JUDGMENT : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. 1. The present revisional applications arise from connected matters. C.O. No. 749 of 2018 arises from Suit No. 3 of 2002 which was dismissed by the Waqf Tribunal on April 10, 2006. The suit was filed by Amjad Ali Mirza, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, for declaration of his title in the suit property and ancillary reliefs, claiming that the suit property was secular. 2. C.O. No. 750 of 2018 arises from a resolution taken in a meeting of the Board of Waqf dated October 14, 1999 declaring the suit properties to be waqf properties. 3. The two revisional applications were initially filed as writ petitions and thereafter converted to applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, giving rise to C.O. Nos. 749 and 750 of 2018. 4. The petitioners argue that the impugned resolution dated October 14, 1999 was entirely devoid of reasons. Even the appellate order, affirming such resolution, was cryptic. The appeal was decided merely by observing that the appeal was governed by the dismissal of the suit mentioned above, since the suit was allegedly filed challenging the resolution-in- question. The appellate forum did not give any reasons apart from the same. However, leaned counsel for the petitioners submits that the suit was not merely challenging the resolution. On the contrary, it is submitted that the primary reliefs in the plaint of the said suit pertained to a declaration that the suit properties were never waqf in nature, a declaration that the plaintiff has absolute right, title and interest in the 'A' schedule properties and that the 'B', 'C' and 'D' schedule properties belonged to the Baitun Najat Imambara Trust along with other consequential declarations and injunction. As such, it is argued that the said premise of the appellate order was erroneous in law and the appellate forum refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in not interfering with the resolution-in-dispute. 5. Apart from the resolution being unreasoned, the board of waqf overlooked the exhaustive evidence adduced by the petitioners and, in virtually a single-sentence order, concluded that the disputed property was a waqf property, only on the basis of a deed dated July 31, 1926 and verbal submissions of the parties. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the opposite parties' case was full of contradictions. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the opposite parties' case was full of contradictions. In the same breath, the waqf was claimed to be created by the late Nawab Wazid Ali Shah as well as by the deed of 1926. This apart, it was also mentioned in the pleadings of the private opposite party (opposite party no. 4) that the 1926 deed comprised of a purchase, thereby defeating the case of the opposite parties that the said deed created a waqf. 7. It was further argued that in the same breath the opposite party no. 4 had claimed that the suit property was enrolled on the basis of a waqf deed, the deed of 1926 being the basis of enrolment, as well as by virtue of long user. 8. It was admitted by the D.W. 1 in the suit that two rooms were designated for mutawallis but that the mother of the D.W. 1, that is, Kobra Begum and Yakub and others resided in a large portion than two rooms. The D.W. 1 admitted that he could not say whether the enrolment application was made before 1989. However, it appears from the enrolment application, which was a part of the records, that both Kobra and Khurshid Begum applied for enrolment of the disputed property as a waqf property in the year 1989, whereas the D.W. 1 stated in his evidence that his mother had been living as mutawalli since 1973 in the suit property. Further, the board's witness did not file any letter of authority in court to adduce evidence. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that no dedication as waqf, as pleaded by the private opposite parties, either by Nawab Wazid Ali Shah or by the 1926 deed, was proved either before the Board of Waqf or before the tribunal. 10. Although it was held by the tribunal that the plaintiff was to succeed on his own case, it is argued by the plaintiffs/petitioners that, in this case, there was a positive assertion by the opposite parties that the suit property was a waqf property and as such, the burden of proving the same lay on the opposite parties and not the plaintiffs/petitioners. The secular nature of the suit property was evident by default, in view of the preceding transfer deeds. The secular nature of the suit property was evident by default, in view of the preceding transfer deeds. It had been admitted that the Garden Reach Land Syndicate purchased the suit property in a public auction from Nawab Wazid Ali Shah and became owners thereof. It was the case of the opposite parties that subsequently, in the interest of the Muslim community of the area, the Secretary of State, Government of India purchased the property-in-dispute from Garden Reach Land Syndicate in the year 1895. The Secretary of State, Government of India then transferred the suit property in the interest of the Mohammedan community in the year 1926 in favour of five Mohammedan persons, apparently as members of a committee, for the welfare of the Mohammedan community in general. The 1926 deed apparently created a trust. The petitioners argue that the said deed did not comprise of a dedication in the name of Allah but was merely a trust deed in effect. 11. It is submitted that at no point of time was there any dedication in the name of Allah, or the God Almighty, which was a prerequisite of any valid waqf. On the contrary, it was admitted by the opposite parties that there had been several transfers of secular nature, transferring the ownership of the property to the individuals and juristic bodies as owners. 12. In fact, in the deed of 1926, the parties were mentioned as transferor and transferee (including survivors) and the property was mentioned to be purchased and vested in the transferees as trustees or benamder. Although it was indicated that the property was conveyed by the 1926 deed for worship of the Mohammedan community, the same was not dedicated to the God Almighty and therefore, did not come within the purview of Section 3(r) of the Waqf Act, 1995, which contemplated a permanent dedication and not one in the name of individuals. 13. This apart, the consistent pleadings of the opposite parties has been that there was an Imambara on the suit property. By placing reliance on Section 223 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that all Imambaras were not waqf properties, although some may be. In the present case, there was no proof that the Imambara was a waqf property. 14. By placing reliance on Section 223 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that all Imambaras were not waqf properties, although some may be. In the present case, there was no proof that the Imambara was a waqf property. 14. Thereafter placing reliance on the decision reported at [Nawab Zain Yar Jung (since deceased) and others vs. Director of Endowments and another, (1963) AIR SC 985], learned counsel submits that the distinction between a trust and a waqf was laid down in the said judgment. Muslim religious endowment involves tying up the property-in-question in the ownership of the God Almighty. The Waqif's rights are extinguished and the ownership is conveyed to Allah. The property does not vest in the mutawalli and the mutawalli is not a trustee as such. 15. In the present case, neither any dedication by Nawab Wazid Ali Shah was proved nor any user of the suit property as a waqf property since time immemorial was established by cogent evidence by the opposite parties. 16. On the contrary, the property was sold to the Garden Reach Land Syndicate as owners. Such owners 'allowed' (indicating licence) the Muslim community to hold religious function. Since the 'dedication' by the Garden Reach Land Syndicate was in respect of five persons, it amounted to an out-and-out sale, ultimately conferring title on the petitioners in respect thereof by inheritance. Both the deed of auction sale in favour of the Garden Reach Land Syndicate and the 1895 deed in favour of the committee of five, mentioned the transaction to be a 'purchase' and not a dedication as such. The property was sold as the 'property of the Nawab' and not Allah, thereby precluding the question of the same being a waqf property. 17. From the written statement of the Board of Waqf, learned counsel for the petitioners points out that the Secretary of State was pleaded to have 'allowed' the property to be possessed and the managing committee to have 'purchased' the property. 18. Even Khurshid Begum, the sister of Kobra Begum, the mutawalli purportedly appointed by the Board in the year 2000, filed a suit (which she later withdrew) where she admitted the property to be a trust property. 19. The tribunal as well as the board overlooked the records of possession of the petitioners, including the entrance in the C.S. records. 18. Even Khurshid Begum, the sister of Kobra Begum, the mutawalli purportedly appointed by the Board in the year 2000, filed a suit (which she later withdrew) where she admitted the property to be a trust property. 19. The tribunal as well as the board overlooked the records of possession of the petitioners, including the entrance in the C.S. records. Amjad Ali, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, was not only recorded as an owner of the suit property but also paid rent in respect of the suit property. 20. The D.W. 1 stated in his evidence that Nawab Wazid Ali Shah dedicated the property-in- question orally, which was never corroborated by any cogent evidence, rather belied by the auction purchase between the Wazid Ali Shah as the owner and the Garden Reach Land Syndicate as the transferee. Moreover, the D.W. 1 stated that he was deposing on behalf of his mother, namely Kobra Begum, which itself indicates that the said witness did not have any personal knowledge. As such, his deposition could not have been a basis of the findings and conclusions arrived at by the tribunal. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argues that, as far as the suit was concerned, the tribunal held that the same was barred by the provisions of Section 89 of the Waqf Act. However, in view of the reliefs (a) to (c) of the plaint being the primary reliefs and the challenge to the Board resolution being only consequential thereto, Section 89 of the Waqf Act, 1995 was not applicable at all. Rather, it was Section 90 which was applicable but never invoked by the tribunal. It was never even pleaded that the suit was barred under Section 90 of the said Act. In fact, Section 90 did not debar the suit filed by the predecessor- in-interest of the petitioners at all. 22. The other question decided by the tribunal against the petitioners was of non-joinder of necessary parties and that the suit was barred by the provisions of Order I Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the said objection was a waivable one and was never taken in the written statement, thereby precluding the opposite parties from taking such point at the hearing or the tribunal from dismissing the suit on such ground. 23. However, the said objection was a waivable one and was never taken in the written statement, thereby precluding the opposite parties from taking such point at the hearing or the tribunal from dismissing the suit on such ground. 23. As regards the alleged admission of Mirza Muquim, a predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in his written statement as regards the property being a waqf property, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that only the judgment of the suit-in-question was produced and the recording in the said judgment as to the purported admission could not be conclusive evidence of such admission. In view of the written statement itself, containing such purported admission, having not been produced before the tribunal, the tribunal's findings as to such admission being binding on the petitioners was perverse. Moreover, it is argued that even an admission could not confer title and as such, the court had to look into documentary evidence by which the present petitioners derived title by way of inheritance. 24. The tribunal, it is argued, places reliance on the deed of 1926, which did not comprise of any dedication to Allah, and 'other evidence'. In the absence of any real proof, the tribunal acted without jurisdiction in acting on such flimsy grounds to hold that there was long user of the suit property as a waqf property. Such finding not being borne out by the records, was perverse and ought to be set aside. 25. The tribunal held that the property was enrolled as a waqf after observing all legal formalities but none of the formalities were proved before the tribunal. The observation of the tribunal that the previous managing committee had become defunct was based on no material and was erroneous both in law and in fact. 26. There was no proof that the Imambara on the suit property was being used for the public or that the Mohammedan public had been using the suit property for more than 100 years. Thus, the tribunal acted without jurisdiction in arriving at the finding that the suit property was a waqf property. 27. 26. There was no proof that the Imambara on the suit property was being used for the public or that the Mohammedan public had been using the suit property for more than 100 years. Thus, the tribunal acted without jurisdiction in arriving at the finding that the suit property was a waqf property. 27. It is also argued on behalf of the petitioners that the basic criteria of Section 36 and/or Section 40 of the Waqf Act, 1995 having not been fulfilled, the tribunal ought to have set aside the resolution of the Board of Waqf as well as decreed the suit in favour of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. No enquiry was held at any point of time either under Section 36 or under Section 40 of the 1995 Act prior to the registration/enrolment of the disputed property as a waqf property. 28. In such view of the matter, the petitioners argue that both the revisional applications ought to be allowed, thereby declaring the secular title of the petitioners to the suit property and setting aside the resolution of the Board of Waqf dated October 14, 1999. 29. While controverting such submissions, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 4 argues that the plaintiffs/petitioners were rank trespassers and not the successors of any of the owners of the property, even if it is taken for argument's sake that the property was a secular one. Amjad Ali Mirza died in the year 1948, leaving behind as heirs his brothers and sisters, being Yakub, Khurshid and Kobra and not the sons of a deceased brother in accordance with Mohammedan law. Section 93 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law is referred to in this context to show the law governing Shia Muslims of India since the private parties to the present litigation are Shia Muslims. 30. By placing particular reliance on Section 93(2) of Mulla's Mahomedan Law, it is argued that the sisters of Amjad Ali Mirza being Khurshid and Kobra being nearer relations, excluded in succession the remote relations, being Amjad Ali Mirza (the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners), and the children of the pre-deceased brother. 31. By relying on the definition of 'Imambarah' in Tahir Mahmood's Muslim Law, learned senior counsel for the opposite party no. 4 submits that an Imambarah is not confined to a building but is a place meant for performance of Muharram and other religious ceremonies. 31. By relying on the definition of 'Imambarah' in Tahir Mahmood's Muslim Law, learned senior counsel for the opposite party no. 4 submits that an Imambarah is not confined to a building but is a place meant for performance of Muharram and other religious ceremonies. It is submitted that since the suit property admittedly housed an Imambara which was used for Muharram and other Mohammedan festivities, the entire land, and not merely the structure thereon, was to be deemed to be an Imambara. 32. Nawab Wazid Ali Shah, it is submitted, dedicated the suit property to the Muslim public. Subsequently, the transfer/assignment in favour of five committee members by the Secretary of State was specifically for the performance of religious ceremonies by the Mohammedan community. Furthermore, the said transfer was obtained by money contributed by the Mohammedan public for the purpose of waqf. In such a situation, no formal dedication was necessary to lend the character of waqf to the property. In support of such proposition, learned senior counsel cites a judgment reported at [U.P. Sunni Central Board of Wakfs vs. Mazhar Hasan and others, (2001) 6 SCC 289 ], in particular paragraph no. 4 thereof. 33. Moreover, the admission of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Muquim in the suit of 1921 was evident from the recording in the judgment of the said suit, which was exhibited. As such, the written statement of the said suit was not required to be exhibited separately, since the recording in the judgment carried a presumption of correctness attached to judicial acts. 34. It is highlighted on behalf of the opposite party no. 4 that the five members of the Mohammedan community, in whom the title of the property vested by virtue of the deed of 1926, comprised of a managing committee for the interest of the Mohammedan community at large. No personal interest was created or vested in such transferees/assignees, which could have lent a secular character to the suit property. It is submitted by learned senior counsel for the opposite party no. 4 that the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners admitted in his plaint in Suit No. 3 of 2002 that Muharram was being held thereon for 100 years, although under the supervision of the plaintiff as a trustee. It is submitted by learned senior counsel for the opposite party no. 4 that the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners admitted in his plaint in Suit No. 3 of 2002 that Muharram was being held thereon for 100 years, although under the supervision of the plaintiff as a trustee. Thus, it was virtually admitted that the suit property was being used as a waqf property for time immemorial, as the celebration of festivities and holding of Muharram by the Muslim community conferred on the property the character of a waqf, for which no formal dedication was necessary, as held in (2001) 6 SCC 289 . 35. Learned senior counsel relies on Section 188 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law to underline such proposition as well as Section 118(6) of Mulla's Mahomedan Law to explain that the performance of Muharram over a property could be one of the purposes of waqf. 36. Moreover, since half of the consideration for purchase of the disputed property was paid by the Muslim community, which is virtually an admitted position, for the transaction of 1926, it is evident that the resolution of the Board of Waqf and the dismissal of the suit was on a correct legal footing. 37. It was next submitted on the strength of Section 13(3) and Sections 32(1) and 32(2) (g) that it was within the power of the Waqf Board to hold property, to maintain, control and administer auqaf and to appoint and remove mutawallis. The powers of registration under Section 36 and the Board's power to declare a property as waqf property of its own, as envisaged under Sections 36 and 40 of the 1995 Act respectively, are also relied on by the opposite party no. 4. 38. The Board of Waqf is represented by two learned counsel, respectively in the two revisional applications. Learned counsel for the Board in the two matters highlight the general notice dated December 7, 1990 and the connected resolution, arguing that the resolution was taken in due compliance of law. 39. It was further argued that Section 89 of the 1995 Act was squarely applicable to the present case since, in effect, the resolution of the Board was challenged and the suit was bad for non-compliance of the said provision. 40. 39. It was further argued that Section 89 of the 1995 Act was squarely applicable to the present case since, in effect, the resolution of the Board was challenged and the suit was bad for non-compliance of the said provision. 40. The case made out by the petitioners as regards their alleged adverse possession was not maintainable in law in respect of the waqf property since Section 107 of the 1995 Act precluded the application of the Limitation Act to the 1995 Act. Section 108A of the 1995 Act provided a non obstante clause, thereby bolstering Section 107. 41. Section 3(r) and Section 3(i) of the 1995 Act respectively provide for creation of a waqf for charitable or religious purposes for the Mohammedan community as well as by long user. 42. As regards the compliance of Section 40 of the 1995 Act, it is argued that hearing was given at the time of registration and enrolment. Moreover, since the property was enrolled prior to the 1995 Act, registration was a matter of mere formality and no further hearing need to have been given in the case. 43. It is argued that Section 43 of the 1995 Act provides for a deemed registration in respect of waqf properties which were registered prior to the commencement of the 1995 Act and is virtually automatic. 44. Sections 6 and 36 of the 1995 Act contemplate registration in respect of admitted auquf whereas Section 40 of the 1995 Act envisage the powers, which are very wide, to declare any property to be of a waqf character. 45. Learned counsel for the Board cites a judgment reported at [Sayyed Ali and others vs. Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board, Hyderabad and others, (1998) AIR SC 972], in support of the proposition that once a property was declared to be a waqf, it was always a waqf. 46. Learned counsel further cites a judgment reported at [T. Kaliamurthi and another vs. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf and others, (2008) 9 SCC 306 ] to explain the position of the Waqf Act, 1995 as regards adverse possession, both before the introduction of Section 108A by amendment on November 1, 2013 and after. Section 107, in any event, precluded the application of the Limitation Act to a waqf property. 47. The Board also cites a judgment reported at [Chhedi Lal Misra (dead) Through LRS. Section 107, in any event, precluded the application of the Limitation Act to a waqf property. 47. The Board also cites a judgment reported at [Chhedi Lal Misra (dead) Through LRS. vs Civil Judge, Lucknow and others, (2007) 4 SCC 632 ] to reiterate the proposition that once a wakf is created, it continues to retain such character, which cannot be extinguished by any act of the mutawalli or anyone claiming through him. The wakif, it was held, stands divested of his title to the properties which, after the creation of the wakf, vests in the Almighty. 48. In a composite reply, learned counsel for the petitioners concludes by reiterating his submissions made at the outset and submitted that the enrolment had once been set aside on March 10, 1997 by a co-ordinate bench of this court and was sent back for re- adjudication. In such view of the matter, the argument of the Board as to the waqf property being enrolled prior to the commencement of the 1995 Act could not hold good. It was the resolution dated October 14, 1999, after coming into force of the 1995 Act, which declared the property as a waqf for all practical purposes, for the first time. As such the rigours of Section 40 were squarely applicable and the compliance of Sections 36 and 40 were not mere formalities. In the absence of compliance therewith, the property could not have been declared to be a waqf. 49. It is further submitted that Section 40 of the 1995 Act does not contemplate a general notice as that relied on by the Board. There had to be a specific notice on the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and a regular enquiry into the matter before declaring the property as a waqf by a cryptic resolution. Thus, such a resolution could not stand the scrutiny of judicial review. 50. As regards the inheritance of Muquim's property by the present petitioners, Section 93 of Mulla's Mahomedan Law is attempted to be interpreted by the petitioners by arguing that the said section contained the doctrine of representation and operated only when direct heirs were absent. In fact, the illustration of the said section in Mulla's Mahomedan Law included the son of the pre-deceased son, apart from sisters. As such, the argument of the opposite party no. In fact, the illustration of the said section in Mulla's Mahomedan Law included the son of the pre-deceased son, apart from sisters. As such, the argument of the opposite party no. 4 as to the petitioners not being successors of the owners of the property was not in consonance with settled law. 51. For deciding the present lis, the following sections of the Waqf Act, 1995 are required to be considered : “Waqf Act, 1995:- 3(r) - “waqf” means the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes – (i) a waqf by user but such waqf shall not cease to be a waqf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) a Shamlat Patti, Shamlat Deh, Jumla Malkkan or by any other name entered in a revenue record; (iii) “grants”, including mashrat-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iv) a waqf-ala-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognized by Muslim law as pious, religious or chartable, provided when the line of succession fails, the income of the waqf shall be spent for education, development, welfare and such other purposes as recognised by Muslim law, and “waqif” means any person making such dedication. .... .... .... .... 36. Registration. - (1) Every waqf, whether created before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be registered at the office of the Board. (2) Application for registration shall be made by the mutawalli: Provided that such applications may be made by the waqf or his descendants or a beneficiary of the waqf or any Muslim belonging to the sect to which the waqf belongs. (2) Application for registration shall be made by the mutawalli: Provided that such applications may be made by the waqf or his descendants or a beneficiary of the waqf or any Muslim belonging to the sect to which the waqf belongs. (3) An application for registration shall be made in such form and manner and at such place as the Board may by regulation provide and shall contain following particulars: - (a) a description of the waqf properties sufficient for the identification thereof; (b) the gross annual income from such properties; (c) the amount of land revenue, cesses, rates and taxes annually payable in respect of the waqf properties; (d) an estimate of the expenses annually incurred in the realisation of the income of the waqf properties; (e) the amount set apart under the waqf for - (i) the salary of the mutawalli and allowances to the individuals; (ii) purely religious purposes; (iii) charitable purposes; and (iv) any other purposes; (f) any other particulars provided by the Board by regulations. (4) Every such application shall be accompanied by a copy of the waqf deed or if no such deed has been executed or a copy thereof cannot be obtained, shall contain full particulars, as far as they are known to the applicant, of the origin, nature and objects of the waqf. (5) Every application made under sub-section (2) shall be signed and verified by the applicant in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the signing and verification of pleadings. (6) The Board may require the applicant to supply any further particulars or information that it may consider necessary. (7) On receipt of an application for registration, the Board may, before the registration of the waqf make such inquiries as it thinks fit in respect of the genuineness and validity of the application and correctness of any particulars therein and when the application is made by any person other than the person administering the waqf property, the Board shall, before registering the waqf, give notice of the application to the person administering the waqf property and shall hear him if he desires to be heard. (8) In the case of auqaf created before the commencement of this Act, every application for registration shall be made, within three months from such commencement and in the case of auqaf created after such commencement, within three months from the date of creation of the waqf: Provided that where there is no Board at the time of creation of a waqf, such application will be made within three months from the date of establishment of the Board. .... .... .... .... 40. Decision if a property is waqf property. - (1) The Board may itself collect information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be waqf property and if any question arises whether a particular property is waqf property or not or whether a waqf is a Sunni waqf or a Shia waqf it may, after making such inquiry as it may deed fit, decide the question. (2) The decision of the Board on a question under sub-section (1) shall, unless revoked or modified by the Tribunal, be final. (3) Where the Board has any reason to believe that nay property of any trust or society registered in pursuance of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) or under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or under any other Act, is waqf property, the Board may notwithstanding anything contained in such Act, hold an inquiry in regard to such property and if after such inquiry the Board is satisfied that such property is waqf property, call upon the trust or society, as the case may be, either to register such property under this Act as waqf property or show cause why such property should not be so registered: Provided that in all such cases, notice of the action proposed to be taken under this sub- section shall be given to the authority by whom the trust or society had been registered. (4) The Board shall, after duly considering such cause as may be shown in pursuance of notice issued under sub-section (3), pass such orders as it may think fit and the order so made by the Board, shall be final, unless it is revoked or modified by a Tribunal.” Sections 93 and 223 of the Mulla's Mahomedan Law are also required to be considered in this context. Those are set out below: “Mulla's Mahomedan Law:- 93. Representation. Those are set out below: “Mulla's Mahomedan Law:- 93. Representation. - (1) The principle of representation has more than one meaning. It may be applied for the purpose of deciding (a) what persons are entitled to inherit, or (b) the quantum of the share of any given person on the footing that he is entitled ] to inherit (2) Where for purpose (a) the rule of exclusion applies (i.e., the nearer in degree excludes the more remote) it is true both of Sunnis and Shias that the principle of representation is not recognized as qualified the rule of exclusion. Thus if A dies leaving him surviving a son and grandsons by a predeceased son, the grandsons are excluded from inheritance by their uncle. They do not take in their father's stead though he would have been an heir had he survived his father. (3) But if both sons predeceased the propositus who died leaving three grandsons by one son and two by the other then all the grandsons are heirs. In that case, is the principle of representation to be applied for purpose (b), that is for ascertaining the share of each grandson? This is a further and different question. If the principle is applied, the grandsons of one branch will have to divide into three what the grandsons of the other branch divide in half. (4) For the limited purpose of calculating the share of each heir - as distinct from the purpose of ascertaining the heirs - the Shia law accepts the principle of representation as a cardinal principle throughout. According to that principle the descendants of a deceased son, if they are heirs, take the portion which he if living would have taken and in that sense represent the son. In the same limited sense, the descendants of a deceased daughter represent the daughter: if they inherit, they take the portion which the daughter if living would have taken. The principle is applicable in the same way to the descendants of a deceased brother, sister or aunt. (5) The principle of representation is not confined in its operation to descendants only. It applies in the ascending as well as in the descending line. Thus great-grandparents take the portion which the grandparents, if living, would have taken: and the father's uncles and aunts take the portion which the deceased's uncles and aunts, if living, would have taken. .... (5) The principle of representation is not confined in its operation to descendants only. It applies in the ascending as well as in the descending line. Thus great-grandparents take the portion which the grandparents, if living, would have taken: and the father's uncles and aunts take the portion which the deceased's uncles and aunts, if living, would have taken. .... .... .... .... 223. Imambara. - An imambara is an apartment in a private house or a building set apart like a private chapel for religious purposes. It is intended for the use of the owner and members of his family, though the public may be admitted with the permission of the owner. It may be the object of a valid wakf - Sec. 178. Such a wakf is a private wakf and not a public wakf nor a trust for the purposes of sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it may be proved that a particular imambara is a public wakf.” 52. As regards the first contention of the petitioners, it is evident and apparent from the impugned resolution of the Board of Waqf itself that the same was virtually devoid of reasons. Although the title in respect of a property was decided by the resolution, the Board did not care to record even a semblance of judicial consideration while taking the resolution. A cursory reference to a deed of 1926 and “verbal submissions” could not be the basis of a consequential adjudication as taken by way of the resolution, without any explanation whatsoever as to the relevant provisions of the said deed and the legal interpretation thereof, as well as the other evidence produced by both sides. 53. However, in order to obviate an unnecessary remand, since all the materials produced before the tribunal and the board, are part of the present records in the form of paper books, this court is inclined to explore the possibility of a decision on merits before this court itself instead of relegating the matter on remand. 54. Section 40 of the Waqf Act empowers the board to collect information by itself about a property which it has reason to believe to be waqf property and after making an inquiry as it may deem fit, to decide such question. 54. Section 40 of the Waqf Act empowers the board to collect information by itself about a property which it has reason to believe to be waqf property and after making an inquiry as it may deem fit, to decide such question. The section does not specify the nature of inquiry to be undertaken by the board in arriving at a decision in that regard. In view of the summary nature of the proceeding as contemplated in the said section, detailed evidence or hearing might not be taken/given by the board before coming to a decision as to whether a property is a waqf property. In the present case, what is to be seen is whether adequate documents and materials were before the board to declare the suit property to be a waqf property. 55. At the same time, the legality of the judgment rendered in the suit filed by the predecessor- in-interest of the petitioners, as affirmed in appeal, is also to be looked into, since the decision of the same would also directly affect the fate of the resolution and vice versa. 56. Although the appellate forum refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in dismissing the appeal merely on the ground that the result of the appeal was dependent on the fate of the resolution, it can very well be looked into as to whether the tribunal itself was justified in dismissing the suit. 57. In the present case, the cardinal factor on which both the tribunal and the board of waqf hinged for arriving at a decision, was the deed of 1926. It is seen from the said deed dated July 31, 1926, that the same was executed by the Secretary of State for India-in-Council in favour of a five-men managing committee. The parties were described as transferors and transferees respectively, the latter term including the survivors of the transferees or their representatives and assignees and members for time being of the said committee. As such, the survival of interest in the legal representatives and survivors could not be the sole determinant, since the expression 'transferees' also took in its fold other members of the said committee, thereby perpetuating the investiture of title in the committee. As such, the survival of interest in the legal representatives and survivors could not be the sole determinant, since the expression 'transferees' also took in its fold other members of the said committee, thereby perpetuating the investiture of title in the committee. The Garden Reach Land Syndicate Limited, it was indicated in the deed of 1926, was going to be dismantled and at a meeting of the Mohammedan community of Kolkata and its suburbs it was resolved that a space may be taken to raise funds and acquire and preserve the Baitun Najat Imambara for the worship of the Mohammedan community. It was further mentioned in the deed that funds for the re-purchase of the Imambara were provided half from voluntary subscriptions from members of the Mohammedan community and the other half from the funds of the Oudh Estate. The deed went on to record that in view of such arrangements, the Government of Bengal issued requisite orders for acquisition of the said property for the specific purpose of transfer to the managing committee. The property was to remain vested in the managing committee, which was empowered to receive conveyance of the property on behalf of the Mohammedan community. It was categorically mentioned in the said deed that the property was conveyed and assigned unto the transferees absolutely for the purpose for which they were acquired, namely the worship of the Mohammedan community. 58. As such, the deed of 1926 makes it categorically clear that the transfer was not in favour of the committee members in their personal capacity or for their individual interest but solely for the worship of the Mohammedan community. 59. The purpose of a waqf ought to be considered in the context of Islam. Since Allah, the God Almighty, is formless from the Islamic perspective, the expression of devotion to Allah could not be deified through a particular symbol alone or a single structure but had to be expressed through various religious activities and rituals. Hence, a dedication for the Mohammedan community to perform the worship of Allah as well as to hold religious functions, tantamount to a dedication to Allah, though there may not be any formal dedication in the name of Allah. 60. Hence, a dedication for the Mohammedan community to perform the worship of Allah as well as to hold religious functions, tantamount to a dedication to Allah, though there may not be any formal dedication in the name of Allah. 60. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the property was being used for sufficiently long comprising a span of 100 years, for the purpose of holding Muharram and other Muslim festivities. 61. Although learned counsel for the petitioners is justified in arguing that no oral dedication by the Nawab was established on evidence, the user of the property for the purpose of serving Allah in the form of various religious functions which is an admitted position, as well as investiture of the property by the deed of 1926 solely for the purpose of worship by the Mohammedan community are sufficient and clear indicators that the property attained the character of a waqf. 62. The deed of 1926 and the nomenclature therein, read as a whole, would indicate that, irrespective of the nomenclature, the contents and purpose of the deed was to dedicate the property for the worship of the God Almighty in the Mohammedan sense of the term. As such, the definition of the waqf, as cited from Tahir Mahmood's authoritative work by the opposite party no. 4, is sufficient to hold that the suit property, in the circumstances of the present case, is a waqf property. 63. Although Section 40 was not complied with in terms in the strictest sense, the spirit of Section 40 was complied with inasmuch as the board considered a deed of 1926, the execution of which has not been rebutted by the petitioners. The said deed, on a meaningful reading, can only be interpreted to be a dedication for the purpose of the God Almighty and worship by the Mohammedan community, if not directly in the name of God Almighty. The will of Allah in the Islamic sense has to be manifested through human agency, for which the investiture contemplated in the 1926 deed was in favour of the human beings, who would act as agents to perpetuate worship by the Mohammedan community. 64. Hence, despite the resolution taken by the board being technically unsound due to dearth of reasons, the conclusion arrived at by the Board was correct. 65. 64. Hence, despite the resolution taken by the board being technically unsound due to dearth of reasons, the conclusion arrived at by the Board was correct. 65. As regards the argument of the petitioners, that the declaration of the property to be a secular property and the title of the petitioners in the property fell within the domain of Section 90 of the Waqf Act, 1995, such argument, though initially impressive, cannot hold good for the simple reason that all such declarations would be consequential upon the issue as to whether the suit property was a waqf or not. 66. Hence, in the present case, the property is found to be a waqf property, despite the petitioners being justified in their interpretation of Section 93 of the Mulla's Mahomedan Law and as to the petitioners being otherwise the successors of one of the original owners of the property. Such succession cannot vest any independent title in the petitioners in view of the property having attained the character of waqf long back. 67. Thus, despite the irregularities in the resolution of the Board of Waqf, once the property became a waqf property, such character of the property could not be changed, to confer any secular right on the petitioners or any other person. 68. As regards the discrepancy in the evidence of D.W. 1 as to the mutawallis residing in more than the two rooms allocated to them and as regards other minute details, those are minor and peripheral to the adjudication on merits. Despite the resolution-in-question being unhappy in its expression, the conclusion arrived at therein is correct in law. 69. As far as the suit was concerned, the same was barred by Section 89 of the Act of 1995, since the reliefs (a) to (c) were, despite their chronological priority in the plaint, consequent upon the adjudication of the subsequent reliefs as to the character of the suit property being a waqf property. 70. As such, there is no occasion to interfere with the orders impugned in the two revisional applications. Accordingly, C.O. No. 749 of 2018 and C.O. No. 750 of 2018 are dismissed on contest without any order as to costs. All connected applications are disposed of accordingly.