JUDGMENT : S.S. Shinde, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. This petition is filed with following substantive prayer- (b) That this Hon'ble Court may pleased to quash and set aside the ad interim ex parte order dated 8th May 2019 passed in Exhibit 4 in Domestix Violence Case No. 87/2019 by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court, Dadar-5, restraining the Petitioner from entering his residence at A-3, Alpa Apartments, Pochkhanwala Road, Near Traffic HQ, Worli Mumbai 400030. 3. Background facts stated in the petition for filing the same are as under- It is the case of the Petitioner that, Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint (for short "said complaint") under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short "DV Act") bearing number 87/DV/2019 seeking various reliefs as mentioned therein on 8th May 2019 before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court, Dadar. The said complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 inter alia a further attempt by Respondent No. 2 to harass and coerce the Petitioner in to yielding to Respondent No. 2's exorbitant demands for maintenance. Respondent No. 2 also preferred an application for interim reliefs numbered as Exhibit 4 in the said compliant, inter alia praying for ad interim ex parte relief under Section 23 (2) of the said Act, along with an affidavit in support of her application. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate on hearing the advocates for Respondent NO. 2 was pleased to partially allow the application for ad interim reliefs, and passed an ad interim ex parte order dated 8th May 2019, restraining the Petitioner from committing any sort of domestic violence against Respondent, as well as restraining the Petitioner from entering his own home, i.e. A-3, Alpa Apartments, Pochkhanwala Road, Near Traffic HQ, Worli, Mumbai- 400030 until further orders. In addition to the impugned order, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate also passed an order dated 8th May 2019 in the main proceedings of the said complaint, issuing notice to the Petitioner through the Protection Officer, while also calling for the domestic violence report, adjourning the matter to 27th May 2019 at 2.45 pm. Thereafter, on 27th May, 2019, the 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dadar was vacant as reflected in the Roznama for the said Complaint, and accordingly the board was discharged, with the next date given as 18th July 2019. Thereafter, on 27th May, 2019, the 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dadar was vacant as reflected in the Roznama for the said Complaint, and accordingly the board was discharged, with the next date given as 18th July 2019. The Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 continued to live together in the said matrimonial home from the date of passing of the impugned order until 15th May 2019 despite Respondent No. 2 clearly obtaining a copy of the said order on 9th May 2019. 4. It is the case of the Petitioner that, on 15th May 2019, the Petitioner had to travel for a business trip to Germany, and accordingly left the said matrimonial home with his expected date of return being 29th May 2019, which Respondent No. 2 was well aware. The Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 spoke via a Whatsapp call, and Respondent No. 2 confirmed that she would be sending a car and driver to pick up the Petitioner from the Airport. On 29th May 2019 at 10.30 am Central Europe Summer Time, the Petitioner received an email from the advocates of the Respondent No. 2 serving on him only a copy of the impugned order, whilst deliberately not serving a copy of the said complaint. The only reason the Petitioner got to read the email before boarding his flight to Mumbai via Muscat, was because his flight (Oman Air Flight No. WY 116) was delayed. The Petitioner replied to Respondent No. 2's advocates email, inter alia acknowledging the same whilst also asking for the copy of the said complaint vide email dated 29th May 2019. The Petitioner also informed | Respondent No. 2's advocate that Respondent had been deliberately and selectively leaking various pieces of material to the media and press, and that she had made veiled threats to even leak the said impugned order in an effort to malign and force the Petitioner to succumb to her exorbitant demands. Thereafter, the advocates for Respondent No. 2 replied to the Petitioners email on 3rd June 2019, stating inter alia that Respondent No. 2 had instructed them that the Petitioner was traveling, and hence service may not have been done by the Court. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8th May 2019 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court, Dadar, thereby restraining the Petitioner from entering the matrimonial home, the present petition is filed. 5. Being aggrieved by the order dated 8th May 2019 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court, Dadar, thereby restraining the Petitioner from entering the matrimonial home, the present petition is filed. 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Girish Kulkarni submitted that, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was led to error in passing the impugned order by Respondent No. 2 representing that the Petitioner owned and possessed several accommodations. Respondent No. 2 deliberately suppressed the fact that except for the said matrimonial home all the other residential properties owned by the Petitioner were on lease and thus otherwise occupied, and therefore not available to the Petitioner to move in to as per his wishes. Respondent No. 2 continued to cohabit with the Petitioner not only after alleged acts of domestic violence were allegedly committed by the Petitioner, but also after passing the impugned order by the learned Magistrate. The Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 continued to cohabit together in the said matrimonial home until 15th May 2019 when the Petitioner left for a business trip to Germany, wherein no effort was made by Respondent No. 2 or her Advocate to serve the impugned order on the Petitioner until the Petitioner was on his way home. Thus, the act of Respondent No. 2 serving a copy of the impugned order on the Petitioner on 29th May 2019, was deliberately planned and carried out in order to inconvenience and harass the Petitioner. As mentioned hereinabove, the Petitioner was to land at approximately 3.00 am from Germany on 29th May 2019, and thus if he had missed the email send by Respondent No. 2's Advocate, he would have entered the said matrimonial home and thereby been in violation of the impugned order, and liable to be punished under the DV Act. 6. As mentioned hereinabove, the Petitioner was to land at approximately 3.00 am from Germany on 29th May 2019, and thus if he had missed the email send by Respondent No. 2's Advocate, he would have entered the said matrimonial home and thereby been in violation of the impugned order, and liable to be punished under the DV Act. 6. It is further submitted that, it is established in law that in order to avail of an Order under Section 23 (2) of the DV Act, an aggrieved person must necessarily file an Affidavit as prescribed in Form III in the Rules framed under the said Act, wherein an aggrieved person would inter alia have to state that reliefs as claimed by her are urgent and that she would face great financial hardship and would be forced to live under the threat of repetition/escalation of acts of domestic violence complained of the accompanying application by the spouse, if the said reliefs were not granted on an ad interim ex parte basis. Since the aforesaid procedure was not adhered to, and the Petitioner was not served notice, and the learned Magistrate has exercised discretion arbitrarily, capaciously and perversely, and therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to invoke supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. It is submitted that, due to the impugned order, the Petitioner has suffered grave and irreparable harm as he is unable to access his clothes, and work related papers, as well as limiting contact with his minor son. Respondent No. 2 has made the allegation that, the Petitioner is a drunkard and that she would never allow their minor son be around any person in a drunken state even if it was his father, yet ironically the Respondent No. 2 permitted her son to travel alone with the Petitioner to the Gir Forests from 18th March 2019 to 24th March 2019, as well as Goa from 12th June 2019 to 16th June 2019, which contradicts her own stand, casting serious doubts on her allegation. Since 29th May 2019, till present the Petitioner has had to stay either at his sisters residence or with his friends, despite the fact that he owns the said matrimonial home which at present is being occupied by Respondent No. 2. Since 29th May 2019, till present the Petitioner has had to stay either at his sisters residence or with his friends, despite the fact that he owns the said matrimonial home which at present is being occupied by Respondent No. 2. The Petitioner has been fully compliant with the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate despite denying in toto all the allegations made by Respondent No. 2, he has continued to support Respondent No. 2 by maintaining her monthly allowance of Rs. 40,000/- per month, allowing her access to all his cars by paying the salaries of all the domestic help employed in the said matrimonial home, paying for Respondent No. 2's and Aashman's expenses in Lugano amounting to Rs. 10 Lakhs amongst other things. It is also submitted by the Petitioner that, upon perusal of emails sent by Respondent No. 2 with regards to her Lugano trip would not indicate that Respondent No. 2 has actually committed any domestic violence, and that Respondent No. 2 has only created a situation wherein she not only unilaterally enjoys the said matrimonial home but also where the Petitioner is coerced into funding a luxurious lifestyle, which she did not previously enjoy. Respondent No. 2 had taken up a rental accommodation at Windmere building, Santa Cruz on 1st March 2019, however she prematurely terminated the rental agreement on 1st April 2019. A perusal of the email exchanged between Respondent No. 2 and the owner of the flat at Windmere would reveal that at the time the Respondent No. 2 filed the said complaint and obtained relief, she was still in possession of the said rental accommodation at Windmere until the end of May. Thus, at the time of filing the said complaint not only there was any urgent need of Respondent No. 2 or imminent threat of Domestic Violence from the Petitioner, but Respondent No. 2 also had alternate accommodation and, which she could have used that she deliberately suppressed from the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in order to obtain the said impugned order. It is further submitted that, considering the fact that matrimonial residence has CCTV cameras installed through out the house, it is ironic that Respondent No. 2 has deliberately chose not to produce the same. It is further submitted that, considering the fact that matrimonial residence has CCTV cameras installed through out the house, it is ironic that Respondent No. 2 has deliberately chose not to produce the same. The digital video recording of the CCTV cameras installed in the matrimonial home are in the possession for Respondent No. 2, as is evident from the fact that she has annexed the selective clips from the same to the FIR filed by her with the police, yet for her own malafide reasons refuses to share full and complete DVR as she is aware the same would rebut the false allegations made by her against the Petitioner. Learned counsel in support of aforesaid contentio placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwari Devi & Ors. V/s. Nirmala Devi and Ors., decided on 04.07.2011. Therefore, Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that, petition deserves consideration. 8. Learned counsel Mr. Aabad Ponda appearing for Respondent No. 2 at the outset submits that, there is efficacious remedy of appeal available to the Petitioner under Section 29 of the DV Act, and therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to directly invoke the writ jurisdiction, so also, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure bypassing the remedy of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act. Learned counsel submits that, when it is open to a party to move the Court in another jurisdiction for obtaining redressal in a manner provided under the statute, the High Court normally will not entertain a writ petition. In support of aforesaid contention learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2 pressed into service following expositions of law:- Girish Kumar Suneja Versus Central Bureau of Investigating, (2017) 14 SCC 809 , State of U.P. Versus Mohammad Nooh, (1958) SCR 595, Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr, (2009) CriLJ 889, Thansingh Nathmal Vs. The Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Others, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , Gita Devi Aggawal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & Ors, (1970) 76 ITR 496 (SC), Punjab National Bank Vs. O.C. Krishnan and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 569 , Anandwardhan and Another Vs. Pandurang and Others, (2005) 11 SCC 195 , Sakiri Vasu Vs. Ltd. & Anr, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , Gita Devi Aggawal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & Ors, (1970) 76 ITR 496 (SC), Punjab National Bank Vs. O.C. Krishnan and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 569 , Anandwardhan and Another Vs. Pandurang and Others, (2005) 11 SCC 195 , Sakiri Vasu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2008) 2 SCC 409 , United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , Transport and Dock Workers Union and Others Vs. Mumbai Port Trust and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 575 , Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2011) 2 SCC 782 and Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another Vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 . 9. In order to seek interference under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, there must exist no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief. In support of aforesaid contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the ration laid down in the following cases:- Ram Narain V/s. Mool Chand and Others, 1959 SCCOnlineALL 205, Mary Angel and Others V/s. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 5 SCC 209 , State of Punjab V/s. Davinder Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 , Chilakamarthi Venkateswardlu and Anr V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, 2019 SCCOnline 984, Smt. Hansa Gauri and Ors. V/s. State of Rajasthan,2012 CriLJ 342, Tara Chand V/s. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2008) 1 RCR(Cri) 154, Ascent Constructions Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Mohan Bhatt, (2008) 1 BankCas 472 : 2008 (103) DRJ 118, Govind and Ors. V/s. The State (Govt. V/s. State of Rajasthan,2012 CriLJ 342, Tara Chand V/s. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2008) 1 RCR(Cri) 154, Ascent Constructions Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Mohan Bhatt, (2008) 1 BankCas 472 : 2008 (103) DRJ 118, Govind and Ors. V/s. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2003) 3 AD(Del) 525 : 104 (2003) DLT 510 : I (2003) DMC 783 : 2003 (68) DRJ 446 : 2003 (2) JCC 1030., Anup Lodha and Ors V/s. The State of West Bengal and Ors., (2016) 1 BankCas 542 (Cal.) : (2015) 4 CALLTI 32 (HC) : 2015 (3) JCC 203, Amarvir Singh V/s. State (NCT of Delhi), (2007) 98 DRJ 228 , Krishna Dwivedi V/s. Surender Kumar,MANU/DE/8475/2007 Criminal M.C. No. 1481 of 2007, Raj Kumar Khurana V/s. State (GNCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2009) 3 CompLJ 17 (Del), K.R. Ramkumar V/s. State, (2004) 2 CTC 42 : 2004 (2) RCR (Crl) 287., Rajesh Kumar Gulati V/s. National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India (NAFED) and Ors., (2008) 147 DLT 219 : ILR (2008) Supp. (7) Delhi I., Ramji Lal V/s. Amid Ved, (2008) CriLJ 1220, Rajesh Kumar V/s. The State of Bihar, (2005) 2 BLJR 1518 : 2005 (3) PLJR 419 . and Sanjay Kumar Ghai V/s. The State, (2008) 100 DRJ 731 . 10. It is submitted that, it is true that, the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one compulsion and in appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. However, learned counsel submits that, in the facts of the present case, none of the aforesaid contingencies arise. The learned Magistrate was entitled to pass ex parte order under Section 23 (2) of the DV Act. Secondly, in the impugned order reasons are assigned by the learned Magistrate, and thirdly, the Petitioner has opportunity to cause appearance before the same Court and put forth his contentions. 11. The learned Magistrate was entitled to pass ex parte order under Section 23 (2) of the DV Act. Secondly, in the impugned order reasons are assigned by the learned Magistrate, and thirdly, the Petitioner has opportunity to cause appearance before the same Court and put forth his contentions. 11. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that, the Petitioner has physically assaulted the complainant and traumatized her by physical, emotional and mental cruelty. Being married to the Petitioner, Respondent No. 2 tried to salvage her marriage by meeting a marriage counsellor. However, there also the Petitioner did not disclose all the facts to the counsellor. The Petitioner on his 40th birthday as usual got drunk and abused and punched the complainant. As the complainant could not take this continuous physical, mental and emotional assault, lodged an NC with the Worli Police Station under Section 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code on 28/07/2018. In the year 2019 itself Respondent No. 2 filed another police complaint on 23rd January, 2019 placing on record how right from the beginning of her marriage. Respondent No. 2 was traumatized by the accused and particularly how the Petitioner had committed various acts of cruelty on her. Respondent No. 2 narrated various incidents including how she was assaulted and physically abused by the Petitioner in the said complaint. The complainant approached the police hoping that, the Petitioner would mend his ways and change his actions but the same was to no avail. As a result of the same, the complainant was compelled to register FIR bearing CR No. 70 of 2019 with the Worli Police Station on 19/02/2019 under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 and 509 of IPC. In the said complaint, complainant again narrated the incidents of cruelty and harassments that are meted out to her and how whether drunk or not she was abused, assaulted and insulted with the filthiest of language by the Petitioner. It is further submitted that, again on 5th March 2019, the complainant was again ill treated and threatened on the phone with rude, abusive and offensive behaviour by the Petitioner. As a result of which the complainant had filed a complaint under Senior Inspector in charge of the Worli Police Station. This was followed by an NC dated 18/04/2019. It is further submitted that, again on 5th March 2019, the complainant was again ill treated and threatened on the phone with rude, abusive and offensive behaviour by the Petitioner. As a result of which the complainant had filed a complaint under Senior Inspector in charge of the Worli Police Station. This was followed by an NC dated 18/04/2019. On 17th April 2019, two police women came to the house in civil dress to record the statement of Aashman. During that time, the Petitioner arrived and complainant informed him that the police has come to record the statement of Aashman and the Petitioner got furious hearing that and barged into the room and asked the cops to leave. That very nigh when the complainant was trying to put her son to sleep, the Petitioner came in the room and started telling the child that, the complainant had called the police at home. A little later the Petitioner knocked at complainant's door and said that puppies are uncomfortable, when the complainant went to check the same, she realised that the Petitioner had taken her phone and after a great struggle he returned the same to her. Later in the night, the complainant was petrified and locked her room and slept off and when she woke up realised that the Petitioner was trying to hack into her various accounts. The Petitioner thereafter the next morning again asked for her phone and when she said that she have left it with her sister, the Petitioner dragged her and forcibly made her sit in the car and took her to her sister's house. The entire way to her sister's house the Petitioner was abusing her, which has been further elaborated by her in her complaint. Thereafter, again the entire morning the Petitioner kept on trying to hack into her Gmail and facebook account. Therefore, complainant filed a written complaint on 18th April 2019 against the Petitioner. It is also submitted that, on 1 st May 2019 again the complainant was compelled to lodge a complaint. After registration of FIR in order to buy peace she initially shifted out of her residence and stayed at Windermere society, Santacruz on rent with their child. Complainant informed the Petitioner that, she moved out of the house. The Petitioner got furious and barged into the house on the next day i.e. on 4th March 2019. After registration of FIR in order to buy peace she initially shifted out of her residence and stayed at Windermere society, Santacruz on rent with their child. Complainant informed the Petitioner that, she moved out of the house. The Petitioner got furious and barged into the house on the next day i.e. on 4th March 2019. The Petitioner came and said the Aashman is not comfortable living here. She asked Aashman and he said that he wants to go back to Alpa apartments. The complainant agreed to go back to Alpa Apartments only upon the assurance given by the Petitioner that he would move out of the house. The Petitioner moved out of the house and again came back after a week. The Petitioner immediately after entering the house changed the CCTV cameras and refused to give the password of the same. Hoping that, there will be peace in her house, she returned back and thought that things will improve but however, things went from bad to worse and it resulted in all these complaints being filed. 12. It is further submitted that, the Petitioner made the life of complainant so miserable that she was compelled to file the proceedings under the DV Act on 8th May 2019, but prior to that she was forced to file various police complaints and tried to ensure that, she was not subjected to any more torture and cruelty and insult in front of her child. Therefore in order to maintain her sanity and live with dignity and in order to ensure that she is in a position to survive with dignity and not be ill treated, she decided to exercise her legal rights and accordingly as a last straw only by means of a protectionery measure, the complainant approached the Magistrate's Court for appropriate relief and the order has been passed which is perfectly legitimate, just and proper in light of the aforesaid circumstances. It is submitted that, when the things became impossible for both of them to reside together, she had informed the Petitioner in March 2019 that she cannot stay with the Petitioner as a result of which he told me that he has finalised a place in Pushpa Milan, Hill Road, Worli, in order to ensure that they leave peacefully and he did not stay with her because he too admitted that his behaviour was such that he would move out. It is submitted that, despite obtaining protective order from the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the complainant was compelled to stay with the Petitioner as she was scared of the consequences including physical assault by the Petitioner, if she informed the Petitioner about the order dated 08/05/2019 while she was in the house and therefore, she could not muster the courage to tell him about the said order dated 08/05/2019 and waited for the Petitioner to leave. The complainant traveled with my son to Lugano for his summer camp and as he saw other children with their parents his face had become small and as a concerned mother for the well being and happiness of her child, the complainant thought her child also wants to be seen with both his parents. Therefore, complainant called up the Petitioner to attend a coffee morning on 15th July 2019 and last day performance on 17th July 2019. However, the Petitioner instead of respecting Court orders of not committing any domestic violence forced himself by pushing the complainant aside into the rented apartment and started creating a scene in front of child only with a view of making false show of care and concern and started taking pictures of articles in the room. The complainant lodged a complaint with the local police at Lugano about the same on 15/7/2019 itself. Even after filing the DV application and despite being aware of the restraining order, the Petitioner in flagrant violation of the same comes below the building everyday thereby trying to create nuisance and in particular on 30/7/2019 came under the house and tried talking to Aashman and when the complainant opposed the same the Petitioner threatened her. 13. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and learned counsel for respective Respondents. 13. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and learned counsel for respective Respondents. With their able assistance perused pleadings and grounds taken in the petition, annexures thereto, and impugned order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 62nd Court, Dadar. It appears that, Respondent No. 2 herein filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act for an order of restrain under Section 17 and protection under Section 18, monitory relief under Section 20, compensation under Section 22 and 23 of the DV Act. In the said application there are multiple prayers, one of the prayer is that, restrain the Petitioner herein or his relatives from entering in portion of the shared household in which applicant i.e. Respondent No. 2 resides. 14. Learned Metropolitan Magistrate keeping in view the averments in the application so also prayers made therein, taking recourse to the Section 23 of the DV Act, and after appreciating contentions of the Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 2, so also relying upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sabita Mark Burges V/s. Mark Lionel Burges, passed in Writ Petition No. 4150 of 2013, by assigning the legally sustainable reasons, has passed the impugned order, thereby restraining the Petitioner herein from committing any sort of domestic violence against the Respondent No. 2. The Petitioner is also restrained from entering into residential premise i.e. A-3, Alpha Apartments, Pochkhanwala Road, Near Traffic Headquarters, Worli, Mumbai- 400 030 of the Applicant Respondent No. 2 herein. 15. At this juncture, it would be apt to reproduce herein below Section 23 of the DV Act, which reads as under:- 23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders. (1) In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent. 16. 16. It is true that while seeking an ex parte relief, an aggrieved person has to follow the mandate of Rule 7 of said Rules, and affidavit so filed shall be in Form III under Rule 7 of the said Rules. In this respect it would be apt to make referent to Section 28 of the DV Act, which reads as under:- 28. Procedure- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offence and under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23. 17. If the sub section 2 of section 28 is carefully perused, there is flexibility in the procedure in as much as the concerned Magistrate may lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or sub section 2 of section 23. Therefore, even if there are some shortcomings/lacuna in following the procedure laid down under sub section 2 of Section 23, Rule 7 of The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (for short "said Rules") and Form III under Rule 7 of the said Rules. On the said ground it is not desirable to set aside the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The very object of bringing into force the aforesaid Act, is to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incident thereto, and therefore, on mere technicalities an aggrieved person cannot be dislodged from seeking an appropriate ex parte relief from the Court of competent jurisdiction by invoking Section 23(2) of the aforesaid Act. 18. So far an argument of availability of alternate remedy of Appeal is concerned, it would be apt to reproduce herein below Section 29 of the DV Act, which reads as under:- 29. Appeal- There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Sessions within thirty days from the date o which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later. Appeal- There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Sessions within thirty days from the date o which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later. It is abundantly clear from the careful perusal of Section 29 of the said Act mentioned herein above that, there shall lie an appeal to the Court of Sessions within thirty days from the date of the order made by the Magistrate is served upon the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later. Therefore, it was possible for the Petitioner to file the appeal instead of filing the present petition. 19. According to the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2, second Respondent did follow the mandate of Rule 7 and filed the affidavit in Form III, as required under DV Act and Rules there under. Even if the case of the Petitioner is accepted as it is that, the proper procedure has not been followed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate or proper affidavit was not filed by Respondent No. 2; in that case also, for redressal of said grievance, it is open for the Petitioner to invoke an appellate jurisdiction under Section 29 of the DV Act. The Petitioner also has an opportunity to cause his appearance before the learned Magistrate, if already not caused, and put forth his contentions. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, when the learned Magistrate has passed the ex parte order assigning cogent reasons, which are legally sustainable, the interference by this Court in the impugned order, on the ground of non adherence to the procedure as alleged by the Petitioner, is not warranted. This Court is of the opinion that, the Petitioner ought to have availed of an appropriate remedy of appeal, so also it was possible for the Petitioner to approach before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, in that view of the matter an interference in the impugned order is not called for. This Court is of the opinion that, the Petitioner ought to have availed of an appropriate remedy of appeal, so also it was possible for the Petitioner to approach before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, in that view of the matter an interference in the impugned order is not called for. In the light of discussion in foregoing paragraphs, without entering into the merits of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that, in view of alternate and efficacious remedy available to the Petitioner or the Petitioner can also contest the proceeding pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, the petition deserves no consideration. In that view of the matter, for the reasons recorded herein above, this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Hence, writ petition is rejected. Rule stands discharged accordingly. 20. All the contentions raised on merits in the petition or in the affidavit in reply filed by Respondent No. 2 are being kept open to be agitated before the concerned Court or the appellate forum, as the case may be. 21. In case the Petitioner challenges the impugned order by way of filing an appeal and if there is delay in filing the said appeal and prayer is made for condonation of delay, the appellate forum shall keep in view the time spent by the Petitioner in prosecuting this petition for the purpose of reckoning the limitation and take the appropriate decision. The Appellate Forum or the Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be shall not get influenced by the observations made herein before, and decide the proceedings on its own merits and in accordance with law after following the principles of natural justice.