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Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2412 (ALL)

Anita v. Jaipal Singh

2019-10-22

PANKAJ BHATIA

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Nigamendra Shukla, learned counsel for the claimants/appellants in First Appeal From Order No. 2801 or 2007, Sri K.S. Amist, learned counsel for the respondents, Sri K.S. Amist, learned counsel for the claimants-appellants and Sri Nigamendra Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents in the connected appeals. 2. All the present four appeals arises out of the same accident and as such they are being disposed off by means of common judgment. The FAFO Nos. 2911 of 2007, 2912 of 2007 and 3007 of 2007 have been filed by the Insurance Company challenging the awards passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal in three claim petitions being Claim Petitions No. 02 of 2003, 03 of 2003 and 08 of 2003. The FAFO No. 2801 of 2007 has been filed by the claimants-appellants seeking enhancement of the award passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal in Claim Petition No. 03 of 2003. For the sake of convenience, the facts are being narrated from the Award dated 18.7.2007 passed by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal/Special Judge (SC/ST) Act, Bulandshahar in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 03 of 2003. 3. The Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 03 of 2003 was filed by the claimants, being the dependents of the deceased Rajendra Singh claiming compensation under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The submissions in brief made in the claim petition, filed on 09.11.2002,were that three persons, namely, Rajendra Singh, Sunil Kumar and Nigam alias Gullu, who were going on their motorcycle Hero Honda No. H.R. 302520, when the motorcycle reached at Bulandshahar, Gulawati Road, situated at Police Chauki near Yadav Hotel about 11.00 A.M. in the morning, a Vehicle bearing No. U.P. 81-C 3949 coming from Bulandshahar, suddenly, turned towards the right on the pavement and hit the motorcycle which resulted into grievous injuries to all the three persons. In the said accident, Rajendra Singh and Nigam alias Gullu died on the spot whereas Sunil Kumar was taken in a serious condition to the Government Hospital, Bulandshahar where he was referred to All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi where he, unfortunately, died on the next day i.e. 10.11.2002. In the said claim petition, it was alleged that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. In the said claim petition, it was alleged that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. It was also stated that the FIR, with regard to the said accident, was registered as Case Crime No. 420 of 2002, under sections 279, 338, 304-A and 427 IPC. 4. In the claim petition filed by the dependents of Rajendra Singh, it was stated that at the time of the accident, the age of Rajendra Singh was 28 years. He was working as a mason and earned Rs. 4500/- per month. It was claimed that the claimants were dependent of Rajendra Singh and thus claimed an amount of Rs. 19,15,000/- as compensation from the owner and the Insurance Company of the vehicle. 5. The owner of the Vehicle, Jaipal Singh, filed his written statement, however, he denied the accident. He further took a defence that the vehicle in question was insured with the National Insurance Company, Aligarh and, at the time of the accident, the driver had a valid driving licence. He also took a plea that the insurance of Hero Honda motorcycle has not been impleaded and, as such, the claim petition was liable to be dismissed. 6. The Insurance Company, opposite party no. 2, before the Tribunal, filed a separate written statement and denied all the averments made on the ground of lack of knowledge. They also pleaded that the liability of the Insurance Company is confined to the terms of the policy. It was stated that the compensation sought is excessive, at the time of the accident, the driver did not have valid driving licence and also the fact that the Insurance Company of Hero Honda motorcycle was a necessary party. It was also pleaded that the deceased in himself responsible for the accident and that the petition was a collusive petition. 7. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal entertained the claim and after exchange of pleadings framed as many as five issues. The first issue pertained to the factum to the accident. It was also pleaded that the deceased in himself responsible for the accident and that the petition was a collusive petition. 7. The Motor Accident Claim Tribunal entertained the claim and after exchange of pleadings framed as many as five issues. The first issue pertained to the factum to the accident. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence, adduced before the Tribunal held that the accident had occurred as was pleaded by the claimant and recorded a categorical finding that the accident took place with the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949 and also recorded that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949 resulting into the death of three persons. 8. The second issue was with regard to the fact that whether the vehicle was duly insured with the Insurance Company. The Tribunal placed reliance upon the insurance policy filed as Paper No. 13-C showing that the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Insurance Company and held that the vehicle was duly insured. 9. The third issue framed was with regard to the fact that whether the driver in question had a valid driving licence, the Tribunal held that the burden of discharging the fact that the driver in question did not have a valid driving licence, had to be discharged by the Insurance Company, who had pleaded the said fact, however, the Insurance Company failed to produce any evidence in support of their contention that the vehicle in question was being driven by a person not having a valid licence and thus proceeded to hold the issue against the Insurance Company. 10. The next issue being Issue no. 4 pertained to the non-impleadment of Insurance Company of the motor vehicle. The Tribunal decided the said issue against the Insurance Company mainly on the ground that he has already recorded that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving by the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. 11. With regard to the 5th issue being the quantum of compensation payable to the dependents of Rajendra Singh, the Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence, held that the age of the deceased was 28 to 30 years. The Tribunal further held that as per the evidence and the pleadings, the deceased used to earn Rs. 11. With regard to the 5th issue being the quantum of compensation payable to the dependents of Rajendra Singh, the Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence, held that the age of the deceased was 28 to 30 years. The Tribunal further held that as per the evidence and the pleadings, the deceased used to earn Rs. 150/-per day and used to work as mason and there was evidence on record to suggest he used to get work for 20 to 25 days in a month, on that basis the Tribunal held the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/-per month. The Tribunal placing reliance on a precedent held that even as per the notional income the income of the deceased has to be assessed at Rs. 36,000/-per year and after deducting of the one third amount, the amount for the purpose of determining of compensation, comes to Rs. 24,000/- per year and applied in multiplier of 18. The Tribunal held that the claimants of the deceased were entitled to a compensation of Rs. 4,32,000/-. The Tribunal also awarded Rs. 2000/-towards funeral expenses, Rs. 2500/-towards loss of consortium, Rs. 2500/-towards loss of estate and Rs. 5000/-towards loss of matrimonial life and thus awarded a sum of Rs. 4,41,500/-along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. It was specifically held that the said amount, as awarded, will be payable by the Insurance Company. 12. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company-appellants has argued that the Tribunal has erred in awarding the compensation as the accident did not take place with the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. It was further argued by learned counsel for the claimants-appellants that the FIR in question was lodged at 12.30 P.M. on 10.11.2012, whereas the accident had taken place at 11.00 A.M. on 09.11.2002. The counsel for the appellants has also argued that the informant was not brought to the witness box and the eye witnesses to the accident were not named in the FIR and their statements were not recorded in the criminal investigation by the police authorities, as such, no reliance could be given to the oral evidence of the two eye witnesses. It was also argued that even the said two witnesses did not give the type of vehicle and only stated about the number of vehicle. It was also argued that even the said two witnesses did not give the type of vehicle and only stated about the number of vehicle. In sum and substance, it was argued that it was a case of hit and run accident and, thus, the award deserves to be set aside. 13. The counsel for the claimant-appellant in FAFO No. 2801 of 2007 has addressed this Court on the question of compensation and has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . He has also placed reliance upon a judgment of this passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9020 of 2007 (U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Additional District Judge/Special Judge), decided on 01.03.2019, to argue that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal cannot be termed as “just compensation” and thus prayed that the amount so awarded by the Tribunal be modified and enhanced, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra). 14. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the questions that arises for decision of the present appeals are: (i) whether the accident took place with the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 394 and ; (ii) whether the compensation awarded can be termed as “just compensation”. 15. Reverting to the first issue as to whether the accident took place with the vehicle in question or not I have gone through the findings recorded by the Tribunal while deciding the Issue No. 1 wherein the two witnesses to the accident had specifically deposed that at the time of the accident they were getting their engines repaired and had witnessed the accident. They had also stated that they tried to chase the vehicle, however, they were not successful in chasing the vehicle. They had specifically deposed that they had read a number of vehicles and had also told the others present there. In fact, the PW-3 had specifically stated that the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949 had hit the motorcycle. Placing reliance upon the said two witnesses, the court arrived at a finding that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving bearing Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949 .In the cross examination also the testimony of the two witnesses could not be discredited. Placing reliance upon the said two witnesses, the court arrived at a finding that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving bearing Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949 .In the cross examination also the testimony of the two witnesses could not be discredited. It is essential to note that before the Tribunal no evidence was led by either of the opposite parties i.e. owner of the vehicle or the Insurance Company to establish that the accident did not take place on account of accident with the Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. Even in the present appeal there is nothing on record to suggest or to demonstrate that there was any error committed by the Tribunal in recording the finding of fact with regard to accident in question. Thus, I have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal has rightly recorded a finding of fact that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of Vehicle No. U.P. 81-C 3949. There is no other argument advanced by the counsel for the claimants-appellants in FAFO Nos. 2911 of 2007, 2912 of 2007 and 3007 of 2007, as such, the said appeals are liable to be dismissed. 16. Now, reverting to the question of adequacy of compensation, as argued by the counsel for the claimants-appellants, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi extensively dealt with the question of “'just compensation” and while dealing with the question of awarding compensation for future prospects in cases of self-employed persons held as under: “Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one’s income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardization on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. But not to apply the principle of standardization on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable.” 17. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions:- (i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. (ii) As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent. (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. (v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore. (vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment. (vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. (viii) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/-and Rs. 15,000/-respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 18. Relying on the said decision, I am of the view that the Tribunal has erred in granting compensation without considering the question of future prospects of the self-employed deceased. I am of the specific view that the court below ought to have considered the question of future prospects of the deceased while awarding the “just compensation”. 19. The evidence, on record, clearly establishes that the deceased used to earn Rs. 3,000/- per month. Thus, on the basis of the judgment of Pranay Sethi (supra), I deem it appropriate that an addition of 40% should be made on the said established income of Rs. 3,000/-as the deceased was below the age of 40 years. Thus, I determine the salary of the deceased Rajendra Singh for the purposes of calculating the compensation at Rs. 3000+1200 (40% of Rs. 3,000/-) at Rs. 4200/-month 20. There being no dispute that the age of the deceased was 28 to 30 years. The multiplicand applicable would be 18. Thus, the compensation payable to the claimants on account of death of Rajendra Singh would be 4200 x 12 x 18. 3000+1200 (40% of Rs. 3,000/-) at Rs. 4200/-month 20. There being no dispute that the age of the deceased was 28 to 30 years. The multiplicand applicable would be 18. Thus, the compensation payable to the claimants on account of death of Rajendra Singh would be 4200 x 12 x 18. Out of the said compensation, one fourth is to be deducted towards personal expenses as laid down in paragraph no. 30 of the judgment in the case of Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Development Corporation, 2009 (6) SCC 121 . Thus, the claimants are entitled to the following amounts 9,07,200-2,26,800 = Rs 6,80,400/- 21. Over and above the said amount, the claimant would also be entitled to the expenses of Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/-and Rs. 15,000/-respectively towards conventional heads namely loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra). 22. Thus, the claimants are entitled to get Rs. 6,80,400+70,000=7,50,400/-. The said amount shall be paid to the claimants along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition up to the date of actual payment. The amount already deposited and paid by the Insurance Company shall be deducted from the total amount to be paid to the claimants as directed above. The Insurance Company shall pay the amounts as directed above within a period of two months from today. 23. Accordingly, the First Appeal From Order No. 2801 of 2007 is partly allowed by modifying the compensation payable, whereas the First Appeal From Order Nos. 2911 of 2007, 2912 of 2007 and 3007 of 2007 are dismissed. 24. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the District Judge, Bulandshahar for compliance and payments to the claimants in accordance with law.