JUDGMENT : 1. These three I.As are connected with the Election Petition No. 1 (K) of 2018 as such, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Heard Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant in I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 and I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2018 assisted by Mr. Arenlong, learned counsel. Also heard Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 1 in both the I.As (election petitioner) and for the applicant in I.A (C) No. 161 (K) of 2018 assisted by Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel. 3. On 10-04-2018, Dr. Sukhato A. Sema opposite party No.1 in both the I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 and I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2018 filed an election petition under Section 80, 80A and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 challenging the legality and validity of the result of election to the No. 13- Pughoboto (ST) Assembly Constituency held in 2018 and praying for declaration of the election of the elected candidate i.e the applicant in these two I.As Shri Y. Vikheho Swu illegal and void and at the same time declare him (the election petitioner) elected from the same Assembly constituency. 4. The election petition was moved on 21-04-2018. Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No.1 in the election petition and the applicant in the two I.As i.e. I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 and I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2018. While the election petition was at that stage, the respondent No.1 in the election petition whose election is under challenge filed the I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 under Section 86 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Section 81 and 83 of the same Act and also read with Rule 1 of Chapter VIII-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules. In the first I.A, the applicant has prayed for dismissal of the election petition No. 1 (K) of 2018 on the following grounds : (1) that the election petition was not presented personally by the election petitioner as required under sub-section 1 of Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (2) that the copy of the election petition served to the respondent (applicant in the two I.As), the verification of the election petition and the affidavits accompanying the same were not attested by the election petitioner with his signature as mandated under Section 81 clause 3 read with Rule 1 Clause A of Chapter VIII-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules. (3) that the election petitioner did not signed on the election petition itself, the verification, the affidavit and on the documents filed along with it and that though the election petitioner has alleged corrupt practices in the election process he did not filed an affidavit under Form 25 as provided under Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. (4) Lastly, that the vakalatnama appended to the election petition is not signed by the election petitioner and therefore, there is neither valid authorization by the election petitioner nor valid acceptance by the counsel. 5. On the day the above stated I.A was filed another I.A i.e., I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2019 was filed by the same applicant (the respondent No.1 in the election petition) praying for keeping the filing of the written statement to the election petition in abeyance till the application filed by him for dismissal of the election petition is disposed of by this Court. While the two I.As were pending for disposal, the election petitioner who is the opposite party No.1 in both the I.As filed an I.A (C) No. 161 (K) of 2018 praying for leave to amend the Form 25 affidavit filed by him along with the election petition. 6. As stated above the first ground on which the applicant in the I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 has sought for dismissal of the election petition is that the election petition was not presented by the election petitioner personally as required under Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is submitted by Mr. 6. As stated above the first ground on which the applicant in the I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 has sought for dismissal of the election petition is that the election petition was not presented by the election petitioner personally as required under Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is submitted by Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant that the day the election petition was presented in the Registry of this High Court, the petitioner himself was not present and to that effect a certificate dated 11- 05-2018 has been issued by the Administrative Officer (Judicial) of the Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench. The contents of the certificate are as follows:- " Date11/05/2018 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN This is to certify that Election Petition No. 1 (K)) 2018 (in the matter of Dr. Sukhato A. Sema versus Shri Vikheho Swu & Another) has been registered in Kohima Bench of the Gauhati High Court on 10-04-2018. On the filing day, the petition has been notarized and brought by the concerned learned counsel without the election petitioner. KUOLIEBEIZO MEPFHU-O Administrative Officer (Judicial) Gauhati High Court Kohima Bench" After referring to the above certificate, the learned senior counsel also submitted that the provision of Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is mandatory. Therefore, an election petition has to be presented by the election petitioner personally and failure to do so will invite dismissal of the same under section 86(1) of the same act. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel referred to the judgment passed in Nandiesha Reddy vs. Kavitha Mahesh, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 721 . The relevant paras are para 22 and 23. The contents of the two relevant paragraphs referred to by the learned senior counsel are reproduced here below:- "22. Section 81 of the Act inter alia provides for presentation of election petition. It reads as follows: 81. The relevant paras are para 22 and 23. The contents of the two relevant paragraphs referred to by the learned senior counsel are reproduced here below:- "22. Section 81 of the Act inter alia provides for presentation of election petition. It reads as follows: 81. Presentation of petitions.-(1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. Explanation.-In this Sub-section, "elector" means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not. 2. (omitted) (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are Respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. 23. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that an election petition calling in question any election can be presented by any candidate at such election. Candidate, in our opinion, would not be only such person whose nomination form has been accepted for scrutiny or whose name appears in the list of validly nominated candidate, that is to say, candidates whose nominations have been found valid. Here, in the present case, the Election Petitioner's plea is that the Returning Officer declined to accept the nomination paper." The learned senior counsel also referred to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court passed in the case of G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another vs. Returning Officer and Others, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 736 . In that case, the election petitioner presented the election petition before the Registry of the High Court. In that case, the election petitioner presented the election petition before the Registry of the High Court. The High Court Registry put up an office note objecting the petition on the ground that the election petitioner was not present at the time of filing of the election petition therefore, the presentation of the election petition was not in accordance with Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Based on the office objection, the matter was placed before the Single Bench of the High Court. The learned single Judge, after considering the statement of the Registrar came to the conclusion that it was not proper presentation in terms of Section 81(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 and dismissed the election petition. Aggrieved, the election petitioner went to the Honble Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the provision of Section 81 (1) of the Act of 1951 came to the following findings and conclusions at paragraphs 14, 19, 22, 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment. The contents of the above stated paragraphs are given below:- 14. A close look of Section 81 reveals that the two remaining Sub-sections after the amendment introduced by Act 47 of 1966, i.e. (1) and (3) deal with two distinct, but interrelated issues. Sub-section (1) deals with the necessary requirements of any petition challenging an election, and Sub-section (3) deals with additional requirements as to the petition presented. Sub-section (1) has five components; (i) the qualification of the petitioner, i.e.he/she must be either "a candidate at such election" or an "elector"; (i) the petition must be presented `by' the petitioner; (ii) the petition must be based "on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101; (iii) it must be presented in the High Court; and (iv) it must be presented within 45 days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. Therefore, all these five requirements are extremely specific and clear. Therefore, all these five requirements are extremely specific and clear. This inference is further strengthened by Section 86 (1) which provides that the "High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81." 19. One can discern the reason why the petition is required to be presented by the petitioner personally. An election petition is a serious matter with a variety of consequences. Since such a petition may lead to the vitiation of a democratic process, any procedure provided by an election statute must be read strictly. Therefore, the Legislature has provided that the petition must be presented "by" the petitioner himself, so that at the time of presentation, the High Court may make preliminary verification which ensures that the petition is neither frivolous nor vexatious. 22. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants relied on a decision of the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in Bhanwar Singh v. Navrang Singh. In the case before the learned Single Judge, the election petition had been presented by one Rajendra Prasad, Advocate and not by the petitioner himself. It was argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner therein that election petition had been validly presented under Section 81(1) of the Act because Section 81(1) of the Act only makes a provision as to who can file an election petition and does not deal with as to who should actually present it before the Registry. It is further submitted that Section 81 of the Act nowhere provides that the petitioner should be physically present at the time of presentation of the election petition. The learned Single Judge, after adverting to the words - "by", "presented" concluded that these words used in Section 81(1) of the Act have to be given wide meaning and found that election petition filed through an advocate without the presence of candidate or elector is valid. We are unable to accept the said conclusion. 24. The challenge to an election is a serious matter. The object of presenting an election petition by a candidate or elector is to ensure genuineness and to curtail vexatious litigations. If we consider Sub-section (1) along with the other provisions in Chapter II and III, the object and intent of the Legislature is that this provision i.e. Section 81(1) is to be strictly adhered to and complied with. 25. The object of presenting an election petition by a candidate or elector is to ensure genuineness and to curtail vexatious litigations. If we consider Sub-section (1) along with the other provisions in Chapter II and III, the object and intent of the Legislature is that this provision i.e. Section 81(1) is to be strictly adhered to and complied with. 25. In view of the endorsement by the Registrar (Judicial) on 07-07-2008 that the election petition was presented only by an advocate and not by the election petitioners, we accept the reasoning of the High Court in dismissing the election petition. We further hold that as per Sub-section (1) of Section 81, election petition is to be presented by any candidate or elector relating to the election personally to the authorized officer of the High Court and failure to adhere such course would be contrary to the said provision and in that event the election petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of improper presentation. 26. Since, the High Court has correctly dismissed the election petition, the civil appeal fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs." 7. Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party/election petitioner submitted that the purpose of this I.A is to delay the trial of the election petition because the grounds of objections raised by the applicant are baseless and they cannot be considered at this stage without evidence. Learned senior counsel, thereafter, submitted that the contention of the applicant that the election petitioner was not present when the election petition was presented before the officer of this High Court, in charge of accepting the same, is without any supporting evidence. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the certificate issued by the Administrative Officer (Judicial), Gauahti High Court Kohima Bench cannot be accepted by its face value without any supporting evidence. The allegation that the election petitioner was not present has to be proved with evidence and, unless that is done, this Court cannot by taking cognizance of the certificate come to the conclusion that the election petitioner was not present at the time of presenting the election petition. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the officer who issued the certificate has no authority to issue such certificate and nothing has been shown to prove that he has such authority to do so. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the officer who issued the certificate has no authority to issue such certificate and nothing has been shown to prove that he has such authority to do so. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel submitted that the burden is on the applicant in this I.A to prove what he has asserted and unless he has discharged his burden successfully his claim cannot simply be accepted. In support of his submission learned senior counsel cited the judgment of Honble Supreme Court passed in the case of Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 558. Relevant paragraphs 9, 10 and 19. The contents of the above stated paragraphs are given here below:- "9. In terms of the said provision, the burden of proving the fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its application and there may be exception thereto. The learned trial Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the defendant was in a dominating position and there had been a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The appellant in his written statement denied and disputed the said averments made in the plaint. 10. Pleading is not evidence, far less proof. Issues are raised on the basis of the pleadings. The defendant-appellant having not admitted or acknowledged the fiduciary relationship between the parties, indisputably, the relationship between the parties itself would be an issue. The suit will fail if both the parties do not adduce any evidence, in view of Section 102 of the Evidence Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into, upon the party against whom, at the time the question arises, judgment would be given, if no further evidence were to be adduced by either side. 19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between a burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is which party is to begin. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between a burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways : (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule is Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same." The learned senior counsel also cited the judgment passed in the case of Gian Chand and Brothers and Another vs. Rattan Lal allias Ratan Singh, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 . Paragraphs referred to in particular are paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22. The contents of the paragraphs are reproduced here below :- 18. It is well settled principle of law that a person who asserts a particular fact is required to affirmatively establish it. In Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (SCC p.561, para 9), it has been held that the burden of proving the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who denies it and the said principle may not be universal in its application and there may be an exception thereto. The purpose of referring to the same is that if the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant had acknowledged the signature, it is obligatory on his part to substantiate the same. But the question would be what would be the consequence in a situation where the signatures are proven and there is an evasive reply in the written statement and what should be construed as substantiating the assertion made by the Plaintiff. 19. In Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity, it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 474, para 13) "12. But the question would be what would be the consequence in a situation where the signatures are proven and there is an evasive reply in the written statement and what should be construed as substantiating the assertion made by the Plaintiff. 19. In Krishna Mohan Kul v. Pratima Maity, it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 474, para 13) "12. When fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence is alleged by a party in a suit, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation." 20. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Subodh Kumar Bannerjee, a Constitution Bench of this Court, while dealing with a mode of proof of a will under the Indian Succession Act, observed that where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. 21. In A. Raghavamma and Anr. v. A. Chenchamma, while making a distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, a three-Judge Bench opined thus: - "12.. There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. The burden of proof in the present case undoubtedly lies upon the Plaintiff to establish the factum of adoption and that of partition. The said circumstances do not alter the incidence of the burden of proof. Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence" 22. The present case is not one such case where the plaintiffs have chosen not to adduce any evidence. They have examined witnesses, proven entries in the books of accounts and also proven the acknowledgements duly signed by the Defendant. The defendant, on the contrary, except making a bald denial of the averments, had not stated anything else. That apart, nothing was put to the witnesses in the cross-examination when the documents were exhibited. He only came with a spacious plea in his evidence which was not pleaded. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court has fallen into error in holding that it was obligatory on the part of the Plaintiffs to examine the handwriting expert to prove the signatures. He only came with a spacious plea in his evidence which was not pleaded. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court has fallen into error in holding that it was obligatory on the part of the Plaintiffs to examine the handwriting expert to prove the signatures. The finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to discharge the burden is absolutely misconceived in the facts of the case." 8. Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides as follows:- "81. Presentation of petitions:- (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in (sub-section (1)) of section 100 and section 101 to the (High Court) by any candidate at such election or any elector (within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates)" This High Court has our own Rules called "Special provision relating to procedure in election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as amended by Act. No. XLVII of 1966. Rule 1 of the said Rules provides as under:- 1. An election petition under S. 80-A of Representation of Peoples Act may be presented duly verified in the form prescribed under Ss. 82 and 83 of the said Act before the Stamp reporter of this Court with a Court fee of Rs. 6.00 affixed thereon, within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the latter of those two dates. 6.00 affixed thereon, within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the latter of those two dates. Every such petition shall be accompanied by- (a) as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition together with one extra copy, all the copies being fully attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy f the petition and as many envelopes as there are respondents hearing requisite postage stamp to enable service to be effected by registered post with acknowledgment due; (b) as many printed forms of notices, duly filled in, as there are respondents; (c) an affidavit in support of the contents of the petition as prescribed in R. 83 (c) of the aforesaid Act where necessary, and (d) a challan showing the deposit of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand) into the State Bank of India, Gauhati Branch in favour of the Registrar of the Court, as security for the costs of the petition. Provided that such deposit in respect of petition to be filed in the Benches a Kohima, Imphal and Agartala may be made in the State Bank of Kohima, Imphal and Agartala, as the case may be, in favour of the Deputy Registrar of the Bench concerned. Note-(I)-The petition shall be legibly type-written or printed in the English language, on durable foolscap paper or other paper similar to it in size and quality, bookwise, on one side of the paper, with not more than 20 or less than 18 lines, of about 10 words in each line on each page and with an inner margin of about an inch and a quarter-wide Note (II)-Any petition which is presented out of time and without any of the above mentioned requisites duly satisfied shall forthwith be returned by the stamp reporter for refilling." 9. Two things are distinctively made clear by the two provisions of the laws given above and the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court cited by the ld senior counsel for the applicant; (i) that election petition must be presented by the petitioner personally and (ii) that the election petition should be presented before the Stamp Reporter of the Court ( as given at Rule 1 of the special provision relating to procedure in election petition under the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951). The law has been settled as held in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the applicant i.e. the case of G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another-vs- Returning Officer and Others, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 736 that election petition must be presented by the petitioner himself. There has not been any deviation from this settled principle of law. In the case of Sheo Sadan Singh vs. Mohan Lal Gautam, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 408 , the election petition was presented before the Registry by the advocates clerk but in the presence of the petitioner. Therefore, it was held that in substance though not in form, it was presented by the petitioner himself, as such, requirement of the law was fully satisfied. However, in this case, the Administrative Officer (Judicial) who is also the Stamp Reporter has certified that the petition which has been already notarized was brought by the concerned learned counsel without the election petitioner. There is no reason to doubt the statement of the officer of the Court given in the certificate with his official seal. In the case of G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another vs. Returning Officer and Others, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 736 , also it was the Registrys objection which was upheld by the High Court and the Honble Supreme Court. In this Bench, it is the Administrative Officer (Judicial) to whom the charge of Stamp Reporter is entrusted. As such, he is the authority before whom the election petition has to be presented by the election petitioner himself. Therefore, he is competent to issue such certificate. In this Bench, it is the Administrative Officer (Judicial) to whom the charge of Stamp Reporter is entrusted. As such, he is the authority before whom the election petition has to be presented by the election petitioner himself. Therefore, he is competent to issue such certificate. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the law which has been settled by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases stated above, I am of the considered view that the election petitioner was not present before the concerned officer of this High Court when the election petition was presented, as such, the provision of Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and Rule 1 of this High Court which are mandatory have not been followed or complied with by him and that would attract the consequence as provided under Section 86 (1) of the same act. 10. The second point of objection raised by the applicant, as already stated is that the copy of the election petition furnished to the applicant in this I.A was not attested as true copy by the election petitioner with his own signature, therefore, the requirement of Section 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has not been met. As such, the election petition deserves to be dismissed under Section 86 (1) of the same. On this, Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the copy of the election petition along with its annexures furnished to him by the learned counsel of the election petitioner are not attested as true copy by the election petitioner with his own signature. Learned senior counsel placing before this Court a copy of the election petition along with its annexures which was served to him submitted that the name of the election petitioner i.e. Dr. Sukhato A. Sema has been written in the body of the election petition and its annexures but this is not the known signature of the election petitioner and in any case the same cannot be termed as signature as the same was written in capital letters. Sukhato A. Sema has been written in the body of the election petition and its annexures but this is not the known signature of the election petitioner and in any case the same cannot be termed as signature as the same was written in capital letters. Thereafter, the learned senior counsel referred to the copy of the nomination papers of the election petition in Form 2B of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and to the affidavits of the election petitioner submitted under Form No. 26 of the same rule wherein, the signatures of the election petitioner signed in italic form appeared at four places; two at the places for signature of the candidate in the nomination papers under Form 2B and two at the places designated for the deponent of the affidavit to sign on the same under Form 26. Learned senior counsel submitted that he had downloaded those documents from the official website of the Chief Electoral Officer, Nagaland viz "ceonagaland.nic.in" .The same were filed along with the I.A as Annexure-130. After referring to the signatures on the documents stated above, the learned senior counsel submitted that there is no similarity between the signatures given in the nomination papers and on the copy of the election petition furnished to him. He also submitted that the signatures given on the nomination papers having been accepted and known as the signature of the election petitioner, the name of the election petitioner written in capital letters on the body of the election furnished to him cannot be accepted as the signature of the election petitioner, therefore, it has to be concluded that the election petitioner has not signed at all on the body of the election petition furnished to him as required under Section 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The learned senior counsel further contended that the name of the petitioner written in capital letters cannot be termed as his signature. In support of his submissions stated above, the learned senior counsel has referred to the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pandey vs. Baidyanath Yadaw and Others, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 1 . The relevant paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are reproduced here below:- "5. In support of his submissions stated above, the learned senior counsel has referred to the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pandey vs. Baidyanath Yadaw and Others, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 1 . The relevant paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are reproduced here below:- "5. The learned Judge of the High Court found as a fact that a large number of mistakes were there in the copy of the election petition supplied to the appellant but as they were of a superficial and insignificant nature bordering on clerical or typing mistakes, on the whole there was a substantial compliance of the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act. The learned Judge has entered into a detailed discussion of the various decisions of this Court and also of High Courts and has correctly held that the provisions of Section 81(3) are mandatory and if the court finds that they have not been complied with it has no alternative but to dismiss the election petition straightaway. Unfortunately, however, in the process of applying the principles laid down by this Court he has completely glossed over the nature of the mistakes by describing them as merely clerical or typing ones. On a perusal of the aforesaid mistakes (listed at pp. 64-65 of the Paperbook) they do not appear to be so. Section 81(3) of the Act runs thus : 81. Presentation of petitions-(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. 6. The consequence of non-compliance of this section has been mentioned in Section 86(1) which may be extracted thus : 86. Trial of election petitions- (1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. 7. A perusal of the above reveals that the statute intended that before an election petition can be entertained, the copy sent to the elected candidate must be a true copy, failing which there would be a serious disobedience of the mandate contained in Section 81(3) which would be fatal to the maintainability of the said petition. 8. 7. A perusal of the above reveals that the statute intended that before an election petition can be entertained, the copy sent to the elected candidate must be a true copy, failing which there would be a serious disobedience of the mandate contained in Section 81(3) which would be fatal to the maintainability of the said petition. 8. It is now well settled by a large catena of authorities of this Court that the electoral process by which the verdict of the people has been given is a sacrosanct one and cannot be lightly set at naught unless the grounds mentioned in the Act for setting aside an election are held to be proved. In these circumstances, it is manifest that the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act should be construed to the letter and spirit of the law because if the election petitioner does not give full and complete notice of the allegations made against the returned candidate, he runs the risk of his petition being dismissed in limine". The learned senior counsel after having referred to the above portions of the judgment with emphasis laid on para 7 submitted that since the petitioner has omitted to sign on the body of the election petition furnished to him, the election petition deserves to be dismissed under Section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The learned senior counsel also referred to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court passed in the case of U.S Sasidharan vs. K. Karunakaran and Another, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 482 . Relevant paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34. The contents of the paragraphs are given below:- "8. Section 81 of the Act provides as follows:- 81. Presentation of petitions.- (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. (2) (Omitted by Act 47 of 1966.) (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. 9. We are concerned with Section 81(3) which enjoins that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. Section 81(3), however, does not provide for giving of copies of the documents either referred to in the election petition or filed in the proceedings. We may now refer to Section 86(1) of the Act which reads as follows:- "86 (1). The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117". 10. Section 86(1), therefore, is a mandate on the court to dismiss an election petition if there be a non-compliance with the provision of Section 81(3). In other words, both Section 81(3) and Section 86(1) are mandatory in nature and if there be any non-compliance with the mandatory provision o Section 81(3), the court will be bound to dismiss the election petition. 15. We have already referred to Section 83 relating to the contents of an election petition. The election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts and also set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice. The material facts or particulars relating to any corrupt practice may be contained in a document and the election petitioner, without pleading the material facts or particulars of corrupt practice, may refer to the document. When such a reference is made in the election petition, a copy of the document must be supplied inasmuch as by making a reference to the document and without pleading its contents in the election petition, the document becomes incorporated in the election petition by reference. In other words, it forms an integral part of the election petition. Section 81(3) provides for giving a true copy of the election petition. In other words, it forms an integral part of the election petition. Section 81(3) provides for giving a true copy of the election petition. When a document forms an integral part of the election petition and a copy of such document is not furnished to the respondent along with a copy of the election petition, the copy of the election petition will not be a true copy within the meaning of Section 81(3) and, as such, the court has to dismiss the election petition under Section 86(1) for non-compliance with Section 81(3). 16. On the other hand, if the contents of the document in question are pleaded in the election petition, the document does not form an integral part of the election petition. In such a case, a copy of the document need not be served on the respondent and that will not be non- compliance with the provision of Section 81(3). The document may be relied upon as an evidence in the proceedings. In other words, when the document does not form an integral part of the election petition, but has been either referred to in the petition or filed in the proceedings as evidence of any fact, a copy of such a document need not be served on the respondent along with a copy of the election petition. 17. There may be another situation when a copy of the document need not be served on the respondent along with the election petition. When a document has been filed in the proceedings, but is not referred to in the petition either directly or indirectly, a copy of such document need not be served on the respondent. What Section 81(3) enjoins is that a true copy of the election petition has to be served on the respondents including the elected candidate. When a document forms an integral part of an election petition containing material facts or particulars of corrupt practice, then a copy of the election petition without such a document is not complete and cannot be said to be a true copy of the election petition. Copy of such document must be served on the respondents. 30. When a document forms an integral part of an election petition containing material facts or particulars of corrupt practice, then a copy of the election petition without such a document is not complete and cannot be said to be a true copy of the election petition. Copy of such document must be served on the respondents. 30. Apart from striking out the whole of the election petition when it does not disclose a cause of action, the court can strike out any statement which is irrelevant, scandalous or has nothing to do with the cause of action under the provision of Order VI, Rule 16 of the CPC. It is submitted by Mr. Poti that if the averments in paragraph 5(xi) of the election petition are irrelevant or do not disclose any cause of action, at the most the said paragraph can be struck out by the court under the provision of Order VI, Rule 16 of the CPC. We are afraid, we are unable to accept the contention. We are not concerned with whether paragraph 5(xi) can be struck out by the court under the provision of Order VI, Rule 16 of the CPC as not disclosing any cause of action, but really we are concerned with the question as to whether the copy of the election petition which has been served on the first respondent without a copy of the video cassette is a true copy of the election petition or not within the meaning of Section 81(3) of the Act. We have come to the conclusion that the appellant has not served on the first respondent a true copy of the election petition inasmuch as, admittedly, a copy of the video cassette which forms an integral part of the election petition, was not served along with the election petition. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention which is rejected. 31. Mr. Poti has drawn our attention to the observations made by this Court in Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia which reads as follows: (SCC pp.522-23, para 41) "Like the CPC, this section also envisages a distinction between "material facts" and "material particulars". Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) corresponds to Order 6, Rule 2, while Clause (b) is analogous to Order 6, Rule 4 and 6 of the Code. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) corresponds to Order 6, Rule 2, while Clause (b) is analogous to Order 6, Rule 4 and 6 of the Code. The distinction between "material facts" and "material particulars" is important because different consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a 'charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, CPC. If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a petition suffering from a deficiency of /material particulars, the court has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation. 32. On the basis of the above observations, it is submitted that if paragraph 5(xi) of the election petition suffers from a deficiency of material particulars, the court has a discretion to allow the appellant to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation. The above observations have been made in a different context and are quite inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case which, as noticed already, relate to the question as to whether the video cassette is an integral part of the election petition and whether non-furnishing of a copy of the video cassette to the first respondent along with a copy of election petition is noncompliance with the mandatory provision of Section 81(3) and, as such, liable to be dismissed under Section 86(1) of the Act. The question of exercise of discretion by the court in permitting the appellant to supply the particulars does not arise at all. 33. Lastly, the decision of this Court in A. Madan Mohan v. Kalavakunta Chandrasekhara has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. We fail to understand how this case is of any assistance to the appellant, for in this case also this Court once more approved of the decision in Karunanidhi's case AIR. 1983 SC 588. No other point has been urged by either party in this appeal. 34. We fail to understand how this case is of any assistance to the appellant, for in this case also this Court once more approved of the decision in Karunanidhi's case AIR. 1983 SC 588. No other point has been urged by either party in this appeal. 34. In view of the, discussion made above, we affirm the judgment of the High Court dismissing the election petition of the appellant on the ground that as the copy of the video cassette was not served on the first respondent along with a copy of the election petition, it was noncompliance with the provision of Section 81(3) of the Act." After having referred to the above judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, the learned senior counsel further submitted that since the petitioner did not put his signature on the copy of the election petition furnished to the respondent in the election petition, the same cannot be termed as true copy of the election petition. Therefore, the election petitioner has failed to meet the requirement of Section 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel referred to paragraph 7 of the judgment passed in the case of Ajay Maken vs. Adesh Kumar Gupta and Another, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 489 . The contents of the paragraph are given hear below:- "7. Legally there is a distinction between failure to sign and verify the original copy of the election petition filed in the Court and failure to attest the copy served on the Respondent to be a true copy of the election petition. While the latter failure falls within the scope of Section 81(3), the earlier failure falls under Sub-section (1)(c) and Sub-section (2) of Section 83. While the failure to comply with the requirements of Section 81 obligates the High Court to dismiss the election petition, the failure to comply with the requirements of Section 83 is not expressly declared to be fatal to the election petition. The said distinction is explained by this Court in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Anr. in paras 20 and 21." 11. Mr. The said distinction is explained by this Court in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Anr. in paras 20 and 21." 11. Mr. D. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel, appearing for the election petitioner, at the very outset submitted that there is no law which provides that it should be with the same signature as given on the nomination papers that copy of the election petition should be attested by the election petitioner and, signature of a person should be in a particular form only. It is for the petitioner to choose what form of signature he should use and also put on the election petition. Therefore, the petitioner had signed with the signature as found in the copy furnished to the respondent and there is nothing wrong with that. Learned senior counsel further submitted that no specific statement has been made by the applicant in his application that the signature of the election petitioner on the body of the election petition furnished to him are not the signature of the election petitioner and even if such statements were made, the burden is on the applicant in the I.A to prove that such signature is not the signature of the election petitioner. Therefore, at this stage, when evidence have not been adduced one cannot come to the conclusion as yet as to the question of whether the signatures on the body of the election petition furnished to the respondent or his counsel are or not of the election petitioner. The learned senior counsel, reiterating his point, submitted further that the truth as to whether the signature that were put on the copy of the election petition supplied to the respondent/applicant were that of the election petitioner or not can only be ascertained when the trial is taken up and evidence are given by both the parties. Therefore, at this stage, it is too early to decide on the issue. According to the learned senior counsel, the purpose of requiring the petitioner to sign on every page of the election petition and each copy furnished to the respondent is to bind the election petitioner to the facts that are alleged in the election petition. As such, what is material is not in what form or in what manner it is signed. As such, what is material is not in what form or in what manner it is signed. The learned senior counsel went further and submitted that minor defects, mistakes or deficiencies are to be ignored and court should not dismiss election petition by adhering strictly to technicalities of little consequence, such as, signature of the election petitioner in capital letters. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel referred to paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment passed by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prasad Sarma-vs- Mani Kumar Subba and Others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 289 . The contents of the two paragraphs are reproduced here below:- "16. From the various decisions noted above, it clearly emerges out that the correctness of the decision Dr. Shipra's case (supra) was doubted and it has been held by the Constitution Bench in the T.M. Jacob's case (supra) that it was confined to the facts of that case. Therefore it cannot be said that Dr. Shipra's case lays down any proposition of law of binding nature. The two decisions of the Constitution Benches, namely, Radhey Shyam Murarka and T.M. Jacob (supra) hold the field as well as the decision in the case of Sri T. Phungzathang. The law as laid down in the above noted decisions would be the guiding precedents in deciding a question relating to a true copy of an affidavit. 17. The purpose of the provision to furnish a true copy of the petition is not to frustrate the cause of the petitioner approaching the Court by adhering strictly to technicalities of little consequence. On the other hand the anxiety is that the respondent must have correct idea of the allegations of corrupt practices made against him with some responsibility and that he may not be misled in any material respect by furnishing of a copy of the affidavit which may not be a correct copy having vital variation from the original. It is true that in the matters relating to elections and election petitions, strict compliance of the legal provisions is necessary and full care is to be taken to see that rights of an elected representative are not lightly disturbed and rightly so. It is true that in the matters relating to elections and election petitions, strict compliance of the legal provisions is necessary and full care is to be taken to see that rights of an elected representative are not lightly disturbed and rightly so. But an election petition is not to be thrown at the threshold on the slightest pretext of one kind or the other which may or may not have any material bearing on the factors to be strictly adhered to in such matters. It is substance not form which would matter. If it is permitted otherwise, the returned candidate would only be in the lookout microscopically for any kind of technical lacuna or defect to abort the endeavour of the petitioner to bring to trial the issues relating to corrupt practices in the elections. The purpose of the law on the point cannot be to allow the returned candidate to avoid the trial of the issues of corrupt practices raised against him on the basis of any little defect which may not result in any vital variation between the original and the true copy so as to have the effect of misleading the returned candidate. As it is, the prevailing situation of elections and practices often said to be adopted now and then and here and there does not always give a very happy picture. Free, fair and fearless elections is ideal to be achieved and not to be defeated for the sake of pretentious and frivolous technicalities." The next case referred to by the ld senior counsel is Sadar Harcharan Singh Brar vs. Sukh Darshan Singh and Others, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 196 . In that case the Honble Supreme Court held as follows:- "15. Having formed an opinion that there was any defect in the affidavit, the election petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity of removing the defect by filing a proper affidavit. Else the effect of such failure should have been left to be determined and adjudicated upon at the trial, as held in G. Mallikarjunappa case. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Else the effect of such failure should have been left to be determined and adjudicated upon at the trial, as held in G. Mallikarjunappa case. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The election petition shall stand restored on the file of the High Court for hearing and decision consistently with what has been stated hereinabove" The learned senior counsel also referred to the case of Sadar Harcharan Singh Brar vs. Sukh Darshan Singh and Others, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 196 . The Honble Supreme Court held as followsr:- 33. Does the word 'copy' occurring in section 81(3) of the Act mean an absolutely exact copy or does it mean a copy so true that nobody could by any possibility misunderstand it. This matter is no longer res integra. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar, a Constitution Bench of this Court elaborately dealt with this question after referring to a catena of authorities. It was held that the test to determine whether a copy was a true one or not was to find out whether any variation from the original was calculated to mislead a reasonable person. The Constitution Bench found as untenable the contention that since copies of the petition served on the returned candidate did not contain signatures of the petitioner below the word 'petitioner', on the copies of the petition served on the respondent, they had ceased to be true copies of the original petition, attracting the consequences of Section 86(1) of the Act. The Bench opined: Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, -we are of the view that the word 'copy' does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore there was no failure to comply with the last part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore there was no failure to comply with the last part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81. In that view of the matter Sub-section (3) of Section 90 was not attracted and there was no question of dismissing the election petition under that Sub- section by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of Section 81. The Bench also opined: When every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner, a fresh signature below the word 'petitioner' was not necessary. Sub- section (3) of Section 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word 'copy' occurring in Sub-section (3) of Section 81. On behalf of the appellant the argument is that Sub-section (3) of Section 81 being mandatory in nature all the requirements of the Sub-section must be strictly complied with and the word 'copy' must be taken to be an absolutely exact transcript of the original. On behalf of the respondents the contention is that the word 'copy' means that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original, alternatively, the argument is that the last part of Sub-section (3) dealing with a copy is merely directive, and for the reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar,. We are of the view that the word 'copy' in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 does not mean an absolutely exact copy, but means that the copy shall be so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, third edition, volume 4, page 3098). In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether any part of Sub-section (3) of section 81 is merely directory. 34. Similar view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench in Ch. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether any part of Sub-section (3) of section 81 is merely directory. 34. Similar view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench in Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad [1964] 6 SCR 213, wherein it was held that the expression 'copy' occurring in section 81(3) of the Act did not mean an exact copy but only one so true that no reasonable person could by any possibility misunderstand it as not being the same as the original. Agreeing with the view of the Constitution Bench in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case (supra), the Constitution Bench in Ch. Subbarao's case ruled that substantial compliance with section 81(3) was sufficient and the petition could not be dismissed where there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Act, in limine, under section 81(3) of the Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Constitution Bench in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case as well as in Ch. Subbarao's case. 35. The object of serving a 'true copy' of an Election Petition and the affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practice on the respondent in Election Petition is to enable the respondent to understand the charge against him so that he can effectively meet the same in the written statement and prepare his defence. The requirement is, thus, of substance and not of form. 36. The expression 'copy' in section 81(3) of the Act, in our opinion, means a copy which is substantially so and which does not contain any material or substantial variation of a vital nature as could possibly mislead a reasonable person to understand and meet the charges/allegations made against him in the election petition. Indeed a copy which differs in material particulars from the original cannot be treated as a true copy of the original within the meaning of section 81(3) of the Act and the vital defect cannot be permitted to be cured after the expiry of the period of limitation. 37. We have already referred to the defect which has been found in the copy of the affidavit served on the appellant in the present case. 37. We have already referred to the defect which has been found in the copy of the affidavit served on the appellant in the present case. There is no dispute that the copy of the affidavit served on the appellant contained the endorsement the effect that the affidavit had been duly signed, verified and affirmed by the election petitioner before a Notary. Below the endorsement of attestation, it was also mentioned: Sd/Notary. There, however, was an omission to mention the name and Notary particulars of the Notary and the stamp and seal of the Notary in the copy of the affidavit served on the appellant. There was no other defect pointed out either in the memo of objection or in C.M.P. No. 2903 of 1996 or even during the course of arguments in the High Court or before us. Could this omission be treated as an omission of a vital or material nature which could possibly mislead or prejudice the appellant in formulating his defence? In our opinion No. The omission was inconsequential. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the appellant could have been misled by the absence of the name and seal or stamp of the Notary on the copy of the affidavit, when endorsement of attestation was present in the copy which showed that the same had been signed by the Notary. It is not denied that the copies of the Election Petition and the affidavit served on the appellant bore the signatures of respondent No. 1 on every page and the original affidavit filed in support of the Election Petition had been properly signed, verified and affirmed by the election petitioner and attested by the Notary. There has, thus, been a substantial compliance with the requirements of section 81(3) read with the proviso to section 83(1)(c) of the Act. Defects in the supply of true copy under section 81 of the Act may be considered to be fatal, where the party has been misled by the copy on account of variation of a material nature in the original and the copy supplied to the respondent. The prejudice caused to the respondent in such cases would attract the provisions of section 81(3) read with section 86(1) of the Act. Same consequence would not follow from non-compliance with Section 83 of the Act. 38. We are unable to agree with Mr. The prejudice caused to the respondent in such cases would attract the provisions of section 81(3) read with section 86(1) of the Act. Same consequence would not follow from non-compliance with Section 83 of the Act. 38. We are unable to agree with Mr. Salve that since proceedings in election petitions are purely statutory proceedings and not 'civil proceedings' as commonly understood, there is no room for invoking and importing the doctrine of substantial compliance into section 86(1) read with section 81(3) of the Act. It is, too late in the day to so urge. The law as settled by the two Constitution Bench decisions of this Court referred to above is by itself sufficient to repel the argument of Mr. Salve. That apart, to our mind, the Legislate intent appears to be quite clear, since it divides violations into two classes-those violations which would entail dismissal of the election petition under section 86(1) of the Act like non compliance with section 81(3) and those violations which attract section 83(1) of the Act i.e. non-compliance with the provisions of section 83. It is only the violation of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance ' as expounded in Murarka Radhey Shyam and Ch. Subbarao's cases. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act, on the other hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the CPC. This position clearly emerges from the provisions of Section 83(1) and 86(5) of the Act, which read thus: "83. Contents of petition-(1) An election petition- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the CPC, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings. 86. 86. Trial of election petition.- (5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. 39. Applying the test as laid down in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar's case to the fact situation of the present case, we come to the conclusion that the defects complained of in the present case were not such as could have misled the appellant at all. The non-mention of the name of the notary or the absence of the stamp and seal of the notary in the otherwise true copy supplied to the appellant could not be construed to be omission or variation of a vital nature and, thus, the defect, if at all it could be construed as a defect was not a defect of any vital nature attracting consequences of Section 86(1) of the Act. Under the circumstances, it must be held that there was no failure on the part of the election petitioner to comply with the last part of Sub- section (3) of Section 81 of the Act and, under the circumstances, Section 86(1) of the Act was not attracted and the election petition could not have been dismissed by reason of the alleged failure to comply with the provisions of Section 81 of the Act. In this connection, it is also relevant to note that the appellant, neither in the memo of objections nor in the written objections or in C.M.P. No. 2903 of 1996 has alleged that he had been misled by the absence of the name, rubber stamp and seal of the notary on the copy of the affidavit supplied to him or that he had been prejudiced to formulate his defence. Even during the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out as to how the appellant could have been prejudiced by the alleged omissions on the copy of the affidavit served on him. 40. Even during the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out as to how the appellant could have been prejudiced by the alleged omissions on the copy of the affidavit served on him. 40. In our opinion it is not every minor variation in form but only a vital defect in substance which can lead to a finding of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Act with the consequences under Section 86(1) to follow. The weight of authority clearly indicates that a certain amount of flexibility is envisaged. While an impermissible deviation from the original may entail the dismissal of an election petition under Section 86(1) of the Act, an insignificant variation in the true copy cannot be construed as a fatal defect. It is, however, neither desirable nor possible to catalogue the defects which may be classified as of a vital nature or those which are not so. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast formula can be prescribed. The tests suggested in Murarka Radhey Shyams case are sound tests and are now well settled. We agree with the same and need not repeat those tests. Considered in this background, we are of the opinion that the alleged defect in the true copy of the affidavit in the present case did not attract the provisions of Section 86(1) of the Act for alleged non-compliance with the last part of Section 81(3) of the Act and that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 81(3) of the Act in supplying 'true copy' of the affidavit to the appellant by the respondent." 12. Section 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides as follows:- "81 (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition." By pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court, Electoral process has been considered to be sacrosanct and it cannot be interfered with by mere presentation of a petition without strictly following the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Rules framed there under. Various judgments of the Honble Supreme Court has made it very clear that Clause 3 of Section 81 of the People Act, 1951 is one of the mandatory conditions which an election petition must fulfill and non-compliance of the same would invite dismissal under Section 86 (1) of the same act. One of the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court on the point is the judgment passed in the case of Ajay Maken vs. Adesh Kumar and Another, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 489 . (The relevant para 7 of the same has been reproduced already in this judgment). The Honble Apex Court has made it very clear in this case that failure to attest copy of the election petition served on the respondents to be true copy of the election petition would obligate the High Court to dismiss the election petition. This would mean that attestation as true copy by the election petitioner on the copy served to the respondents in the election petition is mandatory and non-compliance would invite dismissal of the election petition under Section 86 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 13. The only issue left to be decided therefore, is, whether the name of the election petitioner written in capital letters on the body of the election petition served to the learned counsel for the respondents/applicant can be termed and accepted as his signature. First, we may look at what signature means from the three dictionaries. In Blacks Law Dictionary, the meaning of the word "signature" is given as below:- "signature 1. A person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction. 2. Commercial law. Any name, mark, or writing used with the intention of authenticating a document. UCC $$ 1-01 939), 3-401 (b)-Also termed legal signature. "The signature to a memorandum may be any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate, the writing as that of the singer." Re-statement (Second) of Contracts $ 134 (1979) In Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary, the meaning of the word "signature", is given as below:- "signature 1. A persons name written by himself, or a representation of this in a mark, stamp, deputys handwriting etc. 2. the act of signing one’s name 3. that part of a doctor’s prescription telling the patient how to use the medicine prescribed : usually marked S or Sig 8. A persons name written by himself, or a representation of this in a mark, stamp, deputys handwriting etc. 2. the act of signing one’s name 3. that part of a doctor’s prescription telling the patient how to use the medicine prescribed : usually marked S or Sig 8. in Scots law, a writing formerly prepared and presented by a writer to the signet to the baron of exchequer as a warrant for a grant Signature to mark; to distinguish. (obs) In Concise Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of the word "signature", is given as below:- " signature : 1. a person’s name written in a distinctive way as a form of identification or authorization . the action of signing a document 2. A distinctive product, feature, etc by which someone or something can be identified: (as modifier) the chef’s signature dish 3. Music short for KEY SIGNATURE OF TIME SIGNATURE 4. Printing a letter or figure printed at the foot of one or more pages of each sheet of a book as a guide in binding a printed sheet after being folded to form a group of pages. From the above, signature means a persons name written in a distinctive manner so that it can be identified that it belongs to or is of the person whose name is represented by such sign or mark. Therefore, two characteristics of a signature are; (i) it should be distinctive and (ii) it should represent or should be attributable to the name of the person. Now coming to the present case, the name of the petitioner was no doubt written as Dr. Sukhato A. Sema but in capital letters on all the pages of the copy of the election petition, the verification, the affidavit under form 25 and the documents appended thereto and served to the learned counsel of the respondent/applicant in this I.A. But the question is can the name of a person written in capital letters be termed as distinctive and identifiable as that of the person whose name is written. In my considered view, definitely not, because name of a person written in capital letters certainly lacks distinctiveness which is the essence of signature and it can never be identified with the person who is intended to be represented. Commonly accepted form of signature is either initial of the name or some sign which represents the name with distinctiveness. In my considered view, definitely not, because name of a person written in capital letters certainly lacks distinctiveness which is the essence of signature and it can never be identified with the person who is intended to be represented. Commonly accepted form of signature is either initial of the name or some sign which represents the name with distinctiveness. Therefore, name written in capital letters which lacks distinctiveness and can not be identified as that of the person who it is suppose to represent, as stated above, cannot be accepted as signature. Further, in this case the election petitioner has a known and accepted signature with which he had signed on his nomination papers and the affidavit filed along with it in the same election process. Therefore, common sense tells that he should have signed with the same signature. As stated above, signature should be distinct and attributable to the person who claims the same is his signature. For that reason, it is only natural and expected of the election petitioner that he should have signed on the copy of the election petition, the verification, the affidavit and on the documents with his known and accepted signature as given on the nomination papers and the affidavits. One of the ways of identifying a persons signature is by comparing the signature in question with his known signature. In this case, the known signature of the election petitioner is the one signed on the nomination papers and the accompanying affidavit filed by him in the same election process. Comparing the signature of the election petitioner on the nomination papers and the accompanying affidavit which are in italic in form with the one on the copy of the election petition and the accompanying verification, affidavit and the documents which are but his name written in capital letters, they are far from being even similar. One does not need handwriting expert to find out whether the two signatures are same and they are signed by the same person, because, the difference between the two is so easily identifiable and they are not even similar. They are far apart. Election petitioner is a doctor, therefore, no doubt an educated man. One does not need handwriting expert to find out whether the two signatures are same and they are signed by the same person, because, the difference between the two is so easily identifiable and they are not even similar. They are far apart. Election petitioner is a doctor, therefore, no doubt an educated man. He is supposed to know what a signature means, as such, it is expected of him that when he is required to put his signature in a document, he would have done so by putting his known and accepted signature. If he has not done so, he has only invited the consequence which will follow under the law. I agree with Mr. Mazumdar that there is no law which prescribes that signature should be only in a particular form but that does not mean that a person can change his signature any time he chooses to. Because, as stated above, signature represents a person who signed it. One cannot change his identity any time he likes. If he does so, it is to his own peril. 14. In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the name of the election petitioner, written in capital letters on the pages of the copy of the election petition, furnished to the applicant in this I.A, are not the signature of the election petitioner and, even if they were written by himself they cannot be accepted as his valid signature. In fact, the nomination papers and the accompanying affidavits in the election petition have been downloaded from the website "ceonagaland.nic.in" and compared the same with the copies submitted by the applicant in this I.A. The two are same and the signatures given thereon are also same. After downloading the same I have compared the signature of the petitioner given on the same with the so called signature of the election petitioner given on the copy of the election petition, the verification, the affidavit and the documents appended thereto and as stated already they are far from even being similar. They are totally different, one being in capital letters and the other in italic form. They are totally different, one being in capital letters and the other in italic form. From the above discussions the only irresistible conclusion that can be drawn is that the election petitioner has failed to comply with the provision of Section 81 (3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, as such, this Court has no choice but to act under Section 86 (1) of the same act. 15. The third ground raised by the applicant in this I.A is that under Section 83 (1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it is provided that an election petition should be signed and verified in the manner laid down in the Court of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, if it is alleged in the election petition that any corrupt practice has been committed during the election process, the petition should be accompanied by an affidavit as provided under Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. However, in the case of the election petitioner, he have not signed on the original election petition, the verification and the affidavit purportedly submitted under Form 25 and, he also have not disclosed the source of information and the materials on which the allegation of corrupt practices are made so as to enable the opposite side to answer effectively. Therefore, the election petition and the affidavit are not in conformity with the provisions of law. Mr.Taka Masa learned senior counsel submitted that after the election petitioner came to know the defects of the election petition and of the affidavit submitted in Form 25, it was pointed out in this I.A which was filed on 26-06-2018 but the election petitioner did not immediately file an application praying for correcting the defects on the election petition and the affidavit submitted under Form 25 which he should have done so within 45 days from the day he came to know of the defects. But since he did not do so he is barred from doing it now. To prove his point the learned senior counsel submitted that the present I.A was filed on 26-06-2018 and objection to this I.A was filed on 19-07-2018, but I.A seeking for leave to amend Form 25 affidavit was filed only on 22-11-2018 while the hearing of the present I.A No. 82 (K) of 2018 was taken up. To prove his point the learned senior counsel submitted that the present I.A was filed on 26-06-2018 and objection to this I.A was filed on 19-07-2018, but I.A seeking for leave to amend Form 25 affidavit was filed only on 22-11-2018 while the hearing of the present I.A No. 82 (K) of 2018 was taken up. Therefore, more than 45 days had passed by then, as such, the petition cannot be accepted. The learned senior counsel in support of his submission cited the judgment of Honble Supreme Court passed in the case of Virendra Kumar Saklecha vs. Jagjiwan, reported in (1972) 1 SCC 826 . Relevant paragraphs 10, 13, 14 and 15 are given below:- "10. The respondent filed an affidavit along with the election petition. The affidavit did not disclose the source of information in respect of the speeches alleged to have been made by the appellant. Section 83 of the Act requires an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of allegations of corrupt practice. Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961 requires an affidavit to be in form No. 25. Form No. 25 requires the deponent to state which statements are true to knowledge and which statements are true to information. Under Section 87 of the Act every election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC to the trial of suits. Under Section 102 of the Code the High Court may make rules regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their supervision and may by such rules vary, alter or add to any of the rules in the First Schedule to the Code. 13. The importance of setting out the sources of information in affidavits came up for consideration before this Court from time to time. One of the earliest decisions is State of Bombay v. Parshottam Jog Naik, where this Court endorsed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, and held that the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. Again, in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. One of the earliest decisions is State of Bombay v. Parshottam Jog Naik, where this Court endorsed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, and held that the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. Again, in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Anr. v. Company Law Board and Or, this Court deprecated 'slip short verifications, in an affidavit and reiterated the ruling of this Court in Bombay, case (supra) that verification should invariably be modelled on the lines of Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code 'Whether the Code applies in terms or not'. Again, in A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India this Court said that the importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations. 14. Counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that non-disclosure of the sources of information in the affidavit was a fatal defect and the petition should not have been entertained. It is not necessary to express any opinion on that contention in view of the fact that the matter was heard for several months in the High Court and thereafter the appeal was heard by this Court. The grounds or sources of information are to be set out in an affidavit in an election petition. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that the decisions of this Court were not on election petitions. The rulings of this Court are consistent. The grounds or sources of information are to be set out in the affidavit whether the Code applies or not Section 83 of the Act states that an election petition shall be verified in the manner Laid down in the Code. The verification is as to information received. The affidavit is to be modeled on the provisions contained in Order 19 of the Code. Therefore, the grounds or sources of information are required to be stated. 15. The non-disclosure of grounds or sources of information in an election petition which is to be filed within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate, will have to be scrutinized from two points of view. The non-disclosure, of the grounds will indicate that the election petitioner did not come forward with the sources of information at the first opportunity. The non-disclosure, of the grounds will indicate that the election petitioner did not come forward with the sources of information at the first opportunity. The real importance of setting out the sources of information at the time of the presentation of the petition is to give the other side notice of the contemporaneous evidence on which the election petition is based. That will give an opportunity to the other side to test the genuineness and veracity of the sources of information. The other point of view is that the election petitioner will not be able to make any departure from the sources or grounds. If there is any embellishment of the case it will be discovered." The next case referred to by the learned senior counsel for the applicant is the case of F.A Sapa and Others vs. Singora and Others, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 375 . The relevant paragraph 28 is given below:- "28. From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desire better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the Court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter" The third case referred to is the case of Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and Another vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and Others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2284 . The relevant paragraph 14, is given as below:- 16. The election law insists that to unseat a returned candidate, the corrupt practice must be specifically alleged and strictly proved to have been committed by the returned candidate himself or by his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or by his election agent. Suspicion, howsoever, strong cannot take the place of proof, whether the allegations are sought to be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Since, pleadings play an important role in an election petition, the legislature has provided that the allegations of corrupt practice must be properly alleged and both the material facts and particulars provided in the petition itself so as to disclose a complete cause of action. 17. Section 83 of the Act provides that the election petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and further that he must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice that he alleges including as full a statement as possible of the name of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practices and the date and place of the commission of each of such corrupt practice. This section has been held to be mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then the full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice, so as to present a full picture of the cause of action. 18. A petition leveling a charge of corrupt practice is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner is also obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt practice. This becomes necessary to bind the election petitioner to the charge leveled by him and to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry and to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by a surprise. This becomes necessary to bind the election petitioner to the charge leveled by him and to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry and to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by a surprise. The fourth case referred to by the learned senior counsel is the case of L.R. Shivaramagowda and Others vs. T.M. Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs and Others, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 666 . The relevant paragraphs 16 to 16A are given herebelow:- "16. If the above well settled principles are applied in this case, there is no doubt whatever that the election petition suffers from a very serious defect of failure to set out material facts of the alleged corrupt practice. The defect invalidates the election petition in that regard and the petitioner ought not to have been permitted to adduce any evidence with reference to the same. 16A. We have already extracted paragraphs (f) & (g) of the affidavit filed along with the election petition. It does not disclose the source of information. Nor does it set out which part of the election petition was personally known to the petitioner and which part came to be known by him on information. Significantly, paragraphs (a) to (e) of the affidavit state that the averments therein are true to his information. Paragraph (f) is silent on this aspect of the matter. Paragraph (g) refers all the 42 paragraphs in the petition. The affidavit is not in conformity with the prescribed Form No. 25. Thus there is a failure to comply with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules. It is a very serious defect which has been overlooked by the High Court" The fifth case cited by the learned senior counsel for the applicant is the case of P.A. Mohammed Riyas vs. M.K. Raghavan, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 511 . The relevant paragraphs 42 to 47 are given below:- " 42. For the purpose of reference, Section 83 is extracted hereinbelow: 83. Contents of petition. The relevant paragraphs 42 to 47 are given below:- " 42. For the purpose of reference, Section 83 is extracted hereinbelow: 83. Contents of petition. (1) An election petition (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the Petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the Petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the Petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the Petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the Petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. As will be seen from the Section itself, the Election Petitioner is required to set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that he alleges and the names of the parties involved therein and it further provides that the same is to be signed by the Petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of proceedings. 43. What is important is the proviso which makes it clear that where the Election Petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the Petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof and the schedule or annexures to the Petition shall also be signed by the Petitioner and verified in the same manner as the Petition. In other words, when corrupt practices are alleged in an Election Petition, the source of such allegations has to be disclosed and the same has to be supported by an affidavit in support thereof. 44. In the present case, although allegations as to corrupt practices alleged to have been employed by the Respondent had been mentioned in the body of the Petition, the Petition itself had not been verified in the manner specified in Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 44. In the present case, although allegations as to corrupt practices alleged to have been employed by the Respondent had been mentioned in the body of the Petition, the Petition itself had not been verified in the manner specified in Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (4) of Section 123 of the 1951 Act defines "corrupt practice" and the publication of various statements against the Respondent which were not supported by affidavit, could not, therefore, have been taken into consideration by the High Court while considering the Election Petition. In the absence of proper verification, it has to be accepted that the Election Petition was incomplete as it did not contain a complete cause of action. 45. Of course, it has been submitted and accepted that the defect was curable and such a proposition has been upheld in the various cases cited by Mr. Venugopal, beginning with the decision in Murarka 's case (supra) and subsequently followed in F.A. Sapa case, Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar case and K.K. Ramachandran Master case referred to hereinbefore. In this context, we are unable to accept Mr. Venugopal's submission that despite the fact that the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act provides that where corrupt practices are alleged, the Election Petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that two affidavits would be required, one under Order VI Rule 15(4) Code of Civil Procedure and the other in Form 25. We are also unable to accept Mr. Venugopal's submission that even in a case where the proviso to Section 83 (1) was attracted, a single affidavit would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of both the provisions. 46. Mr.Venugopal's submission that, in any event, since the Election Petition was based entirely on allegations of corrupt practices, filing of two affidavits in respect of the self-same matter, would render one of them redundant, is also not acceptable. As far as the decision in F.A. Sapa case is concerned, it has been clearly indicated that the Petition, which did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, could not be said to be an Election Petition as contemplated in Section 81 and would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. As far as the decision in F.A. Sapa case is concerned, it has been clearly indicated that the Petition, which did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, could not be said to be an Election Petition as contemplated in Section 81 and would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. On the other hand, the failure to comply with the proviso to Section 83 (1) of the Act rendered the Election Petition ineffective, as was held in Hardwari Lal case and the various other cases cited by Mr. P.P. Rao. 47. In our view, the objections taken by Mr. P.P. Rao must succeed, since in the absence of proper verification as contemplated in Section 83, it cannot be said that the cause of action was complete. The consequences of Section 86 of the 1951 Act come into play immediately in view of Sub-Section (1) which relates to trial of Election Petitions and provides that the High Court shall dismiss the Election Petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the 1951 Act. Although, Section 83 has not been mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 86, in the absence of proper verification, it must be held that the provisions of Section 81 had also not been fulfilled and the cause of action for the Election Petition remained incomplete. The Petitioner had the opportunity of curing the defect, but it chose not to do so. The last case referred to by the learned counsel for the applicant on the point under discussed is the case of G.M. Siddeshwar vs. Prasanna Kumar, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 776 . The paragraphs particularly referred to are 45 to 60. The same are reproduced herein below:- 45. However, another aspect of this contention is that if the provisions of Section 83 of the Act are not complied with, then the election petition that has been filed cannot truly be described as an election petition. 46. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore the Constitution Bench dealt with the issue whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was fatal to the maintainability of an election petition wherein allegations of corrupt practices were made. 46. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore the Constitution Bench dealt with the issue whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was fatal to the maintainability of an election petition wherein allegations of corrupt practices were made. It was urged that the affidavit in respect of corrupt practices which accompanied the election petition was neither properly made nor in the prescribed form. A different facet of this argument was that an election petition must comply with the provisions of Section 83 thereof and if it did not, then it could not be called an election petition. 47. The Constitution Bench agreed with the Election Tribunal that a defect in the verification of an affidavit "cannot be a sufficient ground for dismissal of the Petitioner's petition summarily, as the provisions of Section 83 are not necessarily to be complied with in order to make a petition valid and such affidavit can be allowed to be filed at a later stage also." (Murarka case, AIR p. 1551, para 13) In other words, non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not 'fatal' to the maintainability of an election petition and the defect could be remedied. It would follow that if an election petition did not comply with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act, it would still be called an election petition. 48. The broad principle laid down in Murarka was somewhat restricted by another Constitution Bench decision rendered in SubbaRao v. Member, Election Tribunal, In that case, the Constitution Bench introduced two clear principles: firstly, that "if there is a total and complete non compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3), the election petition might not be "an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part" within Section 80 of the Act" and secondly, that "if there is a substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3), the election petition cannot be dismissed by the Tribunal under Section 90(3)." 49. In T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose and Ors., this Court reiterated the doctrine of substantial compliance as mentioned in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar and Ch. Subba Rao and also introduced the doctrine of curability on the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. In T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose and Ors., this Court reiterated the doctrine of substantial compliance as mentioned in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar and Ch. Subba Rao and also introduced the doctrine of curability on the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that the defect in the affidavit in that case was curable and was not of such a fatal nature as to attract dismissal of the election petition at the threshold. 50. The doctrine of substantial compliance as well as the doctrine of curability were followed in V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu. This Court held that a defect in verification of an affidavit is not fatal to the election petition and it could be cured. Following Moidutty it was held that if the election petition falls foul of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and does not disclose a cause of action then it has to be rejected at the threshold. 51. Somewhat more recently, in Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar, this Court reiterated this position in law and held: "50. The position is well settled that an election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish the cause of action in exercise of the power under the Code of Civil Procedure. Appropriate orders in exercise of powers under the Code can be passed if the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not complied with. 52. The principles emerging from these decisions are that although non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act is a curable defect, yet there must be substantial compliance with the provisions thereof. However, if there is total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act, then the petition cannot be described as an election petition and may be dismissed at the threshold. Integral part of an election petition: 53. An issue arises whether an affidavit required to be filed under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act is an integral part of an election petition and, if so, whether the filing of a defective affidavit would be fatal to the maintainability of an election petition. Integral part of an election petition: 53. An issue arises whether an affidavit required to be filed under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act is an integral part of an election petition and, if so, whether the filing of a defective affidavit would be fatal to the maintainability of an election petition. This would, in a sense, be an exception to the general rule mentioned above regarding a defect under Section 83 of the Act being curable. 54. In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar the question raised was as follows: "3..whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed for contravention of Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as copy of Annexure 'A' to the petition was not given along with the petition for being served on the Respondents." 55. It was noted that the contents of the pamphlet, in translation, were incorporated in the election petition. It was also noted that the trial of an election petition has to follow, as far as may be, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, this Court approached the problem by looking at the Code of Civil Procedure to ascertain what would have been the case if what was under consideration was a suit and not the trial of an election petition. 56. It was held that where the averments are too compendious for being included in an election petition, they may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition. In such an event, these schedules or annexures would be an integral part of the election petition and must, therefore, be served on the Respondents. This is quite distinct from documents which may be annexed to the election petition by way of evidence and so do not form an integral part of the averments of the election petition and may not, therefore, be served on the Respondents. 57. In M. Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohammed this Court followed Sahodrabai Rai and held that a schedule or an annexure which is an integral part of an election petition must comply with the provisions of Section 83(2) of the Act. Similarly, the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act where the election petition alleges corrupt practices by the returned candidate also forms a part of the election petition. Similarly, the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act where the election petition alleges corrupt practices by the returned candidate also forms a part of the election petition. If the affidavit, at the end of the election petition is attested as a true copy, then there is sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) of the Act and would tantamount to attesting the election petition itself. 58. F.A. Sapa and Ors. v. Singora and Ors. a three-judge Bench of this Court reviewed the relevant provisions of the Act, Rule 94-A of the Rules, Form No. 25, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the case law and arrived at the following conclusions: 28. From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the Respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the Petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter." 59. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter." 59. It was further laid down that even though a defective affidavit may not be fatal to the maintainability of an election petition, the High Court should ensure compliance before the parties go to trial so that the returned candidate can meet the allegations and is not taken by surprise. 60. What is the consequence of not curing the defect? In Moidutty a defect in verification of the election petition was pointed out by raising a plea in that regard in the written statement. Notwithstanding this, the election Petitioner did not cure the defect. Under these circumstances it was held that until the defect in the verification was rectified the petition could not have been tried. Additionally, it was held that since there was a lack of material particulars regarding the allegations of corrupt practices, it was a case where the election petition ought to have been rejected at the threshold for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to pleadings. 61. This issue was again discussed in Umesh Challiyill v. K.P. Rajendran and this Court suggested the following solution: "20. However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the Petitioner to rectify such defects." 62. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition, and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed format of Form No. 25 and with a defective verification were curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects. 63. No submissions were made with regard to the striking out, in accordance with Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of specifically objectionable paragraphs in the election petition. In any event this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. Conclusion: 67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed, but without any costs." 16. Mr. In any event this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. Conclusion: 67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed, but without any costs." 16. Mr. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the election petitioner/opposite party in I.A. No. 82 (K) of 2018 and I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2018 submitted in the same manner he submitted in the second point already discussed and reiterated that there is nothing wrong with the election petition as the petitioner had signed on all the pages of the same including the verification, the affidavit under form 25 and the documents annexed thereto. However, the learned senior counsel admitted that there was a typographical error committed in respect of the affidavit filed under Form 25 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Learned senior counsel submitted that this error can be cured and for that the I.A (C) No. 161 (K) of 2018 praying for leave of this Court to amend the same has been filed. Once that is done, the requirement of law would have been met. Learned senior counsel submitted that the mistake or the error was committed while filling up the Form 25 affidavit and it was inadvertently done, therefore, leave may be granted. 17. Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 reads as under:- "83. Contents of petition:- (1) An election petition- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the Petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition." A plaint reading of the above provision specially beginning of Clause 1 and clause c and clause 2 would show that an election petition has to be signed by the petitioner and verified as the verification of a pleading in civil case in the manner laid down in the Court of Civil Procedure, 1908. Further, it would also show that if the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition should be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 in support of such allegations and the schedule annexed to the petition should also be verified and signed by the petitioner in the same manner as on the petition. 18. Rule 1 clause 1 and clause 2 of Order IV of CPC provides as follows:- "1. Suit to be commenced by plaint- (1) Every suit shall be initiated by presenting a plaint in duplicate to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf (2) Every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VIL, so far as they are applicable" [(3) The plaint shall not be deemed to be duly instituted unless it complies with the requirements specified in sub-rules (1) and (2)]" From the above provisions of CPC it can be easily understood that every plaint should comply with the rules contained in Order 6 and 7 as far as they are applicable and if it fails it shall not be deemed to be duly instituted. Rule 14 of Order VI of the CPC, provides as follows:- "14. Pleading to be signed- Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any) Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf." From the above provisions what one can understand is that every suit commences with presentation of a plaint which should be signed by the petitioner and his pleader if any. In case the petitioner by reason of absence or for other good cause unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any other person duly authorized by him. In case the petitioner by reason of absence or for other good cause unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any other person duly authorized by him. Further, Rule 15 of the Order 6 CPC provides as follows:- "15. Verification of pleadings- (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed [(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings]" 19. A conjoined reading of the above provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Code of Civil Procedure would show that the election petitioner should sign on the election petition, on the verification, on the affidavits and all the documents annexed thereto and only thereafter present the same before the officer responsible for the same. In this case, the so called signature of the election petitioner which are on the body of the election petition, the verification, the affidavit and the documents annexed thereto are the name of the petitioner written in capital letters. As already discussed in the above paragraphs while discussing the second point raised by the applicant, the election petitioner has a signature which was recognized and accepted in the same election process as was signed on the nomination papers and the affidavit accompanying the same, and since the so called signature in capital letters is not the same as the known and accepted signature, it cannot be accepted as the signature of the election petitioner. The same reasons given while discussing the second point raised by the applicant would apply on this also. The same reasons given while discussing the second point raised by the applicant would apply on this also. Therefore, in the eye of law, the election petition, the verification and the documents filed along with it and the affidavit under Form 25 cannot be accepted as having complied with the provisions of law stated above. The word "shall" used in all the provisions of CPC referred to above would show that the provisions are mandatory and they are to be complied with. Failure to do so would render the election petition not duly instituted. The defects, however, may be curable as submitted by the learned senior counsel of the election petitioner but till the hearing of this I.As, no application has been filed for curing the defects. Moreover, the case of the election petitioner is that the signature of the election petitioner is the ones given in capital letters and he has signed the same. Since this submission of the election petitioner has been rejected the question of curing the defect does not arise. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drown here is that the election petition has not been duly instituted in accordance with law. In view of the discussions and the conclusions drawn in the paragraphs above, the prayer of the applicant in I.A (C) No. 82 (K) of 2018 is allowed. Accordingly, the Election Petition No. 1 (K) of 2018 is dismissed. 20. Now coming to the prayer in I.A (C) No. 161 (K) of 2018, though one may agree with the learned senior counsel Mr. D. Mazumdar that the defect in Form 25 affidavit as far as the typographical errors are concern are curable, but the fact that the petitioners so called signature written in capital letters cannot be cured anymore since no prayer has been made so far and for the reasons already stated the purpose for which the I.A (C) No. 161 (K) of 2018 is filed is already defeated. Moreover, from the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel of the applicant in the two I.As. Moreover, from the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel of the applicant in the two I.As. and the O.P. in this I.A.;Virendra Kumar Saklechas case, the case of F.A. Sapa & others, the case of Gojanan Krishnaji Bapat & Another and the case of G.M Siddeshwar what one can understand is that an affidavit under form 25 accompanying an election petition where corrupt practices are alleged must disclose the source of information and the materials on which the allegations are based. On perusal of the affidavit already filed and the propose amendment given in the application I find nothing which indicates the source of the information and the basis on which the allegations of corrupt practices are based. For this reason also the purpose of the application is already defeated. Therefore, the I.A. is dismissed. 21. Coming to I.A (C) No. 83 (K) of 2018, since the prayer in this I.A is to keep in abeyance the filing of written statement by the respondent No. 1 in the election petition, the same has also become redundant as the election petition itself is dismissed. 22. The I.As are disposed of accordingly.