light formed his opinion is taken note. In such circumstance, when because of such long absence of about 7 years there is presumption of abandonment of the post, the onus was on the appellant to avail the opportunity and bring on record the material to indicate that he was actually attending duty even during that period or that he had authorisedly remained away. In the instant case, the very nature of the earlier proceedings that had taken place against the appellant would disclose that the appellant was habituated to abandoning his duties. In the instant case, the very nature of the earlier proceedings that had taken place against the appellant would disclose that the appellant was habituated to abandoning his duties. If in that background the entire aspect is taken into consideration, neither the proceedings held is vitiated, nor the order of removal passed which ultimately is not in the nature of punishment, but is in the nature of bringing to an end the jural relationship due to the very act of the employee of abandoning the post is vitiated. In that backdrop, taking note of the consideration made by the learned Single Judge, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge so as to call for any interference. 14. In that view, for the discussions made above, the appeal is found to be without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.