JUDGMENT : Abdul Moin, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for respondents. 2. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 21.02.2019, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the petition, by which the District Inspector of Schools, Pratapgarh, has rejected the claim of the petitioner for financial approval of appointment of the petitioner on the post of Clerk on various grounds including the ground that there was no prior approval to the appointment of the petitioner. 3. The case set forth by the petitioner is that he had been appointed by the Committee of Management i.e. respondent no.4 on a Class III post of Clerk in pursuance to an advertisement issued on 11.07.2017 and the appointment order having been issued on 07.08.2017, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-5 to the petition. Admittedly, in pursuance to the appointment order dated 07.08.2017, the petitioner had submitted his joining on 15.08.2017 as would be apparent from the joining report of the petitioner, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-6 to the petition. 4. Admittedly, the appointment to a Class III post in educational institutions is governed by the provisions of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1921'). Admittedly, in the instant case there was no prior approval of the competent authority prior to the petitioner being appointed and he having submitted his joining in pursuance thereof. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the District Inspector of Schools apart from other grounds while rejecting the claim of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 21.02.2019. 5. This Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, 2019 6 ADJ 376 after taking into consideration various Division Bench judgments and the judgments of Apex Court has held that prior approval is a sine-qua-non to a valid appointment on a Class III post in terms of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Act of 1921. 6. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the Apex Court in the case of Kunda Motiram Bodalkar vs. Swami Vivekanand Shikshan Sanstha and others, (2010) 6 SCC 712 has held that where an appointment is made on the basis of an advertisement and that the employee's appointment has been approved subsequently consequently even if there was no prior permission of his appointment and there being no other irregularity in the appointment, the appointment cannot be held to be void. 7. Likewise, reliance has been placed on the Division Bench judgment in the case of Ashika Prasad Shukla vs. District Inspector of Schools, (1998) 3 AWC 2150 , the judgment passed in a bunch of Special Appeals the leading being Special Appeal (Defective) No.542 of 2014 in re: State of U.P. and others vs. C/M Sarvodaya Inter College, Sayar District Ghazipur, Division Bench judgment in the case of Pramod Kumar Pandey and 5 others vs. The District Inspector of Schools and another passed in Special Appeal Defective No.684 of 2019 decided on 01.08.2019 as well as the judgment of Writ Court passed in the case of Abhendra Anand Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, (2017) 2 ADJ 23 . 8. On the other hand, Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, submits that the cases of Kunda Motiram Bodalkar (supra), Ashika Prasad Shukla (supra), C/M Sarvodaya Inter College (supra) and Pramod Kumar Pandey (supra) all pertain to Assistant Teachers who are governed by different set of rules/provision of law while the present case pertains to an appointment on a Class III post which is governed by Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Act of 1921 and hence all the aforesaid cases shall not be applicable. 9. So far as the case of Abhendra Anand Singh (supra) is concerned, Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the said judgment has been passed without considering the judgments of Apex Court in the cases of Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, (1996) 10 SCC 62 , Shesh Mani Shukla vs. District Inspector of Schools Deoria and others, (2009) 15 SCC 436 , U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and another vs. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and another, (1995) Supp3 SCC 456, Union of India and another vs. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15 SCC 463 , and the Division Bench judgments in the cases of Jagdish Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, 2006 2 UPLBEC 1851 and Ms. Shailja Shah vs. Executive Committee, Bharat Varshiya National Association and another, (1995) 25 AllLR 88, Pawan Kumar Mishra vs. Joint Director of Education, Azamgarh and others, (2018) 3 AWC 2418 and even otherwise this Court after considering all the aforesaid Division Bench's judgments including the judgments of Apex Court has held in the case of Deepak Kumar Singh (supra) that prior approval is sine-qua-non for a valid appointment on a Class III post. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the contesting parties and having perused the records, what comes out is that it is an admitted fact that the petitioner had been appointed on a Class III post without prior approval of the competent authority. This aspect of the matter has already been considered threadbare by this Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Singh (supra). For the sake of convenience, the relevant observations in the case of Deepak Kumar Singh (supra) are reproduced as under:- 15. From a perusal of Regulation 101, it is apparent that the appointing authority could not fill up any vacancy of a non teaching staff except with the prior approval of the DIOS. 16. Thus the sine quo non for filling up the vacancy of non teaching staff by the Management is the prior approval of the DIOS. 17. The issue of 'prior approval' has engaged the attention of the Courts from time to time. In the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others Vs. State of U.P and Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 62 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Removal of Difficulties order, which also provides for a prior approval of the DIOS, held that an appointment made inconsistent with the procedure of Removal of Difficulties Order is void abinitio and will not confer any right upon the incumbent to hold the post or to continue in service or to claim salary from the State exchequer. The relevant observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra) are reproduced as under:- "Any appointment made in transgression thereof is illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointees." 18. The relevant observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra) are reproduced as under:- "Any appointment made in transgression thereof is illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointees." 18. Likewise the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shesh Mani Shukla Vs. District Inspector of Schools Deoria and others, (2009) 15 SCC 436 held as under:- "It is true that the appellant has worked for a long time. His appointment, however, being in contravention of the statutory provision was illegal, and, thus, void ab initio. If his appointment has not been granted approval by the statutory authority, no exception can be taken only because the appellant had worked for a long time. The same by itself, in our opinion, cannot form the basis for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus; as it is well known that for the said purpose, the writ petitioner must establish a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the State." 19. A Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. State of U.P and Ors., 2006 (2) UPLBEC 1851 has held as under:- "without prior approval of the Inspector, the Principal or the committee of management cannot issue an appointment letter or permit joining of any candidate. Requirement of prior approval in Regulation 101 is a condition precedent before issuing an appointment letter and is mandatory." 20. Another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ms. Shailja Shah Vs. Executive Committee, Bharat Varshiya National Association and another, (1995) 25 AllLR 88 has held has under:- "expression "prior approval" and "approval" connotes different situation. Where a statute uses the term "prior approval" anything done without prior approval is nullity. Where a statute employs expression "approval", however, in such cases subsequent ratification can make the act valid." 21. The word 'Prior Approval' has also been used in Section 59(1)(a) of U.P Urban Planing and Development Act, 1973 and Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Anr. Vs. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and Anr., (1995) Supp3 SCC 456 has held that "prior approval" and "approval" are two different connotations and if the statute does not mention "prior approval" what is material would be only "approval". 22. Recently Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. Vs. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and Anr., (1995) Supp3 SCC 456 has held that "prior approval" and "approval" are two different connotations and if the statute does not mention "prior approval" what is material would be only "approval". 22. Recently Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. Vs. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15 SCC 463 considered an issue wherein an appointment could have been made only after obtaining prior approval from Competent Authority i.e. Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, New Delhi. However, prior approval was not obtained and appointments were made. Thereafter, appointments were cancelled/ terminated on the ground that the same were illegal as there was no prior approval. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since appointments were made without prior approval, they were de hors the Rules and a nullity, hence, principles of natural justice are also not attracted in such a case. Paras 16 and 17 of judgment which dealt with the aforesaid issue are reproduced below : 16. We shall now consider the efficacy of the reason so recorded in the office order. The recruitment procedure in relation to the post of Veterinary Compounder is governed by the statutory Rules titled 'Central Cattle Breeding Farms (Class III and Class IV posts) Recruitment Rules, 1969, as amended from time to time and including the executive instructions issued in that behalf. As per the stated dispensation for such recruitment, the appointment letter could be issued only by an authorised officer and after grant of approval by the competent authority. Nowhere in the Original Application filed by the Respondent, it has been asserted that such prior approval is not the quintessence for issuing a letter of appointment. 17. For taking this contention forward, we may assume, for the time being, that the then Director Incharge H.S. Rathore, Agriculture Officer had the authority to issue a letter of appointment. Nevertheless, he could do so only upon obtaining prior written approval of the competent authority. No case has been made out in the Original Application that due approval was granted by the competent authority before issue of the letter of appointment to the Respondent. Thus, it is indisputable that no prior approval of the competent authority was given for the appointment of the Respondent. No case has been made out in the Original Application that due approval was granted by the competent authority before issue of the letter of appointment to the Respondent. Thus, it is indisputable that no prior approval of the competent authority was given for the appointment of the Respondent. In such a case, the next logical issue that arises for consideration is: whether the appointment letter issued to the Respondent, would be a case of nullity or a mere irregularity? If it is a case of nullity, affording opportunity to the incumbent would be a mere formality and non grant of opportunity may not vitiate the final decision of termination of his services. The Tribunal has rightly held that in absence of prior approval of the competent authority, the Director Incharge could not have hastened issuance of the appointment letter. The act of commission and omission of the then Director Incharge would, therefore, suffer from the vice of lack of authority and nullity in law." 23. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pawan Kumar Mishra Vs. Joint Director of Education, Azamgarh and Ors., (2018) 3 AWC 2418 after referring to the earlier Division Bench judgment in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra) held as under:- "21. In the instant case, the expression used in Regulation 101, is "prior approval" and not "approval". Consequently, when the statute uses the term "prior approval", then anything done without prior approval is a nullity. In Prabhat Kumar Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, (1996) AIR SC 2638 the Supreme Court held: "Any appointment made in transgression thereof is illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointees." 17. In the light of the aforesaid, we find that admittedly the appellant was appointed without seeking prior approval from the District Inspector of Schools. The said appointment was wholly illegal and was a void order, which conferred no right on the appellant." 24. Likewise, this Court in the case of Shashi Kant Gupta Vs. State of U.P and Ors., 2014 SCCOnline(All) 6039 has held as under :- "1. Principal of Sri Aastik Muni Inter College, Koriyan, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "College") sought permission of District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "DIOS") before commencing selection and appointment on Class-IV post in the College and having received intimation, proceeded to make selection. Principal of Sri Aastik Muni Inter College, Koriyan, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "College") sought permission of District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "DIOS") before commencing selection and appointment on Class-IV post in the College and having received intimation, proceeded to make selection. The advertisement was published in daily newspaper 'Employment Exchange' dated 1-15' February' 2003 published from Kanpur whereby the applications were invited upto 28.2.2003 and interview was to be held on 8.3.2003. Petitioner submitted application on 27.2.2003 and thereafter on 9.3.2003 appointment was made and petitioner joined on 15.3.2003. It is, therefore, evident from the record that after making selection and before appointment, no record was transmitted to DIOS seeking his prior approval as contemplated under Regulation 101, Chapter-III of the Regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1921"). The law does not require prior approval before the selection but Regulation 101 talks of prior approval before the appointment but after making selection. This distinction has been noticed by Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Singh etc. Vs. State of U.P. & others, (2006) 3 ESC 2055 (All)(DB) and it has been held that Regulation 101 is mandatory and if no prior approval has been obtained before making appointment, but after the selection the appointment shall be void-ab-initio and it shall not confer any right upon the incumbent to hold the post or to claim salary. The relevant observation made by Division Bench reads as under: "... without prior approval of the Inspector, the Principal or the committee of management cannot issue an appointment letter or permit joining of any candidate. Requirement of prior approval in Regulation 101 is a condition precedent before issuing an appointment letter and is mandatory." 2. In view of above, the alleged appointment of petitioner cannot be said to be valid. No relief, therefore, as sought for in the writ petition can be granted to petitioner. 3. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed." 25. This Court in the case of Ram Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P and Ors., 2014 SCCOnline(All) 6040 has held has under :- 1. No relief, therefore, as sought for in the writ petition can be granted to petitioner. 3. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed." 25. This Court in the case of Ram Kumar Shukla Vs. State of U.P and Ors., 2014 SCCOnline(All) 6040 has held has under :- 1. Principal of Sri Aastik Muni Inter College, Koriyan, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "College") sought permission of District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "DIOS") before commencing selection and appointment on Class-IV post in the College and having received intimation, proceeded to make selection. The advertisement was published in daily newspaper 'Employment Exchange' dated 1-15' February' 2003 published from Kanpur whereby the applications were invited upto 28.2.2003 and interview was to be held on 8.3.2003. Petitioner submitted application on 27.2.2003 and thereafter on 9.3.2003 appointment was made and petitioner joined on 15.3.2003. It is, therefore, evident from the record that after making selection and before appointment, no record was transmitted to DIOS seeking his prior approval as contemplated under Regulation 101, Chapter-III of the Regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1921"). The law does not require prior approval before the selection but Regulation 101 talks of prior approval before the appointment but after making selection. This distinction has been noticed by Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Singh etc. Vs. State of U.P. & others, (2006) 3 ESC 2055 (All)(DB) and it has been held that Regulation 101 is mandatory and if no prior approval has been obtained before making appointment, but after the selection the appointment shall be void-ab-initio and it shall not confer any right upon the incumbent to hold the post or to claim salary. The relevant observation made by Division Bench reads as under: "... without prior approval of the Inspector, the Principal or the committee of management cannot issue an appointment letter or permit joining of any candidate. Requirement of prior approval in Regulation 101 is a condition precedent before issuing an appointment letter and is mandatory." 2. In view of above, the alleged appointment of petitioner cannot be said to be valid. No relief, therefore, as sought for in the writ petition can be granted to petitioner. 3. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. 26. Requirement of prior approval in Regulation 101 is a condition precedent before issuing an appointment letter and is mandatory." 2. In view of above, the alleged appointment of petitioner cannot be said to be valid. No relief, therefore, as sought for in the writ petition can be granted to petitioner. 3. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. 26. Thus, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it clearly comes out that prior approval was a sine qua non of filling up of vacancy of non teaching staff and issue of the appointment order. It is settled proposition of law that where a thing is to be done in a particular manner it is to be done in that manner or not at all. In this regard, the Court may refer to the judgment of Nazir Ahmad vs. Emperor, (1936) AIR PC 253 wherein it has been held as under:- "where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 27. Likewise the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deep Chand vs. The State of Rajasthan, (1961) AIR SC 1527 has reiterated the principle of law as laid down in the case of Nazir Ahmad (supra) that:- "........Where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden" 28. Likewise the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., (1964) AIR SC 358 has again followed the principle laid down in the case of Nazir Ahmad (supra). 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu Verghese & Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors., 1993 3 SCC 422 while following the principle laid down in the case of Nazir Ahmad (supra) has held that:- "It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all." 30. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussions, it is thus apparent that the relevant regulations provide for a prior approval before filling in the vacancy of non teaching staff. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussions, it is thus apparent that the relevant regulations provide for a prior approval before filling in the vacancy of non teaching staff. Consequently, no such vacancy could be filled up except with the prior approval of the DIOS inasmuch as once the prescribed procedure itself contemplates a prior approval for filling up the vacancy, as such, keeping in view the settled proposition of law that where a manner of doing a particular act is prescribed, the act must be done in that manner or not at all and thus the vacancy could not have been filled in and the petitioner appointed without the prior approval of the DIOS. 31. Though, the Joint Director of Education has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground of there being no substantive vacancy on the date of his appointment and the ground of prior approval does not find place in the impugned order, as has rightly been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, yet this Court is of the view that once the said ground of there being no prior approval prior to appointment of the petitioner has been taken in the counter affidavit and is also a legal ground, consequently instead of remanding back the matter to the Joint Director of Education for a fresh decision, this Court has itself gone through the facts of the case and has also considered the said ground which deciding the case after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner on this ground also more particularly when the pleadings have already been completed and the matter was argued at length. 32. As regards, the judgment cited on behalf of the petitioner in the case of Rajendra Yadav and Sri Ranjan (supra) which pertains to there being deemed approval after lapse of two weeks from the date of seeking prior approval of the DIOS, suffice to state that once the relevant Regulations do not contemplate any such deemed approval consequently, no such deemed approval can be presumed. Moreover, prior approval has been held to be sine qua non by various Division Bench judgment of this Court before making any appointment in terms of Regulation 101, consequently the aforesaid judgments shall not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 33. Moreover, prior approval has been held to be sine qua non by various Division Bench judgment of this Court before making any appointment in terms of Regulation 101, consequently the aforesaid judgments shall not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 33. As regards, the judgment in the case of Abdul Shafiq Hanfi (supra), the said judgment is distinguishable inasmuch the said judgment did not consider the question of prior approval as specifically provided in the Regulations and as has been considered by various Division Bench judgments of this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 34. As regards, the judgment in the case of Surya Kumar Dixit (supra), the same pertains to an order held to be sustainable only on the grounds contained therein keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Ors. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors., 1987 AIR SC 851. This Court has already recorded as to why despite the ground of prior approval not having been taken by the respondent no. 2 while rejecting the case of the petitioner in the impugned order yet the said ground of prior approval having been taken in the counter affidavit as such this Court has itself proceeded to consider the said ground as the pleadings have been completed and it would have been a futile exercise to remit back the matter to the respondent no. 3 for a decision afresh despite having the legal reasons on record. As such, the said judgment would also not be of any help to the petitioner. 35. Accordingly, when facts of the instant case are tested on the touch stone of Regulation 101 wherein the words 'Prior Approval' has been used and the interpretation of the words 'Prior Approval' as has been given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as various Division Benches of this Court and the principle of law as enunciated in the case of Nazir Ahmad (supra) it clearly comes out that where the appointing authority has issued the appointment order or permitted the joining of any candidate without the prior approval the same would be illegal and void abinitio. In the instant case, the Management having initiated the selection process and having issued the advertisement, formed a select committee, selected the petitioner permitted him to join and even issued an appointment order without the prior approval of the DIOS the same would thus vitiate the appointment of the petitioner. 36. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussions, no illegality or infirmity is found in the impugned order dated 26.11.2011 passed by the respondent no. 3. 37. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed." 11. Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it clearly comes out that once there was no prior approval to the appointment of the petitioner on a Class III post consequently the appointment of the petitioner is itself void ab-initio in the eyes of law. Having thus being appointed without any prior approval consequently this Court cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner more particularly when the appointment of the petitioner is void ab-initio and having been made without prior approval of the competent authority. 12. So far as the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Kunda Motiram Bodalkar (supra), Ashika Prasad Shukla (supra), C/M Sarvodaya Inter College (supra) and Pramod Kumar Pandey (supra) are concerned, suffice to state that they all pertain to appointment of Assistant Teachers who are governed by different set of rules and provisions of law while the present case pertains to an appointment on a Class III post which is governed by Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Act of 1921 and hence all the aforesaid cases are distinguishable on their own facts. Further the judgment in the case of Abhendra Anand Singh (supra) has been passed without considering the judgment of Prabhat Kumar Sharma (supra), Shesh Mani Shukla (supra), Jagdish Singh (supra), Ms. Shailja Shah (supra), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra), Raghuwar Pal Singh (supra) and Pawan Kumar Mishra (supra) and even otherwise this Court after considering all the aforesaid Division Bench's judgments including the judgments of Apex Court has held in the case of Deepak Kumar Singh (supra) that prior approval is sine-qua-non for a valid appointment on a Class III post. 13. Accordingly, taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed.