JUDGMENT Mr. Harsimran Singh Sethi, J.:- In the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging order dated 22.08.2008 (Annexure P-31), by which the petitioner was imposed with a punishment of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect and integrity of the petitioner was recorded as doubtful for the years 2004-05. The petitioner is also challenging order dated 19.04.2012 (Annexure P-39), by which his appeal has been dismissed. 2. Though, the impugned orders are being challenged on various grounds, but on the last date of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that against the order dated 22.08.2008, by which the punishment was imposed upon him by the Vice Chancellor, the petitioner had filed appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Board of Management but the Board rejected the said appeal in its 227th meeting held on 29.12.2008 while considering item No.B-4. Counsel for the petitioner argues that while Appellate Authority was considering his appeal against the order passed by the Vice Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor participated in the meeting of the Board, which vitiated the process of deciding his appeal and, therefore, decision of the Appellate Authority taken in respect of item No. B-4 in its 227th meeting held on 29.12.2008 is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 3. On the last date of hearing, the following orders were passed:- “Apart from the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for petitioner to challenge the order of punishment, he argues that appeal filed by the petitioner against the imposition of penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect vide order dated 20.08.2008/22.08.2008 (Annexure P-31) was decided by the Board of Management in their meeting, wherein Vice Chancellor was a part of the said Board of Management, though the appeal filed by the petitioner was against the order of Vice Chancellor and this action of respondents, is contrary to law. Learned counsel for the respondents seeks an adjournment so as to verify the fact that when item No. B-4 relating to the appeal filed by the petitioner was taken up, whether Vice Chancellor participated in the proceedings or not? Let an affidavit in this regard be filed by the respondents before the next date of hearing. Adjourned to 03.09.2019.” 4. Learned counsel for the respondents seeks an adjournment so as to verify the fact that when item No. B-4 relating to the appeal filed by the petitioner was taken up, whether Vice Chancellor participated in the proceedings or not? Let an affidavit in this regard be filed by the respondents before the next date of hearing. Adjourned to 03.09.2019.” 4. In pursuance to the order, an affidavit of the Registrar of the respondent/University has been filed in the Court today and in the said affidavit, it has been clearly stated that while deciding item No.B-4 relating to the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the then Vice Chancellor of the University in the meeting of the Board of Management, the Vice Chancellor was present. 5. As per the settled principle of law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Amar Nath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite and Co. Ltd., 2002 AIR (SC) 678, an officer against whose order an appeal has been preferred, cannot participate in the proceedings, where the appeal is being decided. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under:- “5. One of the arguments raised by Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, is that the order of removal having been passed by the Disciplinary Authority - Shri S. Krishnaswami, who was then the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company, was disqualified to have presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board which heard and dismissed the appeal and, therefore, the order of the Appellate Au thority was vitiated on account of legal bias. We find substance in the argument. It is not disputed that Shri S.Krishnaswami was then the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company. It is also not disputed that Shri Krishnaswami was also the Disciplinary Authority w ho passed the order of removal against the appellant. The question, therefore, arises whether the proceedings of the Board was vitiated on account of participation of the Disciplinary Authority while deciding the appeal preferred by the appellant. 6. One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. 6. One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as ’Debet esse Judex in Propria Causa’, which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kind and form. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid form of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation) Punjab and others vs. Harbhajan Singh - 1996 (9) SCC 281 , it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an Appellate Authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in conformity with law. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company acted as a Disciplinary Authority as well as an Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of the appellant. Such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. In a situation where such a dual function is discharged by one and the same authority, unless permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision, the same would be contrary to rule against bias. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of the matter, in the present case, fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswmai, the then Chairman-cum- Managing Director of the Company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant.” 6. Faced with this situation, counsel for the respondent/University very fairly states that order dated 18.02.2012 (Annexure P-37) may be treated as withdrawn with liberty to pass a fresh order deciding the appeal filed by the petitioner dated 29.03.2012 (Annexure P-38) against the order of the Vice Chancellor. 7. In view thereof, the present writ petition is disposed of at this stage with liberty to the respondent/University to decide the appeal of the petitioner dated 29.03.2012 (Annexure P-38) afresh in accordance with law by passing an appropriate speaking order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Needless to say, in case the petitioner is aggrieved, he will have the liberty to avail an appropriate remedy against the order of the respondent/University, in case same causes prejudice to him.