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2019 DIGILAW 2421 (ALL)

Prathama U. P. Gramin Bank v. Union of India

2019-10-23

YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

body2019
JUDGMENT Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. Heard Sri Dharmendra Vaish, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Jyotsana Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Sri Sandeep Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 2. The present petition has been filed seeking a direction to the Appellate Authority constituted under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (the P.G. Act, 1972) to accept the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner-bank in lieu of the deposit to be made as a pre-condition for filing of an appeal under Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that upon an application filed by the fourth respondent under sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972 (the Rules, 1972) alleging that he had not been paid due amount of gratuity by the Prathama Bank, Head Office, Ram Gahga Vihar, M.D.A., Moradabad (petitioner herein) an order dated 12.3.2019 was passed by the Controlling Authority under the P.G. Act, 1972/Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Bareilly allowing the application and issuing a direction to the Prathama Bank to pay the balance amount of gratuity together with interest to the fourth respondent. 4. It is submitted that against the aforesaid order passed by the Controlling Authority an appeal under Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 was preferred before the second respondent with a request for accepting bank guarantee in lieu of deposit as required under sub-section (7) of Section 7. It is further submitted that the fourth respondent vide its communication dated 2.8.2019 has informed the petitioner-bank that in terms of Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 bank guarantee cannot be permitted as there is no provision for the same and the petitioner has been advised to deposit the amount in the shape of demand draft within the specified period so that the appeal could be entertained. 5. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is a rural bank and is facing financial crisis and in view of the same the condition of deposit of the amount would further aggravate its financial hardship and as such permission ought to have been granted for furnishing of bank guarantee in lieu of the requirement to make the pre-deposit. 6. 6. The issue which thus arises in the present petition is as to whether the condition of pre-deposit under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 is mandatory, and as to whether bank guarantee can be directed to be furnished in lieu of such pre-deposit. 7. In order to appreciate the contention which is sought to be raised by the petitioner the provision of filing of an appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 may be referred to. For ease of reference Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 is being extracted below: "7. Determination of the amount of Gratuity.--(1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. (3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3-A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3) the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground (4)(a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. Explanation.--x x x x x (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. (c) The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer. (d) The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. (d) The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. (e) As soon as may be after a deposit is made under clause (a) the controlling authority shall pay the amount of the deposit-- (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is the employee, to the nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or heir of the employee if the controlling authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity. (5) For the purpose of conducting an inquiry under sub-section (4), the controlling authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court, while trying a suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters namely-- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (6) Any inquiry under this section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4), may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount. (8) The appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the controlling authority." 8. A plain reading of the aforementioned statutory provision indicates that a right of appeal has been provided for against an order under sub-section (4) of Section 7 which is to be preferred within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order. In terms of the first proviso the Appellate Authority is empowered to extend the aforesaid period by a further period of sixty days upon being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed time period. 9. The second proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 which has been inserted by Act 25 of 1984 (The Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 1984, Section 4 (w.e.f. 1.7.1987) stipulates that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the Appellate Authority such amount. 10. The provision with regard to pre-deposit of an amount equal to the amount of gratuity as a condition precedent for the appeal being admitted has been introduced by insertion of the second proviso by Act 25 of 1984 and the same having been provided for in mandatory terms it would follow that the right to appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 7 becomes a vested right only when the pre-condition of deposit is complied with. The Appellate Authority is not to admit the appeal unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with the authority an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4) or deposits such amount with the Appellate Authority. 11. The right of appeal, it is well-settled, is a statutory right and it is open to the legislature which confers the remedy of an appeal to provide for conditions subject to which the right to appeal may be exercised. 11. The right of appeal, it is well-settled, is a statutory right and it is open to the legislature which confers the remedy of an appeal to provide for conditions subject to which the right to appeal may be exercised. The power to regulate the exercise of the right of appeal by providing for a pre-deposit as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal seeking to challenge the imposition of the amount came up for consideration in the case of The Anant Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others, (1975) 2 SCC 175 and it was held that the right of appeal being a creature of a statute it was upon the legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom a legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. The relevant observations in the judgment are as follows: "40. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the High Court. Section 406(2)(e) as amended states that no appeal against a rateable value or tax fixed or charged under the Act shall be entertained by the Judge in the case of an appeal against a tax or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to the appellant, 'unless the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the Commissioner. According to the proviso to the above clause, where in any particular case the Judge is of opinion that the deposit of the amount by the appellant will cause undue hardship to him, the Judge may in his discretion dispense with such deposit or part thereof, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he may deem fit. The object of the above provision apparently is to ensure the deposit of the amount claimed from an appellant in case he seeks to file an appeal against a tax or against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to him. Power at the same time is given to the appellate Judge to relieve the appellant from the rigour of the above provision in case the Judge is of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship to the appellant. Power at the same time is given to the appellate Judge to relieve the appellant from the rigour of the above provision in case the Judge is of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship to the appellant. The requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which seeks to challenge the imposition or the quantum of that tax, in our opinion, has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially when we keep in view the fact that discretion is vested in the appellate Judge to dispense with the compliance of the above requirement. All that the statutory provision seeks to do is to regulate the exercise of the right of appeal. The object of the above provision is to keep in balance the right of appeal, which is conferred upon a person who is aggrieved with the demand of tax made from him, and the right of the Corporation to speedy recovery of the tax. The impugned provision accordingly confers a right of appeal and at the same time prevents the delay in the payment of the tax. We find ourselves unable to accede to the argument that the impugned provision has the effect of creating a discrimination as is offensive to the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is significant that the right of appeal is conferred upon all persons who are aggrieved against the determination of tax or rateable value. The bar created by Section 406(2)(e) to the entertainment of the appeal by a person who has not deposited the amount of tax due from him and who is not able to show to the appellate Judge that the deposit of the amount would cause him undue hardship arises out of his own omission and default. The above provision, in our opinion, has not the effect of making invidious distinction or creating two classes with the object of meting out differential treatment to them; it only spells out the consequences flowing from the omission and default of a person who despite the fact that the deposit of the amount found due from him would cause him no hardship, declines of his own volition to deposit that amount. The right of appeal is the creature of a statute. The right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutory provision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitled to file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasons there appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to the imposition of such conditions. It is permissible, for example, to prescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convicted person is released on bail, he must surrender to custody before his appeal against the sentence of imprisonment would be entertained. Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lie against an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax had been paid. Such a provision was on the statute book in Section 30 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The proviso to that section provided that"... no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-section (1) of Section 46 unless the tax had been paid". Such conditions merely regulate the exercise of the right of appeal so that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. It is open to the Legislature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability or the fulfillment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern no contravention of Article 14 in it. A disability or disadvantage arising out of a party's own default or omission cannot be taken to be tantamount to the creation of two classes offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all persons who make the default or omission." 12. A disability or disadvantage arising out of a party's own default or omission cannot be taken to be tantamount to the creation of two classes offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all persons who make the default or omission." 12. The right to appeal being subject to the obligatory condition of making a pre-deposit again came up for consideration in the context of Section 129-E of the Customs Act, 1962 in the case of Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and another v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, (1988) 4 SCC 402 , and it was held that the right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice and the said right being a statutory right it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows: "5. The aforesaid section provides a conditional right of appeal in respect of an appeal against the duty demanded or penalty levied. Although the section does not expressly provide for rejection of the appeal for non-deposit of duty or penalty, yet it makes it obligatory on the appellant to deposit the duty or penalty, pending the appeal, failing which the Appellate Tribunal is fully competent to reject the appeal. See, in this connection, the observations of this Court in respect of Section 129 prior to substitution of Chapter XV by the Finance Act, 1980 in Navinchandra Chhotelal v. Central Board of Excise & Customs, (1971) 1 SCC 289 . The proviso, however, gives power to the Appellate Authority to dispense with such deposit unconditionally or subject to such conditions in cases of undue hardships. It is a matter of judicial discretion of the Appellate Authority. 9. Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant." 13. It is a matter of judicial discretion of the Appellate Authority. 9. Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant." 13. A similar view was reiterated in the case of Gujarat Agro Industries Company Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others, (1999) 4 SCC 468 , wherein the constitutionality of the pre-condition of deposit under Section 406(2)(e) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 was upheld and it was stated that the right to appeal being a statutory right and not an inherent right it is for the legislature to decide to make the right subject to any condition or not. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows: "8. By the amending Act 1 of 1979 discretion of the Court in granting interim relief has now been limited to the extent of 25% of the tax required to be deposited. It is, therefore, contended that the earlier decision of this Court in Anant Mills case (1975) 2 SCC 175 may not have full application. We, however, do not think that such a contention can be raised in view of the law laid down by this Court in Anant Mills case (1975) 2 SCC 175 . This Court said that right of appeal is the creature of a statute and it is for the legislature to decide whether the right of appeal should be unconditionally given to an aggrieved party or it should be conditionally given. Right of appeal which is a statutory right can be conditional or qualified. It cannot be said that such a law would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute, however, in regard to an appeal, the position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute, however, in regard to an appeal, the position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. When such a law authorises filing of appeal, it can impose conditions as well (see Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, (1974) 2 SCC 393 )." 14. The provision restricting the right of appeal by requiring deposit of the amount concerned in appeal again came up in the case of M/s. Elora Construction Company v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, AIR 1980 Bom 162 , and it was stated that the right of appeal being a creation of statute could be taken away by the statute expressly or by necessary intendment and the provision restricting the right of appeal by requiring deposit of the amount concerned was held constitutionally valid. 15. Again, in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. P. Luxmi Devi (Smt.), (2008) 4 SCC 720 , the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 47-A proviso of the Stamp Act, 1899 was held to be constitutionally valid and not violative of Articles 14 and 19 or any other provision of the Constitution of India (the Constitution). 16. The question as to whether the Appellate Authority has the discretion to say that an appeal could be preferred without satisfying the precondition of deposit where the statutory requirement has been specifically stated in a compulsive language came up for consideration in the case of Manik Lal Majumdar and others v. Gauranga Chandra Dey and others, (2004) 12 SCC 448 , and it was held that the condition of pre-deposit being a statutory requirement no discretion was left to the Appellate Authority to hold that an appeal could be preferred without satisfying the said requirement. 17. 17. The provision with regard to the requirement to deposit the amount of gratuity under the second proviso to Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 came up for consideration in the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. and others v. Deputy Labour Commissioner Appellate Authority (P.G. Act) and others, 2014 LLR 71 and it was held that as per terms of the second proviso, the deposit of the amount of gratuity was required and as the same had not been complied the appeal had rightly been dismissed. The observations made in the judgment are as follows: "3. ...the petitioners were required to deposit the amount of gratuity as provided under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 and as they have not complied the statutory provisions as contained under the Act of 1972, their appeal has rightly been dismissed. This Court is of the considered opinion that the appeal preferred by the petitioners has rightly been dismissed due to non-compliance of the aforesaid statutory provisions." 18. In The Management, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Ltd. v. The Controller under the Payment of Gratuity Act, Assistant Commissioner of Labour and others, 2018 LLR 66, it was held that the object of the legislation was very clear and the second proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, 1972 had been introduced with the object of making pre-deposit of the gratuity amount determined by the Controlling Authority as a pre-requisite for preferring an appeal and failure to deposit the amount would mean that the appeal itself is incompetent. The relevant extracts in the judgment are as follows: "3. Once the Controlling Authority quantifies the amount of gratuity and directs the employer to pay the same, it should be required to be deposited before preferring appeal in terms of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The intention and object of the legislation is very clear and the second proviso to sub-section 7 of Section 7 of the Act, has been introduced with the object of making pre-deposit of the gratuity amount determined by the Controlling Authority as a pre-requisite for preferring appeal. Further, Clause (a) of sub-section 4 of Section 7 deals with voluntary deposit by the employer at the threshold where the employer has come forward with such deposit. 4. Further, Clause (a) of sub-section 4 of Section 7 deals with voluntary deposit by the employer at the threshold where the employer has come forward with such deposit. 4. The Division Bench of this Court in Onward Trading Company, Madras and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras and another, 1989 (2) LLN 672, held that the statutory precondition must be obeyed and also held that failure to deposit the amount would mean that the appeal itself is incompetent. As the petitioner Management has not deposited the amount, the relief sought for by the petitioner has got to be rejected..." 19. A similar position was reiterated in Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 2017 LLR 1058, wherein it was held that the word "shall" used in the second proviso to Section 7(7) is to be read as mandatory and it curtails the right of an appellant not depositing the requisite amount to have his appeal heard or even admitted. Further, it was held that the relevant provision suggests that a duty has been cast on the Appellate Authority not to admit such an appeal unless it is accompanied either by a certificate or by a deposit as the case may be. The observations made in the judgment are as follows: "6. For the purpose of filing of an appeal, there is certain requirement to be complied with. The second proviso to Section 7(7) of the said Act, inter alia, says that no appeal under Section 4 of the Act shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under Section 4 or deposits with the appellate authority such amount. While rejecting the petitioner's appeal, the respondent No. 2 had specifically held that the employer had neither obtained a certificate from the Controlling Authority nor deposited the awarded amount with the appellate authority. Therefore, the appeal was rejected. 9. ...I find no infirmity in the order in rejecting the appeal. The second proviso to Section 7(7) of the Act which was incorporated by way of an amendment specifically says that no appeal shall be admitted unless the requirements as mentioned in the subsequent part of the proviso is complied with. Therefore, the appeal was rejected. 9. ...I find no infirmity in the order in rejecting the appeal. The second proviso to Section 7(7) of the Act which was incorporated by way of an amendment specifically says that no appeal shall be admitted unless the requirements as mentioned in the subsequent part of the proviso is complied with. The use of the word 'shall' is to be read as mandatory and there is no scope of reading it as directory. It curtails the right of an appellant not depositing the requisite amount to have his appeal heard or even admitted. A more close look at the relevant provisions of law suggests that a duty has been cast on the appellate authority not to admit such an appeal unless it is accompanied either by a certificate or by a deposit, as the case may be. The appellate authority merely followed the provisions of law which it was bound to." 20. The provisions with regard to making of a pre-deposit as a condition precedent for filing of an appeal having been inserted under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 by way of a proviso, it would be apposite to refer to the manner in which a proviso is to be construed. 21. In Craies on Statute of Law (Craies on Statute of Law, 7th Edition) referring to the rules regarding construction of a proviso, it has been observed as follows: "9.1. The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it; and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect." 22. Again, as has been pointed out by Craies in the treatise on Statute Law; "The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it." 23. In Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 , the intendment of the proviso has been discussed thus: "8. In Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459 , the intendment of the proviso has been discussed thus: "8. The proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. But the question is one of interpretation of the proviso and there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of the main enactment. Occasionally in a statute, a proviso is unrelated to the subject-matter of the preceding section, or contains matters extraneous to that section, and it may have then to be interpreted as a substantive provision, dealing independently with the matter specified therein, and not as qualifying the main or the preceding section." 24. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596 , the object of the proviso and how it is to be interpreted has been stated in the following manner: "9. The law with regard to provisos is well-settled and well understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule..." 25. Again, in S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V.R. Pattabiraman and others, (1985) 1 SCC 591 , various decisions with regard to the manner of construction of a proviso have been discussed and it has been stated as follows: "29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th Edn.) while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned the following ingredients: 'p. 317. Provisos--These are clauses of exception or qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or qualifying something in; the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be within it. p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.' 30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pp. Provisos--These are clauses of exception or qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or qualifying something in; the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be within it. p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.' 30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pp. 294-95 has collected the following principles in regard to a proviso: (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. (b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. (c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the latter intention of the makers. (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision." 26. In the case of State of Rajas than v. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 , the following observation with regard to construction of a proviso has been made: "14. ...So far as a general principle of construction of a proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the section and carve out something which but for the proviso would have been within the operative part." 27. In S.T.O. v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1967 SC 565 , it was held as follows: "5. ... In S.T.O. v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1967 SC 565 , it was held as follows: "5. ... It is well recognised that a proviso is added to a principal clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what the legislature desires should be excluded." 28. In C.C.T. v. Jhaver Ramkishan Shrikishan, AIR 1968 SC 59 , following observations were made: "8. ...Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an exception to the main part of the section; but it is recognised that in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substantive provision itself." 29. The different purposes served by a proviso have been summarised in the case of Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and others, (2018) 14 SCC 161 , in the following manner: "43. ...To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes: (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment; (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable; (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision." 30. In Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union and another, (2004) 1 SCC 574 , the function of proviso has been considered and it has been observed as follows: "9. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey, (1880) LR 5 QBD 170 at p. 173 (DC) (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corpn. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey, (1880) LR 5 QBD 170 at p. 173 (DC) (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta ( AIR 1965 SC 1728 ), when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. x x x x x "If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, and the earlier clause prevails. ...But if the later clause does not destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the deed as a whole' (per Lord Wrenbury in Forbes v. Git (1921 SCC OnLine PC 102 : (1922) 1 AC 256). A statutory proviso 'is something engrafted on a preceding enactment' (R. v. Taunton St. James (1829) 9 B & C 831 : 109 ER 309, ER p. 311). "The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming after a general enactment is to limit that general enactment in certain instances' (per Lord Eshet in Baiker, In re, ex Constable (1890) LR 25 QBD 285 (CA)." 31. The function of a proviso to carve out an exception or to qualify something enacted therein which would otherwise be within the purview of the enactment was emphasised in Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Company Lid. The function of a proviso to carve out an exception or to qualify something enacted therein which would otherwise be within the purview of the enactment was emphasised in Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Company Lid. v. Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71 , wherein it was stated by Lord Macmillan as follows: "The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case." 32. In "The Construction and Interpretation of Law" by Henry Campbell Black (The Construction and Interpretation of Law by Henry Campbell Black, Edn. 2011) while considering the manner of construction of provisos it has been stated that the natural and appropriate effect of a proviso to a statute, or to a section thereof, is to restrain or qualify the provisions immediately preceding it. 33. The second proviso to sub-section (7) of Section having been introduced by way of an amendment in terms of Act 25 of 1984 and in terms thereof the requirement of pre-deposit of an amount equal to the amount of gratuity as a condition precedent for an appeal being admitted having been provided for in a language which mandatory in form clearly indicates that the intention of the legislature was to qualify the right to appeal under sub-section (7) of Section 7 by providing for pre-deposit of the amount as a condition precedent. 34. It may, therefore, be inferred that in terms of the second proviso introduced by the Act 25 of 1984 the right to appeal granted under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972, has been qualified with the requirement of pre-deposit as a condition precedent, and the said condition having been introduced in a language which is compulsive in form the appeal cannot be held to be competent in the absence of fulfillment of the condition of pre-deposit. 35. It may also be seen that the right to appeal inheres in no one and such right being the creature of a statute, the same can be qualified or be made subject to fulfillment of conditions prescribed therefore. 36. 35. It may also be seen that the right to appeal inheres in no one and such right being the creature of a statute, the same can be qualified or be made subject to fulfillment of conditions prescribed therefore. 36. The object of the legislation is very clear and the second proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 has been introduced with a view to make pre-deposit of the gratuity amount determined by the Controlling Authority as a pre-requisite for preferring an appeal and a duty has been cast on the Appellate Authority not to admit an appeal unless it is accompanied either by a certificate or by a deposit, as the case may be. 37. The Appellate Authority having been given no discretion to waive the condition of pre-deposit there is no scope for admitting the appeal unless at the time of preferring the appeal the appellant produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the amount in question has been deposited with the authority or deposits such amount with the Appellate Authority. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, the stand of the Appellate Authority declining to grant permission for furnishing a bank guarantee in lieu of the requirement of pre-deposit under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 slating that there is no provision for the same, cannot be faulted with. 39. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.