JUDGMENT 1. Appellant-State has filed this appeal challenging the judgment dated 3.6.2014 passed by the trial court, whereby, respondents were acquitted of the charges framed against them. 2. We have heard learned state counsel and learned counsel for the respondents and have gone through the record available on the file carefully. 3. Respondents had faced trial qua offence punishable under Sections 302, 120-B, 201 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as MPC) in FIR No.320 dated 19.07.2010 registered at Police Station Mansarovar, District Jaipur City (East) under Section 302 IPC. 4. Prosecution story was set in motion on the basis of the statement of Shaktidan to the effect that a dead body had been found in the drain. Thereafter, dead body was sent for postmortem examination. As per the postmortem examination report, Exhibit P-7, cause of the death of the deceased was shock due to injury to vital organs and excessive blood loss. 5. After thorough investigation of the case, challan was presented against the respondents. 6. As per the prosecution story, respondents had committed murder of Shashi Bhushan as respondent Anita Devi (wife of deceased Shashi Bhushan) was having illicit relations with respondent Ashok. However, during trial, material witnesses apart from PW-8 had not supported the prosecution case. 7. PW-8 Dhruvnath Thakur deposed that the deceased was his brother. Deceased Shashi Bhushan had got married to Anita Devi about three years back. Shashi Bhushan was doing timber business. On 10.07.2010 Shahshi Bhushan had told him on phone that he had caught his wife red-handed in a compromising position with Ashok. Ashok was a relative of Anita Devi. When he (Shashi Bhushan) informed his father-in-law about the said incident, his father-in-law abused Shashi Bhushan. Father-in-law of Shashi Bhushan also scolded his daughter. Due to this reason, respondents in connivance with each other threatened Shahshi Bhushan with dire consequences. On 16.07.2010 at about 8.00 p.m., they received information that Shashi Bhushan had died. Witnesses further stated that all the respondents in connivance with each other had committed the murder of the deceased. However, the said witness in his cross-examination deposed that he had never stayed with Anita and Shashi Bhushan at Jaipur. His brother Shashi Bhushan had made a phone-call to him on his mobile-phone from some other number, but he could not tell the said number. He had not disclosed his own phone number to the police. However, the said witness in his cross-examination deposed that he had never stayed with Anita and Shashi Bhushan at Jaipur. His brother Shashi Bhushan had made a phone-call to him on his mobile-phone from some other number, but he could not tell the said number. He had not disclosed his own phone number to the police. He had disclosed the phone number from which he had received call from his brother, but the said number was not mentioned in his statement Exhibit D-4. He further stated that when the accused had threatened his brother on 10.07.2010, he had not made any effort for protection of his brother. He had stated in his statement to the police under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that Shashi Bhushan had been threatened with dire consequences, but the said fact was not mentioned in Exhibit D-4. He had named the accused on the basis of suspicion. 8. Hence, in the present case, learned Trial Court rightly held that no reliance could be placed on the testimony of PW-8. The said witness had named the respondents only on the basis of suspicion. Suspicion how-so-ever strong cannot take the place of proof. Statement of PW-8 is not corroborated by any other evidence on record. The other material witnesses had not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 9. In these circumstances, learned Trial Court had rightly ordered the acquittal of the respondents of the charges framed against them. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allarakha K. Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Criminal) 748, has held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. 11. Similarly, in Mrinal Das & others vs. The State of Tripura 2011 (9) Supreme Court Cases 479, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into various judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: "It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons", for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed" 12. Hence, no ground for interference by court is made out. Dismissed.