JUDGMENT : A.S. Chandurkar, J. Rule. Heard finally with consent of counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners are the original plaintiffs who have challenged the order dated 03.01.2018 passed below Exhibit 30 by which the learned Judge of the Commercial Court, Yavatmal has permitted the respondent no.1 herein to file its written statement beyond the period specified for doing so. 3. The plaintiffs filed suit on 02.02.2017 claiming damages as well as recovery of amounts on account of works done. After the defendant no.4 was duly served, an application at Exhibit 26 under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'the said Act') was filed by it on 17.06.2017. On the same day, another application seeking postponement of filing the written statement till the application at Exhibit 26 was decided was also filed. The said application filed below Exhibit 27 was rejected and hence the request made for postponing the filing of the written statement stood disallowed. On 03.10.2017, the application below Exhibit 26 came to be decided and the request made for referring the dispute for arbitration came to be rejected. Thereafter on 25.10.2017, the defendant no.4 filed an application below Exhibit 30 seeking permission to file its written statement. In that application, it was stated that in view of pendency of the application under Section 8 of the said Act, the written statement could not be filed earlier. The plaintiffs filed its reply to the said application stating therein that since a period of more than 125 days had elapsed from the period prescribed, the defendant no.4 could not be permitted to file its written statement. The trial Court by the impugned order dated 03.01.2018 permitted the defendant no.4 to file its written statement subject to costs of Rupees One Thousand. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs have challenged the aforesaid order. 4. Shri K.S. Narwade, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the suit in question was filed before the Commercial Court in terms of the provisions of Commercial Courts, Commercial Divisions and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (for short, 'the Act of 2015'). The written statement was required to be filed initially within a period of thirty days and thereafter within a further period of ninety days subject to furnishing reasons. Beyond the period of 120 days, the defendant had no right to file its written statement. The written statement was required to be filed initially within a period of thirty days and thereafter within a further period of ninety days subject to furnishing reasons. Beyond the period of 120 days, the defendant had no right to file its written statement. Placing heavy reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. Versus K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Others [Civil Appeal No.1638 of 2019], it was submitted that the legal position in this regard now stands settled. It has been held therein that the period beyond 120 days cannot be extended to enable the defendant to file his written statement. Since the suit was being tried by the Commercial Court under the Act of 2015, the ratio of the said decision clearly applied to the case in hand. The costs awarded were accepted under protest reserving the right to challenge that order. The trial Court therefore had no jurisdiction to extend the period to file the written statement and hence the impugned order was liable to be set aside. 5. Shri V.G. Palshikar, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 supported the impugned order. He submitted that since the written statement was accepted on record by virtue of order dated 03.10.2018 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was dated 12.02.2019, said judgment could not be applied retrospectively. That judgment would apply only to proceedings after 12.02.2019. The written statements accepted earlier were therefore not liable to be discarded by applying the ratio of the said decisions. He further submitted that since the trial Court had not issued summons to all the defendants and as copies of the plaint alongwith accompanying documents were not served on all the defendants, the provisions of Order V Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the Code') could not be applied to the case in hand. It was only after due service of the suit summons that the period for filing the written statement would commence. He then submitted that the plaintiff having accepted the costs of Rupees One Thousand as awarded was precluded from challenging the order dated 03.10.2018. Having accepted the amount of costs, the plaintiffs could not be permitted to turn around and challenge that order thereafter. He then submitted that the plaintiff having accepted the costs of Rupees One Thousand as awarded was precluded from challenging the order dated 03.10.2018. Having accepted the amount of costs, the plaintiffs could not be permitted to turn around and challenge that order thereafter. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. Versus B. Karunakar, etc., AIR 1994 SC 1074 , Goan Real Estate and Construction Ltd. & Another Versus Union of India & Others, (2010) AIR SCW 2671 and Kalinga Mining Corporation Versus Union of India & Others, (2013) 5 SCC 252 . He therefore submitted that the impugned order did not warrant any interference. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance I have also gone through the documents placed on record. After giving due consideration to the respective submissions in my view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 7. Perusal of the Roznama of the proceedings indicates that on 02.02.2017, the plaintiffs filed the aforesaid suit seeking damages and recovery of amounts. On 06.02.2017, the trial Court directed issuance of summons to the defendants. On 27.03.2017, the defendant no.4 entered appearance through its counsel. On the application moved on the said date for supply of copy of the plaint and documents, the trial Court directed the plaintiffs to supply the said documents. On 17.04.2017, an application was moved on behalf of the defendants seeking time to file the written statement. On the next date which was 17.06.2017, the applications at Exhibits 26 and 27 referred to above came to be filed. These applications were ultimately decided on 03.10.2017 and the trial Court rejected both the applications. It is thereafter that on 25.10.2017, the defendant no.4 sought permission to file its written statement beyond the period of 120 days. That application has been allowed on 03.01.2018. In the light of the fact that the defendant no.4 entered its appearance on 27.03.2017 through counsel and the trial Court on the same day directed the plaintiffs to furnish a copy of the plaint alongwith documents to the defendants, the submission as urged on behalf of the defendant no.4 that in absence of suit summons being served on the defendant no.4, the period to file the written statement would not commence cannot be accepted. When the defendant no.4 was duly represented by its counsel who filed Vakalatnama on the same day, the service on said defendant was complete. Moreover, the trial Court also directed supply of the plaint and accompanying documents to the said defendants on the same day. 8. It is undisputed that the permission to file written statement was sought beyond the period of 120 days from 27.03.2017. Such request was made after a period of about 125 days. The question to be considered therefore is whether on expiry of 120 days, the Commercial Court had jurisdiction to extend the time prescribed for filing written statement. In M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question as to whether after coming into force of the Act of 2015 which resulted in certain amendments to the Code, the time to file written statement beyond the period of 120 days could be extended. It was held that the provisions of the Code as amended in view of coming into force of the Act of 2015 were mandatory in nature. In the facts of that case also the trial Court on 05.12.2017 accepted the written statement on record beyond the period of 120 days. It was held that considering the mandatory nature of the provisions, such time could not be extended and therefore the written statement which was already taken on record was directed to be taken off. It is found that the facts of the present case are somewhat identical to the facts of the case in the said decision. The ratio of the decision in M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) squarely applies to the case in hand. On that count, the impugned order permitting the written statement to be taken on record is liable to be set aside. The costs have been accepted under protest by the plaintiffs by reserving the right to challenge the order dated 03.10.2017. Hence, such acceptance of costs cannot therefore preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the order dated 03.10.2018. 9. The last contention raised by the defendant no.4 is that since the written statement was already accepted by the trial Court on 03.10.2018 and the judgment of the Supreme Court was dated 12.02.2019, the same could not be applied to the proceedings decided earlier. 9. The last contention raised by the defendant no.4 is that since the written statement was already accepted by the trial Court on 03.10.2018 and the judgment of the Supreme Court was dated 12.02.2019, the same could not be applied to the proceedings decided earlier. This contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the provisions of the Code as amended by virtue of the Act of 2015 coming into force have been held to be mandatory in nature. When provisions existing in the statute book are interpreted to have mandatory effect it would only mean that since the day the said provisions came into force, they were mandatory in nature. Reference in this regard can be usefully made to the observations in paragraph 59 of the decision in Lily Thomas & Others Versus Union of India & Others, (2000) 6 SCC 224 :- "59. ......... It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the court does not legislate but only gives an interpretation to an existing law........" Moreover, it has not been held in M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that the said decision would operate prospectively. In that view of the matter, it will have to be held that with the coming into force of the Act of 2015, the defendant in a Commercial suit was not entitled to file written statement beyond the period of 120 days. The ratio of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 therefore cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Thus, in the light of the ratio of the aforesaid decision, it becomes clear that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to permit the defendant no.4 to file its written statement after the period of 120 days. The impugned order is therefore without jurisdiction. 10. Hence, on that count, the order passed below Exhibit 30 in Special Civil Suit No.1 of 2017 on 03.01.2018 is set aside. The trial Court shall take off the written statement of the defendant no.4 that has been placed on record. 11. The Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. No costs.