JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 23.01.2019, by which the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed. 2. The respondent-writ petitioner challenged the order dated 6.5.2016, by which his services on the post of Technical Helper was terminated. The appellant issued an advertisement for appointment on the post of Technical Helper. The respondent-writ petitioner applied for appointment on that post. He appeared in the written examination held on 2.9.2014 and qualified the same. He was appointed on the post of Technical Helper by order of the appellant dated 6.5.2015. He submitted his joining on 22.5.2015. Suddenly, on 31.8.2015, a show cause notice was issued to him stating therein that he submitted false declaration on 14.4.2015 to the effect that neither any criminal case is pending against him, nor was he convicted in any criminal case. According to the appellant, a criminal case was in fact, registered against the respondent-writ petitioner, which fact has been concealed by him. Reply to the show cause notice was sought within seven days. The respondent in the reply submitted copy of the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur in Criminal Case No. 79/2011 and the order dated 9.9.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur in criminal appeal No. 87/2015 mentioning therein that he has been given benefit of probation by the Judicial Magistrate and he was directed to pay only a sum of Rs. 200 as prosecution expenses as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short-'the Act of 1958'). He filed an appeal against the aforesaid order of the Judicial Magistrate. Learned Sessions Judge, Sawaimadhopur by judgment dated 9.9.2015 allowed the appeal and granted him benefit of probation under Section 12 of the Act of 1958, according to which no disqualification was attached to him in the matter of appointment and therefore he prayed that the show cause notice be dropped. 3. The case of the respondent-writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant issued a notice on 4.3.2016 calling upon the respondent to appear in person before the Chairman cum Managing Director, Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. on 15.3.2016 for personal hearing. 3. The case of the respondent-writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant issued a notice on 4.3.2016 calling upon the respondent to appear in person before the Chairman cum Managing Director, Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. on 15.3.2016 for personal hearing. Even though in compliance of that, the respondent appeared before him, but without providing opportunity of hearing, the Chairman cum Managing Director, issued an order dated 6.5.2016 terminating his services. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh vs. UOI & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471 , especially on paras 38.4 and 38.4.1 of the report. The learned Single Judge observed that the respondent was guilty of offence under Sections 341 & 323 IPC and was served with the punishment of a reprimand under Section 3 of the Act of 1958 and also a fine of Rs. 200 under Section 5 thereof by the trial court. However, in appeal, he was extended the benefit of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 with direction that this would not be treated as a disqualification in service. 4. Shri Niraj Kumar Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in law in not appreciating that the challan against the respondent was filed by the police for offence under Sections 147, 341, 323 and 149 of IPC, but he was convicted for offence under Section 341 and 323 of IPC and also punished for the same. The learned Single Judge has seriously erred in ignoring the fact that these offences are not trivial in nature. The case of the respondent does not fall within the criteria of para 38.4.1 of the judgment of Avtar Singh, supra and these offences cannot be considered as offence of petty/trivial nature. 5. Alternatively, learned counsel submitted that a declaration was submitted by the respondent before the appellants on 14.4.2015, whereas the decision of the appellate court in the present case was delivered on 9.9.2015 and therefore the decision of the subsequent period cannot be extended to the respondent for appointment in the earlier period in terms of the aforesaid case of Avtar Singh, supra. Even otherwise, the judgment of Avtar Singh, supra was passed on 21.7.2016, whereas the termination order was passed prior thereto on 6.5.2016. Earlier position of law was different. Even otherwise, the judgment of Avtar Singh, supra was passed on 21.7.2016, whereas the termination order was passed prior thereto on 6.5.2016. Earlier position of law was different. By virtue of doctrine of prospective overruling, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh shall apply prospectively. The termination order issued on 6.5.2016 would therefore be governed by the declared position of law on that date. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record, especially the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawaimadhopur, we find that the aforesaid criminal case was registered on complaint of one Ramesh Kumar with regard to incident in the morning of 2.12.2010. The complaint was filed in the court, which was sent to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. The FIR was registered by the police for offence under Sections 143, 341 and 323 IPC. The charge sheet was filed not just against the appellant, but his father Om Prakash, his uncle Ram Kunwar, his brother Rajendra and his cousin Kamlesh S/o. Ram Kunwar. The civil litigation was pending between the parties with regard to land in dispute. The incident of maar peet also took place on account of such land dispute. The cross case was registered at the instance of accused-party against the complainant party in which complainant Ramesh Kumar and certain other persons were made accused. The trial court extended the benefit of doubt to all the accused and acquitted them of the charges under Sections 147 and 149 of IPC, but convicted them for offence under Sections 341 and 323 IPC and extended them benefit of Section 3 of the Act of 1958 by simply requiring them to deposit a sum of Rs. 200 each as prosecution expenses with the court as per Section 5 of the Act of 1958. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order by filing the appeal. The learned Sessions Judge, Sawaimadhopur by its judgment dated 9.9.2015 allowed the appeal in part and directed since the benefit of Section 3 and 4 of the Act of 1958 was given to the appellants as per Section 12 of the Act of 1958, they shall not suffer any disqualification under the law. 7. The Supreme Court in Avtar Singh, supra, after re-visiting the previous judgments, has in para 38.4.1 held as under: "38.4.1. 7. The Supreme Court in Avtar Singh, supra, after re-visiting the previous judgments, has in para 38.4.1 held as under: "38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 8. It would be evident from the aforesaid order that the appellant was already guilty in a dispute of trivial nature with its father, uncle, brother and cousin. It was therefore a trivial nature dispute and such a dispute, which even if disclosed could have been ignored by the employer because of the benefit of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 given to him. The appellate court as per the legislative policy has passed the specific order under Section 12. According to Section 12 of the Act of 1958, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. The word "disqualification" used in Section 12 is such, which may be used to make someone unfit for appointment, but that disqualification by virtue of aforesaid declaration of law under the order of the Court, shall not attach to a conviction of this nature. 9. In view of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order as well as merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.