JUDGMENT : G.S. Patel, J. 1. Heard. The plaintiff filed the suit in the Commercial Division under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ("CPC") for recovery of an amount of Rs. 3,47,12,222.00/- and interest at 15% per annum with quarterly rests. This claim is based on three loan confirmations said to have been signed by the defendant. Interest is computed from 12th April, 2018. Mr. Bharucha for the plaintiff readily accepts that the question of interest may be left to the discretion of the Court. 2. The cause action of the suit is founded only on the loan confirmations. This is clear from the averments in paragraph 19 of the plaint. 3. The writ of summons having been served, the defendant entered appearance. The plaintiff filed this summons for judgment. The defendant then filed an affidavit in reply. With the assistance of Mr. Bharucha for the plaintiff and Mr. Patil for the defendant, I have considered the material on record. 4. A brief background to this case is this. The defendant sought a loan of Rs. 3 crores from the plaintiff. On 28th August, 2015, the plaintiff advanced Rs. 1.4 crores to the defendant and on 9th November, 2015 a further sum of Rs. 60 lakh. On 26th November 2015, the plaintiff says he loaned a further amount of Rs. 60 lakh and on 22nd June 2016, a further sum of Rs. 40 lakh. There is then a reference in the plaint to three loan confirmation agreements dated 11th August, 2017 at pages 22, 36 and 46. Each of these is stamped. The first loan confirmation at page 22 is a confirmation by the defendant that as of 31st July, 2017 the amount due without part interest was Rs. 2,43,36,894.00/-. There is a confirmation of interest payable at 15% per annum with quarterly rests. There is then an undertaking and a promise to pay. This is accompanied by an undertaking to repay the amount before 11th April, 2018 and it is confirmed that the amount due as of that date with interest would be Rs. 2,69,69,133.00/-. The next loan confirmation at page 36, of the same date, is in the same terms but it confirms that an amount of Rs. 75,24,686/- would be due and payable by 11th April, 2018. The third loan confirmation at page 46 sets the amount due and payable at Rs. 52,18,403/-. 2,69,69,133.00/-. The next loan confirmation at page 36, of the same date, is in the same terms but it confirms that an amount of Rs. 75,24,686/- would be due and payable by 11th April, 2018. The third loan confirmation at page 46 sets the amount due and payable at Rs. 52,18,403/-. The suit is for recovery of the aggregate amount in these three loan confirmation agreements. 5. The plaint goes on to say that despite several requests no payment was forthcoming. Instead the defendant requested further extensions of time. There is a reference to correspondence between 26th August, 2016 (Exhibit "D") and going on to 3rd August, 2017 (Exhibit "1-2") all prior to the loan confirmations. The fact that this correspondence pre-dated the loan confirmations is irrelevant. There is also a mention in the plaint of certain cheques having been handed over and of these being dishonoured on presentment, but the suit itself does not seek to recover the amounts of the cheques on dishonour and no cause of action is based on these dishonoured cheques. 6. The affidavit in reply says first that the defendant did not receive the full amount requested, i.e., Rs. 3 crores. That can hardly furnish a defence to a suit such as this based on loan confirmations signed by the defendant. There is then a case made out that the loans are not reflected in the plaintiffs books of account and that the plaintiff does not have the requisite money lender's licence. On this aspect of the matter the law is settled both by the learned Judge in the Ashok Commercial Enterprises & Anr. v. Parekh Aluminex Ltd., III (2014) BC 361 (Bom)., and of the Division Bench in Appeal (Parekh Aluminex Ltd. v. Ashok Commercial Enterprises & Anr., 2015 (2) ALL Mr. 679 : 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2304, S.J. Vazifdar J (as he then was) and Mrs. R.P. Mohite Dere, J, per Mrs. R.P. Mohite Dere, J.) I have considered both in my judgment in Mahesh P. Raheja v. Base Industries Group & Anr.; Chamber Summons No. 488 of 2018 in Commercial Execution Application No. 63 of 2017 in Suit No. 119 of 2016, decided on 22nd July, 2018. It is never enough merely to put up such averments with nothing more. R.P. Mohite Dere, J.) I have considered both in my judgment in Mahesh P. Raheja v. Base Industries Group & Anr.; Chamber Summons No. 488 of 2018 in Commercial Execution Application No. 63 of 2017 in Suit No. 119 of 2016, decided on 22nd July, 2018. It is never enough merely to put up such averments with nothing more. Paragraph 5 of the affidavit in reply contains a clear admission that the defendant did in fact receive at least an amount of Rs. 1 crore but claims to have paid and returned an amount of Rs. 50 lakh. The complaint by the defendant is that this return of Rs. 50 lakh by cheque was to be substituted by a cash loan of Rs. 50 lakh, which never happened and that his request was for an entire cash loan of Rs. 3 crores. None of this affords a meaningful defence because what the suit seeks is recovery of the amounts due and promised to be repaid not on the basis of oral understandings, an implicit agreement, or anything of the kind, but under the signed loan confirmations. What is therefore material is the defence in regard to these three loan confirmations and this is set out in paragraph 10. Here the defendant does not deny his signature on the loan confirmations but says that some of the signatures near the blanks in the loan confirmations (and which blanks were in respect of some cheques) are forged. If that is so, then it is unclear what, if anything, the defendant has done about this so-called forgery, and Mr. Bharucha for the plaintiff states that no action whatsoever has been taken. Indeed, Mr. Patil has instructions to say that the defendant is only now "in the process of taking "some action". That is too little too late, 7. The affidavit in reply denies one particular e-mail at Exhibit "D" to the plaint and which is dated 26th August, 2016. But this will not assist the defendant in the least. The reason is that there are clearly e-mails following the one at Exhibit "D" running from Exhibit "E" all the way to Exhibit "1-2". The dates are from 8th February, 2017 to 3rd August, 2017 and there is no denial of these emails. There cannot be, for the simple reason that some of them are from the defendant himself. The reason is that there are clearly e-mails following the one at Exhibit "D" running from Exhibit "E" all the way to Exhibit "1-2". The dates are from 8th February, 2017 to 3rd August, 2017 and there is no denial of these emails. There cannot be, for the simple reason that some of them are from the defendant himself. Of these, I believe the most important is the one at page 73 of the plaint, Exhibit "I-2" of 3rd August 2017, for here the defendant writes to the plaintiff saying that 'as discussed' he would prefer a loan agreement rather than a promissory note. This is in the context of the previous e-mail that asked for a confirmation of the planned disbursement, i.e., repayment date prior to 31st July, 2017. What is significant is that the defendant's e-mail is of 3rd August, 2017 and the loan confirmations that followed are obviously on that basis and are all dated 11th August, 2017. That these loan confirmations were therefore at the instance of the defendant is not something that can reasonably be denied by the defendant. 8. The substance of the defence seems to be that since the plaintiff did not give to the defendant the entire amount the defendant wanted, but only part of it, and did not give it to him in the mode he wanted, i.e., cash, therefore the defendant is not liable to make any repayment to the plaintiff. That does not even stand to reason. It is not even remotely plausible nor probable. 9. Reliance is placed on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sanjay Mishra v. Kanishka Kapoor, TV, (2009) BC 223 : (2009) 4 Mah LJ 155, by the defendant to say that if the amount is not accounted for it is not legally recoverable. The decision though binding is distinguishable because in that case the entire consideration was not only under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but, more importantly, it did not involve any consideration of a signed loan confirmation at all. 10. The reliance thereafter on the decision of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Dr. Jagannath Ganesh Hegade v. In Depth Entertaining Arts Pvt. Ltd., Decided on 1st August, 2016 in Summons for Judgment No. 88 of 2015, may not be appropriate. 10. The reliance thereafter on the decision of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Dr. Jagannath Ganesh Hegade v. In Depth Entertaining Arts Pvt. Ltd., Decided on 1st August, 2016 in Summons for Judgment No. 88 of 2015, may not be appropriate. That decision seems to have proceeded on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mechelec Engineers & Manufactures v. Basic Equipment Corporation & Anr., 1976 (SLT Soft) 592 : (1976) 4 SCC 687 . In view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., II (2017) SLT 542 : 11 (2017) BC 280 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 5321 , this is not an appropriate reference. 11. I am unable to find any triable issue or any defence to the suit. The defences sought to be raised in the Affidavit in Reply are without merit. The Summons for Judgment is made absolute. 12. The suit is accordingly decreed in the amount of Rs. 3,47,12,222.00/- along with further interest on the amount of Rs. 2.50 crores at 18% per annum from the date of the suit till payment or realisation. 13. In view of the amendments by the Commercial Courts Act to Section 35 of the CPC the plaintiff is entitled to an order of costs. These costs must be reasonable litigation costs. The plaintiff has paid the maximum ad valorem Court fees of Rs. 3 lakh on the plaint. The plaintiff is entitled to a refund in accordance with the Rules. The balance will constitute the first component of costs. In addition, there will be a decree in costs against the defendant in the amount of Rs. 3.5 lakh, which I consider to be reasonable having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The decree for costs will not carry interest. 14. Drawn up decree expedited. 15. Liberty to the plaintiff to move in execution without awaiting sealing of the decree. 16. The Summons for Judgment and the Commercial Summary Suit is disposed of in these terms.