JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Uma Nath Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2. 2. The petitioner by means of this petition seeks a direction upon the respondent No.3 Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority to decide his representation dated 20.09.2013 for leasing out the land which was acquired from the petitioner in view of the Government Order dated 24.04.2010. 3. There is no dispute to the fact that the land of the petitioner, Khasra No. 356 area 1800 square meters situate in village Sakipur, Pargana Dadri, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Buddh Nagar, was acquired by the State of U.P. for the benefit of the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. 4. In respect of the said acquisition, an award has also been pronounced under Section 11 of the Act and the acquisition is final and conclusive. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the aforesaid land has not been utilized by the Development Authority for the industrial purpose and as such in view of the Government Order dated 24.04.2010, the petitioner is entitled for the lease back of the said land as has been done in the case of one Khajan Singh. 6. It is in respect of such lease back of the land that the petitioner has submitted the aforesaid representation. 7. The aforesaid Government Order provides that in view of public resentment against the acquisition in matters where de-notification of the land has been accepted, the acquired land may be given on lease to the tenure holders at the level of the authority on the approval of the Board. 8. The language of the aforesaid Government Order makes it clear that the lease back policy is applicable where proceedings for de-notification of the acquired land have been approved. In the case at hand, we do not find that there is any averment to the above effect so as to bestow the benefit of leasing out the acquired land in favour of the petitioner. 9. In addition to the above, there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act or any other law which directs for re-conveyance of the acquired land to the tenure holders for any reason.
9. In addition to the above, there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act or any other law which directs for re-conveyance of the acquired land to the tenure holders for any reason. The land which has been acquired vests with the Government and cannot be re-conveyed to the tenure holders in the absence of any provision in this regard in the concerned Statute. 10. It is well settled that a Government Order simply supplements the statutory provisions but has no overriding effect upon the statutory provisions. Thus, if the Act does not provide for the re-conveyance of the acquired land to the erstwhile owners for any reason, it cannot be done by means of a simple Government Order. 11. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar Vs. District Magistrate, Agra and others, (2005) 2 AWC 1650 , dealing with somewhat a similar controversy regarding a Government Order providing for employment to one of the family members of those whose land has been acquired, held that the Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained Code and any Government Order providing for any benefit not mentioned in the Act would be inconsistent with the intention of the Parliament and as such Government Order providing for such extra benefits would be violative of the Act and would be invalid. 12. It further held that no writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued to any authority to consider any claim set up by any person on the basis of a Government Order which is violative and contrary to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 13. It is also pertinent to mention here that the petitioner is not entitle to any parity with the case of Khajan Singh as the principle of parity is not applicable where the benefit has been extended contrary to the law. There are no pleadings to the effect that the aforesaid Khajan Singh was given the benefit of the aforesaid Government Order as per law. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any merit in this petition for exercising the discretionary jurisdiction not even for directing to consider the representation of the petitioner. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his remedy before the appropriate authority.