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2019 DIGILAW 2352 (RAJ)

Bharat Lal Meena v. State of Rajasthan

2019-09-02

ALOK SHARMA

body2019
ORDER : ALOK SHARMA, J. 1. The matter comes up on an application at the instance of the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for amendment of cause title. 2. Mr. Himanshu Jain counsel for the petitioner, submits that the name of the petitioner's father in the cause title of the petition has been carelessly recorded as "Kalu Ram Meena" and in fact is "Jagdish Narayan Meena". He prays that the typographical error in the cause title of the petition in respect of the name of the petitioner's father be accordingly rectified. 3. In view of the reasons stated in the application for amendment of cause title, the same is allowed. Amended cause title recording the correct name of the petitioner's father i.e. Jagdish Narayan Meena already filed, is taken on record. 4. With the consent of counsel for the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal. 5. The petitioner is aggrieved of the order dated 10.6.2016, whereby subsequent to his appointment on regular basis albeit as a probationer in the first instance for two years under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989 (hereafter 'the Rules of 1989') as Constable, his services have been terminated by resort to Rule 23A of the Rajasthan Service Rules (hereafter 'RSR'). 6. Mr. Himanshu Jain, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the issue agitated in this petition is that Rule 23A of RSR could not be invoked, as it has been against one appointed on substantive basis after due process albeit in the first instance as a Probationer. A similar issue also came up before this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Meena vs. The State of Rajasthan [(2018)3 WLC (Raj.) 48] and the Court therein held that one appointed on substantive basis under the Rules of 1989 albeit on probation could not be treated as a temporary employee and be removed/terminated under Rule 23A of RSR. Counsel submitted that even otherwise a probationer could not be purported to have been discharge simplicitor from his employment where the order of discharged was also ex-facie/stigmatic as in the instant case where the petitioner's services have been terminated on the recorded ground in the impugned order dated 10.6.2016 that the petitioner was absent from duty without being duly authorized. Counsel submitted that even otherwise a probationer could not be purported to have been discharge simplicitor from his employment where the order of discharged was also ex-facie/stigmatic as in the instant case where the petitioner's services have been terminated on the recorded ground in the impugned order dated 10.6.2016 that the petitioner was absent from duty without being duly authorized. It was submitted that unauthorized absence where alleged tantamounts to a misconduct for which none can be terminated without a departmental enquiry. The petitioner's termination vide order dated 10.6.2016 for reason of unauthorized absence entailing his services as probationer being held to be unsatisfactory is without requisite due process-the departmental enquiry not having even conducted. It was submitted that the case of the petitioner is not even on a singular material fact different from that of Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra), which was also followed by this Court SBCWP No. 17877/2018 titled Ratan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Others decided on 20.5.2019. Counsel finally submitted that the orders of this Court both in the case of Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra) and Ratan Singh (supra) referred to above has been complied with which shows that they have attained finality. The petitioner has been illegally terminated while on probation after due selection by resort to Rule 23(A) of RSR. It was prayed that he therefore be directed to be reinstated and the order of termination passed on 10.6.2016 be quashed and set aside. 7. Mr. Pushpendra Singh Naruka appearing for Mr. Rupin Kala, Government Counsel, is not in a position to differentiate the case of the petitioner from that of Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra) and Ratan Singh (supra). 8. This Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra) held as under:- "45. The counsel for the respondents has placed reliance in the case of Madan Lal Kulahri (supra), this Court finds that the issue raised in that writ petitions was in respect of violation of Rule 23-A of RSR as the employee was not given prior notice or one month wage in lieu thereof and as such the Court found that since no notice or one month wage in lieu of notice was given, the order was not found sustainable. The Court only permitted liberty to the respondents to pass a fresh order. 46. The Court only permitted liberty to the respondents to pass a fresh order. 46. This Court is of the opinion, that said judgment is of no help to the respondents as it does not decide the controversy as to whether the Appointing Authority has the power to terminate the services of a probationer by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR which is only applicable to a temporary Government servant. 47. This Court finds that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are not sustainable in the eye of law and their action of terminating the services of the petitioners, is found to be illegal and bad in law. 48. Resultantly, the present writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. This Court is further of the opinion that the respondents can always proceed as per law and the persons who are put on probation, can be dealt with as per powers available with the respondents/employer as per relevant Service Rules and Standing Orders issued from time to time. 49. The respondents are directed to implement the present order and further they are directed to reinstate the petitioners back in service within a period of five weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order." 9. The view of the Court thus evidently is that a person regularly appointed after due process albeit on probation cannot be treated as a temporary government servant, and his services cannot be terminated by resort to Rule 23A of RSR. Yet it has been so done in the case of the petitioner vide order dated 10.6.2016. In the circumstances, I would be inclined to allow this petition on the basis of the Court's view in Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra) and Ratan Singh (supra). The impugned order dated 10.6.2016 is quashed and set aside. 10. The petition stands allowed accordingly. The petitioner be reinstated within a period of two weeks from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. 11. It is made clear that the respondents would however be free to proceed afresh, in accordance with law, against the petitioner. Fresh proceedings, as law may provide, against the petitioner, be initiated within a period of 4 weeks of his reinstatement and be completed within eight weeks thereafter.