JUDGMENT : Saumitra Dayal Singh, J. Present revision has been filed by the assessee against the order of the Commercial Tax Tribunal Ghaziabad dated 7.3.2018, passed in second appeal no. 518 of 2013, for the A.Y. 2008-09 (U.P.). By that order, the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the first appeal authority dated 12.7.2013. The first appeal authority had held 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' used in the compressors in refrigerators are not machinery. However, with respect to rejection of books of accounts and best judgment assessment, the matter had been remitted to the assessing authority. The proceedings, thus remanded, have given rise to two separate revisions being Sales/Trade Tax Revision Nos. 298 of 2018 for A.Y. 2008-09 (U.P.) and 299 of 2018 for A.Y. 2008-09 (Central). Those revisions would be dealt with separately. 2. Heard Sri Rahul Agrawal, learned counsel for the applicant-assessee and Sri B.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party-revenue. 3. The present revision has been pressed on the following question of law: "A. Whether goods in question 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' are covered within the ambit of Entry No. 26 of Schedule-II Part-A of the U.P. VAT Act, 2008?" 4. During the assessment year in question, the assessee was engaged in manufacture of 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' used in manufacture of compressors for refrigerators. It sold the same to a manufacturer of refrigerators. Treating the items 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' to be component parts of machinery, the assessee charged those goods @ 4% under Entry 26 of Schedule-II Part-A of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). However, the assessing authority took a different view and treated the same as unclassified goods and subjected the same to tax @ 12.5%. Upon first appeal, the first appeal authority upheld this view of the assessing authority, however, it remitted the matter on quantification issues. Upon further appeal, the Tribunal has confirmed the order of the assessing authority. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it appears, the revenue authorities have taken a view that 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' cannot be taxed as machinery or component parts of the machinery on the reasoning that such 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' are used in compressors used in the refrigerators and air-conditioners, which in turn are consumer goods or home appliances, and not machinery. To reach that conclusion, the Tribunal has reasoned that machineries are only such items as are used for production and manufacture of other goods. The Tribunal has relied on the definition of capital goods under Section 2(f) of the Act and observed, it includes machinery used for production and manufacture of goods. On such reasoning, the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. 6. The aforesaid reasoning appears to be wholly erroneous, inasmuch as, the Tribunal has completely misdirected itself in approach and thus, reached wholly unacceptable conclusions. 7. Entry no. 26 of Schedule-II Part-A reads as under: "26. Machinery, equipment, apparatus, tools, moulds, dies and component spare parts, accessories thereof." 8. Section 2(f) of the Act reads as under: (f) "capital goods" means any plant, machine, machinery, equipment, apparatus, tool, appliance or electrical installation used for manufacture or processing of any goods for sale by the dealer and includes:- (i) components, spare parts and accessories of such plant, machine, machinery, equipment, apparatus, tool, appliance or electrical installation; (ii) moulds and dies; (iii) storage tank; (iv) pollution control equipment; (v) refractory and refractory materials; (vi) tubes and pipes and fittings thereof, (vii) lab equipments, instruments and accessories, (viii) machinery, loader, equipment for lifting or moving goods within factory premises, or (ix) generator and boiler used in manufacture of goods for sale by him but for the purpose of section 13, does not include:- (i) air-conditioning units or air conditioners, refrigerators, air coolers, fans, and air circulators if not connected with manufacturing process; (ii) an automobile including commercial vehicles, and two or three wheelers, and parts, components and accessories for repair and maintenance thereof; (iii) goods purchased and accounted for in business but utilised for the purpose of providing facility to the employees. (iv) vehicle used for transporting goods or passengers or both; (v) capital goods used in the execution of a works contract; and [(vi) ................]Omitted" 9. Section 4(1)(a) of the Act reads as under: "4. Levy of tax on turnover of sale.- (1) The tax, payable on sale of goods under this Act, shall be levied and paid on the taxable turnover of sale of- (a) goods named or described in column 2 of the Schedule II, at every point of sale and at the rate of four percent." 10. Levy of tax on turnover of sale.- (1) The tax, payable on sale of goods under this Act, shall be levied and paid on the taxable turnover of sale of- (a) goods named or described in column 2 of the Schedule II, at every point of sale and at the rate of four percent." 10. Thus, in the first place, Section 4(1)(a) read with Schedule-II of the Act provides for rate of tax on goods that have been described in column-2 Schedule-II. Thus, everything else apart, the rate of tax on goods falling under Schedule-II would remain 4%. There exist other Schedules to the Act and parts thereof providing different categorization of goods both on the basis of rates and also use. However, no classification or categorization of any goods by virtue of those being 'capital goods'. 11. On the other hand, Section 2(f) of the Act is not a provision affecting the rate of tax. There is no taxing entry of 'capital goods' existing or relied upon by the revenue. Inasmuch as, such an entry had not been provided for by the legislature, the line of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, is wholly extraneous and therefore irrelevant. 12. What was required to be seen first was - whether 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' of compressors used in refrigerators and air-conditioners manufactured and sold by the assessee were items as would fall within any of the description of the taxing entry 26 of Schedule II, Part A of the Act. While examining that claim the Tribunal could not have looked into the residuary entry that in effect is Schedule V of the Act. In State of Maharashtra v. Bradma of India Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 669 , the Supreme Court held: "7. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong. Both the Tribunal and the High Court commonly enunciated the principle that a specific entry would override a general entry. In addition we would add, and as has been held in CCE v. Wood Craft Products Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 454 , at p. 462, resort has to be had to the residuary heading only when by a liberal construction the specific heading cannot cover the goods in question. In addition we would add, and as has been held in CCE v. Wood Craft Products Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 454 , at p. 462, resort has to be had to the residuary heading only when by a liberal construction the specific heading cannot cover the goods in question. The language of Entry 97(b) clearly shows, by use of the phrase "other than those specified elsewhere" that it is not only a residuary entry but also that electronic systems, instruments, etc. may be classified under other entries. Entry 90 on the other hand does not contain any words of limitation. The items mentioned therein would cover every species thereof irrespective of the mode of their operation. Cash registering machines are specifically mentioned. In the absence of any limitation or qualification as to the different kinds of cash registering machines, there is no reason to read in any such qualification and limit the entry to particular kinds of cash registering machines. It is significant that by contrast, data processing machines have expressly excluded computers. Were it not so excluded, computers would have also fallen within Entry 90. In fact computers are separately dealt with in Entry 97(a). But the exclusion of computers from data processing machines would indicate that the items mentioned in Entry 90 are generic covering all species of such items. Given the language of the two entries we fail to understand how the High Court could have come to the conclusion that Entry 97(b) was the specific entry and that Entry 90 was the general entry. Such an interpretation goes against the express language of the two entries." 13. Thus, if the answer to the above were in the negative and it were to be found that the 'crankshaft' and 'camshaft' manufactured by the assessee were not machinery, then, in absence of any other or alternative claim, the Tribunal could treat the goods to be unclassified under Schedule V to the Act. If however, that answer were in the affirmative, they could not be treated as unclassified by relying on Section 2(f) of the Act, which has no bearing to classification of any goods for taxation purpose. For the purposes of interpreting a taxing entry and to determine the classification of goods, section 2(f) of the Act and its effect would remain wholly irrelevant. For the purposes of interpreting a taxing entry and to determine the classification of goods, section 2(f) of the Act and its effect would remain wholly irrelevant. It may be clarified, as there is complete absence of any taxing entry of 'capital goods' under any of the Schedules, hence there exists no occasion to examine that issue any further or to determine whether there exists a special entry (of capital goods) and a general entry (of machinery) under entry no. 26, Schedule II, Part A. 14. No such exercise has been carried out by the Tribunal. In fact the Tribunal has got misdirected in forming its opinion on the reasoning, treating the goods to be non-capital goods and therefore not machinery. In that regard the Tribunal has not examined the true scope and ambit of entry 26 Schedule II, Part A, in correct light and it has further erred in relying on section 2(f) of the Act, which is not relevant to interpret the taxing entry, in absence of use of the words 'capital goods', under any of the Schedules to the Act. 15. Even as a general principle, the word 'machinery' and the phrase 'capital goods' are different and may overlap or remain mutually exclusive depending upon the facts of the each case, in the context of the particular fiscal statute wherein they may have been used. While the phrase 'capital goods' may take within its ambit goods and items other than machinery also, insofar as machinery is concerned, it may remain both capital goods as also non-capital goods including consumer goods as well. 16. Any machinery that may be put to use in manufacture of goods may be treated as capital goods in the context of any particular legislation, especially fiscal statutes. However, that treatment given to some machineries for specified purposes would not have any impact on the identity of certain other goods that may continue to be machinery, though not capital goods. Thus, even as to principle, treatment of any goods as non-capital goods, would remain extraneous so far as the taxability of those goods is concerned. That issue would have to be decided purely on the basis of treatment given by the legislature under the taxing provision and entry. In the context of the Act, the legislature has not classified 'capital goods' as a class of goods to be taxed as such. That issue would have to be decided purely on the basis of treatment given by the legislature under the taxing provision and entry. In the context of the Act, the legislature has not classified 'capital goods' as a class of goods to be taxed as such. Only "List of Industrial Inputs" have been so identified and classified under Part C, Schedule II of the Act. 17. Commonly, even in homes and non-commercial or non-industrial establishment machines come to be used on a daily basis. A common example of such machine is a ceiling fan. In absence of a special taxing entry to categorize it otherwise, merely because a ceiling fan may be used both in an industrial establishment and also at a residential establishment would not change its identity and therefore its taxability as a machine. It cannot be treated both as an classified and unclassified goods solely on the basis of its installation, whether at an industrial establishment or a home. 18. In view of the above, order passed by the Tribunal is wholly unsustainable. The same is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, keeping in mind the observations made above. 19. Accordingly, the question of law is left unanswered. The proceedings in remand may be completed as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 20. With the aforesaid observations, the revision stands disposed of.