JUDGMENT : SUBHASIS DASGUPTA, J. 1. Learned advocates for both the parties urge for expeditious disposal of the case in unison focusing that short points, based on law are involved in this case, which can be set at rest by the appeal Court without calling for the lower Court records and without resorting to any extensive hearing. The appeal along with connected application is pending since 2016. 2. Upon perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the appeal along with connected application may be conveniently disposed of without waiting for the lower Court records to come. With the consent of the parties the appeal is thus taken up for hearing. 3. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment and order dated 14.07.2015, passed in MAC case No. 205/2015, by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nadia awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 7,88,000/- with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of this order till realisation in the event of failure to deposit cheques within two months from the date of order. 4. According to appellant/insurance company the quantum of compensation has been erroneously assessed to an inflated amount wrongly accepting the monthly income of deceased at the rate of Rs. 6000/- per month without any documentary evidence in support thereof, and the driver of the offending vehicle having committed breach of the condition of the insurance policy under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, by driving a transport vehicle at the time of accident in spite of owning a driving licence authorising him to drive a light motor vehicle, the insurance company cannot be foisted with the liability to indemnify the claimants. 5. Per contra, the learned advocate for the claimants/respondents has submitted that alleging breach of the condition of insurance policy under the behest of validity of driving licence together with disqualification of the driver may be a ground to put up in defence, but the same is not strong enough to repudiate the award already granted by the Tribunal. The income of the deceased, a green vegetable seller by profession, has been rightly assessed by Tribunal while determining the just compensation, and the same must go unaltered. 6. The Tribunal has elaborately dealt with the factual circumstances in details, while granting the award, but some crucial facts however, may be referred to, which are of highest significance. The income of the deceased, a green vegetable seller by profession, has been rightly assessed by Tribunal while determining the just compensation, and the same must go unaltered. 6. The Tribunal has elaborately dealt with the factual circumstances in details, while granting the award, but some crucial facts however, may be referred to, which are of highest significance. 7. On the fateful day of accident i.e. 26.04.2014 deceased victim, a 38 years old, a green vegetable seller by profession, suffered death after being dashed by the offending vehicle bearing No. WB-51A/8482(Tata Magic) due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, while the deceased victim was returning to his home riding on a bicycle. The deceased victim suffered serious fatal injuries, and he was removed to hospital, where he succumbed to injuries. The claimants (who are widow, minor children and parents of the deceased) proceeded to file this claim case seeking compensation for the loss they suffered. 8. The registered owner of the vehicle has not contested the case, while the claimant/insurance company contested the case by filing written statement. The specific defence raised in the written statement is that the deceased victim did not suffer his death due to fault of the offending vehicle, alternatively said to be rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. The amount claimed as compensation has been contended to be inflated and exorbitant also. 9. Tribunal believed the case of the respondent/claimants holding the deceased, a green vegetable seller by profession, with an income of Rs. 6000/- per month at the time of accident, and ascertained the compensation to the tune indicated hereinabove, with application of 16 as suitable multiplier after deducting 1/3 of the established income of the deceased towards the personal expenses of the deceased. Together with this amount, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in all was allowed towards the funeral expenses, loss of estate and loss of consortium of wife of the deceased. 10. The points raised by the appellant/insurance company requiring decision in this appeal, which we are obliged to answer, are whether the defectiveness and inadequacies of the driving licence together with disqualification of the driver, and alleged erroneous assessment of income of the deceased can frustrate an award granted by the Tribunal to dependent family member of the victim, who suffered a road traffic accident by reason of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. 11. Upon perusal of the judgment awarding compensation, it appears that the validity of the driving licence was not grossly challenged before the Tribunal, but since the insurance company has in its written statement denied all the material averments contained in the claim petition, the point raised pertaining to the validity of the driving licence and/or disqualification of the driver at the time of accident, taken in appeal can never be taken to a surprise. Indisputably the offending vehicle had coverage of insurance at the time of accident. 12. A police case was started at Santipur being case No.181/2014 dated 27.04.2014 under Section 279/338/304(A) of I.P.C. which ultimately ended in charge-sheet. The widow of the deceased has been examined as PW 1 in this case in support of the claim case. The eye witness, PW 2, ratified the claim case giving graphic details of the accident as to how it was so occurred causing death of the deceased. Upon consideration of the oral testimony of PW1, which received corroboration from PW2 (eye witness) together with the documentary evidence, marked as Exhibits, like certified copy of charge-sheet, Exhibit 2, certified copy of Post-Mortem report, Exhibit 3 and certified copy of FIR, Exhibit-7, the Tribunal came to an irresistible conclusion that death of the deceased was due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. Since Motor Vehicle Act is a piece of social legislation, the standard of proof as required in civil or criminal cases is not so high in claim case. It is thus settled that the standard of proof required for proving a claim application is not that of beyond reasonable doubt, but the Court should follow the principles of preponderance of probability. Being emboldened by such principles, the Tribunal believed the evidence of the claimants, adduced before it, and ascertained the just compensation. 13. In the instant appeal under reference, the Tribunal believed that the deceased a green vegetable seller by profession had an income of Rs. 6000/- per month at the time accident. True it is that no supporting paper could be furnished in proof income of the deceased. 14. An exercise is, therefore, in our considered view, necessary in order to ascertain if the Tribunal has justifiably ascertained the income of the deceased for the determination of compensation. 6000/- per month at the time accident. True it is that no supporting paper could be furnished in proof income of the deceased. 14. An exercise is, therefore, in our considered view, necessary in order to ascertain if the Tribunal has justifiably ascertained the income of the deceased for the determination of compensation. It would be profitable here to take support of a decision delivered by Coordinate Bench, reported in case Chapa Ghosh versus Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr, 2017 3 TAC 105 (Cal). The relevant paragraphs of the said decision may be reproduced herein below 20. The coordinate bench in Smt. Bilasini Mondal (supra) has clearly laid down the law that oral evidence is also a piece of evidence and merely because no documentary evidence could be produced in support of the earning of the victim, such oral evidence cannot be rejected outright unless it is found un-realiable for any other reason. The said decision was followed by the subsequent co-ordinate bench in Gopal Chnadra Dey (supra). 21. We see no reason to take a different view. Evidence, defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is of two kinds, - oral and documentary. All statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, are oral evidence. The term 'proved' in the same section, reads as follows: "Proved". - A fact is said to the proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Section 5 ordains that evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings, inter alia, of existence of every fact in issue and other relevant facts. In terms of Section 59, all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, ma be proved by oral evidence. The requirement of Section 60 is that oral evidence must in all cases whatever, be directed. 22. Should oral evidence on a fact in issue be not corroborated by documentary evidence, the Tribunal may in its wisdom look for corroboration. However, it has to be remembered that corroboration is not a rule of law but one of caution as an assurance. 22. Should oral evidence on a fact in issue be not corroborated by documentary evidence, the Tribunal may in its wisdom look for corroboration. However, it has to be remembered that corroboration is not a rule of law but one of caution as an assurance. It is not a rule to be rigidly followed. After all, it is not the quantum of evidence but the quality and credibility of the witness that ought to lend assurance to the Tribunal for its acceptance. 15. The Coordinate Bench in the case of Chapa Ghosh (Roy) & Ors.(supra) delivered decision believing the oral testimony, adduced by the dependent family members of the deceased, even in the absence of documentary evidence being produced, in application of the provisions contained in Sections 3, 5, 59 and 60 of the Evidence Act, and accepted that the deceased conductor could be safely construed to be a person with an income of Rs. 6000/- per month. In the case in hand, the wife of the deceased proved the income of her deceased husband by adducing oral evidence for her special knowledge in application of the provisions under Section 106 of Evidence Act. The oral testimony of the PW1, widow of the deceased asserting income of her deceased husband to the tune of Rs. 6000/- per month could not be discredited by eliciting positive evidence in cross-examination. The averment contained in the claim petition pertaining to income of the deceased was testified with the evidence of PW1. The appellant/insurance company did not adduce any evidence to disprove that the victim was a green vegetable seller having an income of Rs. 6000/- per month. Thus by adducing oral evidence of PW1 to reveal the extent of income of the deceased, the onus was duly discharged and ultimately shifted to insurance company to disprove the same. Though no documentary evidence was produced in support of the income of the deceased, but in the given circumstances of the case, the onus, ultimately shifted to appellant/insurance company, could not be said to have been duly discharged and thereby paving the way for the Tribunal to rightly accept the income of the deceased to Rs. 6000/- per month for determination of just compensation. 6000/- per month for determination of just compensation. There left nothing to take a dissenting view than that of the decision of Coordinate Bench, delivered in the case of Chapa Ghosh (Roy) (supra) and as such the ratio of judgment delivered by Coordinate Bench would be equally applied over the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. The point surfacing breach and/or violation of the condition of insurance policy under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, revealed from alleged driving of a transport vehicle by the driver owning licence to drive light motor vehicle (non-transport) contrary to the terms of insurance policy, and thereby claiming exemption of insurance company from its liability to indemnify claimants may be set at rest by lending support from a decision of the Apex Court delivered in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Swaran Singh and others reported in,2004 3 SCC 197 wherein it was held that even in cases, where the insurance Company was able to put a good defence under Section 149(2) of the MV Act, it was upon the Insurance Company to first pay the claimants of the victim, and thereafter recover it from the owner of the offending vehicle. The ratio of the judgment, summarised at paragraph 110 of the said judgment may be quoted herein-below. "110. (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish "breach" on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof where for would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with the proviso there under and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims." 17. The Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh and Ors. (supra) has enunciated that even where the insurer was able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, it would not be proper to suggest that the Insurance Company would be able to avoid its liability towards the insured. 18. Once the Tribunal has reached to a definite finding that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act after holding the offending vehicle to be involved in the accident for its rash and negligent driving causing death of the deceased, the liability to pay compensation by the authorised insurer comes atomically in to operation in case of third party insurance coverage, and Tribunal has the authority to direct the insurer to pay to the third party and thereafter seek reimburse of the same from the insured person. 19. The ratio of the judgment in Swaran Singh and Ors. 19. The ratio of the judgment in Swaran Singh and Ors. (supra) has further succinctly settled that in a particular case, where insurer is able to prove a breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his disqualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to escape its liability towards the insured, unless such breach or breaches are so fundamental in nature having effect of contribution to the case of the accident. In the instant appeal there left nothing to reveal that for disqualification of driver possessing driving licence to ply light motor vehicle, and further for a transport vehicle having driven by a driver with faulty driving licence, the accident was occurred for its active contribution, and it was so fundamental and patent in nature that it would operate as a good defence to repudiate the claim for award. More so driving of a transport vehicle in spite of holding a driving licence to drive light motor vehicle (non transport) would not make itself so fundamental and patent in nature causing deliberately contribution to the cause of the accident. The appellant/insurer in the given circumstances of the case is not remediless and the manner of resorting to remedy was specifically laid down in the case of Swaran Singh and Ors. (supra) clarifying that to establish the proposition 'Pay and Recover', the money found due to the insurer could be recoverable on a certificate being issued by the Tribunal to the collector in the same process as required under Section 174 of the Act, as arrears of land revenue. The ratio of the decision leading to a proposition 'pay and recovery' was further re-enforced by the Apex Court in a recent decision reported in the case of Shamanna and Another vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2018) 9 SCC 650 . 20. The appellant/insurance company is under obligation to indemnify the award first irrespective of the inadequacies/inappropriateness/defectiveness of the driving licence, held/possessed by the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of accident. After indemnifying the award, the appellant/insurance company can very well take recourse to recovery from the owner of the vehicle. The appeal thus without any merits requiring no interference by this appellate Court. 21. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. After indemnifying the award, the appellant/insurance company can very well take recourse to recovery from the owner of the vehicle. The appeal thus without any merits requiring no interference by this appellate Court. 21. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. With the disposal of this appeal, the connected application also stands disposed of. 22. Regarding cross-objection filed by the respondents/claimants being COT No. 26 of 2017, it appears that by filing the same, the award has been challenged for not granting reasonable figures on conventional heads namely loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses, future prospect in conformity with the decision of the Apex Court, reported in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Pranay Sethi and Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680 together with interest at the rate of interest 9% per annum, while adopting methodology for determination of just compensation. Such cross-objection appears to have been filed on 17.04.17, though the respondents entered their appearance in this appeal on 17.01.17. So the cross-objection was not filed within the time granted within the permissible period available under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C, which postulates that under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C the cross-objection may be filed in the appellate court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing of the appeal. So the time limit provided for preferring cross-objection is one month from the date of service of notice of appeal upon the respondent or its pleader. The service of notice of appeal may be safely construed in the instant appeal under reference from the date when the respondents entered their appearance in the appeal. So the one month time limit as provided in Order 41 Rule 22 C.PC. for preferring the cross-objection has to be reckoned in the instant appeal from the date, when the respondents entered their appearance. The cross-objection thus having filed beyond the period of limitation provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, the same is liable to be dismissed. 23. The Cross-objection being No.26 of 2017 is, thus, accordingly dismissed. 24. It is brought to our attention by the learned advocate for the appellant/insurance company that sum of Rs. 8,29,322/- and statutory deposit of Rs. 25000/- have already been deposited with the Registrar General of this Court, which have been lying invested with the bank in an interest earning scheme. The Cross-objection being No.26 of 2017 is, thus, accordingly dismissed. 24. It is brought to our attention by the learned advocate for the appellant/insurance company that sum of Rs. 8,29,322/- and statutory deposit of Rs. 25000/- have already been deposited with the Registrar General of this Court, which have been lying invested with the bank in an interest earning scheme. Liberty is given to respondent to approach the Registrar General of High Court for withdrawal of amount upon furnishing bank particulars of claimants, held individually, within two (2) weeks from this order, and if such approach is made, the Registrar General will please take steps for releasing the amount upon satisfaction of the identity of the claimants/respondent from the bank within two (2) weeks thereafter from the date of such approach. The shortfall amount, if any, on interest component from the date of such deposit already made till disbursement, at the rate prescribed by the Tribunal, may, however, be permitted to be liquidated by issuing account payee cheques in the name of claimants separately within three(3) weeks from the date of this order. 25. The statutory deposit may however, be permitted to be subjected to adjustment, if necessary, in the process of liquidation of interest component at the rate prescribed by the Tribunal. The residual amount of statutory deposit, if any left, may be permitted to withdraw by the appellant/insurance company and Registrar General shall pass necessary orders releasing such statutory deposit/residual amount of statutorily deposit after adhering to the direction indicated hereinabove. 26. Urgent certified copy of this order if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with requisite formalities. I agree.