Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2337 (ALL)

Saharanpur Estates And Constructions v. Rent Control And Eviction Officer

2019-10-16

SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J. "Whether in view of the provision of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932, an unregistered firm can maintain a suit or a case for enforcement of statutory right under Section 29A(5) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972" is one of the main questions involved in the present writ petition. 1. Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the applicant-landlords/ petitioners and Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned senior advocate assisted by Sri Vishesh Rajvanshi, learned counsel for the tenant-respondent Nos.2 to 6. FACTS:- 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the original owner and landlord of the disputed immovable property being khasra plot No.800, area 0.584 hectares situate in village Daramilkana Ander Hadud Saharanpur, was one Sri Raja Ram son of Babu Moti Ram who had let out the disputed property to the respondent No.2 herein by a registered rent deed dated 12.12.1945 for a period of 50 years from 01.01.1946. Thus, the period of tenancy expired on 31.12.1995. After the death of the original owner and landlord Sri Raja Ram, the disputed property was inherited by his successors, namely the applicant-petitioner No.2 and proforma respondent Nos.7, 8 and 9. Thus, they became the owners and landlords of the disputed property. The owners and landlords formed a partnership firm, i.e. the petitioner No.1 herein by a partnership deed dated 01.09.2012 which includes the owners and landlords also as partners. The partnership firm and the owners and landlords filed an application under Section 29A of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'U.P. Act XIII of 1972') before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, which has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 13.04.2015, not on merits but on maintainability on two grounds - firstly, applicant-petitioner No.1 - partnership firm is not a registered partnership firm and, therefore, the partnership deed dated 01.09.2012 is not admissible in evidence under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1932') and, secondly, the landlord-tenant relationship is not proved. 3. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 13.04.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge (A)/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, the applicant-landlords/ petitioners have filed the present writ petition. SUBMISSIONS:- 4. 3. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 13.04.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge (A)/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, the applicant-landlords/ petitioners have filed the present writ petition. SUBMISSIONS:- 4. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioners submits as under: (i) Provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act 1932 has no application in the present set of facts inasmuch as the application under Section 29A of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, was filed by the applicant-petitioners for enforcement of a statutory right. It was not an application for enforcement of a contract. Even the rent contract under the rent deed dated 12.12.1945, has expired on 31.12.1995. (ii) The applicant-petitioner No.1 is the partnership firm consisting of true owners and landlords of the disputed property. The applicant petitioner No.2 is admittedly co-owner and landlord of the disputed property. Further, it is admitted case of the tenants-respondents that they were paying rent to the petitioner-landlords. Therefore, the tenant-landlord relationship was proved on record. But, without examining the facts, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer abruptly drawn conclusion that there is no landlord-tenant relationship. Such a finding is perverse and therefore, deserves to be set aside. (iii) The impugned order is wholly arbitrary and illegal and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed. 5. Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned senior advocate admits that the applicant-petitioner No.2 is the co-owner and the landlord of the disputed property but supports the impugned order. He submits that there was a rent agreement between the landlord and tenant-respondents dated 12.12.1945 and, therefore, the application filed by the applicant-petitioners shall be deemed to be an application for enforcement of a right under a contract dated 12.12.1945. He supports the impugned order. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:- 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties. 7. Undisputedly, the applicant-petitioner No.2 herein is the co-owner and the landlord of the disputed property. He is also partner in the petitioner No.1 firm along with other co-owners. It is also not in dispute that the respondent-first set was the tenant of the disputed property and was paying rent under the rent agreement dated 12.12.1945 to the owners and landlords. Thus, the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the impugned order that landlord-tenant relationship could not be proved by the applicant-petitioners, is perverse and wholly without application of mind. Therefore, this finding is set aside. 8. Thus, the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the impugned order that landlord-tenant relationship could not be proved by the applicant-petitioners, is perverse and wholly without application of mind. Therefore, this finding is set aside. 8. By the impugned order, the application of the applicant-petitioners under Section 29A of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 has been dismissed also on another ground that the partnership deed dated 01.09.2012, is not admissible and the application is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act 1932. This finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur is not wholly illegal but also shows his poor understanding of the provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act 1932 and Section 29A of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 9. Sub-Section (2) of Section 69 of the Act 1932 provides that "No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless firm is registered and persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firm as partners in the firm." Thus the bar created under Sub-Section (2) of Section 69 of the Act 1932, is only in respect of enforcement of a right arising from a contract. It does not bar filing of a suit by an unregistered firm for enforcement of statutory right. Section 29A(5) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972, gives a statutory right to the landlord or the tenant to move an application before the District Magistrate to determine the annual rent payable in respect of such land @ 10% per annum of the prevailing market value of the land, and such rent shall be payable, except as provided in sub-Section (6) from the date of expiration of the term for which the land was let or from the commencement of this section, whichever is later. This sub-Section (5) casts a statutory right duty the District Magistrate to adjudicate the application so filed by the landlord or the tenant. Thus, the application filed by the applicant-petitioners was for enforcement of statutory right and not for enforcement of a right arising from a rent agreement/contract dated 12.12.1945. Even the aforesaid rent agreement/ contract dated 12.12.1945 has expired by efflux of time on 31.12.1995. Thus, the application filed by the applicant-petitioners was for enforcement of statutory right and not for enforcement of a right arising from a rent agreement/contract dated 12.12.1945. Even the aforesaid rent agreement/ contract dated 12.12.1945 has expired by efflux of time on 31.12.1995. Therefore, the finding of the Additional District Magistrate (A)/ Rent Control Eviction and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur on the point of maintainability of the application of the applicant-petitioners for reason that the applicant petitioner No.1 is not an registered partnership, is wholly arbitrary, illegal and in conflict with the provisions of Section 69(2) of the Act 1932 and Section 29A of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 10. In M/s Raptakos Brett and Company Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) AIR SC 3085, Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the maintainability of suit filed by a registered firm in the context of provisions of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act 1932 and held that the suit filed by an unregistered firm is not barred under Section 69(2) of the Act 1932 if it is based on a statutory right or a common law right. It also observed that the right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right "arising from a contract" but was a statutory right conferred under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The decision in M/s Raptakos Brett and Company Ltd. (supra) was referred with approval in M/s Haldiram Bhujiawala and another v. M/s Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and another, (2000) AIR SC 1287. Similar view has been taken by a bench of this court in Punjab and Sind Banki and another vs. M/s. Manoram Agencies and others, (2008) 4 ADJ 248 . 11. For all the reasons afore-stated, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 13.04.2015 in Case No.1 of 1998 (M/s Saharanpur Estates vs. Saharanpur Cold Storage Ltd.) under Section 29A of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (A)/ Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. Matter is remitted back to the respondent No.1 to decide the aforesaid Case No.1 of 1998 in accordance with law, expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. Matter is remitted back to the respondent No.1 to decide the aforesaid Case No.1 of 1998 in accordance with law, expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. Order on Application No.9 of 2018 under Section 340, Cr.P.C. filed by the tenant-respondent Learned counsel for the tenant-respondent states that the application may be dismissed as not pressed. In view of the aforesaid, the application is dismissed as not pressed.