JUDGMENT : 1. Order No.63/DMA/PSA/DET/2018 dated 11.10.2018, passed by respondent No.2 for detaining the petitioner, has been called in question in terms of the instant petition on the grounds enumerated therein. 2. The case set up by the petitioner is that the detenue, in the month of January, 2017, was arrested in the month of January, 2017 by Police Station, Anantnag, and was thereafter implicated in various criminal cases. The detenu applied for bail in these criminal cases which was, accordingly, granted in his favour. Thereafter in the month of October, 2017, the detenue came to know that an order of detention has been issued against him by District Magistrate, Anantnag, vide No.21/DMA/PSA/ DET/2017 dated 25.10.2017. The said order challenged at pre-execution stage through the medium of HCP No.355/2017 and while considering the writ petition, execution of said detention order was stayed. The said petition is still pending, is also projected in the instant petition. The detenue once again was arrested without any justification from his home on 25.09.2018 and was taken to Police Station, Anantnag and while in custody, he has been taken into preventive custody in terms of impugned order dated 11.10.2018. 3. Respondents have filed the counter affidavit wherein they denied the allegations/grounds raised in the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents also produced the detention record so as to lend support to the stand taken in the counter affidavit. 4. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, in the grounds of detention, detenue has been shown involved in FIR Nos. 225/2013, 180/2016, 190/2016, 207/2016 and 208/2016 registered in the year 2016 at Police Station Anantnag but in these criminal cases detenue has already been admitted to bail but this fact has not been made mention of in the grounds of detention though reference to said FIR has been made. Further, according to learned counsel, the detenu has also been shown involved in FIR Nos.241/2004, 302/2004, 427/2004, 471/2004 and 513/2004 registered at Police Station, Anantnag but the detenue already stands discharged of the allegations levelled in these cases. These facts have also not been made mention of in the grounds of detention. Either detaining authority has been kept in dark or otherwise detaining authority has not applied its mind properly. 5. These facts have also not been made mention of in the grounds of detention. Either detaining authority has been kept in dark or otherwise detaining authority has not applied its mind properly. 5. While detaining a person under Public Safety Act, detaining authority is under a legal obligation to analyze all the circumstances and material and then to gather conclusion about the requirement of depriving a person of his personal liberty. Non-mention about the grant of bail is serious lapse which in turn gives rise to the inference that there is non-application of mind. Similar situation has been dealt with by the Apex Court. It is quite relevant to quote following portion from para 8 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Anant Sakharam Raut v. State of Maharashtra and another” reported in AIR 1987 SC 137 :- “We hold that there was clear non-application of mind on the part of detaining authority about the fact that the petitioner was granted bail when the order of detention was passed. In the result we set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court under appeal, quash the order of detention and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith……” 6. Learned counsel for petitioner asserts that respondent no.2 has not furnished relevant material, like copy of dossier, order of detention and so-called connected material as per record furnished to detaining authority by police and relied upon by detaining authority for passing impugned order of detention, nor relevant material, like copies of FIRs, statements recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. in the cases mentioned in the grounds of detention, seizure memos, arrest memos, bail orders have been furnished to detenu to enable him to make an effective representation by giving his version of facts attributed to him and make an attempt to dispel apprehensions nurtured by detaining authority concerning alleged involvement of detenu in alleged activities, against the said order to the competent authority of detenu in alleged activities, against the said order to competent authority since filing of an effective representation is a constitutional right and to enable detenu to file such a representation it is necessary to provide him copies of dossier, connecting material to detenu, therefore, constitutional right guaranteed to detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India stands infringed. 7. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the non-supply of the documents would not prejudice the detenue as the details of his activities have been specifically made mention of in the grounds of detention. Furthermore, the details of past activities, as referred to in the grounds of detention, are given simply to show what was the past of the detenue, therefore, the documents which are connected with past activities of the detenue were not required to be supplied nor non-supply of such documents would cause prejudice to the detenue in making a representation. It is also contended that the power of preventive detention is different from punitive detention and preventive detention is largely based on suspicion and the Court is not an appropriate forum to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting restraint on a person. Besides above, learned counsel also contended that the requisite material has been supplied to the detenue so as to enable him to file a representation which he has not chosen to do. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondents placed on various judgments which include judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Hardhan Saha and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.” reported in (1975) 3 SCC 198 and “The Secretary to Government Vs. Nabila” 2015 Cr. L. J 1364. 8. Detention record, as produced, carries a copy of the receipt of grounds of detention which shows that grounds of detention issued by District Magistrate, Anantnag in English consisting of 05 leaves have been received by the detenue through Superintendent, Sub Jail, Hira Nagar but it is nowhere mentioned as to whether the material which formed based of the grounds of detention and the consequent order of detention has been furnished to the detenue or not. 9. Past history and activities of the detenue have been narrated in the grounds of detention but reference of the documents in the grounds of detention and the order of detention would suggest that it was imperative for the detaining authority to supply copies of the documents to the detenue, which has not been done which in turn deprived the detenue of his right of making an effective representation against his detention. Infringement of such right as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would render the order of detention as illegal. 10. Infringement of such right as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would render the order of detention as illegal. 10. The grounds under Article 22(5) means all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is based. Nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention must be communicated to the detenue, that is the plain requirement of the first safeguard in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The second safeguard in Article 22(5) requires that the detenue shall be afforded the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. No avoidable delay, no shortfall in the materials communicated shall stand in the way of the detenue in making an earlier, yet comprehensive and effective, representation in regard to all basic facts and materials which have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention depriving him of his freedom. The detaining authority is required to communicate to the detenue: (i) Grounds of detention; (ii) All the documents referred to in the grounds of detention; (iii) All the documents and materials which the detaining authority considers while framing his subjective satisfaction; (iv) Detention order and also the police report or dossier, if any. 11. The word ‘grounds’ used in clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution means not only the materials or conclusions of facts, but also all materials on which those facts or conclusions which constitute grounds are based, such material has to be supplied to the detenue so as to enable him to make an effective and meaningful representation. The detaining authority is obliged to mention in the grounds as to on which material he based his satisfaction, failure to do so renders the detention illegal. To communication the bare grounds of detention to the detenue will not be sufficient unless grounds are accompanied by material which the detaining authority has considered and relied upon. For this, support can be had from the judgment “Nazeer Ahmad Sheikh vs. Additional Chief Secretary Home” reported in 1999 S.L.J 241. 12. To communication the bare grounds of detention to the detenue will not be sufficient unless grounds are accompanied by material which the detaining authority has considered and relied upon. For this, support can be had from the judgment “Nazeer Ahmad Sheikh vs. Additional Chief Secretary Home” reported in 1999 S.L.J 241. 12. Further, non-supply of the relevant material/documents, from which detaining authority derived subjective, satisfaction, would amount of violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, so deprivation of a valuable right. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case “Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra & Ors” ( AIR 1999 SC 3051 ), wherein it has been held: “The right to be communicated the grounds of detention flows from Article 22(5) while the right to be supplied all the material on which the grounds are based flows from the right given to the detenue to make a representation against the order of detention. A representation can be made and the order of detention can be assailed only when all the grounds on which the order is based are communicated to the detenue and the material on which those grounds are based are also disclosed and copies thereof are supplied to the person detained, in his own language.” 13. In para 27 and 28 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Thahira Haris etc. etc. Vs. Government of Karnataka & Ors, reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2184, has held as under: “27. There were several grounds on which the detention of the detenue was challenged in these appeals but it is not necessary to refer to all the grounds since on the ground of not supplying the relied upon document, continued detention of the detenue becomes illegal and detention order has to be quashed on that ground alone. 28. Our Constitution provides adequate safeguards under clauses (5) and (6) of Article 22 to the detenue who has been detained in pursuance of the order made under any law providing for preventive detention. He has right to be supplied copies of all documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention without any delay. The predominant object of communicating the grounds of detention is to enable the detenue at the earliest opportunity to make effective and meaningful representation against his detention. 14. He has right to be supplied copies of all documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention without any delay. The predominant object of communicating the grounds of detention is to enable the detenue at the earliest opportunity to make effective and meaningful representation against his detention. 14. It is also quite apposite to quote para 10 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Ibrahim Ahmad Bhatti alias Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Kandar Ahmad Wagher alias Iqbal alias Gulam Vs. State of Gujarat and others”, (1982) 3 SCC 440 : “10. Two propositions having a bearing on the points at issue in the case before us, clearly merge from the aforesaid resume of decided cases : (a) all documents, statements and other materials incorporated in the grounds by reference and which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction must be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds or in any event not later than five days ordinarily and in the exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than 15 days from the date of his detention and (b) all such material must be furnished to him in a script or language which he understands and failure to do either of the two things would amount to a breach of the two duties cast on the detaining authority under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Relying upon this legal position counsel for the petitioner urged before us that in the instant case a breach of the mandate contained in Article 22 (5) read with Section 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA is clearly involved because of three things that have happened, namely, (i) supply of Urdu translations of the bulk of documents and statements incorporated in the grounds and relied upon by the detaining authority was delayed beyond the normal period of 5 days without any exceptional circumstances obtaining in the matter, (ii) the alleged exceptional circumstances purporting to justify the delay and the fact that the reasons had been recorded in writing were not communicated to the detenu which has prevented him from making effective representation against his continued detention and (iii) Urdu translations of quite a few documents and statements incorporated in the grounds and relied upon by the detaining authority have not been supplied to him at all. As regards the first two aspects counsel relied upon two decisions of the Patna High Court, namely, Bishwa Mohan Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar and Ors. and Bishwanath Prasad Keshari v. State of Bihar & Ors. where the Patna High Court has taken the view that not merely should the exceptional circumstances exist justifying the delayed supply of the grounds of detention but these should be communicated to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation. Counsel urged that because of the aforesaid failure the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be illegal. We find considerable force in these submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner.” 15. The Supreme Court in Rekha v. State of Tami Nadu AIR 2011 SCW 2262 , while making reference to law laid down in Kamleshwar Ishwar Prasad Patel v. Union of India and Others (1995) 2 SCC 51, observed that history of liberty is history of procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of nature of alleged activities of detenu. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation made in Ratan Singh v. State of Punjab and others 1981 (4) SCC 481 , emphasising need to ensure that the Constitutional and Statutory safeguards available to a detenu were pursued in letter and spirit observed: “But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenu’s.” 16. Procedural requirements are only safeguards available to a detenu, for the reason that the Court is not expected to go behind subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. As laid down by the Supreme Court in “Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B. K. Jha and another” (1987) 2 SCC 22 , procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with, if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the Constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. 17. As laid down by the Supreme Court in “Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B. K. Jha and another” (1987) 2 SCC 22 , procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with, if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the Constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. 17. From the above overview of case law on the subject of preventive detention, the baseline, that emerges is that whenever preventive detention is called in question in a court of law, first and foremost task before the Court is to see whether procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Preventive Detention Law pressed into service to slap the detention, are adhered to. 18. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and meagre safeguards that the Constitution provides against improper exercise of the power, must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court, has been said by the Supreme Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and ors 1953 SCR 708 . Detenu has a right, under Article 22(5), to be furnished with particulars of grounds of his detention, sufficient to enable him to make a representation, which on being considered may give relief to him. This Constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, and if same has not been done, detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within meaning of Article 21. The detenu is, therefore, entitled to be released and set at liberty. 19. The right which detenu enjoys under Article 22(5) is of immense importance. In order to properly grasp submissions of petitioner avowed in petition on hand, Article 22(5) is gainful to be reproduced hereunder: “22(5). When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 20. When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 20. This Article of the Constitution can be broadly classified into two categories: (i) the grounds on which the detention order is passed must be communicated to the detenu as expeditiously as possible; and (ii) proper opportunity of making representation against order of detention be provided. 21. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, more than six decades ago, has interpreted Article 22(5) of the Constitution in Dr Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and others, 1953 SCR 708 , observed as under: “.......Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meager safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention “sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him.” We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.” 22. In Shalini Soni (Smt.) & Others v. Union of India and Others (1980) 4 SCC 544 , it was aptly observed that the accused must have proper opportunity of making an effective representation. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.” 22. In Shalini Soni (Smt.) & Others v. Union of India and Others (1980) 4 SCC 544 , it was aptly observed that the accused must have proper opportunity of making an effective representation. The Court observed thus: “...Communication of the grounds presupposes the formulation of the grounds and formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say to pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case and excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism (if one may be permitted to use the word to describe a mechanical reaction without a conscious application of the mind). It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision but the grounds on which the decision is founded, It is a necessary corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts and materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the decision to detain a person depends on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu. From what we have said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the second facet of Article 22(5). An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. The matter may also be looked at from the point of view of the second facet of Article 22(5). An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but of all the factual material which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. Whatever angle from which the question is looked at, it is dear that “grounds” in Article 22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led to such factual inferences. The 'grounds' must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which reference is made in the 'grounds' must be supplied to the detenu as part of the 'grounds'. 23. In Icchu Devi Choraria (Smt.) v. Union of India and others (1980) 4 SCC 531 , the Supreme Court dealt with in great detail significance of clause (5) of Article 22 and subsection 3 of Section 3 of COFEPOSA Act. The court observed: “Now it is obvious that when Clause (5) of Article 22 and Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated, in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated, in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject of course to Clause (6) of Article 22 in order to constitute compliance with Clause (5) of Article 22 and Section 3, Sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, Sub- section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to Clause (6) of Article 22 copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, Sub-section (3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void.” 24. The Supreme Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal and others (1975) 2 SCC 81 , observed that Article 22(5) insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced detaining authority in arriving at requisite satisfaction leading to passing of order of detention, must be communicated to detenu. Para 13 of said judgment is seemly to be reproduced hereunder: “....... Para 13 of said judgment is seemly to be reproduced hereunder: “....... Section 8(1) of the Act, which merely re-enacts the constitutional requirements of Article 22 (5), insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu, so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is, therefore, not only the right of the Court, but also its duty as well, to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. The Court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose, the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire record of the case which was before it. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority.” 25. In Vakil Singh v. State of J&K and another (1975) 3 SCC 545 , the Supreme Court clarified that grounds mean materials on which order of detention was primarily based, that is to say, all primary facts though not subsidiary facts or evidential details. In Ganga Ramchand Bharvani v. Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and others (1980) 4 SCC 624 , the Supreme Court observed at paragraph 16 in the following terms: “The mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenu are elaborate, does not absolve the detaining authority from its constitutional responsibility to supply all the basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenu. In the instant case, the grounds contain only the substance of the statements, while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements. In the instant case, the grounds contain only the substance of the statements, while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of the full texts of these statements which had been referred to and relied upon in the grounds 'of detention', the detenus could not make an effective representation and there is disobedience of the second constitutional imperative pointed out in Khudiram's case. There is merit in this submission.” 26. In S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India and others (1981) 1 SCC 419 , The Supreme Court, while reiterating legal position, observed that failure to furnish documents or materials which formed the basis of detention order along with grounds of detention and even on demand subsequently made by detenu, would amount to failure to serve grounds of detention and, therefore, would vitiate detention order and make it void ab initio. 27. In Khudiram Das's case (supra), Article 22 has been succinctly analysed. The Supreme Court observed that detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and put him behind bar at its own sweet will. It must have grounds for doing so and those grounds must be communicated to detenu as expeditiously as possible, so that he can make effective representation against order of detention. It was further observed that Article 22 provides various safeguards calculated to protect personal liberty against arbitrary restraint without trial. These safeguards are essentially procedural in character and their efficacy depends on the care and caution and the sense of responsibility with which they are regarded by the detaining authority. These are barest minimum safeguards which must be strictly observed by an executive authority. 28. A four-Judge Bench of The Supreme Court in Golam alias Golam Mallick v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 4 , reiterated the legal position. The Supreme Court observed as under: “No doubt, Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act do not, in terms, speak of 'particulars' or 'facts', but only of 'grounds' to be communicated to the detenu. But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with and subservient to the primary mandate: “and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order”, in the aforesaid Clause (5). But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with and subservient to the primary mandate: “and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order”, in the aforesaid Clause (5). Thus construed, it is clear that in the context, 'grounds' does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. That 'something' is the factual constituent of the 'grounds' on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. All the basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention, will be covered by “grounds” within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8, and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against public interest.” 29. In Mohd. Alam v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 463 , the Supreme Court observed that the non-communication of material was violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the Act, inasmuch as it did not intimate to detenu full grounds or material to enable him to make an effective representation. 30. In Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India and others (1981) 2 SCC 436 , it was observed that once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becomes bounden duty of detaining authority to supply the same to detenu as part of grounds or pari passu grounds of detention. In the case of Ramachandra A. Kamat v. Union of India an dothers (1980) 2 SCC 270 , the Supreme Court clearly held that even the documents referred to in the grounds of detention have to be furnished to the detenu. 31. In Tusha Thakker (Shri) v. Union of India and others (1980) 4 SCC 499 , the Supreme Court mentioned that the detenu had a Constitutional right under Article 22(5) to be furnished with copies of all the materials relied upon or referred to in the grounds of detention, with reasonable expedition. 32. 31. In Tusha Thakker (Shri) v. Union of India and others (1980) 4 SCC 499 , the Supreme Court mentioned that the detenu had a Constitutional right under Article 22(5) to be furnished with copies of all the materials relied upon or referred to in the grounds of detention, with reasonable expedition. 32. In “Ram Baochan Dubey v. State of Maharashtra and Another (1982) 3 SCC 383 , this Supreme Court reiterated the legal position and observed that mere service of the grounds of detention is not a compliance of the mandatory provisions of Article 22(5) unless the grounds are accompanied with the documents which are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention. Any lapse would render the detention order void. In Sophia Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra and others (1999) 6 SCC 593 , it was observed that effective representation by the detenu can be made only when copies of the material documents which were considered and relied upon by the Detaining Authority in forming his opinion were supplied to him. 33. In “District Collector, Ananthapur & Another v. V. Laxmanna (2005) 3 SCC 663 , the Supreme Court again reiterated that the documents and materials relied upon by the detaining authority must be supplied to the detenu for affording him opportunity to make effective representation. 34. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M. Nagaraj & ors. Vs. Union of India & ors. (2006) 8 SCC 212 , observed: “It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any Constitution by reason of the basic fact that they are members of the human race.” 35. The Nine Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho (dead) By LRs. Vs. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1 , observed: “It is necessary to always bear in mind that fundamental rights have been considered to be the heart and soul of the Constitution..... Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives of civilized societies and have been described in judgments as & “transcendental”, & inalienable, and primordial”;. 36. Vs. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1 , observed: “It is necessary to always bear in mind that fundamental rights have been considered to be the heart and soul of the Constitution..... Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives of civilized societies and have been described in judgments as & “transcendental”, & inalienable, and primordial”;. 36. The Constitution of India – Article 22(5) and Section 13, J&K Public Safety Act 1978, guarantee two important safeguards to detenu – first that detenu is informed of grounds of detention that prompted detaining authority to pass detention order and second that detenu is allowed to represent against his detention immediately after order of detention is made or executed. The Constitutional and Statutory safeguards guaranteed to detenu are to be meaningful only if detenu is handed over material referred to in grounds of detention that lead to subjective satisfaction that preventive detention of detenu is necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or public order and further it is ensured that the grounds of detention are not vague, sketchy and ambiguous so as to keep the detenu guessing about what really weighed with the detaining authority to make the order. 37. For the reasons discussed above, the petition is allowed and detention order No. 63/DMA/PSA/DET/2018 dated 11.10.2018, passed by District Magistrate, Anantnag – respondent No.2, directing preventive detention of Ashiq Hussain Narchor son of Mohammad Yousuf Narchor resident of Mattan Chowk Tehsil & District Anantnag, is quashed. Respondents are directed to set detenu at liberty if not required in any other offence. Disposed of. 38. Detention records, as produced, be returned to the learned counsel for the respondents.