JUDGMENT : Abdul Rehim, J: The petitioners in W.P. (C) No.42227/2018 are the appellants, challenging judgment of the Single Judge, dated 14-01-2019. The respondents 1 to 3 are the respondents in the writ petition. The 4th respondent is a person who got impleaded in the above appeal, subsequently. 2. Challenge in the writ petition is against the Kerala Sports (Amendment) Act, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amending Act, for short), especially against Section 35 thereof, mainly contending that it is illegal, arbitrary, unlawful and repugnant to Section 9 (5) and (6) of the Kerala Sports Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Parent Act' for short). Repelling the contentions of the petitioners, who are presidents of the District Sports Councils of Kollam, Kottayam, Malappuram and Kasaragod districts, that they are entitled to continue for a period of 5 years from the date of nomination by virtue of Ext.P1 Notification, the learned judge found that, the intention of the legislature through the amendment was to conduct the elections to the District Sports Councils as soon as possible, after the Amending Act is brought into force. It was also found that, the post of the Presidents and Vice Presidents of District Sports Council are also to be filled up by elections from among the members of the Sports Council. Hence, once such elections are conducted, those who are continuing on the basis of nominations, in accordance with the unamended provisions of the Parent Act, will have to vacate their office. In other words, it was held that, the term of the nomination has to be read in consonance with provisions of the Act, as amended. It is further held that, Section 35 of the Amending Act, though apparently not happily worded, would indicate that a re-constitution of the councils was the intention of the legislature. Therefore it was held that, a conjunctive reading of the provisions of the Amending Act would indicate that the intention is to carry out a reconstitution of the councils, without waiting for the present council to run out. Hence the amendment proposing conduct of elections, instead of continuation of the nominated councils, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary, is the finding. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed 3. Hence the amendment proposing conduct of elections, instead of continuation of the nominated councils, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary, is the finding. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed 3. The above said findings are assailed mainly emphasising that, Section 35 of the Amending Act will become void in view of the doctrine of repugnancy, since it is repugnant to Section 9 (5) and (6) of the Parent Act. Further contention is that, Section 35 of the Amending Act does not contemplate a reconstitution through elections, at any time before expiry of the period of nomination, which is prescribed under Section 9 (5) of the Parent Act. It is also contended that there is no legislative competence to introduce a 'special provision' like that of Section 35 in the Amending Act. 4. The Parent Act (as it stood unamended) originally contemplated constitution of the Sports Councils at the State level and District level through elections. But, by virtue of an amendment introduced through the Kerala Sports (Amendment) Act, 2015, the process of election was given a go by and method of nomination was introduced. The petitioners in the writ petition are the presidents of the respective District Sports Councils, nominated through Ext.P1 Notification issued by the Government on 1st March 2016. When the Government issued Ext.P2 proceedings substituting the presidents of some other District Sports Councils through nomination of new persons, the petitioners along with the presidents of some other District Sports Councils approached this court in a writ petition, W.P (C) No.31602/2016. Exhibit P3 is an interim order passed by this court in the said case, directing the Government to maintain status-quo with respect to the nominations. It is the contention that, even thereafter the Government had removed presidents of certain other District Sports Councils by nominating other persons, as evidenced from Ext.P4. 5. In the above context, the Government promulgated the Kerala Sports (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018, on two occasions, through Gazettee Notifications dated 20-08-2018 and 12-09-2018 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ordinances 42/18 and 47/18'). Through amendments brought into Section 9 of the Parent Act, the system of nominating members and presidents of the Sports Councils at the State Level and the District Level was substituted by the method of elections. A transitional provision was also introduced as Section 36 in the Ordinances, which reads as follows; “36. Through amendments brought into Section 9 of the Parent Act, the system of nominating members and presidents of the Sports Councils at the State Level and the District Level was substituted by the method of elections. A transitional provision was also introduced as Section 36 in the Ordinances, which reads as follows; “36. Special Provision.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, rules or regulation made thereunder or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, on and from the date of commencement of State Sports Council, District Sports Councils, Corporation Sports Councils, Municipal Sports Councils and Village Sports Councils constituted as per the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Kerala Sports (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018, the existing State Sports Council, District Sports Councils, Corporation Sports Councils, Municipal Sports Councils and Village Sports Councils shall be deemed to have stand dissolved.” 6. The State legislature had substituted the 'Ordinances 42/18 and 47/18' by the Amending Act of 2018, which got assent of the hon'ble Governor of Kerala and notified with effect from 20th August 2018. Section 36 contained in the 'Ordinances 42/18 and 47/18' was incorporated as such in the Amending Act of 2018 as Section 35 (special provision). Contention raised is mainly that, Section 35 of the Amending Act is repugnant to Section 9 (5) of the Parent Act, which stands unamended, and which provides that, “the District Sports Council shall be reconstituted once in every 5 years.” But, by virtue of Section 35 of the Amending Act 2018, on and from the date of commencement of the Sports Councils constituted as per the amendment incorporated to the Parent Act by virtue of the Ordinance 42/18 the existing councils shall be deemed to have been dissolved. Question is whether it will be repugnant to Section 9 (5) of the Parent Act, which remains unamended. Evidently there occurred a transition with respect to the method of constitution of the Sports Councils. The method of nominating the councils was changed into the method of election. Section 9 (5), as long as it stands unamended, provides that the councils constituted by way of elections will also be having its tenure for 5 years. But it is necessary on the basis of the amendment to reconstitute the councils through elections. Basically that is the objective of the amendment itself. Section 9 (5), as long as it stands unamended, provides that the councils constituted by way of elections will also be having its tenure for 5 years. But it is necessary on the basis of the amendment to reconstitute the councils through elections. Basically that is the objective of the amendment itself. It cannot be said that the legislature has no competence to amend the provisions until the expiry of the tenure of nominated councils. Nor it can be said that, despite such amendment the Government have to wait till the expiry of the term of existing nominated councils, in order to reconstitute them through elections. Therefore the legislature had intentionally introduced the transitional provision, though it is worded as 'Special Provision'. 7. Question arises as to whether a substantive provision in the Parent Act can be altered through such a transitional provisions. In a decision of the House of Lords, Regina V. Secretary of State for Social Security, Britnell ((1991) 2 All E.R. 726) it was found that, if the provisions which is introduced as transitional is purported to have the effect of applying the section to events which had occurred before the amendment and thus give retrospective effect, which is not expressed in the enactment itself, cannot be accepted. The purpose of such transitional provision should be to facilitate the change from one statutory regime to another. Then it could not be regarded as authorising innovation by widening the ambit of the substantive legislation. It is not possible to give a definitive description of what constitutes a transitional provision. The function of the transitional provision is to make special provision for the application of the legislation to the circumstances which exists at the time when that legislation comes into force. One feature of a transitional provision is that its operation is expected to be temporary, in that, it becomes spent when all the past circumstances with which it is designed to deal have been dealt with, while the primary legislation continues to deal indefinitely with the new circumstances which arise after its passage. In the case at hand, provisions in the Parent Act governing the tenure of the councils will continue in the legislation to deal with the new circumstances which arises after the amendment. In the case at hand, provisions in the Parent Act governing the tenure of the councils will continue in the legislation to deal with the new circumstances which arises after the amendment. But the transitional provision is intended to facilitate the change from the statutory regime of nomination of the councils to the new method of election. 8. In the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornan V. State of Kerala and others ( (1994) 5 SCC 593 ) it was held that, a transitional provision cannot become main provision nor it can curtail the ambit and width of principal section. In the absence of the transitional provision there might be difficulty in introducing the change intended to be brought into through the amendment. The word 'transitional' according to the dictionary means, “passage or change from one act or set of circumstances to another”. The objective of such provision is to bridge the gap between commencement of the Act and its operation prior to it. It is a drafting measure to 'regulate the coming into operation of these enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition'. The transitional provision can be attacked only if it is given retrospectivity to the change which was intended to be introduced. Here, on the facts of the case the change in the method of constituting the councils which was introduced through the amendment need to be implemented. The transitional provision is intended only to facilitate such change by dissolving the existing nominated councils on and from the date of commencement of the newly elected councils, which will be constituted based on the amended provisions through the method of elections. Therefore the transitional provision cannot be assailed as not legally sustainable. 9. The learned State Attorney Mr. K.V. Sohan, appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 had raised contentions that, the appellants who are nominated members of the existing councils had no vested right to continue in the said post, despite the amendment. The legislature can take away such right to continue as members of the council, which was created by virtue of a statute, by another statute. In support of the above contention he cited a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay V. State of Maharashtra and others ( (2006) 6 SCC 289 ). He also placed commentaries which deal with the scope of 'transitional provision'. In support of the above contention he cited a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay V. State of Maharashtra and others ( (2006) 6 SCC 289 ). He also placed commentaries which deal with the scope of 'transitional provision'. In the Book of Francis Bennion; titled “Bennion on Statutory interpretation” explained the role of a transitional provision in a statute on the following terms; “Whereas an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enactments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions, which regulate the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition. Where the Act fails to include such provisions expressly, the Court is required to draw such inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements, as in the light of interpretive criteria, it considers Parliament to have intended.” It further provides that; “Transitional provisions in an Act or other instrument are provisions which spell out precisely when and how the operative parts of the instrument are to take effect.” and that “it is for the interpreter to realize, and bear constantly in mind, that what appears to be the plain meaning of a substantive enactment is often modified by transitional provisions located elsewhere in the Act. Often these are tucked away in an obscure place, where they can be easily overlooked.” In another commendatory by G.C. Thornton titled 'Legislative Drafting' it is stated that, “The function of a transitional provision is to make special provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances which exist when that legislation comes into force.” 10. Sri. S. Sreekumar, Senior Counsel appearing for the 4th additional respondent had pointed out that, the writ petition itself was not maintainable because no legal ground was raised to challenge the constitutional validity of an enactment by contending any lack of legislative competence or violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution or of any of the constitutional provisions. Therefore the challenge against validity of Section 35 of the Amending Act is totally unsustainable, is the contention. He cited rulings of the hon'ble Supreme Court in support of the above contentions, Public Services Tribunal Bar Association V. State of U.P. and another ( (2003) 4 SCC 104 ) and Bhanumati and others V. State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( (2010) 12 SCC 1 ). 11. He cited rulings of the hon'ble Supreme Court in support of the above contentions, Public Services Tribunal Bar Association V. State of U.P. and another ( (2003) 4 SCC 104 ) and Bhanumati and others V. State of Uttar Pradesh and others ( (2010) 12 SCC 1 ). 11. The factual aspects involved in the case as well as the legal position remaining settled as above, would not persuade this court in any manner to interfere with the findings arrived by the learned Single Judge contained in the impugned judgment. Consequently the writ appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed.