JUDGMENT : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. 1. The present challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been taken out against an order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata, affirming an order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whereby it had directed the Chairman, Assets Sale Committee to disburse the interest on delayed payment of gratuity to the employees as per the report of the Chartered Accountant, L.B. Jha & Co. The said disbursement was directed not to exceed forty per cent of the sale proceeds, that is, Rs. 15,00,10,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Crore Ten Thousand) and in any case not to exceed the outer limit fixed, that is, Rs. 20 crore, for the employees. 2. The said order of the tribunal was based on a previous consent order dated February 11, 2004, recording a settlement arrived at between the parties to several original proceedings pending before the Kolkata Debts Recovery Tribunal. A consortium of five banks, out of which the present opposite party no. 1 was one, the present petitioner, namely, Amrita Bazaar Patrika (the employer) and its sister concerns, who were the principal borrowers and the guarantors, were parties to the said proceedings, although the employees, represented by the opposite party no. 2, were not. 3. The crux of the agreement between the parties was recorded in paragraph no. 5 of the said consent order dated February 11, 2004, which is set out below: “(5) The parties have agreed to settle the decretal amounts of United Bank of India (T.A. No. 18 of 1997, T.A. No. 19 of 1997) and the claims of the applicant banks in OA No. 192 of 1997, OA No. 193 of 1997 and O.A. No. 275 of 1997 in the following manner: (a) The consortium banks have agreed to settle their respective claims against the defendants by accepting the following amounts by 30th June, 2004. (i) Rs. 2439.65 lakhs by United Bank of India (ii) Rs. 304.35 lakhs by Canara Bank (iii) Rs. 303.13 lakhs by Bank of Baroda (iv) Rs. 228.16 lakhs by Allahabad Bank (v) Rs. 230.67 lakhs by Punjab National Bank (vi) Rs. 57 lacs towards legal expenses incurred by the consortium banks. Besides the above, payment of Rs. 2439.65 lacs to be received by United Bank of India: United Bank of India will also receive Rs. 303.13 lakhs by Bank of Baroda (iv) Rs. 228.16 lakhs by Allahabad Bank (v) Rs. 230.67 lakhs by Punjab National Bank (vi) Rs. 57 lacs towards legal expenses incurred by the consortium banks. Besides the above, payment of Rs. 2439.65 lacs to be received by United Bank of India: United Bank of India will also receive Rs. 150 lacs towards settlement of its dues in respect of Allahabad Patrika Ltd. in O.A. 275 of 1997 out of the sale proceeds. In addition to the same, the United Bank of India, the applicant herein will also receive the cost of publication, payment of valuers' remuneration etc. incurred by it in connection with the sale of the assets/properties out of the sale proceeds. (b) A committee consisting of the Receiver Mr. K.P. Mishra already appointed by the Tribunal and one representative from each of the applicants and one representative representing the three companies viz. Amrita Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad Patrika Ltd. and Jugantar Ltd. and one representative from defendant No. 4 to 9 will take possession of all the hypothecated assets and mortgaged properties being the securities of the applicant banks and they will dispose of in the best possible manner as expeditiously as possible. The quorum of the committee will be four members present and any decision of the majority will be binding on all the parties. The receiver will be the Chairman of the Committee. (c) Out of the sale proceeds of hypothecated assets and mortgaged properties as contained in Annexure I & II of to-day's joint petition the committee would pay (i) 40% to the applicant banks (consortium banks): (ii) 40% of the sale proceeds of the assets will be paid to the workers/employees towards their dues to the maximum extent of Rs. 15 crore; (iii) 20% of the sale proceeds will be utilised by the said three companies for meeting various dues of other creditors. (d) After the dues of workers/employees to the extent of Rs. 15 crores are paid the sharing of the sale proceeds between the applicants (consortium banks) and the three companies (Amrita Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad Patrika Ltd. and Jugantar Ltd.) will be in proportion of 70 : 30. (d) After the dues of workers/employees to the extent of Rs. 15 crores are paid the sharing of the sale proceeds between the applicants (consortium banks) and the three companies (Amrita Bazar Patrika Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad Patrika Ltd. and Jugantar Ltd.) will be in proportion of 70 : 30. In the event the sale proceeds exceeds the valuation price, the excess amount shall be shared in the ratio of 40% to the consortium banks and 60% to the companies and the workers/employees as per their arrangements. Further in the event the workers/employees dues turn out to be more than Rs. 15 crores, the additional amount payable to the workers/employees will be made out of the share of the company from sale proceeds. (e) The Committee will continue to function for the purpose of realization of the claims of the applicant banks from the hypothecated assets and mortgaged properties mentioned in Annexure I & II of the joint petition filed to-day till completion of sale of the all the assets. (f) The Committee will disburse the sale proceeds of the assets and properties of the respondents mentioned in annexures I & II of the joint petition and distribute the same among the applicants in proportion of their settled dues mentioned above. In the event the committee fails to function and discharge its duties in accordance with the aforesaid terms and conditions then the Receiver will carry out the functions of the committees alone and make disbursement according to the agreement herein.” 4. Learned counsel for the employers/petitioners argues that interest on gratuity was not covered by the expression “dues” towards the workers/employees. It is argued that the determination of the amount of gratuity and consequentially the interest for non-payment of the same are governed by Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1972 Act”). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the liability of the employer to pay gratuity only arises when a person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the act or his authorized agent sends a written application to the employer within the time and in the form as may be prescribed for payment of such gratuity, as envisaged in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the 1972 Act. 5. 5. Section 7(2) of the 1972 Act stipulates that as soon as gratuity becomes payable (which is with reference to Sub-section (1) of the said section), the employer shall determine the amount of gratuity and give notice, thereby setting in motion the rest of the section. 6. It is further submitted that where there is a dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, payment of gratuity, the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the Controlling Authority for deciding the dispute, as envisaged in Section 7(4) (b) of the 1972 Act. Upon such application, the Controlling Authority shall, after due enquiry and after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing, determine the matter or matters in dispute and direct the payment of the amount assessed to be payable. 7. It is thus argued that, in the present case, the entitlement of the employees to get gratuity did not arise on the passing of the order dated February 11, 2004, directing the dues of the employees to be paid. Only an entitlement to claim such dues emanated from the said order. Such right was inchoate at that juncture and would have reached fruition only on the employees' fulfilling their part of the duty cast upon them by law, by making an application under Section 7 (1) of the 1972 Act and not otherwise. Such right was thus waivable at the instance of the employees. 8. In the present case, the employees represented by opposite party no. 2 did not take any such measure and as such, their entitlement to get gratuity did not arise at all. Payment of gratuity having been disbursed by the Assets Sale Committee, no fault could be attributed to the employer for non-payment of gratuity in time, more so since no valid claim for gratuity had been raised at all by the employees under Section 7 of the 1972 Act. 9. Moreover, the debts recovery tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the quantum of interest payable on gratuity since it pertained to a dispute with regard to the amount of gratuity payable and a claim of, or in relation to such payment. 9. Moreover, the debts recovery tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the quantum of interest payable on gratuity since it pertained to a dispute with regard to the amount of gratuity payable and a claim of, or in relation to such payment. Such jurisdiction vested solely in the Controlling Authority under the 1972 Act and as such, the tribunal acted without jurisdiction in directing the payment of interest on gratuity. 10. It is further argued that the order dated February 11, 2004 restricted the payment of the employees and dues to a maximum of Rs. 15 crore and only in the event such dues turned out to be more than Rs. 15 crore, the additional amount payable to the workers/employees would be paid out of the share of the company from the sale proceeds. Such liability of the company, that is, the employer/petitioner, necessarily had to be preceded by an element of the negligence on the part of the employer to fulfill its duties as cast by law. Since the employees did not make out any case of the petitioner being at fault for non-payment of gratuity in time and in view of the employees having never made any claim in accordance with law, the tribunal ought not have directed interest on gratuity to be paid to the employees, which could ultimately lead to a drain of the share of the petitioner-company from the sale proceeds, without any fault on the part of the petitioner. 11. Moreover, it is argued that all the payments were being made by the Assets Sale Committee under the aegis of the tribunal and the employer/petitioner had no part to play in disbursal of the dues of the employees, including gratuity. As such, no liability could be cast on the employer, from whose coffers ultimately the interest on gratuity would be paid, for any delay, if at all, having been occasioned in that regard. 12. This apart, it is argued by the petitioner, the tribunal did not assign any reason whatsoever for directing in its order dated September 13, 2017 that the Chairman, Assets Sale Committee would disburse the interest on delayed payment of gratuity to the employees as per the report of the Chartered Accountant, L.B. Jha & Co. 13. In fact, it is argued that no proper hearing was given to the employer/petitioner while passing such order. 14. 13. In fact, it is argued that no proper hearing was given to the employer/petitioner while passing such order. 14. It is further argued that although Section 7(3-A) of the 1972 Act fixes the maximum amount of interest to the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, the report of the Chartered Accountant-in-question awarded the maximum amount of ten per cent on the basis of the current rate of interest, as interest on delayed payment of gratuity. It is argued that no reason found place either in the report of the Chartered Accountant or the orders of the for a below as to why the maximum amount of interest was awarded, despite there being no fault or negligence on the part of the employer in making payment of gratuity. 15. This apart, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even the maximum rate of interest was not ten per cent but had varied from time to time during the relevant period for which interest on gratuity was granted. Such rate had been lower than ten per cent at all the prior points of time and as such, the Chartered Accountant-in-question as well as the for a below acted de hors the law in granting interest on delayed payment of gratuity at a flat rate of ten per cent for the entire period. 16. It is further argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the rate of interest and entitlement to interest had been kept open till the date of passing of the impugned order by the tribunal on September 13, 2017. The entitlement to get such interest on delayed payment of gratuity was never crystallized in any of the previous orders of the tribunal. As such, the for a below acted entirely without jurisdiction in directing the Assets Sale Committee, through its Chairman, to disburse such interest to the employees straightaway as per the report of the Chartered Accountant, without hearing the present petitioner on the same and/or discussing the law as well as facts on the said issue. 17. In particular, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on an order dated December 19, 2016 passed by the tribunal, as reflected from paragraph no. 17. In particular, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on an order dated December 19, 2016 passed by the tribunal, as reflected from paragraph no. 18 of the appellate tribunal's order, that the tribunal had observed vide such order dated December 19, 2016 that the workmen would be entitled to interest and necessary orders would be passed in due course and that remaining claims be paid first; interest would be paid “after hearing the parties”. Such hearing was never given to the present petitioner, thereby flouting the previous order of the tribunal itself December 19, 2016, which had attained finality since the same was not challenged. 18. While controverting the submissions of the petitioner, learned counsel for the employees/opposite party no. 2 argues that there were two relevant reports of the Chartered Accountant, dated September 4, 2014 and February 23, 2017 respectively. The first of the said reports assessed, along with other dues, interest on unpaid gratuity till March 31, 2006. No challenge was ever preferred to the said report. A challenge was only preferred when the tribunal directed payment of interest on gratuity on the basis of the second report which covered the period from April 1, 2006 onwards. In fact, it is submitted that all dues to the employees as regards gratuity and interest on delayed payment of gratuity were already paid in the meantime in terms of the said reports. 19. Hence, it is argued that the present challenge could at best be restricted to the report dated February 23, 2017, pertaining to the period starting from April 1, 2006. 20. It is further submitted that in view of payments having been made by the employer in terms of the order of the tribunal, impugned in the appeal-in-question, the employer is barred by the principle of acquiescence/waiver from challenging the same. 21. In an order dated November 28, 2014 the tribunal recorded that the petitioner-company had submitted before the tribunal that they had no objection to payment of gratuity due of the then present workmen in terms of the assessment made by the Assets Sale Committee out of the sale proceeds and out of the amount earmarked for the workmen. In the same order, it was further recorded that the Chartered Accountant-in-question had calculated the amount payable on account of gratuity interest at a particular rate. In the same order, it was further recorded that the Chartered Accountant-in-question had calculated the amount payable on account of gratuity interest at a particular rate. It was also recorded that till the further claim of the Provident Fund Authority was decided, the workmen could not be allowed to suffer for payment of their gratuity and the Asset Sale Committee should have taken some action, but it was defunct for a long time. As such, the tribunal had taken upon itself the responsibility of ascertaining the workmen's claim on account of gratuity and disbursing the same out of the sale proceeds. It was also held that dues of the workmen on account of gratuity needed to be disbursed. All the calculations reflected therein were made on the basis of the calculations of L.B. Jha & Co., Chartered Accountant. Since the employer/petitioner did not challenge such order, it does not now lie in the mouth of the petitioner to resale from their previous stand and challenge the payment of interest on gratuity. In fact, it is argued on behalf of the employees that no challenge has ever been preferred, till date, by the employer/petitioner against either of the reports of the Chartered Accountants, although the said reports had been the basis of all the orders of disbursal by the tribunal and, under its aegis, the Assets Sale Committee before it became defunct. 22. Learned counsel for the employees places several orders annexed to the revisional application, including those dated February 6, 2017, February 17, 2017, June 13, 2017 and July 10, 2017, in all of which the tribunal had mentioned about the interest payable to the workmen/employees. As such, the petitioner could not now reverse their stand and raise a turn-coat debate on the issue of interest on delayed payment of gratuity. 23. Learned counsel for the employees/opposite party no.2 argues further that the entitlement of the employees to get gratuity and consequentially interest on delayed payment of gratuity flows not from Section 7 of the 1972 Act, but from the order dated February 11, 2004, passed by the tribunal on settlement between the consortium of banks and the employer and their guarantors. Learned counsel for the employees/opposite party no.2 argues further that the entitlement of the employees to get gratuity and consequentially interest on delayed payment of gratuity flows not from Section 7 of the 1972 Act, but from the order dated February 11, 2004, passed by the tribunal on settlement between the consortium of banks and the employer and their guarantors. It is submitted that Section 7 only provided for the modalities of determination of the amount of interest and was not the only source of entitlement for the employees to get gratuity and interest on delayed payment of gratuity. 24. It is further submitted that since the twenty-sixth report of the Standing Committee on Labour (2007-2008), submitted in the Fourteenth Lok Sabha fixed the rate of interest on delayed payment of gratuity at the rate applicable to the GPF deposits, which was ten per cent at the relevant period, the award of interest by the for a below was justified. 25. Learned counsel for the employees/opposite party no. 2 places reliance on the judgment reported at [Asset Reconstruction Company (INDIA) Limited vs. M.H. Mills and Industries Ltd. and Ors., (2012) 1 GLR 790 ], wherein it was held that the debts recovery tribunal had jurisdiction to direct dues of wages or other benefits under Section 17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 26. As such, it is submitted on behalf of the employees that for a below were justified in passing the impugned orders. In fact, the settlement between the consortium of banks and the employer and their guarantors provides for further interest to be payable, if found due in favour of the employees, from the share of the company in the sale proceeds. Further claims in that regard, it is submitted, are pending at the instance of the employees before the tribunal. 27. Learned counsel for the bank submits that the dues of the bank have far exceeded the amounts recovered till now by the sale of the assets of the employer-company. Moreover, the bank has already paid much more than Rs. 15 crore, which was the outer limit fixed by the settlement between the concerned parties. As such, the bank was not liable to be deprived of any further amount of money from the sale proceeds and had no particular interest, otherwise, in the fate of this revisional application. Moreover, the bank has already paid much more than Rs. 15 crore, which was the outer limit fixed by the settlement between the concerned parties. As such, the bank was not liable to be deprived of any further amount of money from the sale proceeds and had no particular interest, otherwise, in the fate of this revisional application. 28. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Standing Committee report, as referred to above, itself shows that the rate of interest varied from time to time, but was all along less than ten per cent. Hence, he reiterates the argument that the for a below acted without jurisdiction in relying on the flat rate of ten per cent in directing interest to be granted on delayed payment of gratuity to the employees. 29. It is further argued that the employees/opposite party no.2 was in error in arguing that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter, since even consent could not confer jurisdiction on a forum. Even if the present petitioner submitted to the proceedings before the tribunal, as far as the dispute regarding payment in relation to any claim of gratuity was concerned, the same fell within the sole domain of the competent authority under the 1972 Act, as contemplated in Section 7(4b) of the said Act. Hence, the for a below did not have any jurisdiction to direct interest to be paid. 30. It is reiterated that there is no proof that the payment made till date was in terms of or on the basis of the first report of the Chartered Accountant. There was no allocation of such payments under any specific head, including that of interest on delayed payment of gratuity, in the disbursal made till date under the aegis of the tribunal. 31. It is submitted that the petitioner could not be barred by waiver and/or acquiescence insofar as the disbursals are concerned, since these were not made at the behest of the employer/petitioner but under the direction of the tribunal and the Assets Sale Committee formed under the aegis of the tribunal. 32. 31. It is submitted that the petitioner could not be barred by waiver and/or acquiescence insofar as the disbursals are concerned, since these were not made at the behest of the employer/petitioner but under the direction of the tribunal and the Assets Sale Committee formed under the aegis of the tribunal. 32. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was no previous occasion to pay in terms of, or to challenge any of the reports of the Chartered Accountants or the previous orders of the tribunal, since the employees made an application for the first time for their alleged dues, only in the year 2016, much later than the period stipulated in law. As such, no entitlement accrued in favour of the employees at any point of time for getting any interest on delayed payment of gratuity. In fact, there was no question of any delay in such payment at all, at least on the part of the employer. The primary criteria of Section 7 of the 1972 Act were not fulfilled in the present case and as such, the for a below acted without jurisdiction in directing payment of interest on gratuity. It is also submitted that the tribunal did not take into consideration the written notes on argument of the employer, filed before it, while passing the orders impugned herein. 33. At the outset, two relevant sections of the 1972 Act are to be looked into for the purpose of deciding this matter, being Sections 4 and 7 of the said Act. The said sections are quoted below: “Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972:- 4. Payment of gratuity. 33. At the outset, two relevant sections of the 1972 Act are to be looked into for the purpose of deciding this matter, being Sections 4 and 7 of the said Act. The said sections are quoted below: “Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972:- 4. Payment of gratuity. - (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,- (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. (2) For every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months, the employer shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days' wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned: Provided that in the case of a piece-rated employee, daily wages shall be computed on the average of the total wages received by him for a period of three months immediately preceding the termination of his employment, and, for this purpose, the wages paid for any overtime work shall not be taken into account: Provided further that in the case of an employee who is employed in a seasonal establishment and who is not so employed throughout the year, the employer shall pay the gratuity at the rate of seven days' wages for each season. Explanation. Explanation. -In the case of a monthly rated employee, the fifteen days' wages shall be calculated by dividing the monthly rate of wages last drawn by him by twenty-six and multiplying the quotient by fifteen. (3) The amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed ten lakh rupees. (4) For the purpose of computing the gratuity payable to an employee who is employed, after his disablement, on reduced wages, his wages for the period preceding his disablement shall be taken to be the wages received by him during that period, and his wages for the period subsequent to his disablement shall be taken to be the wages as so reduced. (5) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the employer. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),- (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited- (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. .... .... .... .... 7. Determination of the amount of gratuity.- (1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. (3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3-A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground. (4) (a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. (c) The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer. (d) The controlling authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. (e) As soon as may be after a deposit is made under clause (a), the controlling authority shall pay the amount of the deposit- (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is not the employee, to the nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or heir of the employee if the controlling authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity. (5) For the purpose of conducting an inquiry under sub-section (4), the controlling authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a court, while trying a suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (6) Any inquiry under this section shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860). (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4), may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount. (8) The appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, confirm, modify or reverse the decision of the controlling authority.” 34. Contrary to the arguments made by the petitioner, Section 7 operates primarily in the field of determination of the amount of gratuity and not the entitlement to it. The source of entitlement is Section 4 of the said Act. 35. In the present case, the settlement between the sparring parties, including the petitioner, which was accepted and given the seal of the tribunal vide order dated February 11, 2004, fixed the dues of the employees, without excluding the interest on delayed payment of gratuity. Although the entitlement of the employees flowed from the said order, to which the employer was a consenting party, Section 4 of the 1972 Act also provided the bulwark behind the said entitlement. 36. Section 7 of the 1972 Act only provides the modalities for determination of gratuity and the procedure and forum for disputes pertaining to such determination alone, and not the entitlement itself. Hence, the tribunals below acted well within their jurisdiction to rely on the order dated February 11, 2004 passed on consent, to direct interest on delayed payment of gratuity to be paid to the employees. 37. It is relevant to note that gratuity is now no longer a mercy or a literal gratuitous act on the part of the employer but has crystallized by legislation into rights flowing from the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The concept of gratuity is based on the Social Security Principle and is not a mere charity of the employer. As such, the legal right of the employees could not be fettered in any manner by an additional rigour of the employees having to show that they had complied with the modalities of Section 7 of the 1972 Act or that there was any specific negligence or fault on the part of the employer, to entitle the employees to get gratuity and interest on delayed payment of gratuity. 38. 38. Although there was no specific reason given or adjudication reflected in the order of the debts recovery tribunal dated September 13, 2017 for directing payment of interest on gratuity to the employees, no such separate adjudication or reason was necessary since the entitlement of the employees for such payment was rooted in the parent order dated February 11, 2004. As regards the previous orders, allegedly leaving the adjudication of interest to be decided in future, there was no specific observation to that effect but whatever was left for decision was only the calculation as regards interest. Since no challenge was taken out at any stage to the reports of the Chartered Accountants, the fora below acted well within their jurisdiction in directing payment of interest in terms of the said reports. The interest component could not be culled out separately from the said reports, in view of the entire dues having been acquiesced to by the employer by not challenging the reports at any point of time as well as by disbursal of the amounts by the Assets Sale Committee first and thereafter under the direction of the tribunals. The argument as to the petitioner having not disbursed the amount and thus, not being bound by acquiescence and/or waiver does not hold good, since the dues were disbursed, including interest on gratuity, in terms of a settlement to which the petitioner was a party and which obtained the sanction of the tribunal. Moreover, the employer/petitioner never challenged such disbursals, thereby legitimizing the invocation of the principles of acquiescence and waiver all the same. 39. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 was justified in placing reliance on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court inasmuch as the tribunal had jurisdiction to pass orders of interest, although in that case under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. 40. This apart, in the present case, the doctrine of factum valet operates. The employer/petitioner conceded to all dues of the employees being paid, without resorting to any restriction as to interest on delayed payments. 40. This apart, in the present case, the doctrine of factum valet operates. The employer/petitioner conceded to all dues of the employees being paid, without resorting to any restriction as to interest on delayed payments. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and entering into a settlement and having subsequently conceded to disbursal in terms of the settlement on several occasions, the petitioner could not now resile and challenge the entitlement of the employees to one of the components of such dues, being the interest on delayed gratuity payment. The fact that the disbursals were made under the aegis of the tribunal does not take away anything from the petitioner having acceded to such disbursals at all points of time and such disbursals being in terms of the settlement, to which the petitioner was a party. Hence, the principles of waiver and acquiescence squarely apply in the present case, debarring the petitioner from challenging the direction to pay interest. 41. In such view of the matter, there is no merit in the present challenge taken out by the petitioner. 42. Accordingly, C.O. No. 4331 of 2018 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the orders of the tribunals below. 43. There will be no order as to costs.