JUDGMENT : These three appeals are filed against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.Nos.7810/2007, 7204/2007, 7468/2007 dated 19-08-2013 on the file of III Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City. 2. The parties are referred to as per their original rankings before the Court below to avoid confusion and for the convenience of the Court. 3. The brief facts of the case: It is the case of the plaintiff in all the suits that the plaintiff is a private limited company having incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and that the factory land and building thereon bearing No.C-212, 4th Cross, 1st Stage, Peenya Industrial Estate, Bangalore-58 in all measuring 453.43 square meters was purchased by the plaintiff in the public auction held on 18.6.2004 by Debts Recovery Tribunal, Bangalore. The said property was morefully described as Schedule ‘A’ property in all the suits. The said sale was confirmed on 18.11.2004 and sale certificate was issued on 19.11.2004. 4. It is contended in O.S.No.7810/2007 that defendant is a tenant with respect to a portion of the Schedule ‘A’ property measuring to an extent of 350 square feet on monthly rent of Rs.2,000/-, in O.S.No.7204/2007 to an extent of 300 square feet on monthly rent of Rs.3,000/- and in O.S.No.7468/2007 to an extent of 200 square feet on monthly rent of Rs.2000/-. The said premises in occupation of the defendants in all the suits are described as ‘B’ Schedule property. 5. It is the case of the plaintiff in all the suits that immediately after purchasing the property called upon the defendants to pay rents from the date of purchase by issuing notice dated 22.11.2004. It is also the case of the plaintiff that immediately after issuance of notices, the defendants filed the suits in O.S.No.9299/2004, 9208/2004 and 9300/2004 seeking the relief of permanent injunction against the plaintiff and all the suits came to be dismissed. It is the case of the plaintiff in all the suits that notice of termination of tenancy was issued on 7.9.2007 in O.S.No.7810/2007, on 09.08.2007 in O.S.No.7204/2007 and on 04.08.2007 in O.S.No.7468/2007 asking the defendants to quit or vacate the premises on or before 31.08.2007. 6. It is also the case of the plaintiff in all the suits that inspite the termination notice was issued, defendants did not vacate the suit schedule premises and also not paid the rents. 6. It is also the case of the plaintiff in all the suits that inspite the termination notice was issued, defendants did not vacate the suit schedule premises and also not paid the rents. Hence, the plaintiff claimed the damages of Rs.10,000/per month in O.S.No.7810/2007 from 01.10.2007 and also claimed arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.66,000/- for the period from December 2004 to 30.09.2007 at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month, claimed the arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.96,000/- from December 2004 till 30.07.2007 at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month in O.S.No.7204/2007 and claimed damages of Rs.9,000/- from the defendant and in O.S.No.7468/2007 claimed arrears of Rs.64,000/- from December 2004 till 31.7.2007 at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month and also claimed damages of Rs.9,000/- per month. 7. In pursuance of the suit summons, respective defendants appeared in their respective suits and filed the written statement raising common contention that suit is barred by law of limitation since the application is not filed within one year from the date of confirmation of sale. Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for filing of the application within one year from the date of confirmation of sale but the suits are filed after the expiry of three years from the date of confirmation of sale i.e., 3.10.2007. The other contention of the defendants is that the suits are not maintainable since the same are barred under Order 7 Rule 1(e) and (f) of the CPC. There is no separate provision under CPC for recovery of possession and hence, the plaintiff ought to have filed the application under Order XXI Rule 95 of CPC to take possession from the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 8. It is also the contention of the defendants that the defendants are not the tenants under the plaintiff. However, they admit in their written statement that they were tenants to one Shamba Shiva Reddy. They further contended that the suit is also not filed in accordance with law. It is also contended that the defendants will not pay any rent and also vacate the schedule premises. The defendants cannot recognize the auction purchaser since the auction purchaser is not a bonafide purchaser. They further contended that the suit is also not filed in accordance with law. It is also contended that the defendants will not pay any rent and also vacate the schedule premises. The defendants cannot recognize the auction purchaser since the auction purchaser is not a bonafide purchaser. Under the said circumstances, the defendants are not legally bound to pay any rent to the plaintiff in the absence of any order from the Court merely basing on the letter dated 22.11.2004, the bonafides of which the defendants are not aware of and which does not establish its genuineness of purchase of the suit schedule property. There is no jural relationship of lessor and lessee and there is no agreement between the plaintiff and defendants and also there are no arrears of rent, since the defendants are regularly paying the rent to the owner as usual. 9. It is also contended that there is no any attornment of tenancy. Hence, there were no any cause of actions to file the suits. It is also contended that all the defendants have filed the suits against the plaintiff restraining the plaintiff from illegally evicting the defendants. Hence, prayed the Court to dismiss the suits. It is also contended that the appeal was pending before the D.R.A.T, Chennai. The original owner has questioned sale. The defendants also taken the contention on behalf of the judgment debtor in these suits and denied all the averments made in the plaints. 10. The Court below, after considering the pleadings of both the plaintiff and defendants, framed the following issues in the respective suits: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that there is relationship of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and defendant as contended? 2. Whether plaintiff proves that the tenancy of defendant has been determined and same is in accordance with law? 3. Whether plaintiff proves that the defendant is in arrears of rent in respect of suit schedule property, if so, as what is the arrears of rent payable by the defendant? 4. Whether suit of the plaintiff is within time? 5. Whether defendant proves that suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction, cause of action as contended? 6. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought for? 7. What order or decree? 11. 4. Whether suit of the plaintiff is within time? 5. Whether defendant proves that suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction, cause of action as contended? 6. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought for? 7. What order or decree? 11. The plaintiff, in order to substantiate its claim, in O.S.No.7810/2007, examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.P1 to P21 and defendant also examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.D1 to D50. In O.S.No.7204/2007, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.P1 to P22 and defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.D1 to D50. In O.S.No.7468/2007, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.P1 to P20 and defendant also examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked documents Exs.D1 to D50. 12. The Court below, after hearing the respective counsels and also considering both oral and documentary evidence, has decreed the suits and directed the defendants to quit and vacate the premises. In O.S.No.7810/2007, the defendant was directed to pay the rental arrears of Rs.66,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till realization and also ordered to pay the damages from the date of suit subject to enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 of Code of Civil Procedure. In O.S.No.7204/2007, the defendant was directed to pay arrears of rent of Rs.96,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till realization and also ordered to pay the damages from the date of suit subject to enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 of CPC and in O.S.No.7468/2007, the defendant was directed to pay the rental arrears of Rs.64,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till realization to the plaintiff and also ordered to pay the damages from the date of suit subject to enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 of CPC. 13. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in all the above suits, the defendants have filed these appeals and in all the appeals, common grounds have been urged contending that the Trial Judge failed to notice that the suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. 13. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in all the above suits, the defendants have filed these appeals and in all the appeals, common grounds have been urged contending that the Trial Judge failed to notice that the suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. In fact issue No.4 deals with the question of limitation and the learned Trial Judge has not at all considered the relevant provision of law to hold the suit as maintainable. Similarly, the defendants took up the specific plea that there is no cause of action and the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. Though issue No.5 was properly framed, but the Court below has not considered both issued Nos.4 and 5 within the legal parameters. 14. It is contended that the sale was confirmed in favour of the plaintiff on 18.11.2004 as per Ex.D.5 and thereafter, the sale certificate was issued on 19.11.2004. The same was questioned in the writ petition before the High Court in W.P.No.4352/2006. A period of one year has been prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to take the possession. The plaintiff ought to have filed the application within one year from the date of confirmation of sale but the same has not been done. Hence, there is a bar to entertain the said suits. The Court below, without considering the provisions of Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has wrongly invoked Article 65(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and held that the suits of the plaintiff are well within time and tenable. 15. It is further contended in the appeal that Shamba Shiva Reddy and the Bank are the necessary parties to the suits and in the absence of making such necessary parties, the suits were disposed of. Hence, it requires interference of this Court. The suits are also hit and barred under Section 47 of CPC. The Court below, also failed to notice that the defendants are not at all tenants under the plaintiff. There is no jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants. The defendants were also the tenants in the property belonged to Shamba Shiva Reddy, to whom he has been paying the rents. The Court below, also failed to notice that the defendants are not at all tenants under the plaintiff. There is no jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants. The defendants were also the tenants in the property belonged to Shamba Shiva Reddy, to whom he has been paying the rents. Therefore, question of praying the Court to direct the tenants to pay the arrears of rent and damages does not arise at all and thus, the impugned orders are not legally tenable and maintainable. 16. It is further contended that the tenancy of the defendants is not lawfully attorned in favour of the plaintiff since the defendants were the tenants under Shamba Shiva Reddy and therefore, the plaintiff has no locus standi to seek the order of eviction. Viewed from any angle, the suits are not only barred by law of limitation besides the Court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suits. Hence, the impugned judgment and decree is not tenable in the eyes of law and prayed the Court to set aside the judgment and decree passed in all the suits. 17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants in his arguments vehemently contended that the plaintiff is not the landlord and there is no jural relationship between the parties. The very suits of the plaintiff are not maintainable since the auction purchaser has invoked the Civil Jurisdiction seeking the relief of possession but the plaintiff ought to have taken the possession under the RDBI Act. The time limit for taking the possession is as envisaged under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court below has erroneously decreed the suits though there is a bar under Section 18 of the RDB Act and also under rule 39 of the Income Tax Rules. The Income Tax Rules also prescribes that the possession has to be taken in accordance with the income tax rules. The plaintiff also fails to take the possession invoking Rules 39 of the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962. Instead of that, the plaintiff has approached the Civil Court. The Court below did not consider Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff ought to have sought for the relief under Order 21 Rule 95 and 96 of CPC. 18. In support of the said contention, learned counsel relied upon the judgment reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 in the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. The Court below did not consider Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff ought to have sought for the relief under Order 21 Rule 95 and 96 of CPC. 18. In support of the said contention, learned counsel relied upon the judgment reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 in the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Canara Bank and Another and brought to my notice paras-23 and 24 of the judgment, wherein it is held that even in regard to “execution”, the jurisdiction of the Recovery officer is exclusive. Section 34 of the Act clearly states that the RDB Act overrides other laws to the extent of “inconsistency”. 19. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in (2007) 2 SCC 230 in the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja and Another Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others and brought to my notice para-24 of the judgment contending that Section 24 of the RDBI Act applies the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing an execution petition, hence now no such application can be filed since the same is barred by law of limitation. Learned counsel further brought to my notice para-27 of the judgment, wherein it is held that at any event as held in Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, Section 446 has no application once the RDB Act applies because Section 34 expressly given overriding effect to the provisions of the RDB Act. Also, the RDB Act is a special law and hence will prevail over the general law in the Companies Act as held in Allahabad Bank V. Canara Bank. 20. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court reported in LAWS (MAD) (2010) 8 568 decided on 2010 August 31 in the case of State Bank of India Vs. A. Kuttalingam and brought to my notice para-8 of the judgment contending that the Civil Court cannot set aside the order passed by the Recovery Officer under the provisions of DRRB Act and the same is not maintainable. 21. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 2015 SC 1240 in the case of Indian Bank Vs. A. Kuttalingam and brought to my notice para-8 of the judgment contending that the Civil Court cannot set aside the order passed by the Recovery Officer under the provisions of DRRB Act and the same is not maintainable. 21. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 2015 SC 1240 in the case of Indian Bank Vs. Manilal Govindji Khona and contended that the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before the DRT under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 22. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1987 SC 1443 in the case of Ganpat Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Kailash Shankar and Ors. and contended that Article 134 of the Limitation Act applies to auction purchasers. Other provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to seek possession by auction purchaser. He brought to my notice, para Nos.7, 8, 9 and 14 and contended that Article 134 is applicable to take possession. 23. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 2005 SC 1500 in the case of Ratan Bapu Patil (Dead) by LR’s and Ors. Vs. Dodhu and Ors. and brought to my notice para-5 of the judgment contending that the limitation starts running under Article 134 of the Limitation Act from the date of confirmation of the sale deed. 24. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 2006 SC 1458 in the case of Balakrishnan Vs. Malaiyandi Konar and brought to my notice para-12 of the judgment contending that Article 134 of the Limitation Act applies and the application has to be filed within one year from the date of confirmation of sale. 25. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1995 Kant. 119 in the case of Annappa Reddy Vs. S. Suresh and brought to my notice paras-13 and 16 of the judgment, wherein it has been held that the application is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. When the remedy is barred in law, the party loses his right. 26. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in 2014 (3) AKR 328 in the case of Lingarajaiah Vs. H.N. Jambappa and brought to my notice paras 8, 10, 14 and 17. When the remedy is barred in law, the party loses his right. 26. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in 2014 (3) AKR 328 in the case of Lingarajaiah Vs. H.N. Jambappa and brought to my notice paras 8, 10, 14 and 17. Referring to the said judgment, he contended that the High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition holding that the application is not filed within time and hence, the suit is barred by limitation. 27. Learned counsel also brought to my notice, the order passed in RFA No.115/2014 contending that while dismissing the regular appeal, this Court held that the execution of the eviction order is subject to the result of the pending suit in O.S.No.2073/2012. 28. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff in his argument vehemently contended that all the suits were filed seeking the direction against the defendants to quit and vacate the ‘B’ schedule property, which are part of the ‘A’ schedule property in all the suits. There were 6 tenaments in the suit schedule ‘A’ property. The suits were filed for recovery of arrears of rent and also seeking the relief of direction against the defendants to quit and vacate the ‘B’ schedule property. It is contended that the suit was filed against the original owner for recovery of money and subsequently, the same was transferred to DRT and then the decree was passed on 11.3.1989. Against the said decree, an appeal was filed in R.A.No.3/2000 before the DRT and same was also dismissed on 5.3.2000. Thereafter, the judgment debtor filed the appeal before the DRAT and the same was dismissed in the year 2005. Thereafter, the judgment debtor filed writ petition No.4352/2006, which also came to be dismissed on 22.6.2015. The property was sold on 18.6.2004 and confirmation of the sale was made on 18.11.2004 and sale certificate was issued on the very next date i.e., on 19.11.2004. Immediately, he gave legal notices to the 6 tenaments on 22.11.2004 in terms of Ex.P5. After receipt of notice, the tenants have filed the suits before the Court seeking the relief of permanent injunction, which were also dismissed for non-prosecution. The plaintiff also filed HRC case in respect of premises measuring less than 14 squares and the same was allowed. Revision petition was filed and the same was also dismissed. After receipt of notice, the tenants have filed the suits before the Court seeking the relief of permanent injunction, which were also dismissed for non-prosecution. The plaintiff also filed HRC case in respect of premises measuring less than 14 squares and the same was allowed. Revision petition was filed and the same was also dismissed. The execution petition was filed and in the said petition, the objector application was filed by the original owner and the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, the original owner who is the judgment debtor filed RFA, which came to be dismissed. He filed a separate suit questioning the validity of the HRC order and also the HRRP order and the same came to be dismissed. These appeals are filed against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court. 29. It is also contended that in respect of other suits, execution petition was filed and possession was taken. The present appellants are the defendants in other three suits. The defendants/appellants kept the premises under lock. In all these proceedings, the original owner is behind all these appellants. Today also, the original owner is present before the Court. Thus, it clearly shows that all these appeals are filed at the instance of the original owner i.e., judgment debtor. It is contended that in terms of Ex.P5 legal notice, rate of rent is specifically mentioned and the same has not been denied. The Court below has rightly considered the case of the plaintiff and decreed the suits and directed the defendants to pay the arrears of rent, since defendants have not paid rent inspite of issuance of notice. 30. It is also contended that the defendants have taken contention even on behalf of the J.Dr. The defendants also relied upon the rental receipts which have been created colluding with the original owner and no prudent man would pay the rent in favour the judgment debtor, who has suffered the decree. In all the proceedings, he failed to succeed in the matter. The defendants contend that they are still paying rent in favour of the original owner. It is clear that the defendants categorically admits that they are tenants with the previous owner. It is further contended that if the tenants are in occupation of the premises, Article 134 is not applicable and so also Order 21 Rule 95 is not applicable since the J.Dr. It is clear that the defendants categorically admits that they are tenants with the previous owner. It is further contended that if the tenants are in occupation of the premises, Article 134 is not applicable and so also Order 21 Rule 95 is not applicable since the J.Dr. was not in occupation of the premises. Article 65(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable, wherein the period of limitation is prescribed as 12 years. 31. It is also contended by the respondent’s counsel that receipts marked at Exs.D7 to D49 are issued on the same date and thus it clearly shows the collusion between the original owner and the tenants. Since the tenancy is not in dispute, the tenants cannot dispute the title. The DRT cannot decide the issue of tenancy since the defendants have denied the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. The very contention that the plaintiff ought to have approached the DRT cannot be accepted. Hence, the judgment and decree not suffers from any legal infirmities. 32. In support of its contention, learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon the judgment reported in ILR 1989 KAR. 1555 in the case of M/s Popular Automobiles Vs. N. Veeraswamy and brought to my notice para-14 of the judgment, wherein it is held that by operation of law, even assuming that the petitioner questions the sale as null and void, here is what is known as statutory attornment and until and unless the sale is set aside by a competent Court, the petitioner has to be regarded as a tenant of the purchaser of the schedule premises. 33. Learned counsel relying upon the judgment reported in ILR 1978 KAR. 1125 between M/s Jeethamal Nemichand Vs. S.B. Sukraj and contended that Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 creates what my be called statutory attornment which substitutes and has the same effect, as contractual attornment, so that because of a transfer of the leased property, or a part thereof, the transferee ipso facto acquires “all the rights” of the lessor, and a new relationship is created between the transferee and the lessee. Letter of attornment is not necessary to complete title to the assignee of the reversion under Section 109. 34. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1995 SC 377 in the case of Dr. Bhargava and Co., and another V. Sh. Letter of attornment is not necessary to complete title to the assignee of the reversion under Section 109. 34. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1995 SC 377 in the case of Dr. Bhargava and Co., and another V. Sh. Shyam Sunder Seth by L.Rs and brought to my notice para-9 of the judgment contending that the suit filed after 4 years from the date of issuance of sale certificate is not barred by limitation as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 35. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff also relied upon the judgment reported in I.L.R. 1991 KAR 3288 in the case of Goudappa Appayya Patil vs. Shivari Bhimappa Pattar. The counsel referring paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the judgment would contend that in a case where the auction sale is held under the K.L.R. Act, the title in the immovable property sold in the public auction passes to the auction-purchaser on the confirmation of the auction sale. He would further contend that title passes to the purchases not under the certificate of sale but by an order of confirmation and the sale certificate merely transmits conclusive information as to what was the property sold and who as the purchaser. The counsel referring this judgment would contend that the title passes to the auction-purchaser on the confirmation of the auction sale and not by issuing sale certificate. But in the case on hand, the sale was confirmed on 18.11.2004. 36. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in (2006) 3 SCC 91 in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra vs. Stanley Parker Jones. The counsel referring paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the judgment would contend that the principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that the tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. Hence, the defendants cannot contend that title is defective and once they admit that they are the tenants under the previous owner, they are estopped from taking the said defence and therefore, the principle of estoppel applies and they cannot approbate or reprobate. 37. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1996 SC 1654 in the case of Joginder Singh and another vs. Smt. Jogindero and others and brought to my notice paragraph No.6 of the judgment contending that it is a settled law that having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall during the continuance of tenancy, be permitted to deny the title of the owner of such property. 38. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported on (2012) 5 SCC 370 in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs. and brought to my notice paragraph Nos.81 and 82 of the judgment wherein it is held that in order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that the Court’s otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases and this problem can be solved or at least can be minimised, if exemplary cost is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. Referring this judgment counsel contend that the appeal has to be dismissed with exemplary cost. 39. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also filed memo along with a copy of the judgment passed in R.F.A.N.115/2014 dated 17.02.2014 and brought to my notice that the eviction order passed in H.R.C.No.51/2009 as confirmed in H.R.R.P.No.210/2010 is subject to the result of the suit filed by the judgment debtor in O.S.No.2073/2012. The counsel has also filed a memo along with a copy of the order passed in Execution No.936/2012 in H.R.C.No.51/2009 dismissing the application filed by the judgment debtor with cost of Rs.2,000/- and a copy of the judgment passed in O.S.No.2073/2012 filed by the judgment debtor and the same also came to be dismissed. 40. The counsel has also filed a memo along with a copy of the order passed in Execution No.936/2012 in H.R.C.No.51/2009 dismissing the application filed by the judgment debtor with cost of Rs.2,000/- and a copy of the judgment passed in O.S.No.2073/2012 filed by the judgment debtor and the same also came to be dismissed. 40. The learned counsel appearing for appellants/defendants in reply to the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that in paragraph No.17 of the judgment passed in RFA, it is observed that execution of the eviction order in H.R.C.No.51/2009 as confirmed in H.R.R.P.No.210/2010 is subject to the result of the pending in O.S.No.2073/2012 and the appeal has not been decided. The counsel also brought to my notice Income-Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 (‘Income Tax Rules’ for short) and referring Section 39 of the Act with regard to delivery of immovable property in occupancy of defaulter would contend that the auction purchaser ought to have taken possession by seeking relief under Section 39 of the Income Tax Rules. 41. Having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents and also keeping in view the contentions urged by respective counsels, the points that arise for consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether the Court below has committed an error in entertaining the suit for ejection, even though there is no jurisdiction as contended by the appellants/defendants? (ii) Whether the Court below has committed an error in not considering Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and failed to dismiss the suit, as the same is time barred as contended by the appellants/defendants? (iii) Whether the Court below has committed an error in passing the judgment and decree against the appellants/defendants directing them to quit and vacate the premises? (iv) Whether the Court below has committed an error in passing an order directing the defendants to pay the arrears of rent as claimed in the plaint and it requires interference of this Court? (v) Whether the Court below has committed an error in holding that there exists jural relationship between the parties and there was termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act? (vi) Whether the Court below has committed an error in holding that there was an attornment of tenancy and whether it requires interference of this Court? (vii) What order? 42. (vi) Whether the Court below has committed an error in holding that there was an attornment of tenancy and whether it requires interference of this Court? (vii) What order? 42. Before considering the points for consideration, I would like to make it clear the factual aspects of the case. It is an undisputed fact that the bank has filed the suit before the Civil Court at the first instance for recovery of the loan amount from the original owner Shamba Shiva Reddy and in view of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Enactment was brought into force, civil suit was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal and decree was granted against said Shamba Shiva Reddy. The said decree was challenged in R.A.No.3/2000 and the same came to be dismissed on 05.03.2000, against which an appeal was filed before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and the same also came to be dismissed. The original owner said Shamba Shiva Reddy also challenged the said order before this Court in W.P.No.4352/2006 and the same came to be dismissed. Hence, the judgment and decree passed in favour of the bank has attained its finality. It has to be noted that the suit schedule property was brought to sale and the same was sold on 18.06.2004 in favour of the defendants and consequently, Sale Certificate was also issued on 19.11.2004. The factual aspects of the case also discloses that auction purchaser has got issued legal notice to all the six tenements, who are in occupation of the premises on 22.11.2004 and the defendants also did not dispute the fact of issuance of legal notice dated 22.11.2004. It is also important to note that on receipt of the notice, the defendants have filed the suit against the plaintiff seeking for the relief of permanent injunction and the said suit also came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. It is also an undisputed fact that the plaintiff has filed a H.R.C. case against one of the tenant in respect of the premises which is less than 14 square meters in H.R.C.No.51/2009 and the same was allowed. Against the said order, a revision petition was filed in H.R.R.P. No.210/2010 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.09.2010. Execution Petition No.936/2012 was also filed and in the said execution proceedings, the obstructor filed an application invoking Order XXI, Rule 97, 98, 99, 101 and 104 of Code of Civil Procedure. Against the said order, a revision petition was filed in H.R.R.P. No.210/2010 and the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.09.2010. Execution Petition No.936/2012 was also filed and in the said execution proceedings, the obstructor filed an application invoking Order XXI, Rule 97, 98, 99, 101 and 104 of Code of Civil Procedure. The said application was dismissed vide order dated 06.01.2014 imposing cost of Rs.2,000/-. Being aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtor/original owner has filed R.F.A.No.115/2014 and the same also came to be dismissed on 17.02.2014. 43. Both the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants and learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has brought to my notice that while dismissing R.F.A.No.115/2014, this Court has made it clear that execution of the eviction order in H.R.C.No.51/2009 as confirmed in H.R.R.P. No.210/2010 is subject to the result of the pending suit in O.S.No.2073/2012. The counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that the said observation has not been taken into consideration by the Court below. The counsel appearing for the plaintiff has also filed a memo along with a copy of the judgment passed in O.S.No.2073/2012 filed by the original owner/judgment debtor, Shamba Shiva Reddy and the said suit also came to be dismissed. The original owner, who questioned the order passed in H.R.C.No.51/2009 as well as H.R.R.P.No.210/2010 was unsuccessful in getting the relief in the said suit. It is also not in dispute that the property was sold and the sale was confirmed under Order XXI, Rule 92 of Code of Civil Procedure and Sale Certificate was issued under Order XXI, Rule 94 of Code of Civil Procedure and hence, the formalities are completed. 44. These three appears are arising out of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court directing the defendants to quit and vacate the premises and to pay the arrears of rent. The Court below has also ordered for enquiry for mesne profits since, the plaintiff has claimed the damages from the date of the suit. Point No.(i): 45. The main contention of the defendants in these appeals is that the Court below has committed an error in entertaining the suit for ejection, though there was no jurisdiction for the civil Court to entertain the suit. Point No.(i): 45. The main contention of the defendants in these appeals is that the Court below has committed an error in entertaining the suit for ejection, though there was no jurisdiction for the civil Court to entertain the suit. The counsel would contend that since, there is a bar under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘RDB Act’ for short), the auction purchaser ought to have approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal for recovery of possession and not before the civil Court. The counsel also would contend that Section 39 of the Income Tax Rules prescribes with regard to delivery of immovable property in occupancy of defaulter that where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the defaulter or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the defaulter subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under Rule 65 of the Principal Rules, the Tax Recovery Officer shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by such purchaser. 46. Having considered the contention of learned counsel for the appellants, in order to decide the issue between the parties, this Court would like to extract Section 18 of the R.D.B. Act and also Section 39 of Income Tax Rules which reads as hereunder: "Section 18: Bar of jurisdiction--On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in section 17." 39. Delivery of immovable property in occupancy of defaulter:- (1) Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the defaulter or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the defaulter subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rule 65 of the principal rules, the Tax Recovery Officer shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser or any person whom the purchaser may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same. (2) For the purposes of Sub-Rule (1), if the person in possession does not afford free access, the Tax Recovery Officer may, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public according to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the purchaser, or any person whom the purchaser may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, in possession. Before considering Section 18 of the R.D.B. Act, it is appropriate to refer Section 17 of the said Act which reads as hereunder:- "Section 17: Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals--(1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act." 47. A careful reading of Section 18 of the R.D.B Act contemplates that no Court shall be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction powers/authority, except the Supreme Court and the High Court in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the said Act. Thus, it is manifest that only in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted. Thus, it is manifest that only in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted. While considering the scope of Section 17 of the R.D.B Act dealing with jurisdiction, power or authority of the Tribunals, it is evident that such jurisdiction, power and authority shall be entertained by the Tribunals in respect of the application from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. To put it simple, the jurisdiction of the Tribunals is only in respect of the applications filed by the banks and financial institutions, that too, for recovery of debts due to them. Thus, such jurisdiction, exclusively to be exercised by the Tribunals as empowered under Section 17 of the Act cannot be entertained by the Civil Court and such entertainment is barred under Section 17 of the R.D.B. Act. 48. Thus, a combined reading of Sections 18 and 17 of the R.D.B. Act would only drive this Court to come to a conclusion that “bar of jurisdiction” imposed under Section 18 on the Civil Courts is not a total bar to exercise its jurisdiction in all matters of disputes between the parties but, such restriction is imposed only in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the Act. Hence, the restriction is only conditional. 49. This Court also would like to refer the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2009 (8) SCC 646 in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Hong Kong & Shangha Banking Corpn. with reference to paragraph Nos.96 and 97 which reads as under: "96. The Tribunal was constituted with a specific purpose as is evident from its Statement of Objects. The Preamble of the Act also is a point to that too. We have also noticed the scheme of the Act. It has a limited jurisdiction. Under the Act, as it originally stood, it did not even have any power to entertain a claim of set-off or counterclaim. No independent proceedings can be initiated before it by a debtor. 97. A debtor under the common law of contract as also in terms of the loan agreement may have an independent right. No forum has been created for endorsement of that right. No independent proceedings can be initiated before it by a debtor. 97. A debtor under the common law of contract as also in terms of the loan agreement may have an independent right. No forum has been created for endorsement of that right. Jurisdiction of a civil court as noticed hereinbefore is barred only in respect of the matters which strictly come within the purview of Section 17 thereof and not beyond the same. The civil court, therefore, will continue to have jurisdiction." 50. Having considered the scope of Sections 17 and 18 of the R.D.B Act and considering the decision of the Apex Court (supra), it is clear that “bar of jurisdiction” of Civil Court contemplated under Section 18 of the Act is not a total bar as claimed by the plaintiff but, it is only under the circumstances stated therein. In the case on hand, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that there is a bar under Section 18 of the R.D.B. Act cannot be accepted. The suit is filed for the relief of recovery of possession and arrears of rent since, the plaintiff is the successful auction purchaser of the property. It is also pertinent to note that the plaintiff is not the financial institution to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal to seek for the relief of possession and arrears of rent and the Debts Recovery Tribunal also cannot decide the issue between the parties, since the Court has to decide the issue with regard to jural relationship between the parties. 51. It is the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants in his argument that Section 39 of the Income Tax Rules contemplates with regard to delivery of immovable property in occupancy of defaulter where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the defaulter or of some person on his behalf, the Recovery Officer shall on the application of the purchaser, order for delivery of possession by removing any person, who refuses to vacate the same. This contention also cannot be accepted for the reason that the recovery is not in respect of income tax and in the case on hand, the original owner has committed a default in repayment of loan which he had availed and hence, property was brought for sale by Debts Recovery Tribunal. This contention also cannot be accepted for the reason that the recovery is not in respect of income tax and in the case on hand, the original owner has committed a default in repayment of loan which he had availed and hence, property was brought for sale by Debts Recovery Tribunal. The property was purchased in the auction and sale was confirmed and consequently, Sale Certificate has also been issued. Hence, it is left open to the auction purchaser either to seek possession through Debts Recovery Tribunal as a quick remedy or to approach the Court which has the jurisdiction to order for recovery of possession. Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants cannot be accepted. 52. Having considered the material on record and facts and circumstances of the case and also relevant provisions as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants, it is clear that the very contention of the appellants/defendants that there is a bar under Section 18 of the R.D.B Act and also under Rule 39 of Income Tax Rules cannot be accepted and there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants. Hence, I answer point No.(i) as ‘negative’. Point No.(ii): 53. The other contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that the suit is barred by limitation since, Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable. The Court below has committed an error in entertaining the suit, after expiry of period of limitation. The counsel appearing for the plaintiff would contend that Article 134 of the Limitation Act does not attract and Article 65(c) of the Limitation Act applies for the relief of taking possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title which provides that where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. The counsel referring this provision would contend that the period of limitation is 12 years when the possession of defendants become adverse to the plaintiff. 54. The counsel referring this provision would contend that the period of limitation is 12 years when the possession of defendants become adverse to the plaintiff. 54. Having considered the contentions of learned counsel for both the parties, it is appropriate to refer Articles 65(c) and 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as hereunder: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title (a)… (b)… (c) Where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. 134. For delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. One year When the sale becomes absolute. 55. Having considered Articles 65(c) and 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and also the judgment referred by the respective counsels, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that an application is to be filed within one year from the date when the sale becomes absolute for recovery of possession and if such an application is filed before the Executing Court, the Executing Court can pass an order to deliver possession in favour of the auction purchaser. 56. I have given my anxious consideration to the judgments referred by the respective counsels and having considered the same, it is very clear that the sale has to be confirmed under Order XXI, Rule 92 of Code of Civil Procedure if the property is sold and thereafter, Sale Certificate has to be issued under Order XXI, Rule 94 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is also held in the judgments referred (supra) that limitation starts from the date of confirmation of the sale and not from the date of issuance of the Sale Certificate. It is also important to note that Article 134 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of the decree and there is no dispute with regard to the same. It is also important to note that Article 134 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of the decree and there is no dispute with regard to the same. It is also pertinent to note that the Apex Court in the judgment referred (supra) reported in AIR 2006 SC 1458 in the case of Balakrishnan vs. Malaiyandi Konar in paragraph No.12 of the judgment has observed that limitation for the purpose of Article 134 stars from the date of confirmation of sale. This judgment is referred by the learned counsel for the defendants themselves wherein, the Apex Court referring Ganpat Singh’s case and Pattam Khader Khan’s case held that, it is not from the date when Sale Certificate is issued that the limitation starts running. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order XXI, Rule 92 of Code of Civil Procedure effectively passing the title. It is further held that the period of one year limitation now prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act in substitution of a three year period prescribed under Article 180 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 is reflective of the legislative policy of finalizing proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction purchaser to ask for the delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such a quick remedy the law relegates him to a remedy of a regular suit for possession based on title, subject again to limitation. 57. Having considered the principles laid down in the judgment referred (supra), it is clear that if a auction purchaser fails to avail such a quick remedy in such execution proceedings the law relegates to remedy of a suit for possession based on title. Hence, the very contention of the defendants that the suit is barred by limitation cannot be accepted. In the case on hand, the plaintiff did not seek for the relief of quick remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal but, that does not mean that the plaintiff is barred from taking possession, exercising the remedy of regular suit for possession based on title since, title has been confirmed while confirming the sale. 58. In the case on hand, the plaintiff did not seek for the relief of quick remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal but, that does not mean that the plaintiff is barred from taking possession, exercising the remedy of regular suit for possession based on title since, title has been confirmed while confirming the sale. 58. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1995 KAR 119 in the case of Annappa Reddy vs. S. Suresh. In the said judgment, this Court has held that the remedy is barred in law for the party, who looses his rights since, application for delivery of possession is beyond the period stipulated under Article 134 and disentitles the decree holder to claim possession since, the application is not filed within one year as prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act and the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 59. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Lingarajaiah’s case wherein this Court dismissed the civil review petition on the ground that application is not filed within time in the execution proceedings and not in the original suit. This Court also in the above judgment, referring the judgment of Ganpat Singh’s case and Pattam Khader Khan’s case in paragraph No.14 of the judgment discussed in detail the very same principle laid down in the judgment of Apex Court in Balakrishnan’s case reiterated that on his failure to avail such a quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a regular suit for possession based on title, subject again to limitation. 60. I would also like to refer the judgment of this Court reported in ILR 2014 KAR 5628 in the case of Sri Abdul Ubedulla vs. Smt. Noorjahn and Others, wherein this Court has discussed the scope of Article 134 of the Limitation Act and so also Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with questions to be determined by the Court executing the decree and all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which decree has been passed. The counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would also vehemently contend that the judgment of the Court below is not in consonance with Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would also vehemently contend that the judgment of the Court below is not in consonance with Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also held in the said case that when the sale made as absolute, the plaintiff would become the absolute owner of the property and shall have all the rights over such property under law including the right to recover possession. The only difference is, if such application is filed within one year he will get possession without paying any Court fee and without waiting for years. Once he looses that advantage given under law, then he has to file a suit for possession, pay requisite Court fee and such a suit is to be filed within 12 years from the date when the defendants’ possession become adverse to his interest. Hence, it is clear that Article 65(c) of the Limitation Act attracts and the period of limitation is twelve years and not as contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that Article 134 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Article 134 is amenable to the auction purchaser to take possession in the execution proceedings itself and if he fails to avail such quick remedy, then it relegates the auction purchaser to file a suit for possession. In the case on hand, the plaintiff did not avail the quick remedy but, he has filed separate suit. Hence, the very contention of the learned counsel for the defendants cannot be accepted that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 134 of Limitation Act, 1963. I do not find any error committed by the Court below invoking Article 65(c) of Limitation Act and entertaining the suit. Hence, the very contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants cannot be accepted and I answer point No.(ii) as ‘negative’. Point Nos.(iii), (v) & (vi): 61. It is the contention of the defendants that there was no attornment of tenancy and no jural relationship between the parties and there was no any lawful termination of the tenancy. First, I would like to refer with regard to the jural relationship between the parties. The defendants did not dispute the fact that the property was purchased by the plaintiff in the auction and also did not dispute confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate. First, I would like to refer with regard to the jural relationship between the parties. The defendants did not dispute the fact that the property was purchased by the plaintiff in the auction and also did not dispute confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate. When such being the case, the defendants cannot contend that there was no jural relationship between the parties. The defendants categorically admit that they were the tenants under Shamba Shiva Reddy, who was the judgment debtor and since, he did not pay the loan amount, his property was sold in the auction in favour of the plaintiff. When the sale was confirmed and sale certificate has been issued, the same creates the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant under Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act by operation of law and hence, the defendants cannot contend that there was no jural relationship between the parties. 62. The other contention of the defendants is that there was no lawful termination of the tenancy and the same also cannot be accepted for the reason that, immediately after purchase of the property, notice was issued to all the defendants on 22.11.2004 and the defendants have also filed a separate civil suit seeking for the relief of bare injunction against the plaintiff. It is also pertinent to note that legal notice for termination of tenancy was issued on 07.09.2007, 09.08.2007 and 04.08.2007 in all the suits and issuance of legal notice has not been denied. When such being the case, the defendants cannot contend that there was no lawful termination of tenancy under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. 63. The other contention of the defendants is that there was no attornment of tenancy. There was no need to issue any notice of attornment of tenancy when the plaintiff has issued the legal notice on 22.11.2004 claiming that he is the owner of the property by operation of law, based on the sale confirmed on 18.11.2004. Hence, the said contention cannot be accepted. There was no need to issue any notice of attornment of tenancy when the plaintiff has issued the legal notice on 22.11.2004 claiming that he is the owner of the property by operation of law, based on the sale confirmed on 18.11.2004. Hence, the said contention cannot be accepted. With regard to point No.(iii) is concerned, whether the Court below has committed an error in directing the defendants to quit and vacate the premises, the plaintiff’s relied upon the documents with regard to purchase of the property, confirmation of sale and also issuance of sale certificate and so also marked legal notice issued to the defendants on 22.11.2004 and notices terminating the tenancy. When the defendants did not quit and vacate the premises, the Court below, appreciating both oral and documentary evidence rightly allowed the suit directing the defendants to quit and vacate the premises and I do not find any error committed by the Court below. The defendants themselves have raised a false plea before the Court that there was no valid sale and the tenants cannot contend that there was a defective title. The judgment referred by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff is aptly applicable to the case on hand since, the tenant has no locus standi to question the title of the plaintiff since the status of the defendants is only tenants and hence, I answer point Nos.(iii), (v) and (vi) as ‘negative’. Point No.(iv): 64. Though the plaintiff has issued the legal notice on 22.11.2004 that they have purchased the property and instructed to pay the rent, the defendants did not choose to pay the rent instead, they continued to pay the rent in favour of the earlier owner, who suffered a decree and the same has attained finality. Even inspite of the same attaining finality, the defendants had placed some of the receipts for having paid the rent and hence, the Court below taking note of non-payment of rent and also considering the fact that legal notice was issued against the defendants for arrears of rent from the date of purchase i.e., from December, 2004 till the filing of the suit, ordered for payment of the rent. It is to be noted that when the property was auctioned and sale was confirmed by issuing sale certificate and when a specific pleading was made in the plaint as well as in the legal notice mentioning the rate of rent and the defendants also did not deny the rate of rent mentioned in the plaint in their written statement and only in O.S.No.7810/2007, at the time of adducing evidence, he had come up with the defence that the rate of rent was Rs.1,400/-. But, when the notice was issued mentioning the rate of rent and when the same was pleaded in the plaint, no specific denial was made under Order 8 Rule 2 and also did not raise the specific defence under Order 8 Rule 3, when such being the case, the defendants cannot contend that the Court below has committed an error in directing the defendants to pay the arrears of rent and hence, I do not find any error committed by the Court below in directing the defendants to pay the rent, arrears of rent. If he has paid the rent to earlier owner inspite of notice, the same is his peril. It is also important to note that plaintiff has claimed damages from the date of suit and the Court below considering the same has rightly observed that the same has to be decided by holding an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 of Code of Civil Procedure. With regard to mesne profits, the same has to be decided in the separate proceedings. Hence, I do not find any error committed by the Court below in directing the defendants to pay the arrears of rent. Accordingly, I answer point No.(iv) as ‘negative’. 65. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeals are dismissed. No cost.