JUDGMENT : Sinha, J. 1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General for the State and Sri Rakesh Pandey, learned Senior Advocate holding brief of Sri Pramod Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the intervener. 2. The petitioner before this Court is an elected Pramukh of Kshetra Panchayat, Haseran, district Kannauj. While discharging his duties as such, as many as eight members, namely, Sri Pushpendra Singh @ Firu Singh, Sri Yogendra Singh, Sri Firu Singh, Smt. Santosh, Smt. Soni, Sri Ranjit, Sri Ram Vilas and Sri Suresh Chandra of the Kshetra Panchayat concerned made same complaint to the Additional Chief Secretary of the Panchyati Raj Department, U.P. Lucknow on 2nd February, 2018 supported by their individual affidavits regarding financial irregularities and favoritism and nepotism in acceptance of a tender for the development work. Considering the said complaint, the Special Secretary, Government of U.P. Lucknow exercising power so vested in the State Government under the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as rules), directed for preliminary enquiry by the State Government under Rule 4 of the said rules vide order dated 7th March, 2018. The District Magistrate, consequently, issued a direction on 17th March, 2018 appointing Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), Kannauj to hold enquiry and submit report within seven days so that report may be submitted to the State Government within 15 days as per Rules. The Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) Kannauj proceeded to hold preliminary enquiry and fixed 28th March, 2018 directing Block Development Officer to inform all the persons concerned who had made complaint to appear before him at 4:00 pm. Notices were separately issued also by the Additional District Magistrate to all the 8 complainants to appear before him at 4:00 pm in his office. There is document available on record dated 28th March, 2018, in which Sub Divisional Magistrate has intimated the Additional District Magistrate about due service of notice upon the complainant in the matter. As per schedule, enquiry officer held his enquiry on 28th March, 2018 and the complainants did appear and filed their statements. 3. There is document available on record dated 28th March, 2018, in which Sub Divisional Magistrate has intimated the Additional District Magistrate about due service of notice upon the complainant in the matter. As per schedule, enquiry officer held his enquiry on 28th March, 2018 and the complainants did appear and filed their statements. 3. From the perusal of the original records, it also transpires that on the date fixed before Additional District Magistrate as many as 16 members besides the complainant had also appeared and made their respective statements as well as filed notary affidavits in writing. It is after holding meeting as per schedule, the Additional District Magistrate concluded preliminary enquiry and submitted a report to the District Magistrate on 7th April, 2018 recording findings to the effect that from the perusal of the documents and enquiry conducted and the scrutiny of complaints made by Pushpendra Singh and other complainants, he did not find any substantial evidence in support of complaints nor, the complainants were able to produce any substantial evidence in support of their complaints. 4. The operative portion of the report dated 7.4.2018 which is in devnagari script is reproduced hereunder: ^^mijksDr lEiw.kZ tkap ,oa vfHkys[kh; lk{;ksa ls Li"V gksrk gS fd Jh iq"isUnz flag vkfn {ks= iapk;r lnL; vkfn }kjk dh x;h f'kdk;rh izkFkZuk i= esa yxk;s x;s vkjksiksa ds lEcU/k esa f'kdk;rdrkZx.k dksbZ ,sls Bksl lk{;@rF; miyC/k ugh djk ik;s ftlls f'kdk;r dk cy feyrk gks A tkap vk[;k mijksDruqlkj lsok esa izsf"kr gS A^^ 5. It also transpires from the record that some complaint was made by Yogendra Singh and Pushpendra Singh and members of Kshetra Panchayat separately on 2nd April, 2018 in which they requested the District Magistrate that there was undue influence exercised by the petitioner upon the members of the Kshetra Panchayat and, therefore, affidavits were submitted in terrarum by the members and so the fresh enquiry should be conducted by joint team consisting of Rural Development Authority and Public Works Department to verify the facts. 6. It appears that District Magistrate, instead of forwarding report dated 7th April, 2018, proceeded to issue a fresh direction on 16.4.2018 to get the enquiry held afresh by a team consisting of three officials each of Public Works Department, P.M.G.S.Y, Kannauj and, Finance and Accounts Officer of Secondary Educational Department, Kannauj. 6. It appears that District Magistrate, instead of forwarding report dated 7th April, 2018, proceeded to issue a fresh direction on 16.4.2018 to get the enquiry held afresh by a team consisting of three officials each of Public Works Department, P.M.G.S.Y, Kannauj and, Finance and Accounts Officer of Secondary Educational Department, Kannauj. However, on the same day the District Magistrate passed another order on 16th April, 2018 directing constitution of four member committee and this time it included an additional member of (District Rural Development Authority (DRDA) and Executive Engineer of P.M.G.S.Y, Kannauj. This four member Committee proceeded to hold enquiry and submitted a report on 6th July, 2018. The Additional District Magistrate taking into account the report of the four member committee further proceeded to prepare another report in the name of preliminary enquiry and submitted this report on 16th August, 2018 and it is this report that was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Special Secretary U.P. Panchayati Raj Department, Lucknow. 7. The Additional District Magistrate taking into account the report of the four member committee further proceeded to prepare another report in the name of preliminary enquiry and submitted this report on 16th August, 2018 and it is this report that was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Special Secretary U.P. Panchayati Raj Department, Lucknow. 7. The operative portion of the finding of preliminary enquiry report is also reproduced hereunder: ^^vr% iwjs izdj.k ds voyksdu esa ik;k x;k gS fd Jh iq"isUnz o Qh: flag dks NksMdj vU; Jherh lksuh] Jherh lUrks"k] Jh ;ksxsUnz dqekj] Jh jathr] Jh jkefoykl] rFkk Jh lqjs'kpUnz {ks= iapk;r lnL;ks@f'kdk;rdrkZvks }kjk izLrqr 'kiFk i=ksa ds [k.Mu djrs gq, ;g dgk x;k gS fd muds }kjk vkj0Mh0 cuokus rFkk dk;Z fnyokus ds cgkus muls dksjs LVkEi ij gLrk{kj Jh iq"isUnz flag {ks= iapk;r lnL; }kjk djk;s x;s gSa] rFkk mDr 'kiFk i=ksa dks Cykd izeq[k Jh meka'kadj csfj;k dks gVkus ds fy, mi;ksx fd;k x;k gS] ftldk mUgksaus izkFkZuk i=] 'kiFk i= rFkk cu;ku vafdr djkdj [k.Mu fd;k x;k gS A ;g Hkh dgk x;k gS fd Jh mek'kadj csfj;k }kjk x;s dk;Z lUrks"ktud gS A xfBr Vhe }kjk tkap ds lEcU/k esa Hkh {ks= iapk;r lnL;ksa o fuekZ.k lfefr ds v/;{k }kjk c;kuksa esa dgk gS fd mDr pkjks dk;ksa ds uewuk fdlds lkeus fy;s x;s rFkk fdl iz;ksx'kkyk ls tkap djk;h x;h gS A iwoZ esa mDr dk;ksZ ds uewus ysdj pkjksa fuekZ.k dk;Z esa iz;qDr b.VjykWfdax bZaVksa dk DokfyVh dUVªksyj iz;ksx'kkyk eSuiqjh }kjk tkap djkdj gh Hkqxrku fn;k x;k gS A mDr pkjksa ekxksZa dh tkap xzke fodkl foHkkx ds dk;skZa gsrq xfBr Vh0,0lh0 ds }kjk Hkh tkap dh tk pqdh gS A tcfd tkap Vhe }kjk viuh vk[;k esa mDr dk;ksZa esa iz;qDr fuekZ.k lkexzh v/kksekud ik;h x;h gS A tkap vk[;k egksn; dh lsok esa mfpr dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr gSA^^ 8. The State Government issued a show cause notice on 23rd October, 2018 to the petitioner to submit his reply/explanation within 15 days, failing which appropriate action shall be taken taking recourse to the powers under the Act of 1961. The State Government issued a show cause notice on 23rd October, 2018 to the petitioner to submit his reply/explanation within 15 days, failing which appropriate action shall be taken taking recourse to the powers under the Act of 1961. The petitioner before submitting the reply demanded certain papers/documents which were not legible and were part of the compilation consisting of 213 pages, vide letter dated 3rd December, 2018 and made reminder on 29.12.2018, however, it is submitted that those letters of the petitioner remained unanswered and ultimately vide order dated 8th February, 2019 passed by respondent no. 1, final enquiry has been directed as per 1997 Enquiry Rules, but at the same time taking recourse to the proviso , the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner have also been seized. Hence this petition. 9. Assailing the order, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three fold arguments: (a). Once preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Additional District Magistrate pursuant to the order passed by the District Magistrate in compliance of the direction issued by the State Government under Rule 4 and enquiry report was submitted on 7.4.2018, it was not open for the Additional District Magistrate to have directed for enquiry afresh for the second time without prior sanction from the State Government; (b). The District Magistrate did not himself hold 2nd preliminary enquiry and illegally appointed a subcommittee nor, do the rules contemplate for any such exercise of power by the District Magistrate; and (c). The District Magistrate was not justified in withholding the report dated 7.4.2018 and further the State Government was not justified in not submitting legible copies of the documents which were required by the petitioner and upon which much reliance was placed by the State Government recording prima facie opinion regarding financial and other irregularities at the end of the petitioner to denude him immediately of the financial and administrative power under Section 16 of the Act, 1961. 10. Before we proceed to consider the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner we would like to put the record straight. 10. Before we proceed to consider the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner we would like to put the record straight. At the time when petition was initially argued and we made a pointed query to the learned Standing Counsel as to whether there was any such preliminary enquiry report dated 7.4.2018 was already available with District Magistrate, it was argued by learned Standing Counsel that no such report was available nor, any order was passed for holding enquiry prior to 16.4.2018, the order that was passed for holding enquiry by the Additional District Magistrate and the enquiry report that was submitted by Additional District Magistrate on 16th April, 2018, it was in compliance thereof. 11. In order to verify this above statement made by learned Standing Counsel we summoned the original records in sealed cover and yesterday original records were produced in sealed cover was opened and was taken into Court's custody and matter was placed today for final argument and today the record has been thoroughly perused by us. 12. In the initial narration of the facts in this order, we have stated how enquiry was directed by the State Government under the order dated 7th March, 2018 and Additional District Magistrate was directed by the District Magistrate vide order dated 17th March, 2018 to submit report within 7 days and thereafter Additional District Magistrate proceeded to issue notice to the complainants and held meeting with them on 20th March, 2018 and finally submitted a report on 7th April, 2018. This preliminary enquiry report dated 7th April, 2018 is very much available in the original record and, therefore, statement made by learned Standing Counsel on the earlier occasion that no such report was available, turns out to be false one. 13. Now, Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General while defending the State action, has very fairly admitted that earlier enquiry report dated 07.04.2018 is very much available in record and also that the District Magistrate vide his order dated 17.03.2018 had nominated Additional District Magistrate to conduct fact finding preliminary enquiry and he submitted the report. 14. 13. Now, Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General while defending the State action, has very fairly admitted that earlier enquiry report dated 07.04.2018 is very much available in record and also that the District Magistrate vide his order dated 17.03.2018 had nominated Additional District Magistrate to conduct fact finding preliminary enquiry and he submitted the report. 14. However, he has argued that since final enquiry has been ordered in the matter, it should be permitted to be brought to its logical end and as there are serious charges of the financial irregularities and acceptance of tender which is vitiated for nepotism and bias, the Court may not interfere with the order denuding the petitioner from its financial and administrative power. He submits that where public money and its misuse by abuse of position is in issue, Court would be reluctant in allowing such person to retain such power pending final enquiry. 15. Before we proceed to examine this above argument raised by learned Additional Advocate General, we are reminded of a settled legal principle that when something is required under the Act or Rules framed therein to be done in a particular manner, then such thing should be done in that very manner only. We are resided of the judgment of the Apex Court [ (2016) 6 SCC 323 State of Kerala v. Kerala Rare Earth and Minerals Ltd.] wherein the derptive “Quando Aliquid Prohibetur Ex Directo, Prohibetur Et Per Obliquum” was taken into account and the Court held that it is well settled that if law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, then, in order to be valid the act must be done in the prescribed manner only. The Court relied upon another judgment in the case of CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghoswala (2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein specially for the bench Hegde 'J' observed “it is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided therein...”. 16. In the matter of investigation the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Visvanadula Chetti Babu (2010) 15 SCC 103 has taken the same view. 16. In the matter of investigation the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Visvanadula Chetti Babu (2010) 15 SCC 103 has taken the same view. In this case the question under consideration was that the authority to investigate under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995. Rule 7 of Rules provided for investigation by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Vide para 4 the Apex Court held thus: “We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the clear mandate of the Rules, it was only a specified Deputy Superintendent of Police who could investigate an offence under the Act. An investigation done by any officer below that rank and not specified as per Rule 7 would not be entitled to investigate any such offence. In the present matter the investigation has been made by an officer of the rank of an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. This was not permissible. We endorse the judgment of the High Court in this respect.” 17. And again in the case of Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat (2014) 3 SCC 502 , vide para 61 has held thus: “61. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor Vs. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426, 431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Vs. King Emperor reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and then followed by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 322 . This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh by a bench of three Judges reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 in the following words:- “8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted….” This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad reported in 1999 (8) SCC 266 , Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2001 (4) SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Essar Power Limited reported in 2008 (4) SCC 755 . 18. Thus, it is not the ultimate result which is of vital importance but procedure that has been adopted in achieving the end result is of equal importance. The procedural aspect of the matter acquires more significance while testing an ultimate action on a testing anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution in order to uphold such an action. 19. In so far as the controversy in question is concerned, the source of power as has come to be exercised in the present case is the U.P. Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Removal of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs, Adhyakshas and Updhyakshas) Enquiry Rules, 1997, (In short Enquiry Rules). The procedure relating to the complaints has been prescribed for under Rule 3 of the Enquiry Rules whereas Rule 4 provides for the preliminary enquiry that the State Government may on receiving of the complaints, so order in order to get finding to the effect that prima facie case for formal enquiry is involved in the matter of complaint. Rule 5 provides for power to the State Government for holding a formal enquiry, if in the opinion of the State Government, it is imperative in view of the report submitted under Sub-Rule 2 of the Rule 4 and then Rule 6 lays down the procedure for the formal enquiry. For the purpose of the controversy involved in the present case. Rules 4 and 5 are relevant and, therefore, are reproduced hereunder in their entirety: 4. For the purpose of the controversy involved in the present case. Rules 4 and 5 are relevant and, therefore, are reproduced hereunder in their entirety: 4. Preliminary Enquiry--(1) The State Government may, on the receipt of complaint referred to in Rule 3 or otherwise appoint an officer not below the rank of an Additional District Magistrate in the case of Pramukh or Up-Pramukh and District Magistrate in the case of an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. (2) The Officer appointed under sub-rule (1) shall conduct the preliminary enquiry as expeditiously as possible and submit his report to the State Government within a fortnight of his having been so appointed. 5. Enquiry Officer-Where the State Government is of the opinion, on the basis of the report referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 that an enquiry should be held against a Pramukh or Up-Pramukha under Section 16 or gainst an Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha under Section 29, it shall, by an order, appoint an officer to hold the enquiry, who shall not be below the rank of the District Magistrate in the case of an enquiry under Section 16, and not below the rank of a Commissioner in the case of an enquiry under Section 29. (Emphasis added) 20. From bare reading of Rule 4, it is clear that after complaint is received as per procedure prescribed under Rule 3 or even suo motu, the State Government can exercise power for holding preliminary enquiry into the conduct of Pramukhs or Up-Pramukhs, Adhyakshas or Upadhyakshas by appointing officer not below the rank of Additional District Magistrate and District Magistrate respectively. Sub-rule 2 provides for such enquiry officer conducting preliminary enquiry, to accomplish the task quite expeditiously and submit report within a fortnight of his appointment as enquiry officer. 21. Examining the case in hand in the light of provisions contained under Rule 4, we find that after complaints were received under the signatures of as many as 8 members, the State Government through its Secretary, vide order dated 17th March, 2018 directed the District Magistrate to hold preliminary enquiry. 21. Examining the case in hand in the light of provisions contained under Rule 4, we find that after complaints were received under the signatures of as many as 8 members, the State Government through its Secretary, vide order dated 17th March, 2018 directed the District Magistrate to hold preliminary enquiry. Vide letter dated 17th March, 2018, the District Magistrate authorized the Additional District Magistrate to hold enquiry and submit the fact finding report within 7 days, so that report may be submitted to the State Government within 15 days as per Enquiry Rules. 22. The records produced before us contain the documents to the effect that Additional District Magistrate proceeded to hold preliminary enquiry fixing dated 28th March, 2019 and directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate to inform all the complainants to appear before him at 4:00 pm. Sub Divisional Magistrate also intimated the Additional District Magistrate on 28th March, 2018 that the notices got duly served and so also records disclose that preliminary enquiry as ordered was held on 28th March, 2018 and complainants did appear and filed their statements. The Additional District Magistrate thereafter submitted report on 7th April, 2018 recording finding to the effect that from the perusal of the documents and enquiry conducted no substantial evidence was found in support of the complaints. 23. Thus, as far as procedure for holding preliminary enquiry as prescribed for under Rule 4 is concerned, it stood complied with and to that extent the task stood accomplished by 7th April, 2018 but records reveal that the District Magistrate instead of forwarding the report dated 7th April, 2018, directed the enquiry to be held afresh by a team consisting of 3 officials and then enlarged the team with four members on same day i.e. 16.4.2018. As far as this 2nd part of the procedure adopted by the District Magistrate vide order dated 16.4.2018 is concerned, we do not find any such provision of law whereunder District Magistrate is authorized to exercise discretion to hold enquiry for the second time in the face of fact that earlier preliminary enquiry report was pending consideration. We do find any provision whereby the District Magistrate has been authorized to appoint a committee to conduct enquiry. We do find any provision whereby the District Magistrate has been authorized to appoint a committee to conduct enquiry. The Rule is worded like this “officer not below the rank of Additional District Magistrate and officer shall himself authorized a person to hold enquiry by the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate” and so under the said Rule he is not authorized to sub-delegate the power by constituting a committee. Rule 4 can not in any manner be interpreted to hold that it contemplates the constitution of any such committee as has come to be formed in the present case and, therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the order dated 16.4.2018 passed by the Additional District Magistrate appointing committee to hold enquiry was beyond scope of power vested with him under Rule 4 of the Enquiry Rules. The doctrine delegatus non potest delegare in the case of NGEF Ltd. v. Chandra Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Others (2005) 8 SCC 219 has come to be discussed by the Apex Court and vide para 69 the Court has held thus: “69. BIFR admittedly had the power to sell the assets of the Company but the High Court until a winding-up order is issued does not have the same. BIFR in its order dated 02.08.2002 might have made an observation to the effect that the Company may approach the High Court in case it intended to dispose of its property by private negotiation but the same would not mean that BIFR could delegate its power in favour of the High Court. BIFR being a statutory authority in absence of any provision empowering it to delegate its power in favour of any other authority had no jurisdiction to do so. 'Delegatus non potest delegare' is a well-known maxim which means unless expressly authorized a delegatee cannot sub-delegate its power. Moreover, the said observations of BIFR would only mean that the Company Court could exercise its power in accordance with law and not dehors it. If the Company Court had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, it could not derive any jurisdiction only because BIFR said so.” 24. Moreover, the said observations of BIFR would only mean that the Company Court could exercise its power in accordance with law and not dehors it. If the Company Court had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, it could not derive any jurisdiction only because BIFR said so.” 24. Coming to the 2nd aspect of the matter which is relating to Rule 5, we find that in the impugned order the Secretary while directing for formal enquriy has placed reliance only upon the report of preliminary enquiry dated 6th July, 2018 submitted by the committee and then consequential report dated 16th August, 2018 forwarded by the District Magistrate as his report to the Special Secretary U.P Panchayat Raj Department Lucknow. 25. We see that the records produced before us clearly reveal that report dated 7th April, 2018 was also available on record and yet the said report did not find any consideration in the order of Joint Secretary dated 18th February, 2019 impugned in the present writ petition. All that is referred to is the report of the District Magistrate dated 16.8.2018. The fact finding enquiry report of the committee constituted by the District Magistrate under the order dated 16.4.2018 and the contents as have come up in his re-commendatory report dated 16.8.2018 are the same. The District Magistrate, it is proved beyond doubt, virtually did not hold himself any enquiry, instead, submitted a report of the sub committee as his report incorporating the same in his re-commendatory enquiry report dated 16.8.2018. 26. Rule 5 of the enquiry rules provide for 'opinion of the Government'. An opinion would naturally be formed upon the report submitted under Rule 4. So when two reports are submitted to the State Government and one was in compliance of the initial letter issued by the State Government as preliminary enquiry report which was to be submitted within three weeks, there is no justification as to why the Secretary would not refer to that report and would not consider the said report submitted well within time. 27. As the records reveal, the District Magistrate proceeded to hold an enquiry second time on the basis of some complaint made by certain members, but such enquiry would not come within the scope of his authority as prescribed for under Rule 4. 27. As the records reveal, the District Magistrate proceeded to hold an enquiry second time on the basis of some complaint made by certain members, but such enquiry would not come within the scope of his authority as prescribed for under Rule 4. Second enquiry report, therefore, not being as contemplated under the enquiry rules but got ordered by the District Magistrate without any sanction/ request from the State, the order was void, and so the report would also be void and non est and deserves rejection. The procedure which has been laid down under Rule 4 as we have discussed above in this judgment it is very clear that Additional District Magistrate and District Magistrate are the only officers or the officers of their rank who can hold enquiry. 28. Under the circumstances, the report which should have been relied upon by the Secretary and yet if he has passed the order for formal enquiry ignoring that report, earlier submitted by the competent authority within time as contemplated under Rule 4, such an opinion formed by the authority can only be termed to be biased one. The two reports were available and there are no justifiable reasons for not considering the first report while passing order impugned. Thus the order impugned directing for formal enquiry, therefore, deserves to be quashed and is accordingly hereby quashed. 29. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed in above terms with cost.