JUDGMENT : Vivek Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the tenant/defendant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 05.09.2018 passed by the learned court of 7th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in F.A. No. 7A/2016, whereby the appellate court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2016 passed by the learned court of 9th Civil Judge, Class-2, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 64A/2013, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/landlord was dismissed First appellate court has allowed the suit and passed a decree of eviction against the present appellant 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that initially plaintiff/respondent had filed a suit for eviction on the grounds of arrears of rent being not paid after 31.5.2011 as were paid on 2.6.2011 despite notice issued by the plaintiff on 9.11.2011 constituting ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'Act of 1961') Similarly, a decree of eviction was sought on the ground of nuisance, i.e. under the provisions of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961. 3. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is not having any other suitable vacant accommodation for carrying out the business of general store and 'Manihan' and therefore he requires space of 500 ft for which suit premises is required and thus canvasing ground of bona fide requirement as envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, decree was sought 4. It is submitted that learned trial court dismissed the suit recording a finding that none of the grounds as contained in Section 12(1)(a), 12 (1)(c) or 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 are made out seeking eviction of the suit premises being a shop situated on ground floor of municipal plot No. 15/1634, opposite Daud Market, Daulatganj, Lashkar It is submitted that first appellate court overlooked the finding that plaintiffs wife Smt. Meena Garg is already having a business of jewelry and plaintiff is engaged in such business and therefore it cannot be said that he has any bona fide requirement to start a new business of general mercantile goods constituting any ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that plaintiff Shyambabu Garg (P.W. 1) admitted that till 1999 his father was looking after the business of jewelry at Topi Bazar and after his death, wife of P.W. 1, Smt. Meena Garg is looking after such business, but it is submitted that the firm namely M/s. Shyam Jewelers is a firm in which plaintiff is looking after the business and just before filing a suit for eviction he obtained a registration certificate in the name of his wife Smt. Meena Garg and such certificate was issued in the year 2011. It is also submitted that plaintiff has not filed any document in relation to firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers from 1999 to 2011 to show that who was the Proprietor and who was looking after business of such firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers. It is pointed out that Smt. Meena Garg (P.W. 2) in cross-examination has admitted that her father-in-law was the Proprietor of the firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers and he died in the year 1999 without leaving any will and therefore without consent of the plaintiff his wife could not have become Proprietor of said firm and in fact a story has been cooked up to get the suit premises vacated specially when Smt. Meena Garg (P.W. 2), admitted in para 18 of cross-examination that she was not having any sales tax registration in the name of the firm M/s. Shyam Jewelers nor was having any registration with the Income Tax Department to show that who was filing income tax returns for such shop after death of her father till the date of she being declared as proprietor. 6. It is also submitted that there are other properties in the name of the plaintiff and such fact having been suppressed in the plaint, plaintiff is not entitled to seek any decree of eviction. 7. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this court in the case of Amar Bahadur Singh v. Devendra Singh as reported in 2008 (2) JLJ 327 , wherein para 17, it has been held as under:- 17. No exhaustive list that what are the substantial questions of law can be given but the basic ingredients constituting a substantial question of law has been enumerated in Gurudev Kaur (supra) and Govindaraju (supra). No exhaustive list that what are the substantial questions of law can be given but the basic ingredients constituting a substantial question of law has been enumerated in Gurudev Kaur (supra) and Govindaraju (supra). If a case would fall under the following circumstances, it may raise a substantial question of law: (i) The question of law on which there is conflict of judicial opinion and not finally decided by Supreme Court, Privy Council; or by Federal Court [See Sir Chunnilal v. Mehta (supra)]. (ii) The Finding which has been arrived at by Courts below without any evidence on record {See Sree Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others [1999 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 587 : (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] and Rohni Prasad and others v. Kasturchand [2000 RN 141 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 668 ]}; (iii) Inference from or legal effect of proved or admitted facts; (iv) Disregard or non-consideration of relevant or admissible evidence {See Sri Chanel Gupta v. Gulzar Singh and another (1991 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 702 : AIR 1992 SC 123 ], and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohanlal [1999 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 714 : (2000) 1 SCC 434 ]}; (v) Taking into consideration irrelevant or inadmissible evidence {See Santakumari and others v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Annua (2000 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 281 : (2000) 7SCC 60], Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [1999 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 639 : AIR 1999 SC 3067 ], and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam and Ishwar Dass Jain (supra)}; (vi) Misconstruction of evidence or document {See Sundra Naicka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar [ AIR 1994 SC 532 ], and Sukhedi v. Bairo [2000 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 381 : (1999) 4 SCC 262 ]}; (vii) Interpretation or construction of material documents {See Kondiba Dagada Kadam (supra) and Mehrunnisa v. Visham Kumari [1997 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 716 : (1998) 2 SCC 295 ]}; (viii) A question of admissibility of evidence {See Kondiba Dagada Kadam (supra) and Banarsi Das v. Brig. Maharaja Sukhjit Singh and another [1998 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 84 : AIR 1998 SC 179 ); (ix) Disposal of appeal by first appellate Court by allowing application to adduce additional evidence by one party without giving opportunity of rebuttal to the other party; (x) New plea on pure question of law going to the root of the matter; (xi) Rejection of admissible evidence on flimsy ground {See Major Singh v. Rattan Singh [1997 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 89 : AIR 1997 SC 1906 ], and Ishwar Dass Jain (supra)}; (xii) Gross miscarriage of justice {See Rohini Prasad (supra) and Mohd. Yunus v. Gurubux Singh (1995) Suppl. (1) SCC 418); (xiii) Biased approach of the Courts below [See Banarsi Dass (supra); (xiv) Reversal of finding by first appellate Court without evidence {See Mehrunnisa (supra)]; (xv) Perverse finding recorded by the Courts below {See State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh {[2000 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 191 : (2000) 5 SCC 652 ]; and Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Chkannabasappa and Others [ (2000) 10 SCC 248 ]}; (xvi) Inconsistent and contradictory finding of the Court [See Harphool Singh (supra)]; (xvii) When appeal is decided only on equitable ground and without application of mind {See Md. Hadi Hussain v. Abdul Hamidl Choudhary and Others { (2000) 10 SCC 248 ]}; (xviii) When the Court has no jurisdiction [See Kondiba Dagada Kadam (supra)]. 8. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai and another as reported in 2011 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 708 : 2011 (6) SCC 555 , wherein in para 9 it has been held that if evidence is contrary to the pleadings, then such evidence howsoever cogent it may be, cannot be relied on in terms of the provisions contained in Order 18 Rule 2 and Order 6 read with provisions of Section 3 and 5 of the Evidence Act. It has been held that the evidence contrary to the pleadings is liable to be rejected. When what is pleaded is not proved, or what is stated in the evidence is contrary to the pleadings, the dictum that no amount of evidence, contrary to the pleadings, howsoever cogent, can be relied on, would apply. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is submitted that it will be apparent from the perusal of the plaint itself that in para 6 of the plaint, plaintiff has categorically mentioned that he wants to start business of general store & 'Manihari' for which he has no shop or non residential area available within the municipal limits of greater Gwalior, therefore, he is entitled to get such premises evicted. In para 7 of the plaint, it is clearly mentioned that to start such business, he needs atleast 500 square feet of area on the ground floor and such area is not available to him. Even it was pleaded that at other place marked as 'A' in the map another tenant Gopichand is enjoying the possession of the property and one marked as 'C was in possession of Tilakraj and though shop in possession of Tilakraj has been vacated but it is not suitable to conduct business of general store and general merchandise. It is also mentioned that plaintiff has also initiated proceedings for eviction of tenant Gopichand and Deendayal for the purpose of his self requirement and such requirement is bona fide. 10. Taking through such pleadings, it is pointed out that though defendant has argued that there are several other properties in Gwalior city in the name of the plaintiff, and therefore, in absence of such pleadings in the light of law laid down in Janak Dulari (Supra), plaintiff is not entitled to lead any evidence, this Court is of the opinion that when there is a specific pleading in para 6 and 7 of the plaint that plaintiff is not having any non-residential property of dimension of atleast 500 square feet on the ground floor, then such pleading is sufficient and it cannot be said that no evidence could have led contrary to the pleadings. There being a specific pleading, therefore, evidence could have been led, and therefore, judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Janak Dulari (Supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. There being a specific pleading, therefore, evidence could have been led, and therefore, judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Janak Dulari (Supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. Respondent/plaintiff has placed reliance on the judgment of high court in the case of Sujata Sarkar v. Anil Kumar Duttani as reported in 2009 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 568 : 2009 (2) MPLJ 156 to support his contention that though in his plaint there are pleadings in respect of non-availability of alternate suitable accommodation but even in absence of such pleadings coordinate Bench of this high court in case of Sujata Sarkar (Supra) has held that when there is adequate and sufficient oral evidence on record that the plaintiff does not possess any other suitable accommodation in city is sufficient to advance the cause that plaintiff was not having suitable alternate accommodation. 12. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Babulal and others v. Shankarlal & others as reported in 2008 (17) SCC 638 , wherein it has been held that landlord is required to prove his case within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, for starting new business. The High Court erred in framing of substantial questions of law that whether pleading and evidence were required to be averred in regard to nature of business in the plaint and the Supreme Court held that Section 12(1)(f) does not require to specifically plead nature or a particular type of business. It is submitted that in present case, even the nature and type of business has been specified, and therefore, there is no ground available to interfere with the judgment of first appellate Court. 13. It is pointed out that nature of business is not a substantial question of law but a question of fact. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of co-ordinate bench of this court in case of Kishore Singh v. Satish Kumar as reported in 2017 (3) JLJ 375 , wherein it has been held that it is not necessary for plaintiffs son to remain unemployed till getting vacant possession of suit accommodation. If after filing of suit, his son helping his father's jewelry shop, it could not be inferred that plaintiffs son is not having any bona fide need. If after filing of suit, his son helping his father's jewelry shop, it could not be inferred that plaintiffs son is not having any bona fide need. It is submitted that this judgment answers the argument raised by defendant/tenant in second appeal that landlord was helping his wife in jewelry business and therefore he is not entitled to seek a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide need. Similarly it is submitted that though the appellant has raised a plea of availability of four other houses available to the plaintiff but from the evidence it has come that the landlord is staying on the higher floors of the same building and other properties are not the commercial properties and the onus was on the defendant/appellant to prove that such properties were also commercial in nature and are fit for starting such business. Having failed to discharge this burden, it is not open to the appellant/tenant to say that some accommodation is available on the first floor of the suit premises and this contention is supported by the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari as reported in 2010 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 554 : (2010) 1 SCC 503 , wherein it has been held that once it is not disputed that landlord is in bona fide need of the premises, Court cannot dictate landlord which floor he can use for his business, that is for the landlord to decide. 14. It is submitted that claim of the plaintiff is bolstered from the judgment of co-ordinate Bench of this court in case of Sitaram Patel v. Bipin Chand Jain as reported in 2003 (2) MPLJ 312 , wherein it has been held that if court below wrongly considers the residential accommodation as alternative accommodation for non residential purpose, then such finding cannot be sustained. It is submitted that in the present case, the trial court has erred in considering one vacant shop in the suit premises to be sufficient for the plaintiffs business and has held that plaintiff has failed to prove his bona fide requirement, therefore, non availability of alternate accommodation looses its significance. It is submitted that in the present case, the trial court has erred in considering one vacant shop in the suit premises to be sufficient for the plaintiffs business and has held that plaintiff has failed to prove his bona fide requirement, therefore, non availability of alternate accommodation looses its significance. It is submitted that the requirement of Section 12(1)(f) is confined to the limit that landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. It is pointed out that though the trial court has recorded a finding in para 24 of the impugned judgment that defendant has failed to point out that there is any alternative accommodation available except the suit premises, yet on the basis of finding that plaintiff has failed to prove his bona fide requirement that too which has been arrived at on the basis of delayed registration of the firm in the name of wife of the plaintiff and non production of the income tax and sales tax documents is perverse. It is submitted that if there is violation of Income Tax Act or Sales Tax Act, then the authorities concerned are free to take such action and that could not have been made a ground for denying bona fide need of the plaintiff to start a new business. It is submitted that such finding being perverse and contrary to law laid down by the coordinate Bench of this court in Kishore Singh (supra) is liable to be set aside. 15. In this context, the first issue which arises for consideration is that, whether first appellate Court has rightly considered the evidence on record as to the bona fide need of the plaintiff to start his business of general store in the right earnest and context. The First Appellate Court has recorded a finding in para 15 of its judgment that defendant has failed to prove availability of non-alternative accommodation in possession of the plaintiff to start his business and this finding against the defendant has not been challenged by the defendant/tenant. The First Appellate Court has recorded a finding in para 15 of its judgment that defendant has failed to prove availability of non-alternative accommodation in possession of the plaintiff to start his business and this finding against the defendant has not been challenged by the defendant/tenant. In para 26 of the deposition, evidence of defendant witness Ashok Kumar (DW-1) has been appreciated wherein DW-1 in Para 2 of cross-examination has admitted that in support of his plea that plaintiff is running the business of jewelry from the shop situated at Topi Bazar, he had produced a photograph as Ex. A-2 but admitted that Ex. A-2 is in fact a photograph of a closed shop and does not reveal that plaintiff is engaged in the business of jewelry. Similarly this witness in Para 32 has admitted that plaintiff alongwith his family is staying on the higher floor of the same building where suit property is situated. In view of such fact, the trial court erred in recording a finding contrary to the documentary and oral evidence on record that plaintiff was managing jewelry business from a shop situated at Topi Bazar especially when such shop was found closed as per the Article A-2 and being run by plaintiffs wife as per other documents. Thus, when defendant has failed to disprove the bona fide need of the plaintiff to start a general store business, then such finding being perverse and contrary to the evidence on record could not have been relied by the trial court and to this extent, trial court erred in recording a finding that there is no bona fide need of the suit premises for the purpose of business of general store. 16. The co-ordinate Bench of this court in case of Munna Lal v. Roopa Devi & Anr. as reported in 2007 (44) R.C.R. (Civil) 516 : 2007 (1) MRLJ 429 has held that in a suit for bona fide requirement to start business, the alternate accommodation must be reasonable suitable accommodation and not any accommodation as per the averment of the defendant. as reported in 2007 (44) R.C.R. (Civil) 516 : 2007 (1) MRLJ 429 has held that in a suit for bona fide requirement to start business, the alternate accommodation must be reasonable suitable accommodation and not any accommodation as per the averment of the defendant. Similarly in case of Namamal v. Prakashchand Jain as reported in 2009 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 389 : 2009 (2) MPHT 396 , it has been held that alternative accommodation should be a suitable accommodation and merely availability of another accommodation when the said accommodation is not suitable for starting the business of landlord cannot be said to be an alternative accommodation. In the present case, even trial court has admitted that there is no other alternative accommodation, and therefore, this aspect has remained conclusive both before the trial court and first appellate Court. In this regard, judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Raghavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. as reported in 2000 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 135 : AIR 2000 SC 534 can be made applicable wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Similarly in case of Radheshyam v. Sardar Preetam Singh as reported in 2000 (3) MPHT 5 , it has been held that need of the landlord has to be seen from his point of view also. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence which has come on record, judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Ramji das & another v. Rambabu and others as reported in 2000 (2) R.C.R. (Rent) 179 : 2000 (9) SCC 329 can be also relied wherein it has been held that past conduct cannot form basis, totally to decide, present need of the landlord. Courts are bound to consider his present need in a suit filed for eviction of tenant. 17. Courts are bound to consider his present need in a suit filed for eviction of tenant. 17. In view of such judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that trial court erred in rejecting the plea of bona fide requirement merely on the basis of past conduct without having taken into consideration the present need of the plaintiff which has not been disputed or controverted through any cogent evidence as can be seen from the cross examination of the plaintiff, and therefore, reversal of such finding of fact by the first appellate Court does not give rise to any substantial question of law so to admit this second appeal, therefore, appeal fails and is dismissed.