JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ application has been filed seeking quashing of the F.I.R. registered at Navrangpura Police Station, District Ahmedabad, being C.R. No.I-40/2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('the IPC' for short). 2. The brief facts of the case leading to filling of the present application are as under : 2.1. It is the case of the applicant that the applicant is a citizen of India, but he is residing in Thailand since past two decades and more. The applicant is having his well established business in Thailand and he is a national of Thailand. The applicant was possessing a Hotel in Bangkok, viz. Erawan Hotel located in Thailand. It is also the case of the applicant that respondent No.2 herein was interested in purchasing the said hotel belonged to the applicant and accordingly, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was executed between the parties i.e. the respondent No.2 and the applicant at Bangkok, Thailand. When the respondent No.2 defaulted in making timely payment, the applicant, as per the covenants of the MoU forfeited the amount deposited by the respondent No.2 and sold his hotel to another buyer at lower consideration and sustained loss. 2.2. On the other hand, despite being defaulted in making timely payment, the respondent No.2 preferred a suit before the trial court at Thailand demanding the amount so deposited by him with the applicant pursuant to the MoU dated 12.08.2010. Thereafter, the trial court of Thailand decreed the suit in favour of respondent No.2, which was challenged by the applicant before the Appellate Court at Thailand. The Appellate Court allowed the Appeal filed by the applicant and the same was challenged by the respondent No.2 before the Supreme Court of Thailand. The Supreme Court of Thailand vide order dated 05.06.2015 was pleased to dismiss the Appeal, which was filed by the respondent No.2, confirming the order passed by the Appellate Court, Thailand, wherein it has been observed that there is no requirement to refund the amount to the respondent No.2 considering the fact that on account of default committed by the respondent No.2, the applicant had to sustain loss. It is alleged by the applicant that the issue of claiming refund of the forfeited amount pursuant to the MoU dated 12.08.2010 was ultimately in favour of him. It is alleged by the applicant that the issue of claiming refund of the forfeited amount pursuant to the MoU dated 12.08.2010 was ultimately in favour of him. However, respondent No.2 filed a frivolous F.I.R. against the applicant at Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad, Gujarat (India), being C.R.No.I-03/2016, wherein it has been alleged by respondent No.2 that the applicant fraudulently pocketed money, which was paid by him pursuant to the MoU. It is alleged by the applicant that the respondent No.2 based his claim on the premise of non-supply of some of the documents to him by the applicant. It is also alleged by the applicant that the respondent No.2 conveniently suppressed the aspect of long drawn civil dispute amongst them at Thailand arising out of the very same MoU and ultimate decision rendered therein in favour of him pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court, Thailand. 2.3. It is the further case of the applicant that pursuant to the F.I.R., which was lodged by the respondent No.2, a look-out corner notice was issued against the applicant and he was arrested by the police at Chennai Airport in India and thereafter, the applicant had filed bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No.1613 of 2016 before the City Civil & Sessions court, Ahmedabad, which was allowed and the applicant was enlarged on regular bail. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 had preferred Criminal Misc. Application No.1810 of 2016 seeking modification of the conditions of the order passed by the Sessions Court while granting regular bail to the applicant, which was dismissed by the Sessions Court vide order dated 06.05.2016. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju appearing for the applicant has submitted that the applicant also preferred a petition before this Court being Criminal Misc. Application No.13093 of 2016 wherein the applicant has prayed for quashment of the F.I.R. registered at Navrangpura Police Station, being C.R. No.I-03 of 2016 filed by the respondent No.2 whereby this Court vide order dated 09.06.2016 was pleased to stay further proceedings of the F.I.R. He has submitted that though this Court had stayed further proceedings of the F.I.R., the concerned Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet on 20.07.2016 and filing of the charge-sheet culminated into registration of Criminal Case No. 642 of 2016 against the applicant before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad. He has also submitted that the applicant thereafter preferred Criminal Misc. He has also submitted that the applicant thereafter preferred Criminal Misc. Application No.19592 of 2016 before this Court inter alia praying for suspension of the conditions imposed by the trial court while granting regular bail to the applicant, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 02.09.2016. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that this Court was pleased to hear application for the suspension of conditions imposed by the trial court, the main matter being Criminal Revision Application No. 450 of 2016 as well as the Application for quashing of the F.I.R being Criminal Misc. Application No.13093 of 2016 together. He has submitted that this Court vide order dated 02.09.2016 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.450 of 2016 staying further proceedings of Criminal Case No.642 of 2016 and this Court also passed a detailed order in Criminal Misc. Application No.13093 of 2016 noticing the lapse at the hands of concerned Investigating Officer, who, despite the orders passed by this Court staying further proceedings of the F.I.R., has filed charge-sheet, issuing notice to the said Investigating Officer. He has further submitted that the respondent No.2 thereafter being aggrieved by the order dated 02.09.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.19592 of 2016 preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.7012-7013/2016 under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, whereby this Court vide order dated 30.09.2016 dismissed Special Leave Petitions along with all interim applications. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that the applicant could travel back to Thailand pursuant to the order passed by this court on 02.09.2016 only after dismissal of the Special Leave petitions filed by the respondent No.2. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that the applicant could travel back to Thailand pursuant to the order passed by this court on 02.09.2016 only after dismissal of the Special Leave petitions filed by the respondent No.2. He has submitted that the applicant thereafter, pursuant to the directions of this Court, complied with each and every condition imposed by this Court vide order dated 02.09.2016, viz., (1) the applicant furnished an undertaking in respect of the property owned by the applicant in the State of Kerala stating that the applicant will not, in any manner transfer, assign or alienate the said property till he returns back to India (2) the applicant also deposited the original title deeds of his property situated in Kerala with the Registry of City Sessions Court at Ahmedabad, (3) the applicant also furnished the itinerary of his visit to Thailand before the Registry of City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad as well as the concerned Investigating Officer and also provided the details of his permanent address at Thailand, and (4) the applicant also filed a separate undertaking before the Indian Embassy at Thailand as well as before this Court ensuring due compliance of the order passed by this Court. He has also submitted that the applicant was also directed by this Court to furnish a solvent surety of Rs.2,50,000/- and a personal bond for the like amount and in compliance of the said conditions, the applicant had submitted his personal bond on 03.10.2016. 6. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that pursuant to the order passed by this court, the applicant gave a solvent surety and accordingly, the applicant had requested his lawyer to arrange for a surety and on the basis of that one Shri Amartbhai Amathabhai Parmar had agreed to become solvent surety of the applicant and he had obtained the certificate of the concerned Mamlatdar of Ahmedabad City on 30.09.2016 and the same was thereafter submitted in the proceedings pending before the trial court. He has submitted that the applicant is not versed with Gujarati language and the applicant is also not having any relatives in Gujarat and therefore, the applicant has requested the lawyer for arranging a solvent surety. He has submitted that the applicant is not versed with Gujarati language and the applicant is also not having any relatives in Gujarat and therefore, the applicant has requested the lawyer for arranging a solvent surety. He also submitted that the surety, thus, was arranged by the lawyer who was unknown to the applicant and therefore, the concerned lawyer who has arranged the surety has given a certificate to effect that he knows Shri Amratbhai Amthabhai Parmar and he is personally aware that he is possessing sufficient immovable property to enable to stand surety for the accused in the case to the extent of Rs.2,50,000/-. He further submitted that the time period granted by this Court pursuant to the order dated 02.09.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.19592 of 2016 was expiring and therefore, the applicant had to prefer another application seeking extension of time before this Court, which came to be registered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 4831 of 2017. 7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that it appears that the respondent No.2 had made an application before the Mamlatdar inquiring about the genuineness of the surety certificate of Shri Amaratbhai Amthabhai Parmar. He submitted that the concerned authority appears to have given a reply to the application so made by the respondent No.2 to the effect that no such surety has been issued by this office. He submitted that the respondent No.2 thereafter filed a complaint before Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad against the applicant requesting the authority to register the said complaint as an F.I.R. He also submitted that this Court vide order dated 17.02.2017, was pleased to allow Criminal Misc. Application No. 4831 of 2017 and extended the time for a further period of six months on the same conditions which were imposed on the applicant vide order dated 02.09.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.19592 of 2016. He further submitted that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.4831 of 2017, the applicant has deposited an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- before the trial court and also filed his fresh bond as well as filed a fresh solvent surety of on Shri Rameshbhai Lavjibhai Zala. 8. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Application No.19592 of 2016. He further submitted that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.4831 of 2017, the applicant has deposited an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- before the trial court and also filed his fresh bond as well as filed a fresh solvent surety of on Shri Rameshbhai Lavjibhai Zala. 8. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Raju for the applicant submitted that since the police authorities did not register an F.I.R. pursuant to the complaint given by the respondent No.2 dated 06.02.2017, the respondent No.2 had filed a petition before this Court being Special Criminal Application No.1426 of 2017, which was disposed of by not entertaining it. He submitted that the respondent No.2 thereafter appears to have filed an application before the trial court invoking Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') He also submitted that the said application so preferred by the respondent No.2 was not persuaded and therefore, the same was disposed of by the trial court by observing that the applicant so preferred by the respondent No.2 has become infructuous in view of the fact that an F.I.R. has already been registered against the applicant. He further submitted that despite the fact that this Court had issued directions, in the aforementioned Special Criminal Application No.1426 of 2017, the F.I.R. was registered by the Navrangpura Police Station. 9. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the respondent No.2 thereafter has filed an application before this Court being Criminal Misc. Application No. 6647 of 2017, inter alia, praying recalling of the order dated 17.02.2017 passed by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.4831 of 2017. He has submitted that this Court thereafter vide order dated 01.05.2017 was pleased to allow the application preferred by the respondent No.2 and was pleased to recall the order. He has also submitted that the said order was assailed by the applicant before the Apex Court by way of preferring Special Leave Petition (Cri.) No. 14727 of 2017, which was withdrawn on 10.07.2017. He has also submitted that the said order was assailed by the applicant before the Apex Court by way of preferring Special Leave Petition (Cri.) No. 14727 of 2017, which was withdrawn on 10.07.2017. He has further submitted that though this Court in clear terms had observed in the order dated 20.02.2017 passed in Special Criminal Application No.1426 of 2017 that the police should not be involved in this issue and it shall be the concerned Court who should examine the aspect of filing of fake solvency, the respondent No.2 filed a complaint against the applicant without disclosing the order passed by this Court and the concerned Investigating Officer registered the same as an FIR. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the prime accused Shri Parmar i.e. accused No.1 was known to the concerned lawyer who has certified that he is possessing sufficient valuable immovable property to enable to stand surety of the applicant and pursuant to the advise of the lawyer, the accused No.1 had remained the surety. He has submitted that from 30.03.2017 till today, the police would have certainly interrogated accused No.1 and the police would have gathered appropriate informations from him as to whether he knows the applicant or otherwise. He has also submitted that since the applicant was not knowing accused No.1 at all, there was no reason available with the Investigating Officer to arraign the applicant as an accused. He has further submitted that the Investigating Agency rather than to make the applicant as an accused and therefore also, the applicant has preferred the present application in view of the above referred circumstances. 11. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the petitioner has submitted that by virtue of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it has been provided that nothing in the Court shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent power of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process or to secure the ends of justice. He has submitted that Section 482 of the Code or Section 561(A) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which existed prior to 1973 did not confer any power, but to obviate any doubt, it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of this Court. He has submitted that Section 482 of the Code or Section 561(A) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which existed prior to 1973 did not confer any power, but to obviate any doubt, it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of this Court. It is further submitted that Section 223 of the government of India Act, 1935 enacted that jurisdiction of the existing Court and the power to judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice “shall be” the same as immediately before the commencement of Part-III of the Act. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ratilal Bhimji Mithani V/s. Collector of Customs, reported in 1967 SCR 926 , AIR 1967 SC 1639 . 12. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that basic offence of “forgery is denied in Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code, 1973 and Section 464 only defines one of the ingredients of forgery. Section 465 is the punishment for forgery. Section 466 forgery of records of court or of public register etc. Section 467 relates to the forgery of valuable security, will etc and Section 468 relates to forgery for the purpose of cheating. Hence, Section 463 is the basic offence and rest are of same genre. He has submitted that it is settled law that an offence of “Forgery” cannot lie against a person who has not created or signed the alleged forged document. It is submitted that in the instant case, it is the case of prosecution itself that the applicant has neither signed or created the said document and in fact the same was created by other accused. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sheila Sebastian V/s. R. Jawaharaj & Anr., reported in (2018) 7 SCC 581 . He has submitted that there is no allegation against the applicant that he either forged or signed the alleged documents. He has also submitted that there is no bar on exercise of powers of this Court retained by it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to entertain a petition and, if satisfied that there is no legal evidence to quash a charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section 120B of the IPC. He has also submitted that there is no bar on exercise of powers of this Court retained by it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to entertain a petition and, if satisfied that there is no legal evidence to quash a charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section 120B of the IPC. He has further submitted that for an act to constitute an offence of conspiracy as provided in Section 120B of the IPC, mere knowledge or discussion of an illegal act is not sufficient, the prosecution, even at the stage of filing of charge-sheet, stage of taking cognizance or at the stage of framing of charge must show the meeting of minds. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Baldev Singh V/s. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 564 . 13. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that in the instant case, the bare perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that: 1. The applicant is resident of Thailand for last 20 years and admittedly did not know any one in Gujarat. 2. The applicant only met the co-accused for the first and last time on the date of submissions of the alleged forged document. 3. The applicant did not know the surety namely Mr. Amaratbhai Amthabhai Parmar prior to 03.10.2016 and in fact met him through Mr. Nasir Khan, who was introduced to him by Mr. Nareshbhai Bhikhabhai Rabari (witness-Junior of Mr. Sandeep Kristy), who was referred to him by Mr. Umesh Patel. This has been confirmed by the statement of both Mr. Snehlataben and Mr. Nareshbhai Bhikabhai Rabari. 4. There is no statement of any witnesses or any other evidence on record that the document was made in the presence of the applicant or that he was aware that the document has been forged. 5. The only allegation against the applicant in the charge-sheet is that he had knowledge and in view of the dicta of the Apex Court the knowledge is not enough to prosecute him for the offence of forgery. 6. It is admitted fact that the surety was arranged by the lawyer of the applicant, who he trusted and now facing the instant prosecution for having reposed faith in his lawyer, who also happens to be a co-accused namely Mr. Praveen Pandya. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. 6. It is admitted fact that the surety was arranged by the lawyer of the applicant, who he trusted and now facing the instant prosecution for having reposed faith in his lawyer, who also happens to be a co-accused namely Mr. Praveen Pandya. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted. that the aforesaid facts which are clearly reflected in the charge-sheet itself would show that there was no meeting of mind between the accused and the applicant was in no way involved or aware or could be aware that the surety certificate produced by the surety was forged and fabricated. He has submitted that it is no more res integra that an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation V/s. Narayana Rao, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 512 . He has further submitted that the statement of the co-accused in the very same offence and made after the registration of the FIR made before the Police Officer is not a statement under Section 161 or 164 of the Code and hence, cannot even be filed along with a final report under Section 173(2) or (8) of the Code, much less from basis of an order of cognizance or further prosecution. 15. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that on bare perusal of the scheme of Section 173 of the Code would reveal that what can be filed along with the charge-sheet are documents enumerated in Section 173(5) of the Code. He has submitted that Section 173(5) of the Code provides that a statement recorded under Section 161 of witness that prosecution wishes to rely upon. This may also include statement of a witness under Section 164 and the statement of an approver. He has also submitted that however, there can never be a statement of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the said statement cannot be filed along with a final report by taking resort of Section 173(5) of the Code. This may also include statement of a witness under Section 164 and the statement of an approver. He has also submitted that however, there can never be a statement of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the said statement cannot be filed along with a final report by taking resort of Section 173(5) of the Code. He has further submitted that such statement of an accused would be hit by Section 162 of the Code as it is neither a statement under Section 27 or 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of R.P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 . 16. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the only evidence which was sought to be produced, and produced only during the course of hearing, and it is not clear whether such document formed part of the charge-sheet, it the alleged statements of two co-accused namely Mr. Nareshbhai Rabari the lawyer for the applicant. It was submitted by the State during the course of hearing that the said co-accused, who has recorded a statement on 11.01.2018 under Section 161 of the Code, has been made an accused and has made a third statement that the applicant advised him that he wanted the surety by “hook or crook”. He has submitted that the said statement has not been shown or provided to the counsel for the applicant. 17. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the statement of the all the witnesses in the instant case are liable to be declared not legal evidence because: 1. The statement under Section 161 of the witness cannot be a signed statement, in view of the bar under Section. 162 of the Code whereas in the instant case each and every statement is a signed statement; 2. The statement of the co-accused made to the Police is not a statement under Sections 161 or 164 of the Code and hence cannot be filed or looked at all at any stage of the prosecution; 3. The statement of the co-accused made during the police custody cannot be used as it is not covered by the exception as provided by Section. 10 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872; 4. The statement of the co-accused made during the police custody cannot be used as it is not covered by the exception as provided by Section. 10 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872; 4. The statement of the co-accused can be read if the same is a statement covered by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and leads to discovery of a new fact which was not in the knowledge of the Police Officer, which is also not the case presently; 5. The statement of the co-accused is not also a confession under Section 30 of The Indian Evidence Act and hence cannot be read against the Petitioner at any stage of the proceedings; 6. There is no corroborative evidence to support such a statement; 7. The statement of a co-accused is not a material which can be translated into a legally admissible evidence; 8. That, dehors the said statement of the co-accused, there is no other evidence which can be marshalled against the applicant; 18. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the a post arrest statement made to a Police Officer, whether it is a confession or otherwise, touching his involvement in the conspiracy, would not fall within the ambit of Sections of the Evidence Act, 1872. Hence the statement of Mr. Nareshbhai Rabari made after he was made an accused and during the course of his interrogation cannot be read against the applicant, whereas his statement made on 11.01.2018 when he was considered as a witness can be read in favour of the applicant. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat V/s. Mohammed Atik & Ors., reported in (1998) 4 SCC 351 . He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani @ Pappu Kalani V/s. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 337 . 19. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the present criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of law and has been instituted maliciously to avenge the personal vendetta of the respondent No.2 and in fact is a ploy to blackmail the applicant to recover from him the monies which have been forfeited in furtherance of the clause of Memorandum of Understanding. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex court in the case of Chandrapal Singh & Ors. V/s. Maharaj Singh and Anr., reported in (1982) 1 SCC 466 . He has also submitted that there is a direct finding of this Court interse parties that the respondent No.2 has initiated persecution which is abuse of process of law, which reads as under: “156. I am of the view that a purely civil dispute between the parties is sought to be given the colour of a criminal offence. It is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The delay in registering the FIR and initiating the criminal prosecution also should not be ignored or overlooked.” 19.1. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has further submitted that the criminal proceedings initiated against the present applicant are nothing but abuse of process of law with sole purpose of harassing the applicant. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana V/s. Bhajanlal & Ors., reported in 1992 suppl.(1) SCC 335. He has submitted that a view taken by a coordinate bench of this Court is binding on the coordinate bench of this Court that it is pertinent to note that, the Coordinate Bench of this Court had the initial stage, on a petition filed seeking registration of FIR, had taken a view that the present case does not require involvement of police and it would be appropriate for the court concerned to look into the matter. He has further submitted that the coordinate bench of this Court has already taken a view that the facts of the present case does not require involvement of police and hence, prosecution by the police and the said judgment was not assailed by the respondent No.2 and in fact has been accepted when he filed an application before the trial court on 21.02.2017 in terms of the observations made by this Court. 20. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has further submitted that allowing the impugned prosecution to continue would set the said order to naught and this Court would be taking a view contrary to the view taken by the coordinate bench of this Court, which has attained finality and which has been accepted by the respondent No.2. 20. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has further submitted that allowing the impugned prosecution to continue would set the said order to naught and this Court would be taking a view contrary to the view taken by the coordinate bench of this Court, which has attained finality and which has been accepted by the respondent No.2. He has further submitted that it is settled principle that the order of an earlier bench is to be followed so as to avoid conflicting views taken by coordinate benches of this Court. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh & Ors. V/s. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 . 21. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin appearing for the respondent-State submitted in the present case, the Investigating Officer has completed the investigation and has filed charge-sheet for the offences under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120(3) of the IPC on 06.10.2017 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.13, Ahmedabad, which has been registered as Criminal Case No.63659 of 2017. He submitted that the said charge-sheet has been filed against two accused namely (1) Pareshbhai Vinodbhai Mekwana; (2) Mahammadhanif Ahmedhusen Shaikh and four accused were shown absconding accused namely (1) Saleem Abdulraheman Eracham Veetil, (the applicant herein) (2) Amaratbhai Amathabhai Parmar; (3) Nasirkhan Bismillahkhan Pathan; (4) Pravin Pandya. He has also submitted that on filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued summons upon the accused by an order dated 06.10.2017. 22. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin for the respondent-State submitted that thereafter some of the absconding accused came to be arrested and, therefore, supplementary charge-sheet came to be filed on 04.04.2018 for the offences under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120(3) of the IPC before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.13, Ahmedabad, which has been registered as Criminal Case No. 32420 of 2018. He submitted that the said charge-sheet has been filed against two accused namely (1) Nasirkhan Bismillahkhan Pathan; (2) Kamaruddin S/o Abdulmajid Mahamadyakub Ansari, and three accused were shown absconding accused namely (1) Saleem Abdulraheman Eracham Veetil, (the applicant herein) (2) Amaratbhai Amathabhai Parmar; (3) Pravin Pandya. He submitted that the said charge-sheet has been filed against two accused namely (1) Nasirkhan Bismillahkhan Pathan; (2) Kamaruddin S/o Abdulmajid Mahamadyakub Ansari, and three accused were shown absconding accused namely (1) Saleem Abdulraheman Eracham Veetil, (the applicant herein) (2) Amaratbhai Amathabhai Parmar; (3) Pravin Pandya. He also submitted that on filing of the chargesheet, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued summons upon the accused by an order dated 04.04.2018. 23. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Amin further submitted that the statements of various witnesses have been recorded by the Investigating Officer, which show the involvement of the applicant in the offence. Reliance was placed on the statement of one of the witnesses - Nareshbhai Bhikhabhai Rabari, who has stated that the applicant had asked to obtain the solvency certificate whether genuine or false and accordingly the same was arranged. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the statement of Nasirkhan Bismillakhan Akbarkhan, who has stated that the applicant had asked him to obtain a solvency certificate. Mr. Amin submitted that the applicant was in dire need of solvency certificate and on his suggestion the fake solvency certificate was produced. 24. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin for the respondent-State has therefore submitted that since bogus solvency certificate was used by the present applicant for his benefit as per the order passed by this Court and, therefore, the present writ application in conspiracy with other co-accused have challenged the solvency certificate and, therefore, the applicant is shown as absconding accused in column No.2 in the charge-sheet. He, therefore, submitted that as the applicant is an absconding accused, on this ground alone, the present application is required to be dismissed. He further submitted that since the witnesses and co-accused have named the present applicant as accused and as the applicant is shown as an absconding accused at the time of filing of the charge-sheet, therefore, it requires investigation about the role played by the applicant as to how the offence is committed by the applicant. and, hence, the custodial interrogation of the applicant is also required and the F.I.R. requires investigation so far as the applicant is concerned and even other accused, who are not arrested. 25. and, hence, the custodial interrogation of the applicant is also required and the F.I.R. requires investigation so far as the applicant is concerned and even other accused, who are not arrested. 25. Learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in the case of Kailash Govindram Rathi vs State of Gujarat, 2008 (1) G.L.R. 750 , and submitted that at this stage the FIR cannot be quashed that there are only the statements of co-accused which is inadmissible in evidence. He submitted that the applicant is an absconder and the investigating officer is unable to record his statement, hence, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage. In support of his submission, learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the judgement of the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Dolatram Tekchand Harjani vs state of Gujarat, 2013 (3) GLR 2133 . Reliance was also placed by him on the judgemnet of the Apex Court in the case of Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi vs State of Maharashtra, 1980 (2) SCC 465 , for the proposition of law that under the principle contained in section 10 of the Evidence Act, once a conspiracy to commit an illegal act of one conspirator becomes the act of the other. He submitted that there is gang of such persons who are indulged in such acts, hence it is submitted that the writ application not be entertained. 26. Finally, the learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel vs state of Gujarat, 2018 (3) SCC 104 and submitted that at this stage the evidence cannot be examined by this Court while exercising powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.. Thus, the learned Public Prosecutor has urged that in view of his submissions, the impugned FIR may not be quashed. 27. In response to the aforesaid submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju submitted that conspiracy cannot be proved by invoking section 10 of the Evidence Act, before the same is given effect. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Kumaranand V/s. Brij Mohan Lal & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 628 and in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) V/s. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, 2005 (11) SCC 600 . 28. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Kumaranand V/s. Brij Mohan Lal & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 628 and in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) V/s. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, 2005 (11) SCC 600 . 28. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the Ld. Public Prosecutor relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of “Dolatram Tekchand Harjani V/s. State of Gujarat and Another” reported in 2013 3 GLR 2133 to assert that the statement of the co-accused could be used at the stage of quashing to defend the prosecution. It is submitted that the said case has no application and does not lay down the proposition sought to be canvassed by the Ld. Prosecutor. It is submitted that the bare perusal of the said judgment would reveal that in the said case statement of the accused was the basis of FIR and the statement of the co-accused was not recorded after registration of the FIR sought to be quashed. 29. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raju for the applicant has submitted that the Ld. Public Prosecutor had also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kailash Govindram Rathi & Ors. V/s. The State a Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2008) 1 GLR 750 to make the same proposition. He has submitted that a bare perusal of the judgment would reveal that it also does not lay down the law as sought to be canvassed by the Ld. Prosecutor. He has also submitted that the said judgment is the case relating to quashing at the initial stage when the investigation is at nascent stage whereas in the instant case, the investigation was completed and two charge sheets have already been filed and the Petitioner has been summoned and warrants of his arrest were issued on 8.11.2017. 30. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. B.B. Naik for learned advocate Mr. Savani appearing for the respondent no.2-complainant invited the attention of this Court to the observations made by the coordinate bench of this Court made in the order dated 01.05.2017 passed in Criminal Misc. Application (recall) No.6647 of 2017 filed by the Respondent no.2 for recalling the order dated 17.2.2017 granting the extension of regular bail on the ground of filing forged and fabricated solvency certificate. Application (recall) No.6647 of 2017 filed by the Respondent no.2 for recalling the order dated 17.2.2017 granting the extension of regular bail on the ground of filing forged and fabricated solvency certificate. He submitted that all the contentions which are raised in the writ application were raised before the coordinate bench and the same are considered and dealt with while allowing the application for recall. He submitted that the applicant had also filed Special Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court, which was withdrawn on 10.07.2017. Thus, he submitted that the contention raised by the applicant that the production of the fabricated solvency certificate was the act of surety only, was rejected by this Court, hence it is not open for the applicant to contend the same before this Court in the present writ petition. 31. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Naik reiterated the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh Amin that the writ application cannot be entertained only on the ground that the applicant is absconding. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the judgement of this Court in a judgment in case of Nadirkhan Babakhan Navabkhan Vs. State of Gujarat, 2004 CrL 3200, wherein it has been held that when the charge-sheet is filed against the arrested accused, the petitioner is shown as absconding accused and, therefore, it is obvious that there would not be any evidence at that point of time with the Investigating Agency except the statement of the co-accused because the petitioner was not available for investigation and, hence, the proceedings cannot be quashed and, therefore without investigation, the involvement of the petitioner there or not cannot be considered. It is also held that at that stage, the petitioner can submit application under Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for discharge. He, therefore, submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment and in the facts of the present case also, the investigation has not commenced as the petitioner is not available and is absconding accused. 32. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the oral as well as written submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties. The documents and the judgments as pointed out them are also perused. 33. 32. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the oral as well as written submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties. The documents and the judgments as pointed out them are also perused. 33. The following facts are established from the record : (a) The FIR being C.R No.I-03/2016 filed against the applicant by the respondent no.2, culminated into three applications which were filed by the applicant. (1) Criminal Revision application no.450/2016 filed against the order dated 6.5.2016 rejected the Misc. Application No.1613 of 2016 for bail. (2) Criminal Misc. Application No.13093 of 2016 praying for quashing the aforementioned FIR. (3) Criminal Misc. Application No.19592 of 2016 praying for suspension of the conditions imposed by the trial court while granting the bail. The same was partly allowed vide order dated 2.9.2016 by modifying certain conditions. (b) By the judgment and order dated 16.11.2017 passed by this Court in both the Criminal Misc. Application (quashing) No.13093 of 2016 and Criminal Revision Application no.450 of 2016, the coordinate bench of this court quashed the proceedings of Criminal Case No.642 of 2016 arising out of FIR No.3 of 2016. The same was challenged by the respondent no.2 by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) Nos.1230-1231 of 2018, which was dismissed on 19.02.2018. (c) In the meantime, the applicant preferred Criminal Misc. Application No.4831 of 2017 seeking leave of this court for leaving India for six months which was granted vide order dated 17.02.2017. (d) The respondent no.2, thereafter, filed the Criminal Misc. Application (recall) No.6647 of 2017 for recalling the order of extension dated 17.2.2017 on the ground that the applicant has produced a forged and fabricated solvency certificate in pursuance to the order dated 26.4.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.1613 of 2016. (e) By the order dated 01.05.2017, the coordinate bench of this Court recalled the order dated 17.02.2017 granting extension to the applicant. (f) The aforesaid facts have culminated into the impugned FIR being I-CR No.40/2017 lodged by the respondent no.2 at Navrangpura Police Station. (g) It is not in dispute that a charge-sheet is filed in furtherance to the impugned FIR. The first was filed on 06.10.2017 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.13, Ahmedabad, which has been registered as Criminal Case no.63659 of 2017. The same is filed against two accused and four accused, including the present applicant are shown as absconding. (g) It is not in dispute that a charge-sheet is filed in furtherance to the impugned FIR. The first was filed on 06.10.2017 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.13, Ahmedabad, which has been registered as Criminal Case no.63659 of 2017. The same is filed against two accused and four accused, including the present applicant are shown as absconding. After some of the absconding accused were arrested a supplementary charge sheet has been filed on 04.04.2018 for the offences under sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120b of the IPC before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.13, Ahmedabad, which has been registered as Criminal Case No. 32420 of 2018. The charge-sheet has been filed against two accused and three accused are shown absconding which includes the present applicant. Thus, unquestionably, the applicant is an absconder and he has not made himself available for the investigation. 34. In the order dated 01.05.2017, passed by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application(Recall) No. 6647 of 2017, while recalling the order of extension of bail, this Court has observed thus: “18. Though much fervently an attempt is made on the part of the respondent no.2 to disassociate himself from the affidavit of the professional surety, the fact remains that he had taken advantage of such surety in claiming that the order of this Court had been complied with. The respondent no.2 was quite aware of the fact that unless such certificate is adduced to the trial court, he could not have been permitted to travel abroad. To say now at this stage that this was an act of the surely himself and the applicant had nothing to do with it, is not acceptable nor palatable to this Court.” Thus, the coordinate bench of this Court while passing the order of recall has declined to accept the contention of the applicant that the act was of the surety and he had nothing to with the same. The aforesaid observations have become final and after detail scrutiny of the facts and this Court has recalled the order dated 17.02.2017. 35. The investigation also prima facie reveals the complicity of the applicant in the offence. The contention raised by the applicant that no offence of forgery is established against him and the surety and the advocates are responsible does not merit acceptance at this stage. 35. The investigation also prima facie reveals the complicity of the applicant in the offence. The contention raised by the applicant that no offence of forgery is established against him and the surety and the advocates are responsible does not merit acceptance at this stage. The applicant cannot resile from the fact that he is the beneficiary of the surety and the solvency certificate produced by him. The same are yet to be examined by adducing evidence in the trial proceedings. 36. The proposition of the applicant that the statement of the co-accused is not admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act is not palatable at this stage when the investigation is yet to be completed. Such statement can be considered for further corroboration. The court cannot scuttle the investigation prematurely at treating such statement as evidence at the stage of investigation does not arise. 37. In the petition filed for quashing under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., where the accused was absconding and charge sheet was filed qua other accused, this Court in the case of Nadirkhan Babakhan Navabkhan Pathan (supra) has observed thus: “In view of the fact that petitioner was not available at the time of investigation, charge-sheets qua other accused were required to be submitted within the stipulated time into the court. Had this not been done by the investigating agency, it is possible that other accused in the cases may claim default bail and hence, charge-sheets qua the other accused were correctly submitted and since the petitioner was not available, his name was shown as absconding accused. Merely because of the fact that charge-sheets were submitted qua the accused who were available for investigation does not mean that investigation qua the present petitioner was completed or he can take benefit by evading investigation. Since the name of present petitioner was shown as absconding accused, it means that he was not available for interrogation or investigation and hence, it would be in the fitness of things that investigating agency be permitted to carry out investigation in the matters for reaching the roots of the offences. Since the name of present petitioner was shown as absconding accused, it means that he was not available for interrogation or investigation and hence, it would be in the fitness of things that investigating agency be permitted to carry out investigation in the matters for reaching the roots of the offences. Since the only evidence available against the petitioner is the clue given by the co-accused to the Investigating Officer, it is the duty of the petitioner to help the investigating agency for the same rather than requesting the Court at this stage under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaints or deleting his name from the respective charge-sheets.” 38. In the case of Dolatram Tekchand Harjani(supra) this Court in a case where the accused was absconding has expressed the following view: “The learned APP appears justified in contending that it is only on completion of investigation process that it may become clear as to whether any amount as alleged was paid or not and whether it paid from the residence of the accused No. 3, i.e. present petitioner or not. So far as the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is passed with reference to oral evidence during the trial and in connection with the application made under Section 227 seeking discharge from prosecution. In the said decision, the Court has not held that the statement of co-accused cannot be considered as clue or information for initiating or conducting investigation and that, therefore, the said decision does not help the petitioner to support the relief prayed for in the present petition viz. that the investigation and the FIR/charge-sheet may be quashed. 12. It is also relevant to consider that the petitioner, according to the submission by learned APP, is absconding and investigation officer has not been able to record his statement. 13. The information related to the alleged offence came to the knowledge of the complainant - a police officer - during investigation of other offence, consequently he filed the complaint/FIR and the investigation is in progress. 14. 13. The information related to the alleged offence came to the knowledge of the complainant - a police officer - during investigation of other offence, consequently he filed the complaint/FIR and the investigation is in progress. 14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that according to the submission by learned APP that the petitioner is absconding and his whereabouts are searched coupled with the fact that the petitioner's case and request for anticipatory bail also did not find favour with the Court and anticipatory bail petition by the petitioner has been rejected and consideration of material on record and the submissions by learned counsel for the petitioner and by learned APP bring out a plain fact situation that the material and details which are presently available are incomplete and inadequate to lead the Court to even prima facie conclusion that any investigation is not justified and the process of investigation, should be terminated. 15. From the available facts and material, it cannot be concluded that the complaint is filed maliciously and/or that there is no need for justification for further investigation. 16. This case does not appear, at this stage, one of the rare or exceptional cases, wherein the Court would be justified in exercising power under Section 482 in quashing the investigation.” Thus, the writ application seeking quashing of the impugned FIR cannot be quashed in wake of the fact that the applicant is an absconder and he has not yet presented himself for facilitating the investigation. 39. On the bedrock of the aforesaid reasoning and observations, this court does not deem it necessary to deal with other contentions with regard to conspiracy since the applicant is absconding and the investigation is still in progress. This court in the present proceedings under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. neither can act as an investigating agency nor an appellate authority to embark upon the evidence. In the case of Dineshbhai (supra), the Supreme Court while examining the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has observed thus: 25. This court in the present proceedings under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. neither can act as an investigating agency nor an appellate authority to embark upon the evidence. In the case of Dineshbhai (supra), the Supreme Court while examining the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has observed thus: 25. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the Complainants finding force therein whereas we do not find any merit in the submissions urged by the learned counsel appearing for the accused persons. 26. The law on the question as to when a registration of the FIR is challenged seeking its quashing by the accused under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code and what are the powers of the High Court and how the High Court should deal with such question is fairly well settled. 27. This Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. ( AIR 1982 SC 949 ) had the occasion to deal with this issue. Y.V. Chandrachud, the learned Chief Justice speaking 14 for Three Judge Bench laid down the following principle: “Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S.157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under S.157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 28. ………… 29. ………. 30. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possess to exercise while examining the legality of any First Information Report complaining commission of several cognizable offences by accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 31. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the 17 Complainants and visase-versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.” Keeping in mind the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment and on a thorough scrutiny of the records and proceedings of the cases, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case which necessitates the exercise of inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised. Hence, the writ application fails legal scrutiny and is hereby dismissed. FURTHER ORDER After the judgment was pronounced, learned advocate Mr. Kurven Desai has requested for extension of interim order and stay of the present order. The same is objected by the learned Public Prosecutor. Hence, the writ application fails legal scrutiny and is hereby dismissed. FURTHER ORDER After the judgment was pronounced, learned advocate Mr. Kurven Desai has requested for extension of interim order and stay of the present order. The same is objected by the learned Public Prosecutor. The applicant was not arrested because of the interim order restraining the respondent State of taking any coercive steps. The request is declined in view of the aforenoted observations and in wake of the fact that the applicant is an absconder. Besides, any direction for not arresting the accused/applicant would amount to an order passed under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. (vide AIR 2017 SC 373 ).