JUDGMENT S M Modak, J. - This is the case, wherein both the parties have undertaken the responsibility of discharging the burden on themselves. The complainant examined himself and banker of the accused, whereas, the accused examined himself and one witness, who was present at the material time. In that sense of the matter, I have said that both have undertaken the responsibility. At the end of the trial, the accused succeeded in satisfying the Court to give a verdict in his favour. Resultantly, the accused was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as "N.I. Act" for short). 2. So, this Court is required to decide, whether the trial Court was right in answering the issue of liability against the complainant. This happened in S.C.C. No.2837/2005. The Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class No.5, Nagpur gave verdict as said above on 19/08/2006. It is challenged at the instance of the complainant before this Court. 3. I get an opportunity to hear learned Advocate Shri S.H. Quazi for the appellant and learned Advocate Shri R.M. Patwardhan for the respondent-accused. Through their assistance, I have perused the record. There is no dispute about asking of hand-loan by the accused from the complainant. There is no dispute about the purpose of loan being purchase of plot. The dispute pertains to the amount of loan. According to the complainant, it was Rs.75,000/-, whereas according to the accused, it was only Rs.20,000/-. 4. The next area of dispute is on account of Hero Honda Splendor, two wheeler vehicle. There is no dispute about handing over it''s custody to the complainant. The dispute pertains to the mode in which the complainant was put in custody. According to the complainant, he purchased it from the accused for a total consideration of Rs.32,000/-. Rs.20,000/- was paid at the time of taking custody and Rs.12,000/- was paid on 11/12/2002 when writing was prepared. Whereas, according to the accused, the custody was given not by way of sale, but complainant took custody towards the security for repayment of the loan. Defence of Accused 5. From reading the record, the defence of the accused in nutshell is as follows : While taking loan of Rs.20,000/-, he handed over two blank cheques and two blank stamp papers duly signed by him to the complainant. They were given on 15/12/2002. Defence of Accused 5. From reading the record, the defence of the accused in nutshell is as follows : While taking loan of Rs.20,000/-, he handed over two blank cheques and two blank stamp papers duly signed by him to the complainant. They were given on 15/12/2002. The Hero Honda Splendor motorcycle was handed over towards security as the complainant was asking for return of money. There was no intention to sell it and that is why the complainant has not transferred it in his name. The accused indirectly wants to suggest that contents of the cheque in question and documents about sale of Splendor motorcycle were filled in by the complainant to suit his purpose. 6. As said above, the trial Court has concluded about the rebuttal of presumption by the accused and acquitted him. The said judgment is challenged on various grounds. They are as follows : (a) Overlooking the provisions of the N.I. Act which authorizes the payee to complete the instrument. (b) Admitting the purpose of loan and considering other sums raised by the accused for purchase of plot, it is but plausible to borrow Rs.75,000/- by the accused. (c) The agreement about the vehicle is on stamp-paper of Rs.50/- and it falsifies the accused'' suggestion that he has signed the blank stamp papers of the value of Rs.20/- and Rs.100/-. (d) Unreliability of evidence of witness Anil Bansiram Chavan, particularly in view of his relationship, his antecedent and answers given during cross-examination. 7. To buttress his submission, appellant''s Advocate relied upon the following judgments : (i) K.N. Beena vs. Maniyappan and another, (2001) AIR SC 2895. (ii) S. Ponnusamy @ S.P. Samy vs. K. Mani, (2016) 1 DCR 70. (iii) Purushottam s/o Maniklal Gandhi vs. Manohar K. Deshmukh and another, (2007) 1 MhLJ 210 . 8. On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri R.M. Patwardhan for the respondent-accused supported the judgments for the following reasons :- (i) There is a time gap in between date of taking the loan i.e. 15/12/2002 and the date put on the cheque as 12/07/2004. (ii) Absence of any document to show the amount of loan was Rs.75,000/- (and not Rs.20,000/-). (iii) Not transferring Splendor motorcycle in his own name by the complainant. (iv) Stand made clear in the notice reply. (v) Not clarifying in his evidence to rebut the grounds taken in the notice reply. (ii) Absence of any document to show the amount of loan was Rs.75,000/- (and not Rs.20,000/-). (iii) Not transferring Splendor motorcycle in his own name by the complainant. (iv) Stand made clear in the notice reply. (v) Not clarifying in his evidence to rebut the grounds taken in the notice reply. (vi) There is difference in between handwriting of the signature of the cheque on one hand and other contents on the other hand. 9. He relied upon the following judgments : (i) Kamala S. vs. Vidhyadharan M.J. and another, (2007) 5 SCC 264 . (ii) Ghanshyamdas Lalchand Chandak vs. Sheikh Hamid Sheikh Gulab & Anr., (2018) AllMR(Cri) 2436. (iii) Jay Gramgita Gramin Bigarsheti Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit, Donduda vs., (2019) AllMR(Cri) 1155. Scope for Interference 10. Amongst these judgments, the judgment in the case of Kamala S. (supra) deals with issue about extent of interference by the High Court in the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court. It will be material to consider the ratio laid down therein initially itself. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has laid emphasis on how the approach of the High Court will be. There are two aspects, one is the judgment of acquittal shall not ordinarily be interfered with, when two views are possible and the second is, if the findings are to be set aside, there has to be certain reasonings. Whereas, in the judgment of Purushottam Gandhi (supra) relied upon by the appellant, the issue of interference by the appellate Court was also involved. This Court was pleased to differentiate in between acquittal involving an offence like assault on one hand and an offence in respect of issuance and delivery of negotiable instrument on the other hand. This Court intends to lay down a proposition that the Court should not start hearing the appeal with an intent that the appellant Court has to be slow in interfering. It is further observed as under : "But, in respect of issuance and delivery of a negotiable instrument, about which apart from the factual aspects there are statutory presumptions as well, this proposition may not be valid. Therefore, it may be necessary for an Appellate Court to find out as to what facts are established, and whether on the basis of such fact, any presumption get attracted or rebutted in order to draw appropriate inferences." Rebuttal of Presumption 11. Therefore, it may be necessary for an Appellate Court to find out as to what facts are established, and whether on the basis of such fact, any presumption get attracted or rebutted in order to draw appropriate inferences." Rebuttal of Presumption 11. Whereas, Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of K.N. Beena (supra) was pleased to find out under what circumstances it can be said that the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act can be said to be rebutted by the accused. There are certain riders observed in that behalf. Simply denying the liability in a notice reply and just giving formal evidence does not amount to rebutting the presumption. This Court has dealt with an issue of shouldering and discharging of onus in the cases of Ghanshyamdas Chandak and Jay Gramgita Gramin Bigarsheti Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit (cited supra). After reading them, the following principles emerge :- (i) The burden on the accused is not heavy as that of complainant. (ii) Accused can discharge the burden by applying the test of preponderance of probability. (iii) It can be discharged on the basis of available material. (iv) It can be discharged by way of cross-examining the complainant and in a given case, it can be discharged by giving evidence too. Provisions of Law 12. The complainant can very well take the help of a presumption as laid down under Sections 139 and 118 of the N.I. Act. The principles laid down in Section 139 are as follows : (i) When holder of a cheque received the cheque, it shall be presumed that it is for the discharge of debt or liability (i.e. legally enforceable). (ii) This presumption is operative till drawer/accused proves to the contrary. This presumption is subject to the facts proved to the contrary. Whereas, Section 118 lays down the following presumptions. (i) There is always a consideration for the negotiable instrument. (ii) It was drawn on the date on the cheque. The above presumptions are always subject to facts proved to the contrary. 13. So, the law itself permits an accused person to prove that there is no passing of a consideration from the complainant to himself and, hence, cheque was not issued towards discharge of that consideration. He may also prove that the negotiable instrument including the cheque was not drawn on the date written on the cheque. 13. So, the law itself permits an accused person to prove that there is no passing of a consideration from the complainant to himself and, hence, cheque was not issued towards discharge of that consideration. He may also prove that the negotiable instrument including the cheque was not drawn on the date written on the cheque. Findings of the Trial Court (i) Issuance of blank cheque and blank stamp paper towards security of the hand loan of Rs.20,000/- is more probable. (ii) The complainant and the accused were having commercial relationship and, hence, it is not expected to give the huge amount without any writing and interest. (iii) When there was an agreement to repay the amount within three months, it is unexpected that the person will wait for payment for long period. (iv) Transaction is dated 15/12/2002, whereas cheque bears the date as 12/07/2004. (v) Different pens are used for writing contents of cheque in question (Exh.26) on one hand and signature on it on the other hand. (vi) Different pens are used for writing contents of the agreement and signature on Exh.34. (vii) Splendor motorcycle was not transferred in his name by the complainant for more than two years from agreement dated 11/12/2002. (viii) The facts deposed before the Court are also pleaded in the notice reply by the accused. (ix) Defence witness Anil has corroborated the version of the accused about issuing blank cheques and stamp papers as a security. (x) Mere relationship of the witness with the accused is not sufficient to discard his evidence. (xi) It is improbable that for paying the consideration of Rs.1,60,000/-, the accused will take Rs.75,000/- towards loan being half of Rs.1,60,000/-. (xii) No steps were taken by the complainant for recovery of the amount till the time of issuance of a cheque. (xiii) No interest is claimed on a huge amount of Rs.75,000/-. (xiv) Possibility of exercise of dominance by the lender/ complainant while accepting blank cheques and blank stamp papers. (xv) There is no entry about advancing loan of Rs.75,000/- to the accused in the income tax return. (xvi) Merely admitting the signature marked as Portion "A" and Portion "B" at Exh.34, acknowledgment/agreement for sale of Splendor (wrongly mentioned as Exh.20 in paragraph 19) does not amount to admitting rest of the contents of Exh.34. 14. (xv) There is no entry about advancing loan of Rs.75,000/- to the accused in the income tax return. (xvi) Merely admitting the signature marked as Portion "A" and Portion "B" at Exh.34, acknowledgment/agreement for sale of Splendor (wrongly mentioned as Exh.20 in paragraph 19) does not amount to admitting rest of the contents of Exh.34. 14. After reading the judgment and considering the findings of the trial Court (as narrated above), I find that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence. This is not the case in which the accused has taken defence of simply denying the liability or simply denying the compliance of the procedure. Whereas, this is the case, which involves perfect balancing of the material that is to say one piece of evidence relied upon by the complainant on one hand and another piece of evidence or the interpretation of the evidence relied upon by the complainant. What I find is that, the trial Court has not committed any fault in doing that exercise and coming to the conclusion. I will give the reasons for that. Reasoning 15. Even though, the accused comes with the defence of issuing blank cheques and signing on blank documents, the complainant does not admit it. Whereas, he comes with the case that he has accepted the cheques and the stamp papers both complied in all respects. I am saying so, on the basis of answers given by the complainant during cross-examination and cross-examining the accused. To certain extent, learned Advocate for the respondent-accused is right in his submission that the complainant in his evidence has not clarified how the defence taken by the accused in his notice reply was false. I also do agree that the complainant in his complaint or in his evidence ought to have clarified how the points raised in the notice reply are incorrect or false. However, the Court has to look into the entire evidence for ascertaining what is the case of a party. 16. When these issues are agitated before the learned trial Court, the trial Court has undertaken the task of comparing two documents, one is the cheque at Exh.16 and another is the document at Exh.34. The trial Court found the handwriting of the signature on one hand and the hand writing of the contents of the cheque on the other hand in a different ink (paragraph 9 of the judgment). The trial Court found the handwriting of the signature on one hand and the hand writing of the contents of the cheque on the other hand in a different ink (paragraph 9 of the judgment). Similar are the observations in respect of document/receipt at Exh.34 (paragraph 13 of the judgment). 17. It is true that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act and particularly Section 73 empowers the Court to compare the handwriting. There are certain restraints on exercise of such power by the Court. So, I have restrained myself from undergoing that exercise. But, one can certainly say that the complainant has denied giving of a blank cheque by the accused. 18. It is undisputed fact that in order to prove that Rs.75,000/- was advanced by the complainant, except the cheque, the complainant has not produced any document. For example, any receipt, promissory note, any other acknowledgment. The only document produced in support is the intimation given by the Income Tax Authority to the complainant under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act (Exh.30). This was produced by the complainant when certain questions were put during cross-examination. The reason suggested by the accused to the complainant during cross-examination for absence of entry in Income Tax Return is not advancing loan of Rs.75,000/- to the accused. The complainant produced the said intimation. It is his choice about which document he should produce. He has chosen to produce the said intimation, but it does not contain any advancement of loan of Rs.75,000/- to the accused or outstanding of that amount. I does not support his claim. 19. It is also true that there is nothing in the evidence to suggest in what manner Rs.75,000/- was advanced to the accused. That is to say by way of cash or cheque or by any other mode. When the accused has taken a specific stand of receiving Rs.20,000/- only, it was more necessary for the complainant at least to show the amount advanced was Rs.75,000/- and manner in which it was advanced (and not Rs.20,000/-). It is also true that the accused has produced neither of them. He received only Rs.20,000/-. 20. The trial Court has also laid more emphasis on the timegap in between the date of advancement of loan i.e. 15/12/2002 and the date of cheque as 12/07/2004. It is also true that the accused has produced neither of them. He received only Rs.20,000/-. 20. The trial Court has also laid more emphasis on the timegap in between the date of advancement of loan i.e. 15/12/2002 and the date of cheque as 12/07/2004. It is also true that from 15/12/2002, there is no letter produced from the complainant thereby at least demanding or reminding the accused about Rs.75,000/- being advance. So, I agree with the learned Magistrate about rebuttal of presumption by the accused. It is a settled law that the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act can be rebutted by actually adducing the evidence or by circumstantial evidence. 21. Though the complainant does not come with the case of receiving a blank cheque, during oral argument, judgments in case of S. Ponnusamy and in the case of Purushottam Gandhi were relied upon by him. In paragraph 8 of the judgment in case of Purushottam Gandhi, there is a discussion about the factual aspect. The complainant had come with the case of advancing the loan whereas the accused accepted receipt of entire amount, but gave an explanation that it is for the purpose of repaying the expenses incurred by him on account of construction (paragraph 5). There is marked difference in between the facts of that case and this case. In that case, the accused has accepted the liability for entire amount, whereas in this case, there is acceptance of liability for part of the amount. So, I do not think that the observations in that judgment will be useful to the complainant. 22. This is also true in the case of S. Ponnusamy. The inference drawn in that case about drawing of a presumption under Section 118 of the N.I. Act on the background of admitting the signature on the cheque is based upon the facts of that case. It was not the case wherein there was only a document in the form of a cheque. The signature on which, is admitted by the accused. It was preceded by a document of promissory note. This is not the case before us, except the cheque, there is no preceding document. Ultimately, on the basis of a promissory note, there can be a presumption of passing of consideration. We cannot draw a presumption about passing of a consideration on the basis of a cheque. It was preceded by a document of promissory note. This is not the case before us, except the cheque, there is no preceding document. Ultimately, on the basis of a promissory note, there can be a presumption of passing of consideration. We cannot draw a presumption about passing of a consideration on the basis of a cheque. So, I am afraid that the case of S. Ponnusamy will be helpful to the accused. Handing over custody of Splendor 23. The complainant claims that this is a transaction separate from advancing the loan, whereas the accused claims that the transaction of sale of a vehicle is concocted / false story. It is pertinent to note that the receipt/document at Exh.34 was tendered in evidence after the complainant completed his evidence. He was recalled by the learned Magistrate by exercising power under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is true that the complainant also filed supporting documents in the form of battery guarantee card, insurance receipt for that vehicle. The accused also described this receipt signed by him when no contents were written in it. The learned Magistrate found that the handwriting of signature marked as "A" and marked as "B" are similar. It bears the date as 11/12/2002 for execution. This is four days earlier to advancement of loan. When the loan was advanced on 15/12/2002, how come there can be a receipt on 11/12/2002. This is the only factor which is overlooked by the trial Court. Because, I do not find any observation to that effect. Even, I do not find any explanation from the accused why Exh.34 was signed four days earlier to 15/12/2002. 24. But, there are other circumstances, which create doubts about the bona fides of the complainant in that behalf. Because, admittedly the vehicle was not transferred in the name of the complainant in the R.T.O. If the said transaction is different from that alleged by the accused (and is only a purchase), why not the vehicle was transferred. This receipt is not relied upon by the complainant to show advancement of loan of Rs.75,000/- (but only for purchase of vehicle). 25. The accused in his cross-examination was confronted with his signatures appearing at bottom of front page and back page of the receipt/agreement at Exh.34. He admits those signatures belonging to him. This receipt is not relied upon by the complainant to show advancement of loan of Rs.75,000/- (but only for purchase of vehicle). 25. The accused in his cross-examination was confronted with his signatures appearing at bottom of front page and back page of the receipt/agreement at Exh.34. He admits those signatures belonging to him. I think that there are reasons to believe that Exh.34 does not reflect the transaction of purchase and sale of the Splendor. 26. The complainant admits of not issuing a notice to the accused for transferring the vehicle. He admits of not obtaining T.T.O. Form. The evidence of the complainant is also silent about the payment of installments to be made on account of loan for that Splendor vehicle. A person, who has purchased a vehicle, will definitely take steps for its transfer in his name at the earliest. This is a conduct of a prudent man. This circumstances mentioned above are inconsistent with the conduct of a prudent man, who has agreed to purchase a vehicle. 27. Even otherwise whether the Splendor was handed over to the complainant towards the incident of sale or whether it was by way of security does not really affect the liability based upon the dishonour of cheque. Because, if it is really a transaction of sale, as such it has no connection with the liability founded upon the cheque. If the Splendor is handed over towards the security, it will also not materially affect the liability founded upon the dishonour of cheque. Because accused does not say that liability of Rs.20,000/- has come to an end by appropriating motorcycle for that. So, the outcome of appreciation of the evidence on this issue as such does not affect the decision of this appeal. Evidence of Anil Chavan 28. Examining a witness Anil Chavan on this point is for the purpose of corroboration. It is true that his evidence cannot be verified on the touchstone of availability of the documentary evidence. So, can we believe his evidence as a gospel truth? Certainly not. But, the burden on the accused is not as heavy as that of complainant. The test of preponderance of probabilities is applicable. He is a relative of the accused. He was externed by the Police. On these grounds, the complainant has challenged his evidence. But, his cross-examination does not go to the extent of disbelieving him totally. Certainly not. But, the burden on the accused is not as heavy as that of complainant. The test of preponderance of probabilities is applicable. He is a relative of the accused. He was externed by the Police. On these grounds, the complainant has challenged his evidence. But, his cross-examination does not go to the extent of disbelieving him totally. I find some truth in his evidence. Final Conclusion 29. So, if considered together (evidence of complainant and the accused), I find the defence of the accused as probable. There is a reason to believe that the cheque at Exh.16 was a blank cheque and only contained the signature of the accused. Except cheque, there is no document to show passing of consideration of Rs.75,000/- to the accused. So, it can safely be said that the accused is successful in rebutting the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. For the above discussions, I do not find any merit in the grounds agitated before me. So, I am not inclined to interfere in the findings and in the conclusion drawn by the trial Court. There is no merit in the appeal. 30. Hence, the appeal stands dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.