JUDGMENT : S.M Modak, J. As we know there are various stages involved in filing of the complaint for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short referred as "N.I.Act). Different time limit is prescribed for these stages. Section 138 of N.I.Act is bifurcated into two parts. One is 'part excluding three proviso' and second is 'part comprising three provisos'. 2. There are two views prevailing about interpretation of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. One view is that moment cheque is dishonoured, it is said that offence is complete and compliance of the procedure laid down in three provisos only postpones filing of complaint. Another view is that offence is complete only when there is a compliance of the procedure laid down in three proviso preceded by dishonour of cheque. CONTROVERSY 3. The first stage deals with issuance of notice to the drawer. Proviso (b) deals with that it has to be issued within 15 days (it was there till 2002 and which is extended to 30 days). The period is to be computed from "the date of receipt of information by the drawer from the bank". In the case before me the controversy has arisen in between the parties which is the correct date of getting a knowledge of dishonour by the complainant. On one hand the complainant contended that he got knowledge on 23rd May, 1997. Whereas on the basis of available evidence, the accused contended that it is not on 23rd May, 1997 but it is on 21st May, 1997 the complainant was informed about the dishonour by his banker. 4. The Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katol recorded the evidence of complainant and two bank witnesses. The trial Court had shown disfavour to the complainant and held that "complainant got knowledge on 21st May, 1997" and accordingly "the notice dated 6th June, 1997 was held to be given after the expiry of 15 days and as such the mandatory requirement of clause (b) was not fulfilled" and accordingly, the accused was acquitted. Hence, the complainant is before this Court by way of an appeal. 5. Apart from the issue of compliance, the learned trial Judge framed points on other issues also. The points and findings are as below:- Sr. No. Points Findings 1. About Directorship of accused nos. 3, 4, 7 and 8 ? .. In the affirmative. 2. Hence, the complainant is before this Court by way of an appeal. 5. Apart from the issue of compliance, the learned trial Judge framed points on other issues also. The points and findings are as below:- Sr. No. Points Findings 1. About Directorship of accused nos. 3, 4, 7 and 8 ? .. In the affirmative. 2. About accused nos. 3, 4, 7 & 8 being in-charge of the affairs of accused no. 1 Company .. Only involvement of accused nos. 3 and 4 is proved 3. Issuance of 10 cheques towards discharge of debt. .. In the affirmative. 4. Presentation of cheques within validity and their dishonour due to insufficient funds .. In the affirmative. 5. Issuance of notice within 15 days from the date of knowledge of dishonoured ... Not within 15 days. 6. Proof of commission offence by accused nos. 1, 3, 4, 7 & 8. In the negative. SCOPE OF THIS APPEAL 6. As stated above, the trial Court only gave a finding in respect of "Timely issuance of notice" against the appellant. Initially, there were eight accused persons. One is company and 2 to 8 are the Directors. Trial Court dropped the proceedings against the accused nos. 2, 5 & 6. So trial proceeded only against rest of the accused i.e. accused nos. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8. After evidence, trial Court concluded only about involvement of accused nos. 3 and 4 in the affairs of the accused no.1 company. The trial Court gave a benefit to two of the Directors i.e accused No. 7 and 8. This finding is not challenged on behalf of the complainant as submitted by the learned advocate Shri Hussain for the appellant during the oral argument. He fairly conceded that the involvement of accused no.7 and 8 in the affairs of the company could not be proved by the complainant. Hence there is no occasion for this Court to ascertain the correctness of that findings. 7. For rest of the issue trial Court finds favour with the appellant. On behalf of the respondent, there is no challenge during arguments to the findings on those issue. Rest of the issues were answered against the respondent. Hence, this Court has not undertaken the exercise of finding the correctness of those findings. Hence, the scope of this appeal is only limited to following issues. 1. On behalf of the respondent, there is no challenge during arguments to the findings on those issue. Rest of the issues were answered against the respondent. Hence, this Court has not undertaken the exercise of finding the correctness of those findings. Hence, the scope of this appeal is only limited to following issues. 1. "Whether the notice dated 6th June, 1997 was issued by the complainant in time i.e. within 15 days from the date of knowledge of dishonour" 2. "Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the complainant did not issue the notice dated 6th June, 1997 within 15 days" SUBMISSION 8. Learned advocate for the complainant brought to my notice following instances to support his contention about knowledge on 23rd May, 1997. (a). The bank of accused i.e. State Bank of India, Katol Branch on 23rd May, 1997 gave him paper in respect of returning cheque (Para No.3 of affidavit in lieu of evidence of complainant). (b). Answer in his cross-examination "that he got information about dishonour of 10 cheques on 23rd May, 1997." (Page 88 of the paper book). (c). Denial by complainant of suggestion given by the accused as to "it is not correct to say that he got knowledge of dishonour on 21st May, 1997". (Page 87 of the paper book). Whereas learned advocate Shri Kale on behalf of the respondent accused pointed out to me the following instances. (i). Not referring the date of knowledge of dishonour in the notice dated 6th June, 1997 (Particularly in para no.4). (ii). Answer given by the complainant during the cross-examination "it was told to his advocate while issuing notice that ten cheques were dishonoured on 23rd May, 1997." (iii). Failure to give explanation why this fact is not mentioned in the notice (Page 89 of paper book) (iv). Denial of suggestion given to complainant during cross-examination as to the "date is mentioned in para no.4 subsequently in order to bring the complaint within limitation" (Page 89 of the paper book). 9. Apart from the above referred evidence and documents, the complainant examined two witnesses. They are as follows:- (1) Shri Ravi Shankarrao Kulkarni (2) Shri Prabhakar Keshaorao Katkar, Accountant in State Bank of India, Katol Branch in the year 1997. ORAL EVIDENCE OF BANK WITNESS KULKARNI 10. Prior to considering their evidence it will be material to consider certain introductory facts. Apart from the above referred evidence and documents, the complainant examined two witnesses. They are as follows:- (1) Shri Ravi Shankarrao Kulkarni (2) Shri Prabhakar Keshaorao Katkar, Accountant in State Bank of India, Katol Branch in the year 1997. ORAL EVIDENCE OF BANK WITNESS KULKARNI 10. Prior to considering their evidence it will be material to consider certain introductory facts. The complainant and accused no.1 were having respective bank accounts in the Katol Branch of State Bank of India. The complainant deposited ten cheques in the said Branch on 21st May, 1997 (Exh.238, counter foil). There are two letters/intimation/cheque return memo issued by the Katol Branch. They are as follows:- (a) cheque returned memo bearing the date as 21st May, 1997, the reason funds insufficient is encircled in it. (b) letter dated 21st May, 1997 addressed by Katol Branch to the complainant (thereby returning 10 cheques as per the memo). The date mentioned on this letter as 21st May, 1997 is a part of record. Dispute does not deals with date. It deals with when did the complainant got knowledge of dishonour. DAK BOOK FOR 10 CHEQUES 11. From the evidence of witness Kulkarni, we can find that two registers are maintained when cheques are dishonoured. They are Cheque Returned Register and Dak Book. The cheque return memo dated 21st May, 1997 bearing the signature of witness Prabhakar Katkar. So also the letter dated 21st May, 1997 address to the complainant also bears his signature. It has come in the evidence of Kulkarni that Dak Book was preserved for two years and thereafter it is destroyed. There is no entry for destruction of the relevant Dak Book (probably containing an entry for return of 10 cheques to the complainant). BANK PRACTICE OF MAKING ENTRY IN DAK BOOK 12. In order to prove the said practice, the complainant relied upon the evidence of same bank witness Kulkarni. He was re-examined after his initial evidence. Through him the following documents were brought on record. (a) Exh.305 - Circular dated 05.08. pertaining to making up rules by the bank about preservation. (b) Exh.306 - Directions dated 19.01.1984 pertaining to timely destruction of old record. (c) Exh.307 - Direction dated 03.04.1995 mentioning the retention period of the registers. Exh.307 the prescribes the period of three years and eight years respectively for dak register and clearing cheque delivery register. pertaining to making up rules by the bank about preservation. (b) Exh.306 - Directions dated 19.01.1984 pertaining to timely destruction of old record. (c) Exh.307 - Direction dated 03.04.1995 mentioning the retention period of the registers. Exh.307 the prescribes the period of three years and eight years respectively for dak register and clearing cheque delivery register. The dishonour of 10 cheques took place in the month of May, 1997 and witness Kulkarni gave evidence in the year 2005. So it is quite natural not to preserve but to destroy Dak Book Register for the relevant period through which 10 cheques were returned. 13. In order to prove the practice, the complainant got proved the documents in respect of dishonour of another cheque issued in his favour they are as follows :- Exh.309 - Counter foil for depositing Exh.310 - Cheque return memo dated 09.08.2004 addressed to the complainant. Exh. 308 - Extract of dak book/local delivery book 10th August, 2004 (containing one entry about return of cheque dated 7 th August, 2004 to the complainant). 14. From these documents complainant wants to bring on record that it is not always possible to return the cheque to the complainant/payee on the same date on which cheque is returned by bank. That is why he tendered in evidence the Cheque Return Memo dated 09.08.2004 and Dak Book entry of the next date on 10.08.2004. 15. In the case before us admittedly the dak book is not available being destroyed. From this evidence one can certainly infer that entry for return of dishonour cheque may not always be made on the same day on which information for dishonour is received by collecting banker. Because preparing intimation letter is one act and actually returning the cheque is another act. On this background the evidence about notings about dishonour of 10 cheques be considered. EVIDENCE ABOUT DISHONOUR OF 10 CHEQUES 16. The cheque return memo issued by the drawee bank and intimation letter issued by the collecting banker are for the purpose of giving intimation to the concerned person. Whereas cheque return register and dak book register are maintained for the purpose of documenting return of the cheque to the payee. The cheque is an negotiable instrument and it is a valuable security. It needs to be returned to the proper person and needs to be documented. Whereas cheque return register and dak book register are maintained for the purpose of documenting return of the cheque to the payee. The cheque is an negotiable instrument and it is a valuable security. It needs to be returned to the proper person and needs to be documented. Through witness Kulkarni the complainant brought on record the cheque return register containing an entry about return of 10 cheques to the complainant. Through him following documents were brought on record. (a) Exh. 283 - extract of bank account in the name of accused no.1 company showing about insufficient balance where 10 cheques were dishonoured. (b) Exh. 284 - extract of relevant page of cheque return register. 17. Now it will be material to consider what this evidence suggest about knowledge of dishonour to the complainant. Oral evidence of Kulkarni will be relevant. The following facts emerges from his evidence :- (I) The extract at Exh.284 bears his signature. (II) Entry dated 21.05.1997 about return of 10 cheques to the complainant. (III) There is a practice to make an entry in the cheque return register on the same date on which the cheques are returned to the concerned person. (IV) When cheque return memo is handed over to the complainant on the same date, entry is made in the dak book Exh.308 (It is in respect of cheque other than 10 cheques). 18. Now it is material to consider the evidence of witness Prabhakar Katkar EVIDENCE OF WITNESS PRABHAKAR KATKAR 19. The following facts emerges from his evidence:- (a) He has signed on cheque return memo (Exh.319) and intimation letter to complainant (Exh.320). (b) There is a practice to give intimation about return of cheque on the next date to the concerned person ordinarily. (c) Intimation letter is sent through delivery book. (d) There is a holiday to bank on 22nd May, 1997. (e) There is a possibility that the cheques in question must have been returned on 23rd May, 1997. (f) He cannot tell confidently that the cheques were returned on 23rd May, 1997. Already on 22nd May, 1997 there is holiday on account of "Buddha Pournima" (g) Bank was having holiday on 22nd May, 1997 (Deposed by witness Katkar) (h) Not having any official document to show about the said holiday. 20. In this case 22nd May, 1997 is intervening date in between 21st May, 1997 and 23rd May, 1997. Already on 22nd May, 1997 there is holiday on account of "Buddha Pournima" (g) Bank was having holiday on 22nd May, 1997 (Deposed by witness Katkar) (h) Not having any official document to show about the said holiday. 20. In this case 22nd May, 1997 is intervening date in between 21st May, 1997 and 23rd May, 1997. The bank was having a holiday on 22nd May, 1997 gets significance because complainant pleads that he received back the cheque on 23rd May, 1997. I think the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that bank was having holiday on 22nd May, 1997 on account of Buddha Pournima and this was done on the basis of the diary shown during arguments on behalf of the appellant. Even though, Shri Kulkarni has not produced holiday document, it does not mean to say that he was deposing false. There is no reason for him to depose false. Even cross examination was not done to such an extent. I can certainly infer that on 22nd May, 1997 there was a Buddha Pournima. Everyone in India also knows about the importance of Lord Buddha in Indian culture. TRIAL COURT FINDINGS 21. On the point of proof of holiday, trial Court observed as follows:- (a) Thus, in absence of document (circular) version that on 22nd May, 1997 there was a holiday to the State Bank of India cannot be accepted. (b) Witness Katkar has also not produced on record any document showing about the holiday. (c) Complainant ought to have produced a document to show the holiday". 22. The witness Katkar has not brought the rule which supports the practice to wait till 3 p.m. so that account holder can deposit the amount and practice to return the cheque only when account holder fails to deposit the amount. No categorical statement by the witness to show that the cheques were returned on 23rd May, 1997. The evidence on the point of probability to return the cheque on the next date is not helpful to the complainant. The evidence is not sufficient to prove that cheques were not returned on the date of dishonour. 23. If intimation of 10 cheques would have been given on 23rd May, 1997, intimation letter ought to have been given on 23rd May, 1997. JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY BOTH THE SIDES. 24. Complainant relied upon Saketh India Limited Vs. The evidence is not sufficient to prove that cheques were not returned on the date of dishonour. 23. If intimation of 10 cheques would have been given on 23rd May, 1997, intimation letter ought to have been given on 23rd May, 1997. JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY BOTH THE SIDES. 24. Complainant relied upon Saketh India Limited Vs. India Securities Ltd., 1999 3 SCC 1 and accused relied upon Abhishek Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another in Criminal Revision No. 1427 of 2016. I have read both these judgments. 25. The issue involved in Saketh India Limited (supra) before the Hon'ble Apex Court was "whether the time limit fixed of one month for filling complaint was adhered to or not". A month has to be reckoned according to British Calender as per Section 3 (35) of General Clauses Act. The question was whether to include the date or whether to exclude the date on which the cause of action had arisen. After taking over view of the earlier decisions the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "there is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not be complied here" (Para 5 reproduced from the earlier judgment in para No.6 of this judgment). 26. In nutshell while computing the period, the period on which the cause of action had arisen is to be excluded. The provisions of Section 12(1) and 12(2) of Limitation Act and Section 9 of General Clauses Act were referred. In that case the period of 15th day from the receipt of the notice expired on 14th October, 1995. By applying the principle narrated above, the date 15th October, 1995 was excluded. The period starts from 16th October, 1995 and hence the complaint was held maintainable. 27. Similarly, in case of Abhishek Kumar (supra), the complaint was filed earlier to accrual of cause of action. It means full period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice was not given to the drawer. The process was issued and revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was exhausted. "The principle of excluding the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded" was followed therein. The view expressed in Saketh India Limited (supra) was reiterated. Accordingly, the complaint was held maintainable and not filed at a premature stage. APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE 28. "The principle of excluding the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded" was followed therein. The view expressed in Saketh India Limited (supra) was reiterated. Accordingly, the complaint was held maintainable and not filed at a premature stage. APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE 28. It will be material to consider the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act again. Clause itself provides since when the period of 15 days for issuance of notice is to be computed. It says period is to be computed from the date of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding return of cheque as unpaid. So what it implies. It is not the date of intimation letter which is material but it is the date on which payee received the knowledge of dishonour. It is a question of fact. In a given case the date of intimation letter may be the date of knowledge or any other case there may be a time gap in between date of intimation letter and date of actually getting knowledge. 29. The accused stress upon 21st May, 1997 as the date of knowledge whereas complainant stress upon 23rd May, 1997 as the date of knowledge. As reproduced above whatsoever may the oral evidence [of two witnesses from the bank] and documentary evidence, the dak book for the relevant period is not available. There is a reason to believe that it is destroyed so whether complainant can be blamed for that. Certainly not because for preserving or destruction is not in his hand. APPROACH OF APPELLATE COURT 30. There are certain norms about extent to which the Appellate Court can interfere in the judgment of acquittal of the trial Court. It is stated that presumption of innocence is reinforced when there is a judgment of acquittal. There is the difference in between trial of offence under Indian Penal Code and trial of offence involving cheque related cases. Indian Penal Code offences are against society whereas offence under Negotiable Instrument Act is enacted by the parliament so as to curb tendency of giving cheques and not honouring the payment. So offence of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, as such relates mainly to drawer of the cheque/accused and payee/holder in due course as the complainant. Trial Court should consider this factors while appreciating the evidence. 31. So offence of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, as such relates mainly to drawer of the cheque/accused and payee/holder in due course as the complainant. Trial Court should consider this factors while appreciating the evidence. 31. It is said that if the judgment of acquittal is there, if a view different from that of a trial Court is plausible, the Appellate Court should not interfere in the acquittal judgment. There need to have some compelling reasons for that. For example the trial Court has failed to consider a particular piece of evidence or trial Court has wrongly accepted evidence against the provisions of law. 32. I am of the considered view that strict principle of minimal interference by Appellate Court in an appeal against judgment of acquittal is not to be followed in an appeal involving offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. CONCLUSION 33. So we have got oral evidence of complainant stating that 23rd May, 1997 is the date of knowledge of dishonour on one hand whereas on the other hand oral evidence of two bank witnesses stating that it is possible that cheques have been returned to the complainant on 23rd May, 1997. Admittedly, these two witnesses have not possessed any document to show that it happened on 23rd May, 1997. ABOUT BANK WITNESSES 34. There are two aspects. One is practice being followed by bank and second is documentation of happening of events. Dak Book Register could not be produced as said earlier. I think there is a reason for these two bank witnesses not to be categorical about "receipt of knowledge of dishonour by complainant on 23rd May, 1997" because there must have thought that their opinion is not supported by document. ABOUT CHEQUE RETURN REGISTER 35. On this background when I have perused only documentary evidence i.e Cheque Return Register for the relevant period, it shows that on 21st May, 1997 there is an entry about return of 10 cheques. It is in the printed format. There is no column by name of signature of recipient of the cheques. There is a column by name initials. On this background when I have read the evidence of witness Kulkarni, I do not find anywhere that he has deposed about obtaining the signature of the complainant on 21st May, 1997 as a token for receipt of those cheques. 36. There is a column by name initials. On this background when I have read the evidence of witness Kulkarni, I do not find anywhere that he has deposed about obtaining the signature of the complainant on 21st May, 1997 as a token for receipt of those cheques. 36. "Buddha Pournima" may fall on different date but if we consider of any year, we find that generally it falls in the month of May. We can certainly infer that Bank are closed on that date. In view of this there is every possibility that cheques could not have been returned on 22nd May, 1997 but were returned immediately on next date i.e. 23rd May, 1997. There is reason to believe that cheque return memo and intimation letter was prepared on 21st May, 1997 but it was delivered on 23rd May, 1997. NOTICE IS SILENT 37. Certainly complainant has not mentioned in the notice dated 6th June, 1997 about date 23rd May, 1997 as the knowledge date but whether it is mandatory to mention that date at that time? I do not think so. The particulars that the cheques are dishonoured and the reason are material. By observing about not mentioning the date of knowledge in the notice, learned trial Judge has put in certain compliance which is not the requirement of law. 38. After failure to make payment filing of complaint is the first stage at which required details are required given to the Court by the complainant. Court is required to satisfy itself that the complaint is filed in time. Court is required to see at the time of issuance of process that averments in the complaint satisfies compliance as laid down in three proviso to Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. So mentioning the date of knowledge in the complaint is the proper stage. I do not give much importance for mentioning the date by hand in a typed matter in the complaint. The complainant has stated this fact on oath also. FINAL CONCLUSION 39. I do not think that the complainant has to be disbelieved merely because he could not support his version by producing documentary evidence through bank witness. The oral evidence from bank witnesses (not accompanied by relevant documents) is sufficient to corroborate the oral evidence of complainant. So for these discussion I disagree with the observations of learned trial Judge. I do not think that the complainant has to be disbelieved merely because he could not support his version by producing documentary evidence through bank witness. The oral evidence from bank witnesses (not accompanied by relevant documents) is sufficient to corroborate the oral evidence of complainant. So for these discussion I disagree with the observations of learned trial Judge. Learned trial Judge has taken too technical view. It was the job of the trial Court to appreciate the oral evidence of the complainant on one hand and oral evidence of two bank witnesses and their documents on the other hand. It seems that the trial court began 'its job of appreciation' with finding fault theory. It is wrong approach. Always you cannot get full proof evidence. We have to consider the evidence in totality. We have to apply the test of prudent man. We have to consider the probabilities, what could have happened, why particular piece of evidence is not forthcoming, is there deliberate attempt to conceal. If it is not there, then the Court should believe it. That is why I say trial Court has failed in this exercise and came to wrong conclusion. 40. Thus there is a reason to interfere in the findings to this issue given by the trial Court. Thus, I hold that complainant got knowledge of dishonour on 23rd May, 1997. As per the principle reiterated in Saketh India Limited (supra) the date 23rd May, 1997 is to be excluded while computing the period of 15 days. So if we compute the period from 24th May, 1997, 6th June, 1997, (date of notice) will be the 14th day. The notice was posted on 6th June, 1997 itself. The postal receipt are at Exhs. 241 to 251. So it is perfectly in time as contemplated by law. LIABILITY OF EVERY ACCUSED 41. So with this findings I have to hold that complainant has proved the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act. The cheques were issued on the account of accused No.1 Company and they are signed by accused Nos.3 and 4. So they are certainly aware about the liability of the company. The acknowledgment for sending of notice to accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 have been duly exhibited. The acknowledgments are at Exh.255, 256 and 257. The cheques were issued on the account of accused No.1 Company and they are signed by accused Nos.3 and 4. So they are certainly aware about the liability of the company. The acknowledgment for sending of notice to accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 have been duly exhibited. The acknowledgments are at Exh.255, 256 and 257. So there is presumption about the knowledge to comply with requisition of the notice. 42. They have not come with the case about repayment of 10 cheques amount. So apart from accused No.1-Company, accused nos.3 and 4 are also guilty for the commission of offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act. POWERS OF APPELLATE COURT 43. As per the powers given under Section 386 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the Appellate Court can alter the finding and on the basis of that can also convict the accused persons. Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is punishable with either two years imprisonment or twice the amount of cheque as a fine or with both. The case is of the year 2005 and the appeal is pending since 2006. Considering the long standing pendency, I am not inclined to impose the sentence of imprisonment on accused nos.3 and 4 but I intended to impose fine on both of them as well as on accused no.1. SENTENCE 44. Total amount of 10 cheques comes to Rs.6,76,620.75. I am intending not to impose the fine to the maximum extent I intend to impose total fine of Rs.10,00,000/-. Out of that amount accused No.1 to pay Rs.3,00,000/- and accused no.3 and 4 to pay Rs.3,50,000/- each. After realisation of the amount, an amount of Rs.9,50,000/- be paid to the complainant for the expenses incurred by him on all counts and for agony suffered by him. Hence, I pass the following order. ORDER (i). Criminal Appeal is allowed. (ii). The Judgment dated 18th November, 2005 passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class in Summary Case No.902 of 1997 is set aside. (iii). Accused Nos.1, 3 and 4/respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 are convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. They are sentenced to pay fine of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rs. Ten Lakhs). (iv). Accused No. 1 is directed to pay fine of Rs.3,00,000/-, Accused Nos. (iii). Accused Nos.1, 3 and 4/respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 are convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. They are sentenced to pay fine of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rs. Ten Lakhs). (iv). Accused No. 1 is directed to pay fine of Rs.3,00,000/-, Accused Nos. 3 and 4 are directed to pay a fine of Rs.3,50,000/- each within three months from the date of this order. Out of deposit of Rs.10,00,000/- the complainant be paid Rs.9,50,000/- from the actual amount deposited before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katol Court. (v). Remaining amount of Rs.50,000/- be credited to the Treasury. (vi). Accused Nos. 3 and 4 are sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months each in case of failure to pay a fine amount of Rs.3,50,000/- each within three months from today. (vii). In case of failure to pay the fine amount within three months, the complainant is at liberty to take steps before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Katol Court. (viii). Record and proceeding be sent back.