JUDGMENT : C. PRAVEEN KUMAR, J. 1. The husband of the petitioner, by name Peddireddy Konda Reddy S/o. Late Narasimha Reddy, was subjected to preventive detention under Section 3(2) read with 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short, 'the Act'), under order dated 28.11.2018 of the Collector & District Magistrate, Kurnool District. His detention was approved by the Government vide G.O. Rt. No. 2555, General Administration (SCI.) Department, dated 6.12.2018. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to produce the detenu before this Court and set him at liberty, by declaring the detention order dated 28.11.2018 and the consequential G.O. Rt. No. 2555 dated 6.12.2018 as illegal, arbitrary and in violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 2. The record reflects that after the approval of the order of detention by the Government, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act. Thereupon, the Advisory Board reviewed the matter and submitted a report to the Government on 20.12.2018 under Section 11(1) of the Act, opining that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu. After consideration of the said report, the Government confirmed the detention of the petitioner's husband and directed that his detention shall be continued for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention, i.e., 30.11.2018, vide G.O. Rt. No. 17, General Administration (SCI) Department, dated 2.1.2019. 3. The order of detention referred to eight crimes in which the detenu was alleged to have been involved. Out of them, four crimes were registered for the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and the remaining four crimes were registered under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code for breach of peace. The detenu was acquitted in the cases registered for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and insofar as the offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was bound over by the concerned authority. The detenu was acquitted in the cases registered for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and insofar as the offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was bound over by the concerned authority. Having referred to the eight crimes registered against the detenu, the detaining authority observed that the detenu has been motivating innocent youth towards committing of both property and bodily offences and due to his motivation, the common youth of Chinna Kandukuru, Allagadda and surrounding villages were involved in several offences and that the detenu, by maintaining a gang and operating in the commission of offences armed with deadly weapons, has been causing breach of public peace and tranquility. The detenu and his henchmen have been damaging the public property and thereby, exhibiting high handed behavior in the areas, affecting the public order. Thus, the detaining authority held that the detenu falls under the definition of 'Goonda' under the Act and he is required to be detained, and accordingly, passed the order of detention under challenge. 4. A counter-affidavit came to be filed by the 1st respondent-Collector & District Magistrate, Kurnool, denying the averments made in the writ affidavit and supporting the order of detention. 5. Though various grounds are urged in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would mainly contend that the order of detention came to be passed by the detaining authority in a confused state of mind and on stale grounds. To substantiate his contention, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant portions of the order of detention and grounds of detention and pointed out that the detaining authority was not in a position to make up his mind as to whether the detention of the detenu is required in order to maintain 'law and order' or 'public order'. That apart, the Counsel would contend that the order of detention was based on stale incidents, and therefore it cannot be sustained. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that there is a gap of about 18 months between the last incident and the date of passing of the order of detention and as no proper explanation was offered by the detaining authority for such long delay in passing the order of detention, the order of detention is liable to be set aside on that ground also. 6. 6. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General would submit that even if it is presumed, but not admitting, that the detaining authority was in a state of confusion as to whether the detention of the detenu is required on account of 'law and order' issue or to maintain 'public order', there was other material before the detaining authority, which is sufficient to show that the detention of the detenu is not illegal. While admitting that the last incident was on 27.5.2017, he would, however, contend that if the detenu was not detained, he would have continued with his activities thereby disturbing the even tempo of life of the people. 7. So far as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the detaining authority passed the order of detention in a confused state of mind, is concerned, it is to be noted that in the order of detention, the detaining authority, having referred to eight crimes registered against the detenu, observed that the provisions of IPC and Cr.P.C. are found insufficient in ordinary course to deal with the detenu since he is a habitual offender indulging repeatedly in dangerous "Goonda" activities adversely affecting public order and therefore, he would fall within the meaning of word "Goonda" as defined in Section 2(G) of the Act. However, in the grounds of detention, which were supplied to the detenu, the detaining authority observed as follows: "Thus, the said Peddireddy Kondareddy, S/o. late Narasimha Reddy is a potential criminal as seen from his criminal history. He is acting prejudicial to the public order. He has no respect towards law and is relapsing to recidivism creating panic in the minds of general public. He is acting prejudicial to the public order. He has no respect towards law and is relapsing to recidivism creating panic in the minds of general public. Hence, on the basis of the record placed before me, I am satisfied that you should be detained under A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land in order to maintain Law and Order effectively with an iron hand and to keep peaceful atmosphere and ensure peaceful existence of the people in the limits of Allagadda Rural PS and Allagadda Town PS of Kumool District, there is no other go to go except to book Peddireddy Kondareddy, S/o. late Narasimha Reddy as detenue under Section 2(G) of the A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986. It is therefore, ordered that you shall be detained under Section 2(g) of A.P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1 of 1986). To prevent you from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." 8. As can be seen from the above observations, it is clear that the detaining authority was not in a position to make up his mind as to whether the activities of the detenu are affecting 'public order' or 'law and order'. Though, in the first and last paragraphs extracted above, the detaining authority held that the detenu has been acting prejudicial to the public order and his detention was ordered to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, in the second paragraph, it is stated that the detenu should be detained under the Act in order to maintain 'law and order' and to keep peaceful atmosphere and to ensure peaceful existence of the people. Thus, the order of detention lacks clarity as to whether on the ground of 'public order' or 'law and order', the detention of the detenu was necessitated. Thus, the order of detention lacks clarity as to whether on the ground of 'public order' or 'law and order', the detention of the detenu was necessitated. Further, though the detaining authority stated that the detenu is acting prejudicial to the public order, except citing stale incidents, such as, the detenu motivating innocent youth towards committing of both property and bodily offences and by maintaining a gang operating in the commission of offences armed with deadly weapons, causing breach of public peace and tranquility, the order of detention and the grounds of detention do not reveal relevant and justifiable grounds for ordering the detention of the detenu in order to maintain 'public order'. In the absence of a positive conclusion that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to 'public order', prevention detention laws cannot be made applicable to 'law and order' issues. 9. The issue as regards satisfaction arrived at on grounds of 'public order' and 'public peace and law and order' and its consequences, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the composite High Court for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in Vasanthu Sumalatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2016 (2) ALD (Crl.) 156 : 2016 (1) ALT 738 (D.B.), wherein, the Division Bench, having dealt with the expressions 'public order' and 'law and order' in detail and having referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police v. C. Anita, 2004 (2) ALD (Crl.) 827 (SC) : (2004) 7 SCC 467 ; Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, (1974) 1 SCC 185 ; Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 2 SCC 177 ; T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 6 SCC 168 ; State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub, (1980) 3 SCC 57 ; Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , held as follows: "71. The detaining authority cannot wish away the fact that, in the grounds of detention, he has recorded his satisfaction of the need to detain the detenus as he apprehended their activities to be injurious to "public peace" and "law and order" neither of which are grounds for detaining a citizen, in preventive custody, under A.P. Act 1 of 1986. The detaining authority cannot wish away the fact that, in the grounds of detention, he has recorded his satisfaction of the need to detain the detenus as he apprehended their activities to be injurious to "public peace" and "law and order" neither of which are grounds for detaining a citizen, in preventive custody, under A.P. Act 1 of 1986. Even if the order and the grounds of detention are read together, the fact, that the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction in the orders of detention on grounds of "public order" and in the grounds of detention, as affecting "public peace" and "law and order", reflect his confused state of mind, and lack of clarity of thought in satisfying himself whether the detention should be on grounds of "public order" or "public peace and law and order". As noted hereinabove, "pubic order" has acquired a meaning distinct from "law and order" and, as the detaining authority is not empowered to detain citizens on grounds that their activities are injurious to "pubic peace and law and order", his subjective satisfaction is based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations invalidating the orders of detention." 10. In the light of the aforesaid judgment and having regard to the fact that the grounds of detention and the order of detention reveal confused state of mind of the detaining authority and lack of clarity of thought in satisfying himself whether the detention should be on the ground of 'public order' or 'law and order', and since the detaining authority is not empowered to order detention of a citizen on the ground that his activities are prejudicial to 'law and order', as noted earlier, we are of the considered opinion that his subject satisfaction came to be based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations, thereby invalidating the order of detention under challenge. 11. That apart, there is a gap of about one and a half year between the date of registration of the last criminal case and the date of passing the order of detention. The only explanation offered by the detaining authority is that the detenu had been avoiding arrest and concealing his presence, which cannot be said to be valid reason. 12. The only explanation offered by the detaining authority is that the detenu had been avoiding arrest and concealing his presence, which cannot be said to be valid reason. 12. The issue of long and unexplained gap between the date of registration of the last crime and the date of passing the detention order, has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 1 ; Jagan Nath Biswas v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 4 SCC 115 ; Sk. Serajul v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 1517 ; Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 (1) ALD (Crl.) 892 (SC) : (1999) 4 SCC 417 and Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 233 . 13. In Lakshman Khatik's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "5. All the three grounds on which the District Magistrate purports to have reached the required satisfaction are based on incident which took place in rapid succession in the months of August, 1971. The first incident of unloading 5 bags of rice took place in the afternoon of 3.8.1971. The second incident took place on 5.8.1971 also in the afternoon practically at the same place as the first incident. This time also some rice was removed from the trucks carrying rice. The third incident took place in the afternoon of 20.8.1971 also at the same place. That also related to the removal of some rice form loaded trucks. It is not clear from the record whether the petitioner was prosecuted for the theft, especially, when it is seen that the first incident of removal of rice was witnessed by two Constables. However that might be, it appears to us that the District Magistrate could not have been possibly satisfied about the need for detention on 22.3.1972 having regard to the detenu's conduct some 7 months earlier. Indeed mere delay in passing a detention order is not conclusive, but we have to see the type of grounds given and consider whether such grounds could really weigh with an officer some 7 months later in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies of foodgrains. It is not explained why there was such a long delay in passing the order. The District Magistrate appears almost to have passed an order of conviction and sentence for offences committee about 7 months earlier. The authorities concerned must have due regard to the object with which the order is passed, and if the object was to prevent disruption of supplies of foodgrains one should think that prompt action in such matters should be taken as soon as incidents like those which are referred to in the grounds have taken place. In our opinion the order of detention is invalid." 14. In Jagan Nath Biswas's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "2. The incidents themselves look rather serious but also state, having regard to the long gap between the occurrences and the order of detention. One should have expected some proximity in time to provide a rational nexus between the incidents relied on and the satisfaction arrived at. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that unexplained and long delay will be fatal to the plea of subjective satisfaction. In the present case, Counsel for the State. Shri G.S. Chatterjee, took time to furnish an explanation as to why there was such a long delay for the District Magistrate to pass the order of detention. Unfortunately, we are no wise today than at the previous hearing. In short, we are not taken into confidence by the District Magistrate as to why there should have been such an inordinate delay. We, in turn therefore, are not satisfied about the bona fides of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate." 15. In Sk. Serajul's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "....There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. In Sk. Serajul's case (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "....There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities. Of course when we say this we must not be understood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the delay and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine. But here we find that though an affidavit in reply to the petition was filed by the Deputy Secretary Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal, no explanation was forthcoming in this affidavit as to why the order of detention was made as late as 24th August, 1972 when the last incident on which it was founded occurred on 15th January, 1972 and why the petitioner was not arrested until 22nd February, 1973. Though the order of detention was made on 24th August, 1972...." 16. In Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar's case (supra) and Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik's case (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the detention orders on the grounds of unexplained/unsatisfactory explanation of the delay between the prejudicial activities and the date of passing of the detention orders. 17. Though the order of detention was made on 24th August, 1972...." 16. In Ahamed Mohaideen Zabbar's case (supra) and Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik's case (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the detention orders on the grounds of unexplained/unsatisfactory explanation of the delay between the prejudicial activities and the date of passing of the detention orders. 17. Following the aforesaid judgments, a Division Bench of the composite High Court for the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, by order dated 27.2.2018 passed in WP No. 42192 of 2017, has set aside the order of detention challenged therein, on the ground of long and unexplained gap between the date of registration of last crime and the date of passing of the detention order. 18. Having regard to the above judgments, since in the instant case also, no reasonable explanation was offered by the detaining authority explaining the long gap of one and a half year between the date of registration of the last crime and the date of passing the order of detention, the order of detention passed by the detaining authority, as approved and confirmed by the Government, is liable to be set aside on this score as well. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed by setting aside the order of detention dated 28.11.2018 passed by the Collector & District Magistrate, Kurnool District, approved under G.O. Rt. No. 2555, General Administration (SCI) Department, dated 6.12.2018. The husband of the petitioner, by name Peddireddy Konda Reddy S/o. Late Narasimha Reddy, shall be set at liberty forthwith unless his confinement is required in relation to any other case. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.