JUDGMENT : Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. Heard Sri Amrish Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Girish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the first and second respondents and Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent. 2. Counsel for the petitioner has confined his prayer to the prayer clause no.1 in terms of which a challenge has been raised to the order dated 05/06.08.2019 passed by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972/Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Kanpur in File No.K-36(89)2019/C.1., whereby the appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (the P.G. Act, 1972) has been rejected as being barred by limitation. 3. Contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that as per the terms of Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal is 60 days from the date of receipt of the order under challenge, which is extendable by a further period of 60 days upon sufficient cause being shown. 4. It is submitted that in the instant case the application filed by the third respondent for a direction for payment of gratuity amount, registered as Case No.JHS-36(23)/2018, was allowed by the Controlling Authority under the P.G. Act, 1972/Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Jhansi by means of an order dated 18.03.2019, and the said order was received by the petitioner on 09.04.2019. 5. It is further submitted that the order dated 18.03.2019 was modified in terms of a corrigendum bearing the same date i.e. 18.03.2019 and this corrigendum was received by the petitioner on 16.04.2019. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appeal under Section 7(7) of the P.G. Act, 1972 which had been preferred before the Appellate Authority on 13.06.2019 was within the period of limitation of 60 days as provided for. 6. It is contended that the appeal having been filed within the prescribed period of limitation there was no occasion for filing of an application seeking condonation of delay and in this view of matter the order passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal as being barred by limitation for the reason of non-filing of the application for condonation of delay, cannot be sustained. 7. 7. Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta, learned counsel for the third respondent raises a dispute with regard to the date of receipt of the corrigendum order dated 18.03.2019 and submits that there is no material on record to demonstrate that the appeal was filed within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the corrigendum order. 8. Be that as it may, the order passed in appeal does not show any consideration of the facts relevant for deciding the issue with regard to limitation so as to sustain the conclusion drawn by the Appellate Authority. 9. In this regard it would be apposite to refer to the provisions contained under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 with regard to filing of an appeal against an order passed under sub-section (4) of Section 7. For ease of reference sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 is being extracted below:- "7. Determination of the amount of Gratuity.-- x x x x x (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4), may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf : Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days. Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the controlling authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount." 10. A plain reading of the aforementioned provision indicates that any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) of Section 7, may, within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other Authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. A plain reading of the aforementioned provision indicates that any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) of Section 7, may, within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other Authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf. In terms of the first proviso the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of 60 days, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. 11. It is thus seen that as per terms of sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 the prescribed limitation for filing an appeal against an order under sub-section (4), is 60 days from the date of receipt of the order, and in a case where the appeal is preferred within the aforesaid prescribed time period the same would be held to be within limitation and there would be no requirement for seeking extension of the time period. 12. It is only the case where the appeal has been filed beyond the prescribed time period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order passed under sub-section (4), that the first proviso to sub-section (7) would be required to be invoked by filing an application for condonation of delay, and the Appellate Authority would thereafter be required to exercise its discretion in the matter and in case it records its satisfaction that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period of 60 days, the said period may be extended by a further period of 60 days. 13. In this view of the matter, the order dated 05/06.08.2019 having been passed by the Appellate Authority without consideration of the facts relevant for deciding the issue of limitation the same cannot be legally sustained and is thus set aside. 14. The matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. 15. It would be open to parties to appear before the Appellate Authority and make their submissions on the point of limitation. 14. The matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. 15. It would be open to parties to appear before the Appellate Authority and make their submissions on the point of limitation. The appeal, if found by the Appellate Authority to be within prescribed period of limitation, as provided under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the P.G. Act, 1972 may be heard and decided on its merits thereafter. 16. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed itself on the rival contentions sought to be raised by the parties, either on the point of limitation or on merits. 17. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.