ORDER : Petitioners claim to have been appointed by respondent No.1 to work as Cluster Coordinators and were put in charge of ten villages. The nature of work of the petitioners was to visit the respective villages and train and appraise the villagers regarding Community Health Development. 2. The grievance of the petitioners is that the petitioners and similarly situated employees working in various units have been getting wages regularly and they have been working seriously and honestly to the fullest satisfaction of the respondents. But, one Rev. Mashak, the District Superintendent started harassing the petitioners for no reasons and stopped payment of wages to the petitioners from April 2001 and hence the petitioners moved an application before the Labour Court, Gulbarga under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’) in Application No.28/2004. In the said proceedings, respondents took up a defence that their services were disengaged from April 2001 and hence they were not entitled for the wages. However, the said application was allowed in part by the Labour Court holding that the petitioners were entitled for wages from April 2001 to March 2003 and further it was held that since the month of March 2003, there has been closure of work. Hence, contending that respondents have failed to comply with the requirements of Section 25F or Section 25FFF of the Act, petitioners raised a dispute before the Labour Court. This reference has been rejected by the Labour Court under the impugned award dated 30.11.2010 and hence, the petitioners are before this Court seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the award of the Labour Court passed in Reference No.144/2008 dated 30.11.2010 (Annexure-A) and for an order of reinstatement of the petitioners with full backwages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. 3. Sri P.Vilas Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that in the application filed by the petitioners under Section 33C (2) of the Act, the respondents have taken up a specific plea that the unit run by the respondents was closed since 31.03.2003. The Labour Court has also recorded a finding that the unit run by the second party has been closed down. But, the services of the petitioners have been terminated without following the mandatory conditions prescribed in Section 25F and 25FFF of the Act. The Labour Court has also recorded a finding that the unit run by the second party has been closed down. But, the services of the petitioners have been terminated without following the mandatory conditions prescribed in Section 25F and 25FFF of the Act. The termination of the petitioners is illegal and amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Since the petitioners are not paid one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation also having not been paid to the petitioners, the termination of the petitioners has to be held as illegal and consequently the petitioners are entitled for reinstatement and all consequential benefits. 4. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that in the event the unit run by the petitioners is considered as closed down, the petitioners are entitled for retrenchment compensation. Thus, he prayed for granting appropriate relief to the petitioners under the provisions of the Act. 5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as of this Court: 1. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Ors. [ (1990) 3 SCR 111 ]; 2. Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation ( AIR 2010 SC 1116 ); 3. Devinder Singh vs Municipal Council, Sanaur [ (2011) 6 SCC 584 ] 4. District Red Cross Society vs. Babita Arora & Ors. [ (2007) 7 SCC 366 ]; 5. Holston Hospital, Yadgir vs. Labour Court, Gulbarga & Anr. (Writ Petition No.30058/1996, dated 31.03.1999); 6. Syed Arif Hussain S/o Syed Mohd. Hussain vs. The Assistant Executive Engineer & Ors. (W.P.No.81383/2011, dated 20.03.2019). 6. Learned counsel for the respondents while refuting the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that the petitioners have made out a new case before this Court. The application was filed before the Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the Act seeking reinstatement on the ground that the petitioners were unlawfully terminated from service. The Labour Court has recorded a finding that there was no termination of the petitioners and therefore the petitioners are not entitled for the relief of reinstatement and hence the petition is liable to be rejected. The Labour Court has recorded a finding that there was no termination of the petitioners and therefore the petitioners are not entitled for the relief of reinstatement and hence the petition is liable to be rejected. He further contended that the petitioners have not made any claim based on the closure or retrenchment and therefore the petitioners are not entitled for closure compensation as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. There is no finding by the Labour Court that the respondent is an Industry and the project run by the petitioners has been closed down. In the absence of any such finding, the provisions of Sections 25F and 25FFF of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the present case and thus, sought for dismissal of the petitions. 7. In the light of the above findings, the question which arises for consideration is, whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection of Section 25F and 25FFF of the Act, if the establishment in which they were working has been closed down? 8. Upon considering the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and on going through the material on record, I find that initially the claim was made by the petitioners under Section 33C (2) of the Act on the specific averments which find place in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition, which read as under: “5. The petitioners and other similarly situated employees working at various units have been getting wages regularly. The petitioners have all along been working sincerely, honestly and to the fullest satisfaction of the Respondents. Inspite of they working so Rev.Mashak the Dist. Superintendent started harassing the employees on one or other pretext. They were not paid wages, since April 2001 without assigning any reasons whatsoever. The petitioners have been working sincerely. But because of mis management and by way of un fair labour practice the wages of the petitioners have been illegally withheld by the Respondents since April 2001, the detail particulars of withholding the wages of individual employees is specifically mentioned in the AnnexureA. 6. When the petitioners have been putting all their labour, the respondents are supposed to pay them their due wages. The family members and their children have been under starvation inspite of working. 6. When the petitioners have been putting all their labour, the respondents are supposed to pay them their due wages. The family members and their children have been under starvation inspite of working. Hence, on the above basis the petitioners have approached the labour Court, Gulbarga u/s. 33 (c) (2) of I.D. Act. In application No.28/2004 against the Respondents.” 9. The Labour Court in its impugned award has returned a finding that the activities of the second party (respondents) were closed from 2003. There is no specific finding that the unit where the petitioners were working was closed on 31.03.2003 as contended by the petitioners. The theory of termination set up by the petitioners was not believed by the Labour Court and consequently in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the impugned award, the Labour Court has held as under: “26. IssueNo.4:The 1st party prays to set aside an order termination dtd. 31032003, but 1st party failed to prove the alleged termination. It is proved that the activities/programmes under taken by the 1st respondent were closed in the year 2003. It means the scheme under taken by the 2nd party is no more existence since 2003. It is settled proposition of the law that when service of some person was taken for specific programme and on completion that programme such persons cannot seek an order for reinstatement. 27. Even though counsel for the 1st party reference Sec. 25 FFF of Industrial Disputes Act but 1st party has not approached the court stating that the 2nd party under taking is close down. Moreover the 1st party is not claiming compensation alleging that the under taking of the 2nd party is close down. Therefore the 1st party cannot be get the benefit of section 25 FFF of Industrial Disputes Act. The 1st party is not entitle to either for set aside oral order termination or for reinstatement.” 10. There can be no dispute over the proposition of law that the provisions contained in Section 25F (a) and (b) are mandatory in nature. The termination of the service of a workman amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and therefore the termination of an employee without giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation renders the action of the employer null and void is also cannot be disputed. The termination of the service of a workman amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act and therefore the termination of an employee without giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation renders the action of the employer null and void is also cannot be disputed. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of District Red Cross Society(supra), “once a valid transfer or a valid closure comes into effect, the relationship of employer and employee does not survive and ceases to exist. Compensation is required to be paid to the workman as a consequence thereof and for no other purpose.” 11. In the instant case, petitioners have proceeded against the respondents claiming arrears of wages on the specific ground that their services were unlawfully terminated. But, their claim has been found to be false and it is held that the activities of the respondents itself were closed. The question of paying retrenchment compensation would arise only when the employee has been in continuous service under the employer when the undertaking was closed. The condition prescribed in Section 25F of the Act would come into operation only if the worker was in service as on the date of the closure, in which event he would be entitled for one month’s notice or one month pay in lieu thereof. In the instant case, there is no finding that the unit was closed on 31.03.2003. That apart, even though the petitioners have now come up with a plea that the unit run by the respondents was closed in 2003, petitioners did not seek retrenchment compensation before the Labour Court. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents has reminded the Court of the approach in dealing with the case involving the interpretation of social welfare legislation by referring to para 23 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of HarjinderSingh(supra), which reads as under: “23. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating bylanes and sidelanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workmanemployee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. It need no emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity, the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman would not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer – public or private.” 13. But, in the instant case, petitioners having received their legitimate salary till the last date of their engagement with the respondents, cannot seek retrenchment compensation on the ground of closure of the unit. There is no constitutional propriety in seeking relief from the employer one after another. But, in the instant case, petitioners having received their legitimate salary till the last date of their engagement with the respondents, cannot seek retrenchment compensation on the ground of closure of the unit. There is no constitutional propriety in seeking relief from the employer one after another. In this context, it is also necessary to keep in mind the limitation of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnanthat, “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no loner in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting error of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the fact of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” For the above reasons, the petitions are dismissed.