JUDGMENT : Sonia Gokani, J. 1. Issue notice returnable forthwith. Mr. Hirday Buch, learned advocate waives service of notice for and on behalf of respondent No. 1. 2. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India so also under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking to challenge the order dated 07.03.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gir Somnath at Veraval in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 below Applications Exh. 3 and Exh. 4. Factual Matrix: 3. Facts in nutshell are enumerated in the following paragraphs:- 4. The First Information Report in the instant case being C.R. No. I-51 of 1995 has been lodged by Shri Madanbhai Khemabhai Maru, a Royalty Inspector working at Veraval, who on an application given jointly by three person of Sutrapada with regard to the illegal excavation of limestone from the pastoral land situated at Taluka: Sutrapada, District: Gir Somnath, more particularly, land bearing Survey Nos. 1509, 1546, 1590 and 1591 initiated this section. A member of the Flying Squad, who is also signatory to the panchnama drawn at the place of offence, along with the other members of the Flying Squad visited the place of offence where they found around 38 to 40 excavated areas. Excavated limestones were allegedly supplied to the Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Limited ("the GHCL" for short). On working out the possible quantity of excavation and the sale of the same to the GHCL, it has been alleged in the FIR itself that the extent of illegal mining of limestone is to the tune of Rs. 2.83 crores quantity of which is around 2.83525 metric tonnes. 4.1 After due investigation, respondent No. 1 came to be chargesheeted along with one another accused, namely, Gordhanbhai Jethabhai Devaliya and they were charged for offences punishable under sections 379, 420 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 4.2 During the course of trial, the second accused passed away and, therefore, the case qua him got abated. 4.3 After availing the opportunities to both the sides, the trial got concluded where the judgment and order of conviction as well as sentence, came to be passed by the Court concerned. 4.2 During the course of trial, the second accused passed away and, therefore, the case qua him got abated. 4.3 After availing the opportunities to both the sides, the trial got concluded where the judgment and order of conviction as well as sentence, came to be passed by the Court concerned. 4.4 Respondent No. 1 is convicted for the offences punishable under sections 379 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment and order dated 01.03.2019 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sutrapada, District: Gir Somnath at Veraval and pursuant to this conviction under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, he is ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the period of 02 years and 09 months and is also ordered to pay fine of Rs. 2,500/- and in default to undergo 10 days of simple imprisonment. 4.5 After the petitioner was held guilty, he was called upon to make submissions on the quantum of sentence, where he has made a request for giving benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, as he had been a sitting member of the Legislative Assembly of the Constituency of Talala in the 2007 and is presently the elected MLA for the second time from the year 2014. He had made a request to the Court for giving benefit of these provisions. It is further the say of the petitioner State that the respondent the had criminal antecedents for having been involved in 07 cases, out of which, in 05 (five) antecedents, he has been acquitted on the ground of inadequate material of evidence. One is pending before the Court of Sessions at Veraval. 4.6 Learned Magistrate, while awarding the sentence on noticing involvement in the case of stealing/robbing natural resources of limestone valuing to an extent of Rs. 2,83,52,500/- (Rs. 2.83 crores rounded off) from the Government land, has chosen not to give the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the respondent and instead has awarded the sentence as stated above. 4.7 An application came to be preferred by respondent No. 1, below Exh. 268 before the Court of learned Magistrate requesting for bail on his deposit of fine of Rs. 2,500/-. He also made a request to grant bail for 30 days intending to file an appeal against the said judgment and order. 4.7 An application came to be preferred by respondent No. 1, below Exh. 268 before the Court of learned Magistrate requesting for bail on his deposit of fine of Rs. 2,500/-. He also made a request to grant bail for 30 days intending to file an appeal against the said judgment and order. On receipt of such application preferred under section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code, learned Magistrate ordered to release respondent No. 1 on bail on his furnishing bond of the like amount and sentence awarded against respondent No. 1 came to be suspended till the appeal period. 5. Respondent No. 1 preferred Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 on 05.03.2019 before the Court of Sessions at Veraval challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. 5.1 He also moved two different applications vide Exh. No. 3 and 4 praying for suspension of sentence as well as stay of conviction passed against him. Both the applications came to be heard on 07.03.2019 and the learned Sessions Judge, Gir Somnath at Veraval passed the following order on the very day:- "Heard learned advocates for both the parties. Read the application. Perused the impugned judgment and various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court produced by the appellant/accused. Considering the overall circumstances on the above, following order:- Conviction order passed by the trial Court is hereby stayed and suspended till final disposal of the appeal." 6. This order is the bone of contention and is impugned in this petition. The said order is challenged before this Court by the State of Gujarat urging inter alia that such order is unsustainable and untenable, since it provides no reasons at all. It has also referred to the evidence of various witnesses and other material to emphasis that the prosecution had relied on those evidence and which had on due appreciation of the same, led to the conviction and order of sentence and, therefore, to suspend not only the sentence but the conviction, more particularly, with the strong criminal antecedents, this Court need to interfere with the order and, therefore, the present petition is preferred with the following reliefs. 6.1 The relief as sought for by the petitioner are as under:- "9. 6.1 The relief as sought for by the petitioner are as under:- "9. The petitioner prays to this Hon'ble Court that: (a) Be pleased to set aside order passed by Learned Sessions Judge, Gir-Somnath-Veraval on 07.03.2019 below Exhibit 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 staying judgment and order of conviction dated 01.03.2019 ordered against respondent No. 1 by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sutrapada District Gir-Somnath Veraval in Criminal Case No. 133 of 2012. (b) During the pendency of this petition, be pleased to stay implementation, execution and operation of order dated 07.03.2019 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Gir-Somnath-Veraval in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 below Exhibit 3 and 4." Oral submission on behalf of litigating parties 7. This Court has heard Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General for the petitioner-State who has emphatically and vociferously argued before this Court that absence of reasons would mean complete violation of spirit of section 389(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code ("the Code" for short). Giving of the reasons by any Court for any adjudication is a must and is something very basic to the requirement of law. With no reasons, there is nothing to comprehend as to what weighed with the Court of law and that also affects heavily requirement of reflecting judiciousness of mind in adjudication process. Whether the conviction was necessary to be stayed or not is also not at all emerging on the record and contents of application would not fulfill the requirement of assigning reasons by the Presiding Officer. It is urged further that unless there exists exceptional circumstances, there would be neither any suspension of the conviction nor would such suspension be ever sustained if it is based on an order with no reasonings. It is urged further that unless there exists exceptional circumstances, there would be neither any suspension of the conviction nor would such suspension be ever sustained if it is based on an order with no reasonings. 7.1 Learned Advocate General has also briefly taken this Court through the evidence of witnesses of prosecution and other materials to point out that the first informant Shri Madanbhai Khemabhai Maru, the Royalty Inspector himself along with other officers when visited Sutrapada, not only had found the excavated areas having been dug illegally, but, eventually when the first informant chose to give his FIR, which was registered as the First Information Report C.R. No. I-51 of 1995 with Sutrapada police station for the offences punishable under section 379, 420 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, police has found sufficient material to submit the final report in the form of chargesheet and various witnesses also supported the version of the prosecution. He has taken this Court through the copies of the documents to urge the Court to appreciate as to how the evidence led and admitted has been sufficient enough for the Court to convict the person and, therefore, any attempt on the part of the appellate Court to suspend the conviction without any iota of reason would amount to travesty of justice. 7.2 Decisions sought to be relied upon by learned Advocate General for the State to substantiate his submission are as follows:- 1. K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, Chandigarh, (2001) 6 SCC 584 2. Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434 3. State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan and another, (2003) 12 SCC 432 4. State of Maharashtra, through CBI, Anti Corruption Branch, Mumbai vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384 . 5. Shyam Narain Pandey vs. State of Utar Pradesh, (2014) 8 SCC 909 6. Gouri Shankar Jha vs. The State of Bihar and other, (1972) 1 SCC 564 . 7. Haryana Financial Corporation and another vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another, (2002) 3 SCC 496 . 8. M.N. Sharma vs. CBI, passed by the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 813 of 2005. 9. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi vs. Roshan Lal Saini, (2012) 12 SCC 390. 10. Pepsi Foods Ltd. And another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 . 8. Per contra, has heard Mr. 8. M.N. Sharma vs. CBI, passed by the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 813 of 2005. 9. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi vs. Roshan Lal Saini, (2012) 12 SCC 390. 10. Pepsi Foods Ltd. And another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 . 8. Per contra, has heard Mr. B.B. Naik, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Hriday Buch, learned advocate for respondent No. 1, who has urged fervently that an overall view of the matter is required to be regarded by the Court. What is important for the appellate Court to consider is the personal liberty and the Court concerned has rightly suspended conviction based on no evidence. It is further the say of the learned Senior Advocate that the registration of the First Information Report was in the year 1995 at the time when the petitioner was not holding any position. Afterwards, due to bifurcation of the district, matter was dragged on. The second accused, in the process, also had passed away and eventually, this criminal trial resulted into the conviction and sentence for the period of 02 years and 09 months of respondent No. 1. It is further urged that there is no material worth the name on which the conviction can be sustained. He has also taken this Court through the deposition of witnesses which also include the Panch witnesses to urge that brother of the present petitioner was the Minister earlier and since he was from the opposition party, this prosecution is nothing, but, born out of political vendetta against the present petitioner. 8.1 It is also urged that under the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has equitable and discretionary jurisdiction. The entire gamut of facts proved before the Court concerned and the appreciation of material which had led to this conviction, shall have to be viewed by the Court so as to know that before the appellate Court, this judgment of conviction and sentence may not stand at all. It is also pointed out to the Court that the Circle Officer or the Talati of that area have not been examined and, therefore, whether the land itself is a pastoral land is itself the vital question, which has not been answered by the prosecution. The trial, since, has been vitiated the appeal is bound to succeed. It is also pointed out to the Court that the Circle Officer or the Talati of that area have not been examined and, therefore, whether the land itself is a pastoral land is itself the vital question, which has not been answered by the prosecution. The trial, since, has been vitiated the appeal is bound to succeed. There are inadmissible materials which are sought to be relied upon by the trial Court. It is further urged that no witnesses from the GHCL has supported the case and the person who has shot the letter from GHCL which has been admitted in the deposition of the first informant, has not been examined and therefore, the contents of that letter cannot be read into evidence. It is also urged that this Court shall also have to regard that continuing the sentence and conviction during the pendency of the appeal would leave very serious consequences, which are of irreversible nature and hence, the order impugned must not be interfered with. It is further submitted that it may also result into huge expenditure to the public exchequer and that shall need to be borne by the Court. 8.2 Learned Senior Advocate has relied on the following authorities for cementing his oral submissions:- 1. Mowu vs. The Superintendent, Special Jail, Nowgong, Assam and others, 1971 (3) SCC 936 . 2. Rangnath vs. Daulatrao and others, (1975) 1 SCC 686 . 3. Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and others, (1995) 2 SCC 513 . 4. Ravikant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bangali, (2007) 1 SCC 673 . 5. Lalsai Khunte vs. Nirmal Sinha and others, (2007) 9 SCC 330 . 6. Sashi Jena and others vs. Khadal Swain and another, (2004) 46 SCC 236. 7. Central Board of Trustees vs. Indore Composite Private Limited, (2018) 8 SCC 443 . 8. Maya Devi (Dead) through LRS. vs. Raj Kumari Batra (dead) through LRS and others, (2010) 9 SCC 486 . 9. Kranti Associates Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496. 10. Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and brothers, (2010) 410 SCC 785. 11. State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sardara Singh, (2008) 9 SCC 392 . 9. 9. Kranti Associates Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496. 10. Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and brothers, (2010) 410 SCC 785. 11. State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sardara Singh, (2008) 9 SCC 392 . 9. In rejoinder, learned Advocate General has urged that the limited scope of this petition is to consider as to whether mandate of section 389 of the Code has been complied with or not. When there are section specific judgments of the Apex Court, non-reasoned order cannot be sustained at all. He has also urged this Court that the decisions which have been relied upon by the other side would have no applicability in the given set of facts and circumstances and has emphasized that there could be no forensic examination by this Court nor could there be any intention on the part of the petitioner when it took the Court through briefly the evidence to act as an appellate Court. If there is violation of the mandate under section 389 of the Code, this Court needs to correct it as otherwise it would amount to abuse of process of and would lead to any Court passing an order, which would be arbitrary and without any check. It is further his version that without any reason even this Court would have no idea as to what had weighed with the appellate Court in suspending not only the sentence but also the conviction. 10. Having thus heard learned advocates for both the sides and also on thoughtfully and duly considering the material placed on the record so also on examining various judgments sought to be relied upon by both the sides, this Court deems it fit not to sustain the order impugned for the reasons which would follow hereinafter:- Law on Suspension of conviction and Sentence:- 11. At the outset, section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code profitably is required to be reproduced as under:- "389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release: Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail. (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall,-where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (3) Where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under Sub-Section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced." 11.1 The provision speaks of suspension of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal. The Court shall need to order that the convicted person be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing the bail where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a terms not exceeding three years or where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one and he is on bail. The Court shall need to order that the convicted person be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing the bail where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a terms not exceeding three years or where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one and he is on bail. It would be for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and to obtain the order of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1) and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail be deemed to be suspended. 12. The Apex Court in the case of K.C. Sareen (supra) was dealing with the appeal of the public servant convicted and sentenced for corruption charges, which was pending in the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the public servant since had wanted his conviction also to be suspended in order to aver the other fallout of the conviction, but, the High Court declined to oblige him though he moved the High Court twice for the said purpose. Since not entertained by the High Court, the appellant had moved the Apex Court. 12.1 The Apex Court held and observed that for a public servant convicted for corruption, order of conviction should not be suspended though sentence of imprisonment may be suspended till disposal of the appeal. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision. It also added that power to suspend conviction should be exercised by appellate or revisional court in very exceptional cases having regard to all aspects including ramification of such suspension. Considering all aspects including ramification of such suspension. 12.2 Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:- "11. The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter. 12. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction. 13. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision." 13. In the case of Gajanan and another (supra), again it was a question of suspension of sentence as well as conviction of the respondent public servant convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the High Court while entertaining the appeal. The Court held that in exceptional cases, such powers are to be exercised considering all aspects including the ramification of such suspension. The Court held that in exceptional cases, such powers are to be exercised considering all aspects including the ramification of such suspension. It further held that High Court had passed the impugned order only to enable the respondent to continue in service despite conviction, which cannot be said to be exceptional circumstances and, therefore, the order of the High Court was not sustained. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:- "4. Having perused the impugned order as also the judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen (supra), we find the High Court had no room for distinguishing the law laid down by this Court in K.C. Sareen's case (supra) even on facts. This Court in the said case held: "The legal position, therefore, is this : though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the Court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The Court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate Court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter" (Emphasis supplied) 5. In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen (supra), this Court has held that it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court should exercise such power of stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not taken into consideration any of the above factors while staying the conviction. It should also be noted that the view expressed by this Court in K.C. Sareen's case (supra) was subsequently approved followed by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Atar Singh and Anr. (2001 (10) JT (SC) 212)." 14. In the case of Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, similar question had arisen with the Apex Court holding that section 389 of the Code confers discretion on the appellate Court to decide the question of suspension of a conviction in a given case, but, in exercise of that discretion if the Court suspends conviction, it would always be open for the Apex Court to examine the correctness of exercise of that discretion and pass an appropriate order in the event the Apex Court comes to the conclusion that the discretion had not been properly exercised. In the given circumstances, it held that the High Court had mechanically passed an order of suspending the conviction. 15. In the case of Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that the power under section 389 of the Code must be exercised with great circumspection and caution and applicant must bring to notice of court all adverse circumstances or disqualifications likely to be suffered by him in case conviction is not suspended. If damage likely to be caused to applicant cannot be undone for non-suspension of conviction the only may such power be exercised. Pleadings of applicant must be scrutinized judiciously and, pros and cons have to be analysed and then conviction may be suspended, if required, after reasons are recorded in writing. If Court deems it necessary it may even impose conditions while suspending conviction to protect interest of other parties. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- "9. Pleadings of applicant must be scrutinized judiciously and, pros and cons have to be analysed and then conviction may be suspended, if required, after reasons are recorded in writing. If Court deems it necessary it may even impose conditions while suspending conviction to protect interest of other parties. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- "9. In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 513 , this Court dealt with the said issue elaborately and held that if, in a befitting case, the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended, or stayed, so that the convicted person does not have to suffer from a certain disqualification, provided for by some other statute, it may exercise its power in this regard because otherwise, the damage done cannot be undone. However, while granting such stay of conviction, the court must examine all the pros and cons and then, only if it feels satisfied that a case has infact been made out for grant of such an order, it may proceed to do so and even while doing so, it may, if it so considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are deemed appropriate, to protect the interests of the other parties. Further, it is the duty of the applicant to specifically invite the attention of the appellate court as regards the consequences, which are likely to follow, upon grant of such stay, so as to enable it to apply its mind fully to the issue, since under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C., the court is under an obligation to support its order in a manner provided therein, the same being, "for the reasons to be recorded by it in writing". xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 10. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Savabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673 , this Court held as under:- "It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative…….All these decisions, while recognizing the power to stay conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences." (emphasis added) 11. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 1003 , this Court held that the Appellate Court can suspend "an order appealed against", i.e. an order of conviction, only if the convict specifically establishes the consequences that may follow if the operation of the said order is not stayed. Stay of conviction must be granted only in a rare case and that too, only under special circumstances. (See also: State of Punjab v. Navraj Singh, AIR 2008 SC 2962 ; and CBI, New Delhi v. Roshan Lal Saini, AIR 2009 SC 755 ). 12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done." 16. In the case of Shyam Narain Pandey (supra), the appellant was convicted to life imprisonment. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done." 16. In the case of Shyam Narain Pandey (supra), the appellant was convicted to life imprisonment. On the ground that he would be deprived of his livelihood since he would have lost his job of the Principal and would be unable to participate in subsequent selection procedures conducted by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad if his conviction was not stayed, such prayer of staying conviction was made, when rejected, matter travelled to the Apex Court and it held that rejection of prayer of stay of conviction calls for no interference. 16.1 The Court held that the convict would be declared to be guilty of criminal offence by the Court of law on finding him guilty of charges against him. It further held that Court should be wary in staying conviction especially when offence alleged against convict is punishable with death or life imprisonment or for a period of not less than 10 years, or where offence involved is of moral turpitude. If conviction is stayed in such cases, it would have serious impact on public perception on integrity of judicial institution and would shake public confidence in judiciary. It is only in rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences resulting in injustice, when stay of conviction may be granted. It held considering nature of crime, the High Court rightly held that it was not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction. Relevant paragraphs are profitably reproduced as under:- "6. It may be noticed that even for the suspension of the sentence, the court has to record the reasons in writing under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. Couple of provisos were added under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. pursuant to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India and observations of this Court in various judgments, as per Act 25 of 2005. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. It was regarding the release on bail of a convict where the sentence is of death or life imprisonment or of a period not less than ten years. If the appellate court is inclined to consider release of a convict of such offences, the public prosecutor has to be given an opportunity for showing cause in writing against such release. This is also an indication as to the seriousness of such offences and circumspection which the court should have while passing the order on stay of conviction. Similar is the case with offences involving moral turpitude. If the convict is involved in crimes which are so outrageous and yet beyond suspension of sentence, if the conviction also is stayed, it would have serious impact on the public perception on the integrity institution. Such orders definitely will shake the public confidence in judiciary. That is why, it has been cautioned time and again that the court should be very wary in staying the conviction especially in the types of cases referred to above and it shall be done only in very rare and exceptional cases of irreparable injury coupled with irreversible consequences resulting in injustice. 7. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhabhouma S. Bagali, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the power to stay the conviction … "16.5...should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences". 8. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab and another, following Ravikant S. Patil case (supra), at paragraph-6, this Court held as follows: "6. The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow [pic] on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case." 9. In State of Maharashtra through CBI, Anti Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, referring also to the two decisions cited above, it has been held at paragraph-15 that: "15. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case." 9. In State of Maharashtra through CBI, Anti Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, referring also to the two decisions cited above, it has been held at paragraph-15 that: "15. …the appellate court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done." 10. In State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan and another, and Union of India v. Atar Singh and another, cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, this court had to deal with specific situation of loss of job and it has been held that it is not one of exceptional cases for staying the conviction." 11. In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant, the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed, etc. and has rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction." 16.2 In the case of Gouri Shankar Jha (supra), there was debate on assigning reasons while exercising powers under section 167(2) and section 344 of the Code. and has rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction." 16.2 In the case of Gouri Shankar Jha (supra), there was debate on assigning reasons while exercising powers under section 167(2) and section 344 of the Code. Both the provisions had been worked out in detail to hold that section 167 operates at a stage when a person is arrested and either an investigation has started or is yet to start, and that it cannot be completed within 24 hours. 16.3 Section 344 on the other hand shows that the investigation has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accused person may have committed the offence and further evidence may be obtained to enable the police to do which, a remand to jail custody is necessary. The fact that section 344 of the Code occurs in the chapter dealing with inquiries and trials does not mean that it does not apply to cases in which the process of investigation and collection of evidence is still going on. Therefore, non-giving of reasons separately may not do at the stage of invoking section 167 of the Code, whereas at the stage of section 344, that liberty is held permissible as sufficient material is available with the Court. 17. In the case of Haryana Financial Corporation and another (supra), the Apex Court held that the words in the judgment are not to be interpreted like statute and the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:- "19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statues, they do not interpret judgments. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statues, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton ( 1951 AC 737 at P. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." 18. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 19. In the case of Roshan Lal Saini (supra), there was a question of suspension of conviction where the issue was with regard to the permissible grounds of suspension and the Apex Court held that the ground that the public servant convicted for corruption would otherwise loose his job is not a permissible ground where recordence of reasons have been held to be mandatory requirement. 20. 20. On the part of the respondent, it has sought to rely upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mowu(supra), where the order of remand when was passed under section 388 of the Code, the question was with regard to recording of reasons after perusal of the remand report from the police and whether that satisfied the provisions of section 344 of the Code, the Court held and observed that passing of such order of remand would be based on a detailed police report explaining complicated nature of evidence, then would form the basis for the reasons and their perusal would amount to reasons of passing the order. Relevant paragraphs are as under:- "18. The next objection was that in passing the various remand orders the mandatory provisions of Section 344 of the Code, under which only those orders could be passed, were not followed in the sense that while passing the said orders the Magistrate did not record his reasons for doing so. It must, however, be remembered that so far as the remand orders passed by the District Magistrate, Kohima are concerned, the Code not being in force in Nagaland, the question of the provisions of Section 344 being strictly applied cannot arise. Even after the interim order passed by the High Court on January 19, 1970, and the record of the case in pursuance of that order having been transferred to Nowgong it is somewhat doubtful whether the provisions of the Code had to be strictly applied. As aforesaid, the State's application under Section 526 of the Code is not yet disposed of and there is, therefore, yet no final order transferring the case from the Court at Kohima to the Court at Nowgong. The interim order merely directed the records of "the Kohima Police Station Case No. 11(12)/69" to be sent to the District Magistrate, Nowgong only for the purpose of passing necessary orders with regard to the petitioner. No final order having yet been passed transferring the case, the case would still appear to continue to be Kohima case only authority given to the District Magistrate, Nowgong being to pass necessary orders in the meantime as regards the petitioner. The interim order in fact did not authorise the District Magistrate, Nowgong, to try the case. 19. No final order having yet been passed transferring the case, the case would still appear to continue to be Kohima case only authority given to the District Magistrate, Nowgong being to pass necessary orders in the meantime as regards the petitioner. The interim order in fact did not authorise the District Magistrate, Nowgong, to try the case. 19. Assuming, however, that Section 344 applies after the record was sent to Nowgong and the petitioner was produced before the Additional District Magistrate, Nowgong, the order-sheet shows that the Magistrate had before him the remand report of the concerned police officer. The affidavit of the Magistrate shows that the petitioner was produced before him every time he passed the remand order. The remand report would obviously contain a prayer for remand on the ground that the investigation and the collection of evidence has not yet been completed probably due to the dimensions of the case and the complicated nature of the evidence. These clearly would be the reasons for the order of remand. Therefore, when the order-sheet speaks of the Magistrate having perused the police report for remand, the reasons and the circumstances set out in the report would be the reasons for passing the orders of remand. Hence, it is difficult to say that Section 344 of the Code, assuming it applies, was contravened." 21. In the case of Rangnath (supra), the case of disposal of the statutory appeal where there was a failure to state the reasons, the Apex Court held under the administrative law that the failure to state the reasons is not vital when there is no determination or adjudication of facts involved. The decision rested on point of law. In the case of Rangnath (supra), the case of disposal of the statutory appeal where there was a failure to state the reasons, the Apex Court held under the administrative law that the failure to state the reasons is not vital when there is no determination or adjudication of facts involved. The decision rested on point of law. The Court noticed that it may not be possible in all cases to say that a non-speaking order is bad or invalid and on that account alone but when an order is liable to be challenged under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts do insist that an appeal of the kind filed by the appellant should be and ought to have been disposed of by a speaking order giving some reasons in its support, but, on the facts and in the circumstances of that case, the High Court did not feel convinced to give reasons, and in the opinion of the Apex Court rightly, did not set aside the order of the State Government and remitted back the appellant's appeal merely on that account, since there was no determination or adjudication of facts was involved. The decision of the case rested on the points of law. Relevant paragraph is as hereunder:- "7. It was not necessary for the State Government to give a personal hearing to the appellant or his authorised representative before disposal of his appeal. As has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court the State Government ought to have disposed of the statutory appeal of the appellant filed under section 2A(2) of the Abolition of Inams Act by a speaking order. It may not be possible in all cases to say that a non-speaking order is bad or invalid on that account alone but when an order is liable to be challenged under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, courts do insist that an appeal of the kind filed by the appellant should be and ought to have been disposed of by a speaking order giving some reasons in its support. But on the facts and in our circumstances of this case the High Court did not feel persuaded, and in our opinion rightly, to set aside the order of the State Government and remit back the appellant's appeal to them merely on that account. But on the facts and in our circumstances of this case the High Court did not feel persuaded, and in our opinion rightly, to set aside the order of the State Government and remit back the appellant's appeal to them merely on that account. No determination or adjudication of facts was involved. The decision of the case rested on the points of law. The High Court did not examine the question as to whether respondent No. 1 could not be a tenant of the appellant because of the reason that the Inam had been held to be a Watan Inam and consequently according to the appellant it was a service Inam. In the present proceedings the High Court pointed out that respondent No. 1 was admittedly the appellant's tenant. Mere service of notice under Section 44 of the Tenancy Act had not terminated the tenancy. The proceeding for resumption of the land under the Tenancy Act finally terminated against the appellant on the ground that respondent No. 1 could no longer be evicted as he had acquired the right of an occupant under the Abolition of Inams Act. 22. In the case of Shashi Jena and others (supra), the Apex Court examined examined the scope of inquiry under section 202 of the Code to hold that the same is very limited and that is to find out whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused who has no right to participate therein much less a right to cross-examine any witness examined by the prosecution, but he may remain present only with a view to be informed of what is going on. As during the course of inquiry under section 202 of the Code an accused has no right much less opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness, statement of such a witness recorded during the course of the inquiry is not admissible in evidence under section 33 of the Evidence Act and, consequently, the same cannot form the basis of conviction of an accused. Before the Apex Court, it was a case of homicide and the prosecution had succeeded in proving that circumstance against the accused persons which, being the solitary circumstance against them, according to the Apex Court, could not form the basis of their conviction as it is well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence there should be a chain circumstances showing complicity of the accused persons with the crime and the chain should be completed. 22.1 In the instant case, base application given by three of the village persons to the Geologist (the first informant) since had been admitted in the deposition of the first informant, it had been urged before this Court that the admissibility of such application and the statements of these persons even if recorded during the course of inquiry should not make them admissible evidence and any conviction based on such inadmissible evidence would amount to vitiating the trial. 23. In the case of Rama Narang (supra), there was a conviction of Managing Director for an offence involving moral turpitude as disqualification before the appellate Court, request was made for suspension of order of conviction. The appellant was convicted under sections 120-B and 420 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to 03 months rigorous imprisonment on the first count and 2 1/2 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/- on the second count. On appeal, the Delhi High Court by an interim order under section 389(1) of the Code released the appellant on bail directing the stay of the operation of the impugned order while admitting the appeal. The appellant then was appointed as a Director in 1988 and Managing Director in 1990 of a company. There was a challenge to the validity of the appellant's appointment upheld by Bombay High Court in company case. The Apex Court held that the appointment was void being in violation of section 267. By admission of appeal against conviction, the disqualification arising from the conviction did not disappear. There was a challenge to the validity of the appellant's appointment upheld by Bombay High Court in company case. The Apex Court held that the appointment was void being in violation of section 267. By admission of appeal against conviction, the disqualification arising from the conviction did not disappear. However, in a fit case in appeal High Court on being satisfied about need for suspension of conviction, can grant interim stay of order of conviction but the appellant should have fairly apprised the High Court about the consequent disqualification under section 267 of the Companies Act in case of his conviction so as to enable the Court to apply its mind on that point before deciding the issue of interim order of stay. No hide and seek can be permitted to be applied with the High Court by suspension on his conviction. 23.1 Relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under:- "11. That brings us to the next question, namely, whether the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court has the effect of staying the operation of Section 267 of the Companies Act? Admittedly, the appellant before us, on conviction and sentence, preferred an appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code in the Delhi High Court. The learned Judge of the said High Court while admitting the appeal passed an interim order purporting to be one under Section 389(1) of the Code to the following effect: "Accused be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial judge. The operation of the impugned order shall remain stayed." Section 389 of the Code is entitled "suspension of sentence pending the appeal, release of appellant on bail". Sub-section (1) then provides that pending any appeal by a convicted person the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code it becomes clear that pending an appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended. 12. On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code it becomes clear that pending an appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended. 12. Chapter XVIII relates to trial before a Court of Sessions. Sections 225 to 227, relate to the stage prior to the framing of charge. Section 228 provides for the framing of charge against the accused person. If after the charge is framed the accused pleads guilty, Section 229 provides that the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. However, if he does not enter a plea of guilty Sections 230 and 231 provide for leading of prosecution evidence. If, on the completion of the prosecution evidence and examination of the accused, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence with which he is charged, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal. If the Judge does not record an acquittal under Section 232, the accused would have to be called upon to enter on his defence as required by Section 233. After the evidence-in-defence is completed and the arguments heard as required by Section 235, Section 235 requires the Judge to give a judgment in the case. If the accused is convicted, sub-section (2) of Section 235 requires that the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. It will thus be seen that under the Code after the conviction is recorded, Section 235(2) inter alia provides that the Judge shall hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. The trial, therefore, comes to an end only after the sentence is awarded to the convicted person. 524 13. Chapter XXVII deals with judgment. Section354 sets out the contends of judgment. It says that every judgment referred to in Section 353 shall, inter alia, specify the offence (if any) of which and the Section of the Indian Penal Code or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced. Thus a judgment is not complete unless the punishment to which the accused person is sentenced is set out therein. Thus a judgment is not complete unless the punishment to which the accused person is sentenced is set out therein. Section 356 refers to the making of an order for notifying address of previously convicted offender. Section 357 refers to an order in regard to the payment of compensation. Section 359 provides for an order in regard to the payment of costs in non-cognizable cases and Section 360 refers to release on probation of good conduct. It will thus be seen from the above provisions that after the court records a conviction, the accused has to be heard on the question of sentence and it is only after the sentence is awarded that the judgment becomes complete and can be appealed against under Section 374 of the Code. 14. The provisions contained in the Companies Act have relevance to the management of the affairs of Companies incorporated under that law. The operation of Section 267 would take effect as soon as conviction is recorded by a competent court of an offence involving moral turpitude. Sections 267, 274 and 283 referred to earlier constitute a code whereunder a Director, Managing Director and the whole-time Director are visited with certain disqualifications in the event of conviction. As already pointed out above, the Companies Act itself Makes a distinction in the matter of fixation of the point of time when the disqualification becomes effect in the case of a Director and a Managing Director. That is because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship, vide Needle Industries India Ltd. v. Needle Industries Ltd. (1981) 3 SCR 698 . 15. Under the provisions of the Code to which we have already referred there are two stages in a criminal trial before a Sessions Court, the stage upto the recording of a conviction and the stage post conviction upto the imposition of sentence. A judgment becomes complete after both these stages are covered. Under Section 374(2) of the Code any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge may appeal to the High Court. Section 384 provides for summary dismissal of appeal if the Appellate Court does not find sufficient ground to entertain the appeal. If, however, the appeal is not summarily dismissed, the Court must cause notice to issue as to the time and place at which such appeal will be heard. Section 384 provides for summary dismissal of appeal if the Appellate Court does not find sufficient ground to entertain the appeal. If, however, the appeal is not summarily dismissed, the Court must cause notice to issue as to the time and place at which such appeal will be heard. Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does 'Order' in Section 389(1) empowers the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does 'Order' in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Sections 357 or 360 of the Code? Obviously the order referred to in Section 389(1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution 525 under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. Since the order of conviction does not on the mere filing of an appeal disappear it is difficult to accept the submission that Section 267 of the 'Companies Act must be read to apply only to a 'final' order of conviction. Such an interpretation may defeat the very object and purpose for which it came to be enacted. It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that on the admission of the appeal by the Delhi High Court the order of conviction had ceased to exist. If that be so why seek a stay or suspension of the Order? 16. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. If that be so why seek a stay or suspension of the Order? 16. In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order 'for reasons to be recorded by it in writing'. If the attention of the Court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court; he cannot suppress the precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then con-tend that the disqualification has ceased to operate. In the instant case if we turn to the application by which interim 'stay' of the operation of the impugned judgment was secured we do not find a single word to the effect that if the operation of the conviction is not stayed the consequence as indicated in Section 267 of the Companies Act will fall on the appellant. How could it then be said that the Delhi High Court had applied its mind to this precise question before granting 'stay'? That is why the High Court order granting interim stay does not assign any reason having relevance to the said issue. By not making a specific reference to this aspect of the matter, how could the appellant have persuaded the Delhi High Court to stop the coming into operation of Section 267 of the Companies Act? And how could the Court have applied its mind to this question if its pointed attention was not drawn? As we said earlier the application seeking interim stay is wholly silent on this point. And how could the Court have applied its mind to this question if its pointed attention was not drawn? As we said earlier the application seeking interim stay is wholly silent on this point. That is why we feel that this is a case in which the appellant indulged in an exercise of hide and seek in obtaining the interim stay without drawing the pointed attention of the Delhi High Court that stay of conviction was essential to avoid the disqualification under Section 267 of the Companies Act. If such a precise request was made to the Court pointing out the consequences likely to fall on the continuance of the conviction order, the Court would have applied its mind to the specific question and if it thought that case was made out for grant of interim stay of the conviction order, with or without conditions attached thereto, it may have granted an order to that effect. There can be no doubt that the object of Section 267 of the Companies Act is wholesome and that is to ensure that the management of the company is not in soiled hands. As we have pointed out earlier the Managing Director of a company holds a fiduciary 526 position qua the company and its shareholders and, therefore, different considerations would flow if an order is sought from the Appellate Court for staying the operation of the disqualification that would result on the application of Section 267 of the Companies Act. Therefore, even on facts since the appellant had not sought any order from the Delhi High Court for stay of the disqualification he was likely to incur under Section 267 of the Companies Act on account of his conviction, it cannot be inferred that the High Court had applied its mind to this specific aspect of the matter and therefore granted a stay of the operation of the impugned judgment. It is for that reason that we do not find in the order of the High Court a single reason relevant to the consequence of the conviction under Section 267 of the Companies Act. It is for that reason that we do not find in the order of the High Court a single reason relevant to the consequence of the conviction under Section 267 of the Companies Act. The interim stay granted by the Delhi High Court must, therefore, be read in that context and cannot extend to stay the operation of Section 267 of the Companies Act." 23.2 Before the Apex Court the appellant had not sought any order from the Delhi High Court for stay of the disqualification, which was likely to incur under section 267 of the Companies Act. On account of his conviction, therefore, it was held that it cannot be inferred that the High Court had not applied its mind to the specific aspect of the matter and thereafter it granted stay of operation of their judgment which was impugned. Because of that reason, the Apex Court held that it did not find order of the High Court relevant to the consequence of the conviction under section 267 of the Companies Act. Interim stay granted by the Delhi High Court needed to be read in that context and the same cannot extend to stay operation of section 269 of the Companies Act. The Apex Court held that for the reasons given in detail, they were of the opinion that since the appellant indulged in hide and seek game with the Court and did not reveal that for the purpose of evading disqualification under section 267 of the Companies Act, interim stay was necessary, the Apex Court held that there was no substance in appeal and the same was dismissed. 23.3 It was attempted to point out before this Court by learned Senior Advocate that in an application for stay of conviction/sentence, as stated by the Apex Court, not only the details had been furnished as to why there was a need for suspending not only the sentence but conviction also. The applicant also had provided the details of far reaching consequence. 24. The applicant also had provided the details of far reaching consequence. 24. In the case of the Ravikant S. Patil (supra), conviction of the candidate for criminal offence when was being questioned in wake of the disqualification of the person concerned, the Apex Court held that the stay of the conviction can be granted by the Court under section 389 of the Code, but, such stay is to be granted only in exceptional and rare circumstances where non-grant of stay would lead to irreversible consequences. Person seeking stay must draw attention of the appellate Court to specific consequences that may arise if conviction is not stayed, otherwise such stay cannot be granted. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in K.C. Sareen case (supra), the Court held that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant, the appellate court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal, even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. Reasonings: 25. From the law on the subject and the decisions which have been discussed hereinabove that section 389 of the Code since provides for suspension of the sentence so also the conviction by the appellate Court, it is the discretion on the part of the Court concerned to order the release of the convicted persons, where his sentence of imprisonment for a term does not exceed 03 years or where the offence or where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one and he is on bail. It is the appellate Court, which is obliged to give reasons at the time when the request is made by the convict and if the Court is satisfied that the person is intending to present an appeal, unless there are special reasons for refusing the appeal, the Court should afford sufficient time to present the appeal. 26. It goes without saying that reasons are a must by the Court at the time of exercising its powers to suspend the sentence, much less while ordering suspension of conviction, which should be only in rare and exceptional circumstances only while recognizing such powers of the appellate Court, it has been contended that unless shown that such stay if not granted would result into injustice and irreversible consequences, no such exercise on a mere asking can be done. Again, since stay of conviction would mean that conviction is not operative from the day of its stay, its serious impact on the society shall need to be kept in view by the Court while suspending the conviction, particularly when the offence involved is against public policy or when the offence is of such a nature, proliferation of which increasingly is deleterious to the societal health, the Court should be wary in grant of suspension of conviction. It would not only send a wrong signal, but it would also shrunk the confidence of people in the system. 26.1 These decisions also find the need of giving reasons, clear, cogent and substantiating under section 389 of the Code. Of course, a few decisions for some other provisions of law and under the administrative law would condone the non-speaking orders when application itself contain the details and its perusal gets reflected in the order or when there is hardly anything to be decided in the matter and the questions raised are the issues of law. 27. This Court is conscious of the fact that challenge has been made to the judgment of conviction and sentence and order before the appellate forum and the appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 is already pending before the learned Sessions Judge, Gir Somnath at Veraval, it is during the pendency of this appeal that the application had been moved, undoubtedly where the details have been provided at Exh. 4 stating therein that the trial Court had permitted the bail for the period of 30 days and also suspended the sentence. However, if the entire judgment of conviction and sentence is not stayed, there is likelihood of his being disqualified as the member of the Legislative Assembly. It is also the say of the petitioner that there is no direct evidence involving him in the crime in question and yet Court below has ordered conviction. There is a fair chance of succeeding in the appeal and, therefore, there will be irreversible situation arising if the Court does not suspend the sentence and the conviction both. There is likelihood of the Government exchequer also incurring heavy expenses if bye-election is declared and, therefore, when his success in the election of 2014 was with a huge margin, the Court should regard that in suspending the conviction. There is likelihood of the Government exchequer also incurring heavy expenses if bye-election is declared and, therefore, when his success in the election of 2014 was with a huge margin, the Court should regard that in suspending the conviction. This application does indicate the details as to how there would be an irreversible situation if the suspension of conviction is not stayed and, therefore, it was emphasized before this Court that the same should be construed as sufficient requirement for the appellate Court not to give reasons in its order as all that was required to be detailed in the order gets duly covered by this application. 28. Another aspect which had been emphatically argued before this Court is by taking this Court through the evidence, which had been adduced by the prosecution and the appreciation which had been made by the Court concerned on the strength of the prosecution evidence that the evidence is quite shaky and there was no likelihood of it being upheld by the appellate forum. This is a very shaky ground on which the entire facts of the appeal stand and also order which is passed does not deserve any interference at the hands of this Court. 28.1 Although, this petition is presented before this Court in which the State has challenged the order of the appellate forum on a limited ground of the same being an unreasoned order and, therefore, being unsustainable and without enlarging the scope of this petition, the Court was taken through the evidence to point out that it was on admissible and sustainable evidence that the conviction has been based. 28.2 It is not for this Court at this stage to adjudicate as an appellate Court whether this conviction would be upheld eventually in the future or not whereas the other side had given an overall view of the evidence to urge in the reverse that the very judgment is vitiated for having been based on inadmissible evidence and most of the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. Without making any attempt to act as an appellate Court, in wake of the pendency of the appeal before the appropriate Court for this limited purpose the Court needed to examine preliminarily evidence which has been adduced on which the trial Court has relied upon to base its judgment of conviction. Without making any attempt to act as an appellate Court, in wake of the pendency of the appeal before the appropriate Court for this limited purpose the Court needed to examine preliminarily evidence which has been adduced on which the trial Court has relied upon to base its judgment of conviction. The Court notices that many of the witnesses have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. However, the first informant, who is a Geologist and before whom the applications had been made jointly by three persons of the village of illegal mining in pastoral land has fully supported the case of the prosecution. Likewise, the person, namely, Shri Madanbhai Khemabhai Maru, who was a part of the flying squad and was part of the team which had visited various sites of the alleged illegal mining also has supported the case of the prosecution and has also quantified the total illegal excavated limestone being to the extent of 2.83525 metric tonnes. With regard to the said being pastoral land being Survey Nos. 1509, 1546, 1590 and 1591 and also further links of financial gains having been deposited in the accounts of firm with other evidence of the bank officers and the bank statements ultimately led to completing the chain of evidence to hold respondent No. 1 guilty of theft of limestone. Without meaning to conclude on this aspect at this stage, since the appeal is at large, the Court is satisfied at preliminary stage that it is not conviction which is based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence totally as plurality of evidence is not warranted for proof of any fact as provided under section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act. At the cost of reiteration, it needs to be said that the Court is conscious that in a matter of present nature, the Court is not at all required to touch the merits of the case nor is it required to prejudice the chances of either side before the Appellate Court, however, since the respondent chose to deal with the evidence at length with emphatic reiteration that the trial is vitiated and hence, conviction is unsustainable and, therefore, absence of reasonings while suspending sentence and conviction would call for no indulgence, led this Court to cursorily deal with the issues on merit. And, therefore, also to say at this stage that the application which had been made was sufficient for the Court to suspend the conviction without giving any reason is also an unsustainable preposition. The provision itself when makes it obligatory to assign reasons, any detail in the application can not act as a substitute for the Court's reasons. 29. In the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited and another (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the question arose of necessity of giving reasons by a body or authority in support of its decision. Such aspect has come up before the Apex Court in several cases. Initially the Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time, the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached the vanishing point. The Apex Court has always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the 'inscrutable face of a sphinx". The Court further held that only in cases of Court Martial, has it struck a different note wherein it held that reasons are not required to be recorded for an order confirming the finding and sentence recorded by the Court Martial. Court martial asa proceeding is sui generis in nature and the Court of Court martial is different, being called a court of honour and the proceedings therein are slightly different from other proceedings. The Constitution also deals with court-martial proceedings differently as is clear from Articles 33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution. The Apex Court held that in India judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decision, since such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. It further held that insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done, but it must also appear to be done, as well. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process, then, it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Stransbourg Jurisprudence. 29.1 Relevant paragraphs are reproduced for better appreciation of this aspect:- "47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process"." 30. In yet another decision in the case of Maya Devi (supra), the Apex Court held that the most effective check against any arbitrary exercise of power is the well-recognised legal principle that orders can be made only after due and proper application of mind. Application of mind brings reasonableness not only to the exercise of power but to the ultimate conclusion also. Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind. And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support of the order or conclusion. Following are the golden words amplifying the requirement of reasons:- "15. Application of mind brings reasonableness not only to the exercise of power but to the ultimate conclusion also. Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind. And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support of the order or conclusion. Following are the golden words amplifying the requirement of reasons:- "15. What then are the safeguards against an arbitrary exercise of power? The first and the most effective check against any such exercise is the well recognized legal principle that orders can be made only after due and proper application of mind. Application of mind brings reasonableness not only to the exercise of power but to the ultimate conclusion also. Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind. And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support of the order or conclusion. 16. Recording of reasons in cases where the order is subject to further appeal is very important from yet another angle. An appellate Court or the authority ought to have the advantage of examining the reasons that prevailed with the Court or the authority making the order. Conversely, absence of reasons in an appealable order deprives the appellate Court or the authority of that advantage and casts an onerous responsibility upon it to examine and determine the question on its own. An appellate Court or authority may in a given case decline to undertake any such exercise and remit the matter back to the lower Court or authority for a fresh and reasoned order. That, however, is not an inflexible rule, for an appellate Court may notwithstanding the absence of reasons in support of the order under appeal before it examine the matter on merits and finally decide the same at the appellate stage. Whether or not the appellate Court should remit the matter is discretionary with the appellate Court and would largely depend upon the nature of the dispute, the nature and the extent of evidence that may have to be appreciated, the complexity of the issues that arise for determination and whether remand is going to result in avoidable prolongation of the litigation between the parties. Remands are usually avoided if the appellate Court is of the view that it will prolong the litigation." 31. Remands are usually avoided if the appellate Court is of the view that it will prolong the litigation." 31. In the case of Shukla and Brothers (supra), the Apex Court was considering an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which was directed against the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in SB Sales Tax Revision Petition, where the High Court had summarily dismissed the revision petition by cryptic non-speaking order. The Apex Court held that the judgments of the Court should meet the requirement of recording of reasons with higher degree of satisfaction than administrative or the quasi-judicial orders. It further held that requirement of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning recorded for declining or granting relief. While dealing with the matter at admission stage even recording of concise reasons dealing with the merit of the contentions raised before the Court may suffice. In contrast, a detailed judgment while the matter is being disposed of after final hearing may be more appropriate. In both the events, it is imperative for the Court to record its own reasoning however concise it might be. 31.1 The Apex Court further held that a litigant who approaches the Court with any grievance is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to two kinds of infirmities, namely, that it may cause prejudice to the affected party and it would hamper the proper administration of justice. These principles, the Apex Court held that are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, with the mightier degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. The order of the Court must reflect what weighed with the Court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. "9. The increasing institution of cases in all Courts in India and its resultant burden upon the Courts has invited attention of all concerned in the justice administration system. The order of the Court must reflect what weighed with the Court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. "9. The increasing institution of cases in all Courts in India and its resultant burden upon the Courts has invited attention of all concerned in the justice administration system. Despite heavy quantum of cases in Courts, in our view, it would neither be permissible nor possible to state as a principle of law, that while exercising power of judicial review on administrative action and more particularly judgment of courts in appeal before the higher Court, providing of reasons can never be dispensed with. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely must be granted an opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the concerned authority should provide a fair and transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned or speaking order. This has been uniformly applied by courts in India and abroad. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 ], while referring to the practice adopted and insistence placed by the Courts in United States, emphasized the importance of recording of reasons for decisions by the administrative authorities and tribunals. It said "administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise". To enable the Courts to exercise the power of review in consonance with settled principles, the authorities are advised of the considerations underlining the action under review. This Court with approval stated:- "the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained." 11. In exercise of the power of judicial review, the concept of reasoned orders/actions has been enforced equally by the foreign courts as by the courts in India. The administrative authority and tribunals are obliged to give reasons, absence whereof could render the order liable to judicial chastise. Thus, it will not be far from absolute principle of law that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions to enable the appellate or higher Courts to exercise their jurisdiction appropriately and in accordance with law. The administrative authority and tribunals are obliged to give reasons, absence whereof could render the order liable to judicial chastise. Thus, it will not be far from absolute principle of law that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions to enable the appellate or higher Courts to exercise their jurisdiction appropriately and in accordance with law. It is the reasoning alone, that can enable a higher or an appellate court to appreciate the controversy in issue in its correct perspective and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by the Court whose order is impugned, is sustainable in law and whether it has adopted the correct legal approach. To sub-serve the purpose of justice delivery system, therefore, it is essential that the Courts should record reasons for its conclusions, whether disposing of the case at admission stage or after regular hearing. 12. At the cost of repetition, we may notice, that this Court has consistently taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the Court with any grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principles are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. A judgment without reasons causes prejudice to the person against whom it is pronounced, as that litigant is unable to know the ground which weighed with the Court in rejecting his claim and also causes impediments in his taking adequate and appropriate grounds before the higher Court in the event of challenge to that judgment. Now, we may refer to certain judgments of this Court as well as of the High Courts which have taken this view." xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 19. In the cases where the courts have not recorded reasons in the judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the orders by the court of competent jurisdiction are challenged in the absence of proper discussion. The requirement of recording reasons is applicable with greater rigour to the judicial proceedings. In the cases where the courts have not recorded reasons in the judgment, legality, propriety and correctness of the orders by the court of competent jurisdiction are challenged in the absence of proper discussion. The requirement of recording reasons is applicable with greater rigour to the judicial proceedings. The orders of the court must reflect what weighed with the court of granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. In this regard we may refer to certain judgments of this Court." 32. Considering these decisions and also noticing that the combined order impugned, passed below Exh. Nos. 3 and 4 of the Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 lacks completely reasons and is a cryptic, non-speaking order, therefore, cannot stand to leg nor can it be sustained. The application, which had been tendered on the part of respondent No. 1 even though contains requirements of respondent No. 1 and also has conveyed the details as would be required to be placed before the Court concerned, however, that which is obligatory on the part of the Court can have no other substitute and the appellate Court while dealing with such application, when has totally failed in its duty in giving reasons, this Court would be failing in its duty if it does not interfere and quash the said order. 32.1 It can be deduced that the State is before this Court seeking quashment of the order invoking powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 so also under section 482 of the Code. It is a settled law that the High Court can exercise its powers of judicial review and such powers are conferred upon the High Court to check the abuse of process of law. 33. Reasons being the soul of any order, this opaqueness on account of absence of reasons, it not checked, it may give impetus to the arbitrariness and to trade on extraneous grounds. Our democracy based on rule of law, favours the reasoned order and decisions based on facts and hence, to upkeep the objectives of judicial accountability and transparency, this Court is required to interfere with the order impugned. Final Order: 34. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The order of the appellate Court dated 07.03.2019 passed below Exhs. 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 is quashed and set aside. Final Order: 34. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The order of the appellate Court dated 07.03.2019 passed below Exhs. 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2019 is quashed and set aside. Considering the fact that this order would leave a void, matter is required to be remanded back to the appellate Court concerned for it to once again apply its mind and give the reasons on the application, which has been made by respondent No. 1 herein bearing in mind the well settled law on the subject detailed hereinabove. Let this process be completed by the Court concerned without loss of time. 35. The findings and observations made by this Court on merit of the matter shall not prejudice either side in pursing their respective legal remedies and the appellate Court shall also independently assess the matter needless to say, in accordance with law. Direct service is permitted.