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2019 DIGILAW 251 (GAU)

Lalremruata Ralte v. State Of Mizoram

2019-02-22

HITESH KUMAR SARMA, KALYAN RAI SURANA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Hitesh Kumar Sarma, J. This Criminal Appeal No.1 of 2018 (J) has been preferred by the appellants, namely, (i) Sri Lalremruata Ralte (hereinafter referred to as A-1) and (ii) Sri Lalthlamuanpuia (hereinafter referred to as A-2), against the judgment and order dated 28.07.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl Judicial district, Aizawl in Sessions Case No. 115/2013 arising out of Crl. Tr. No. 1517/2013 under Section 302 and 201 IPC (corresponding to Aizawl Police Station Case No. 265/2013). By the said judgment, A-1 was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for four months under Section 302 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.5000/- with default stipulation and A-2 was convicted and sentenced to serve rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple imprisonment for two months, under Section 201 IPC. The sentences of A- 1 were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 18.01.2013 at 9.30 PM, an FIR was lodged with the Officer-in-charge, Aizawl P.S. by Lalhmingthangi Chhangte, stating that in continuation of her earlier report regarding the missing of her daughter, namely, K. Zohmangaihi since the night of 10.08.2013, she strongly suspected that her husband (i.e. A-1) had killed her daughter. In the FIR, she justified her suspicion that it was A-1 who had killed her deceased daughter as he had left for Delhi on the very next day after her daughter had gone missing. 3. On receipt of FIR (vide Ext.P-1), the police registered Aizawl P.S. Case No. 265/2013, under Section 302 IPC, investigated into it, collected evidence, arrested both accused persons, recovered the dead body of the deceased, sent it for post mortem examination, seized blood stained clothes from the place of occurrence and sent the same for forensic examination. Also seized the vehicle owned by A-1, which was used to remove and dispose of the dead body of the deceased, obtained reports of post mortem examination as well as forensic examination, got the confessional statement of A-1 recorded by a Magistrate, examined witnesses. Finally, on completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid charge-sheet against both the accused-appellants under Section 302 and 201 of IPC. 4. Finally, on completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid charge-sheet against both the accused-appellants under Section 302 and 201 of IPC. 4. In due course, after committal of the case to the Court of Session, the learned Addl. Session Judge, Aizawl, commenced the trial of the case after observing all the required legal formalities. 5. A formal charge under Section 302 and 201 of IPC was framed against the accused-appellants by the learned trial Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Aizawl. The charge so framed was read over and explained to both the accused-appellants who pleaded innocence and claimed to be tried. 6. To being home the charge against the accused-appellants, the prosecution examined as many as eighteen witnesses who were subjected to cross- examination by the defence. The defence did not examine any witnesses. 7. After closure of the prosecution evidence, statements of both the accused-appellants were recorded by the learned trial Court under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In their such statements, they denied the accusations leveled against them. 8. We have meticulously examined the records of the learned trial Court including the judgment appealed against and scrutinized the evidence of the witnesses. We have also heard Mr. Victor L. Ralte, learned amicus curiae for the appellants and Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. P.P. for the State respondent. 9. Before proceeding to discuss the other evidence on record, taking into consideration the principal charge under Section 302 of the IPC, we have scanned the evidence of PW-21, who is the doctor, on police requisition, had performed the post mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased, on 19-08-2013 in the Forensic Medicine Department in the civil Hospital, Aizawl. On such examination, he recorded his findings, vide Ext.P-22, as follows: "1. Fracture of skull with opening of skull cavity at bilateral parietal, temporal and frontal region with intact occipital bone and base of skull. 2. Fracture of both bones of left fore arm on lower 1/3. 3. Laceration measuring 10cm x muscle depth on lateral aspect of upper 1/3 of right fore arm." PW-21 had opined that the cause of death of the deceased was head injury, caused by blunt force impact and that the injuries were ante mortem in nature. During his cross-examination, the defence had failed to elicit any material so as to discredit his evidence. 10. During his cross-examination, the defence had failed to elicit any material so as to discredit his evidence. 10. In the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) AIR SC 465, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case within the scope and ambit of Section 300 thirdly' of the IPC, which are:- "Firstly, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." 11. So far the first and second constituent of an offence falling under Section 300 thirdly' of the IPC, the post mortem examination is very succinct, leaving absolutely no doubt that the head injury sustained by the deceased was due to use of blunt force, causing in her death. So far the other constituents, "thirdly" and "fourthly" are concerned, we will take up the same slightly later while discussing the other evidence on record. 12. Based on the evidence of the Doctor conducting post mortem examination (PW-21), it can safely be held that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature due to the injuries sustained by her. On the facts emerged on the totality of the evidence on record, it transpires that although the death of the deceased was caused in the intervening morning between 10.08.2013 and 11.08.2013, the post mortem examination could be conducted only on 19.08.2013 after recovery of the dead body of the deceased on 18.08.2013. 13. The evidence on record reveals that there was no eye witness to the occurrence and there is no direct evidence implicating the accused-appellants. 13. The evidence on record reveals that there was no eye witness to the occurrence and there is no direct evidence implicating the accused-appellants. The investigation of the case appears to have taken a turn only upon the arrest of A-1, whereupon he had made a statement disclosing the facts relating to the death of the deceased as well as leading the Investigating Police Officer to recover the dead body, vide disclosure statement (Ext. P-3), wherein he disclosed that on 10.08.2013, at 11.00 pm, he had a quarrel with the deceased after going to bed, and enraged with the quarrel, he went to the kitchen to pick up a hammer (weighing 500 grams with wooden handle) and proceeded towards the deceased, who was on bed and hit her on the head about four times in which his wife (i.e. the deceased) succumbed to her injuries. He packed her dead body in a jute sack and loaded it in the trunk of his Santro Xing Car MZ-01-J-0831 and headed towards Sakawrhmuituai Tlang dumping ground. On reaching there, he threw the dead body of his wife at the dumping ground. He had further disclosed that he shall lead the police to the particular place, i.e., the dumping ground at Sakawrhmuituai Tlang, where he had thrown the dead body of his wife. 14. The evidence of the Investigating Police Officer (PW-22) is that before A-1 was arrested and brought into custody, he had visited the place of occurrence twice on 18.08.2013. In his first visit he had observed that the pillow cover, bed sheet and quilt-cover were missing from the master bedroom. In his second visit to the place of occurrence with expert team of Forensic Science Laboratory (hereinafter referred to as 'FSL'), he found blood stains on the mattress of the bed and other places at the place of occurrence. Swabbing was done by the team of FSL experts on suspected blood stains and collected the same in filter paper, which was seized by him, vide Ext.P-9. By another seizure memo (Ext.P-5), he had also seized one hammer of around 500 grams weight with wooden handle, suspected to be used in the commission of the offence, which was found in the rack near the bed of the deceased. He had then forwarded the evidence collected vide Ext.P-5 for forensic examination. 15. By another seizure memo (Ext.P-5), he had also seized one hammer of around 500 grams weight with wooden handle, suspected to be used in the commission of the offence, which was found in the rack near the bed of the deceased. He had then forwarded the evidence collected vide Ext.P-5 for forensic examination. 15. Pursuant to the disclosure statement made by A-1 and as led by him, the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the dumping ground at Sakawrhmuituai Tlang. The disclosure statement was recorded as provided under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 16. Relying on the case of Kottaya v. Emperor, (1947) AIR PC 67, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma Vs. State of Bombay, (1955) AIR SC 104, held as follows- "22. ... Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the rules enacted in Sections 25 and 26 of the Act which provide that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence and that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Where however any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, that part of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered can be proved whether it amounts to a confession or not. The expression "whether it amounts to a confession or not" has been used in order to emphasize the position that even though it may amount to a confession that much information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered can be proved against the accused. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. But clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. (Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, (1947) AIR PC 67)." 17. But clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. (Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, (1947) AIR PC 67)." 17. Now, the fact that the deceased had died due to the head injury produced by blunt force impact and that the hammer (M. Ext.3) was used in inflicting the fatal head injury is so evident from the materials on record that we have no hesitation to hold that the deceased suffered homicidal death in the hands of the A-1. 18. On appreciating the evidence of PW-1, it is seen that she is the first informant. On 12.08.2013, she had heard from PW-2 that her daughter was missing. She had tried to contact the deceased over mobile phone but her calls were not answered by her daughter. Therefore, she suspected her to be dead. So, it appears from her evidence that she does not have any independent knowledge of the occurrence, and admittedly, she also did not visit the place of occurrence even after the receipt of information that her daughter was missing. But, the fact that she got the information about missing of her daughter from PW-2 is corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 to the effect that she had informed the aforesaid fact to PW-1. 19. The PW-2 appears to be a vital witness in this case. Her evidence is to the effect that she used to stay with A-1 and the victim in the same house since 2008. In the morning of 11.08.2013, A-1 entered home from outside and told her that in the previous night he had quarrel with the victim and that the victim left their house at about 11.00 PM. Her further evidence is that on that day itself, i.e. 11.08.2013, A-1 had left for Delhi with Marina Lalmauanawmi. She also deposed that only after 17.08.2013, when they did not hear about the victim, PW-1 had lodged the FIR. She also deposed that Lalthlamuanpuia (A-2) had stayed in the house of the A-1 and the victim along with his son on 11.08.2013 and left the said house on 12.08.2013 for Kolasib. But, while leaving the house, he had locked the door of the bedroom of the victim, i.e., the place of occurrence. She also deposed that Lalthlamuanpuia (A-2) had stayed in the house of the A-1 and the victim along with his son on 11.08.2013 and left the said house on 12.08.2013 for Kolasib. But, while leaving the house, he had locked the door of the bedroom of the victim, i.e., the place of occurrence. The police, accompanied by local Council member, had opened the lock of the said bedroom and when she entered there, she found that one pillow cover, bed-sheet and quilt- cover were missing. She also noticed blood stain on the edge of the bed and the hammer A-1 used for hitting the victim. It has also come out from her evidence that out of 35 pairs of shoes including slippers belonging to the victim, 34 Nos. of shoes and slippers were found on the shoe rack and one slipper was found inside the bathroom, as such, the said witness did not believe that the victim had left the house, as stated by A-1, without putting on shoe or slipper. According to her evidence, the accused had murdered the victim on 10.08.2013 between sunset and sunrise on the intervening day of 11.08.2013 and dumped the dead body with A-2 at Sakawrhmuituai dumping ground. She also specifically stated that the A-2 had taken-away the pillow cover, bed-sheet and quilt-cover while leaving the house on 12.08.2013. However, during her cross-examination, the defence could only elicit from the said witness that the dumping of the dead body by the accused appellant and taking away of the bed-sheet, quilt-cover and the pillow cover were not seen by her, but she learnt the same fact from the police. However, so far the statement of A-1 to her that after the quarrel in the previous night his wife had left the home and that the A-1 came home in the morning on 11.08.2013, and thereafter, left for Delhi with Marina Lalmauanawmi, are all facts, which remained intact during her cross-examination. Another circumstance revealed by the evidence on record is that, apart from the A-1 and his deceased wife, there was no other person in the place of occurrence at the relevant time. Therefore, there is no explanation as to how after 11.08.2013, when the bed room of the A-1 and deceased was locked by A-2, blood stain could be detected in several places inside the bed room, i.e., the place of occurrence. Therefore, there is no explanation as to how after 11.08.2013, when the bed room of the A-1 and deceased was locked by A-2, blood stain could be detected in several places inside the bed room, i.e., the place of occurrence. Thus, this piece of evidence of PW-2 not only squarely implicates A-1 for murdering the deceased, but also implicates A-2, for staying in the place of occurrence after A-1 had left, causing disappearance of vital evidence in form of pillow cover, bed-sheet and quilt-cover, that might have blood-stains, which, if left behind, would leave a tell-tale evidence, and that the locking of the bed room where the occurrence took place, was only with a view to prevent any inquisitive eyes from seeing the scene of crime. 20. In his deposition, PW-4 had subscribed to the evidence of the Investigating Police Officer (PW-22) to the effect that in his presence, the disclosure statement/ confession was made by A-1. PW-4 is a witness to the seizure of the hammer (M. Ext.3). He is also a witness to the seizure memo (Ext.P- 4), prepared in respect of the Santro Xing car of A-1, which was used to carry the dead body of the deceased. He had admitted his signature on Ext.P-4. Although in his cross-examination, he is found to have stated that he had not made a statement before the police, yet the admission of his signatures in the aforesaid exhibit, confirms his presence when the aforesaid seizures were made. Otherwise also, he was not a witness to the crime. Therefore, his evidence is confined to the seizure of M.Ext.3 and also the Santro Car vide Ext. P-4. PW-6 is also a witness to the seizure of hammer as well as the Santro Xing Car and he exhibited his signatures on the respective seizure lists. In his cross-examination, the defence had failed to extract anything contrary to indicate that his evidence was not trustworthy. Such evidence of the seizure has also been subscribed to by PW-2, as found from her evidence, indicated hereinbefore. 21. Pw-7 is also a witness to the recovery as well as the seizure of the hammer (M.Ext.3) from beside the bed at the place of occurrence as well as to the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3) made by A-1. He is also witness to the inquest of the dead body of the deceased. 21. Pw-7 is also a witness to the recovery as well as the seizure of the hammer (M.Ext.3) from beside the bed at the place of occurrence as well as to the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3) made by A-1. He is also witness to the inquest of the dead body of the deceased. His evidence also show that he was a witness to the seizure of blood stained swab and the hammer (Ext.P-5 and M. Ext.3) and seizure of gold earring (Ext.P-6). In cross-examination, his evidence remained intact so far the seizures referred to above are concerned, except for seizure of hammer (M. Ext.3). It appears that while he deposed that he was not a witness to the recovery of the hammer yet, in the same breath, he stated that the recovery of the hammer was made from inside the house of A-1 in his presence. 22. Pw-9 is the witness to the seizure of the mobile and the ATM Cards vide Ext.P-2 and he exhibited the same. He is also a witness to the inquest of the dead body of the deceased, vide Ext. P-7. PW-10 is also a witness to the inquest of the dead body. She also identified the dead body of the deceased. 23. Pw-12 is the witness to the seizure of mobile phone (Ext.P-8) and he is also a witness to the inquest of the dead body of the deceased. He is also a witness to the seizure of gold ear-ring of the deceased vide Ext.P-6. 24. Pw-13 is the witness to the seizure of Santro Xing Car vide Ext.P-4. PW- 15 is a witness to the seizure of bank pass-books, cheque-books, sale deeds and two ATM cards, vide Ext. P-9. Their evidence remained intact in respect of the aforesaid seizures, even on their respective cross-examination. 25. The prosecution witnesses, viz., PW-4, PW-6, PW-7, PW-9, PW-10, PW- 12, PW-13, PW-15 are all witnesses to different seizures made by the Investigating Police Officer and their respective evidence are neither connected to the perpetration and/or with the commission of the crime. 26. The evidence of PW5 is that the police seized mobile phone, Nokia (white), SBI ATM Card (2 nos.) No. 6220180480900025184 and 6220180153900- 044717 and that he was present and gave his signatures thereon as witness. He is also a witness to the disclosure statement made by A-1 vide Ext. P-3. 26. The evidence of PW5 is that the police seized mobile phone, Nokia (white), SBI ATM Card (2 nos.) No. 6220180480900025184 and 6220180153900- 044717 and that he was present and gave his signatures thereon as witness. He is also a witness to the disclosure statement made by A-1 vide Ext. P-3. He exhibited the seized mobile phone vide Ext. M(1). He also exhibited Ext. M(2), i.e., SBI ATM cards. Such evidence of seizure of the aforesaid seized articles has been proved by his evidence. However, in his cross-examination, he had deposed that since he was outside the room where the A-1 was interrogated by the Investigating Police Officer, he could not hear his statement made to the police. His such evidence lost its relevance in view of the fact that A-1 himself had led the Investigating Officer to recover the dead body of the deceased following his disclosure statement vide Ext.3 and, as such, his statement does not affect the evidentiary value of the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3). 27. Now, we are left with the evidence of PW-17, PW-18, PW-19, who are all forensic experts and authored their respective forensic reports. We are also left with the evidence of PW-22 (Investigating Police Officer) and another witness, namely, Sri Thomas Lalrammawia, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate who had recorded the confessional statement of A-1, under Section 164 Cr.P.C, and also another witness, namely, Sri Vincent Lalrokima, the then Deputy Secretary, L&J Department, who at the relevant time, was working as Judicial Magistrate First Class, had recorded the statement of one Samuel Vanlalliana Ralte (15). 28. So far the evidence of PW, namely, Thomas Lalramawia, the Judicial Magistrate is concerned, although he had recorded the confessional statement of A-1, vide Ext. P16, the legality and reliability on the said statement is the subject of challenge by the learned amicus curiae, questioning it on the ground of non- compliance of the mandatory provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 164 Cr.P.C. It has been submitted that the Magistrate, while recording the confession, is required to make a memorandum at the foot of such confessional statement as prescribed by Section 164 Cr.P.C. as follows:- "I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. (signed) A.B. Magistrate" But, upon the perusal of the memorandum at the foot of the said confessional statement, we find that the same was not signed by the Magistrate concerned. Therefore, we have no alternative but to hold that the mandatory requirement as prescribed by Sub- Section (4) of Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was not observed. On that count alone, the confessional statement, vide Ext. P-16, cannot be relied upon. Otherwise also, on perusal of the contents of Ext.P-16, it appears that it contains both exculpatory as well as inculpatory statement. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the statement of A-1, vide Ext.P-16, does not amount to a confessional statement. 29. So far the evidence of Thomas Lalrammawia is concerned, he was the then learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, and had recorded the statement of a witness, namely, Samuel Vanlalliana Ralte, under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. The same has lost its relevance in view of the fact that during the trial the said witness was not examined by the prosecution as their witness. 30. Pw-17 is the Assistant Director, FSL, Aizawl, who had received police requisition, dated 23.08.2013 for examining 12 exhibits, pertaining to this case. Those 12 exhibits were dried suspected blood stains collected from various places from the place of occurrence, i.e. from inside the bed room of the A-1 and the victim, piece of left and right thigh muscle of the victim, suspected weapon of offence (i.e. hammer). He deposed that using scientific instruments available in FSL, physical and biological examination of those exhibits were done, and vide his report (Ext.P-9), the said witness had opined as follows: (i) The stains from exhibits 1 to 9 were blood of human origin belonging to Group 'O'. (ii) Blood Group of Ext.11, i.e., piece of right thigh muscle is Group 'O'. (iii) Blood stain was not detected from Ext.12. During his cross-examination, the said witness stated that the blood stain found in Exhibits 1 to 9 was not examined to determine that it belonged to the victim. He further stated that the police had not sent the viscera of the victim for examination. (iii) Blood stain was not detected from Ext.12. During his cross-examination, the said witness stated that the blood stain found in Exhibits 1 to 9 was not examined to determine that it belonged to the victim. He further stated that the police had not sent the viscera of the victim for examination. No other material could be elicited to discredit the evidence of the said witness. 31. Pw-18 is the Junior Scientific Officer, In-Charge of Mobile Forensic, FSL Aizawl, who deposed that on telephonic requisition received from the Officer-in- Charge of Aizawl P.S., he had visited the residence of A-1 on 18.08.2013 with his team and on searching with ultra-violet light, blood stains were found on the edge of the bed and blood stained finger prints/palm prints were observed at the backside of the head-board of the said bed. The suspected blood stains from various places were swabbed with filter papers. He had also stated that a hammer kept in the back beside of the bed was also recovered without physical stain of blood. He had also checked the Santro Car of the accused allegedly used for removal and dumping the dead body of the deceased, but no evidence of blood was found there. He stated that the evidence collected was handed over to the Investigating Police Officer to maintain proper chain of custody. He also stated that on 19.08.2013, he had gone to the dumping ground at Sakawrhmuituai Tlang along with the Assistant Director of FSL and JSO of FSL and when the dead body was taking from the said dumping ground, he took photographs of the said dead body and the same was examined by the Assistant Director of FSL. On the requisition made by the Finger Print Division, FSL, he made a printout of the photographs of the blood stained finger print/palm print and the same was submitted to the said Division for comparison, examination, etc. The details of crimes scene that was prepared was marked as Ext.P-11. His evidence could not be demolished in course of his cross-examination by the defence. 32. The details of crimes scene that was prepared was marked as Ext.P-11. His evidence could not be demolished in course of his cross-examination by the defence. 32. Pw-19 is the Junior Scientific Officer (Finger Print Expert, FSL, Aizawl), who deposed that on telephonic requisition received from Officer-in-Charge, Aizawl Police Station, he had visited the place of occurrence on 18.08.2013, at around 10.15 am with his team consisting of J.S.O. and Crime Scene Attendant and on reaching the place of occurrence, the Investigating Police Officer had led them to the crime scene where they found blood stains with the help of ultra-violet light on the edge of the bed and blood stained fingerprints/palm prints were observed at the backside of the headboard of the bed, which was photographed by the J.S.O. On being requisitioned, he had examined the fingerprint impression of A-1 for comparison with the palm print found at the crime scene. The result, vide Ext.P-12 along with the interpretation of the result being Ext.P-12(b) including Ext. P- 12(c)(d)(e) was to the effect that the right palm print impression of A-1 was identical with the blood stained print found at the backside of the headboard of the bed of A-1 and the victim. His evidence could not be discredited in course of his cross-examination. 33. The evidence of PW-22 corroborates the evidence of PWs 17, 18 and 19 to the effect that requisitions were sent by the Investigating Police Officer to the FSL in respect of the collection of evidence, examination of the evidence so collected from the crime scene and the receipt of report from the Forensic Experts, which establishes that the due process was followed for such collection of evidence from the crime scene and their examination by the Forensic Experts. Therefore, it appears that the investigation has been able to link A-1 with his presence in the crime scene by virtue of his fingerprints/palm prints on blood stains of Group 'O' blood, which was the blood group of the victim. The prosecution has been able to establish through the evidence of PWs 17, 18 and 19 that the blood group of blood stains collected from the place of occurrence and from the piece of right thigh muscle collected from the dead body were identical, i.e., blood group 'O'. The prosecution has been able to establish through the evidence of PWs 17, 18 and 19 that the blood group of blood stains collected from the place of occurrence and from the piece of right thigh muscle collected from the dead body were identical, i.e., blood group 'O'. The prosecution has also been able to establish from the call detailed record of A-2 that he had received calls and SMS from A-1 on 11.08.2013 at around 04.11 am. In so far as this part of the evidence of PW-22 is concerned, the same could not be discredited in course of cross-examination. 34. The third constituent of Section 300 of the IPC, as mentioned at paragraph-18 of the case of Virsa Singh (supra), is that the prosecution needs to prove that there was an intention to inflict the particular bodily injury, that is to say, that such injury was neither accidental nor unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended to be inflicted. The use of the hammer on the head of the deceased makes it amply clear that A-1 had an intention to inflict the injury and the same was not accidental or unintentional. As per the constituent "fourthly" of Section 300 of the IPC, as per Virsa Singh (supra) and also in view of the fact that the other three constituents have been established, we need to see whether the type of injury found on the body of the deceased were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. From the evidence of PW-21, we have already found that the cause of death is the "blunt force impact" on the head of the deceased, which was inflicted by the hammer. The weapon used in causing the injury and the medical opinion of PW-21 in respect of blunt force impact appears to have matched, leading this Court to believe that the cause of death was due to the blunt force impact, which, as the evidence reveals, was caused by the seized hammer. At the relevant time of occurrence, as only A-1 was there with the deceased, the circumstantial evidence weighs against the A-1 for causing death of his deceased wife with hammer-blow on her head, which falls within the scope and ambit of Section 302 of the IPC. 35. At the relevant time of occurrence, as only A-1 was there with the deceased, the circumstantial evidence weighs against the A-1 for causing death of his deceased wife with hammer-blow on her head, which falls within the scope and ambit of Section 302 of the IPC. 35. So far the evidence against A-1 and A-2, in respect of charge under Section 201 of the IPC of causing disappearance of evidence of commission of offence of murder, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment are concerned, we have further scanned the evidence on record. The evidence of PW-2 shows that A-1 came back home where the place of occurrence is situated, the place of occurrence at about 8.00 am on 11.08.2013, and told her that after quarrel in the previous night, the victim had left his house. Thereafter, on that day itself, A-2 came to the house of A-1, stayed there in the night of 11.08.2013 with his son and they left the house of A-1 and the victim on 12.08.2013, along with the blood stained clothes, i.e., the pillow cover, quilt-cover and the bed-sheet of the master bed of the deceased and A-1. While leaving, A-2 had also locked the door of the bedroom of A-1 and the victim, i.e., the place of occurrence from outside. Such evidence of PW-2 remained intact even in course of her cross-examination, and as such, we find no reason to disbelieve her evidence, she being another inmate of the house of A-1 and the victim and had positively seen A-2 coming to the house, entering into the bed room, i.e., the place of occurrence and also locking the door of the bed room from outside. That being so, such evidence speaks amply that with a view to screen the offender and to make evidence of the offence disappear, A-2 had closed the door of the place of occurrence from outside after taking away the blood stained clothes. From the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3), it is found that both A-2 and A-1 had participated in the removal of the dead body of the deceased from the place of occurrence. This apart, the statement of A-1 in the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3) is distinctly reliable with the offence of causing disappearance of evidence and therefore, reliable. 36. From the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3), it is found that both A-2 and A-1 had participated in the removal of the dead body of the deceased from the place of occurrence. This apart, the statement of A-1 in the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3) is distinctly reliable with the offence of causing disappearance of evidence and therefore, reliable. 36. Now, the evidence discussed above, brings to light certain implicating circumstances, which are required to be considered in the light of the settled law on circumstantial evidence. Some of the implicating circumstances, which can be culled out from the evidence on record, are as follows: (i) The evidence shows that A-1 and the deceased were together at the time of the occurrence. (ii) The dead body of the victim was recovered on being led by A-1, pursuant to his disclosure statement. (iii) In this case, the weapon of offence, i.e., the hammer was seized from the place of occurrence, i.e., the bed room of A-1 and the victim and the said hammer was used in inflicting the fatal injuries on the head of the deceased. (iv) As per the statement made by A-1 before PW-2, the deceased, who was his wife, had left the house in the night, yet, instead of searching her out, A-1 had left for Delhi on 11.08.2013 itself with Marina Lalmauanawmi, the daughter of his elder brother i.e. A-2. There is no evidence that A-1 had taken any steps to search his wife/deceased. A-1 came back from Delhi on 18.08.2013, and he was arrested at Aizawl Airport. Till then, no action was forthcoming from his side to search for his wife. This appears to be an unnatural conduct, unless A-1 knew that his wife was no more alive. (v) The Investigating Police Officer found human blood stains at various places at the place of occurrence including the mattresses, upper side of the bed, wash basin, etc. (vi) The un-discarded evidence of PW-2 is that she was told by A-1 that a quarrel had taken place between him and the deceased in the previous night and thereafter, she had left the house. This fact was stated to PW- 2 by A-1 himself at about 8.00 am on 11.08.2013 after coming back home, which indicates that he was not in his house for some time in the morning, only to come back at about 8.00 am. This fact was stated to PW- 2 by A-1 himself at about 8.00 am on 11.08.2013 after coming back home, which indicates that he was not in his house for some time in the morning, only to come back at about 8.00 am. (vii) The evidence also shows that out of 35 pair of shoes and slippers of the deceased, one pair of slipper was found in the bathroom of the house of A-1 and the deceased and the remaining 34 pairs remained in the rack, which belies the story propounded by the A-1 before PW-2 that the victim had left the house on her own volition after the alleged quarrel which creates a circumstances to suggest that the victim did not leave the house, as stated to PW2 by A-1, without putting-on her shoes or slippers. (viii) The scientific evidence of the FSL Experts show that the samples of blood stain collected from site of occurrence had matched with the blood group of the deceased. In this regard, the A-1 had not offered any explanation as to how his deceased wife's blood matching with the group could be found at several sites in the place of occurrence since he was the only person at the place of occurrence with his wife/deceased. (ix) The blood stained fingerprints/palm prints were observed at the backside of the head-board of the bed and the forensic report opining that the right palm print impression of A-1 was identical with the blood stained print found at the backside of the head-board of the bed of the accused/victim. (x) The scientific evidence of Forensic expert in respect of blood group of the deceased matching with the blood group found in the palm print of A-1 is a circumstances pointing to the fact that she was inflicted with the fatal injuries on the bed at the place of occurrence, prior to the palm print left by A-1 on the bed. (xi) From the evidence on record, apart from the A-1 and his deceased wife, there was no other person in the place of occurrence at the relevant time to cause the death of the deceased. (xii) The other incriminating circumstances is that on 11.08.2013, after A-1 had left for Delhi, the bed room of A-1 and deceased was locked by A-2. (xii) The other incriminating circumstances is that on 11.08.2013, after A-1 had left for Delhi, the bed room of A-1 and deceased was locked by A-2. If the murder did not take place before 8.00 am on 11.08.2013, when A-1 had left home in the morning, there was no way that any blood stain of Group-O blood would find its way in several places inside such locked room, as such, the inevitable inference would be that blood stains existed in the place of occurrence from before morning of 11.08.2013, when the deceased was last seen alive with A-1. (xiii) The evidence establishes that A-1 and A-2 had removed the dead body from the place of occurrence to the place of recovery with a view to cause disappearance of evidence and to screen the offenders from the crime. (xiv) The coming of A-1 at about 08:00 am on 11.08.2013, creates a circumstances that he had left with the dead body of the deceased with A-2 from the place of occurrence for disposal of the same. (xv) The evidence collected from Ext.P-15, i.e. the call detail record of mobile phone seized from A-2, also points out that at 04:11:24 am of 11.08.2013, he had received an incoming SMS from the mobile phone of A-1. Thereafter, as per Ext.P-15, A-2 had received phone calls from A-1 at 04:12:46 and 04:13:12. Such evidence is indicative of the fact that A- 1 had called A-2 for the purpose of removal of dead body of the deceased, which both of them did as per the disclosure statement (Ext.P-3), which we have already relied on. 37. The learned amicus curiae, during the course of his argument, apart from assailing the confessional statement of A-1, which has already been discussed hereinbefore, has also canvassed before this Court that A-1 had committed the offence at the spur of the moment, under grave and sudden provocation from his deceased wife. The evidence on record does not reveal that A-1 had taken such plea during the trial, rather, his defence was of total denial. Even in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., A-1 had denied commission of the offence involved in this case. He also did not lead any defence evidence to bring home his said plea, as now canvassed before this Court. Even in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., A-1 had denied commission of the offence involved in this case. He also did not lead any defence evidence to bring home his said plea, as now canvassed before this Court. The unimpeachable evidence of PW- 2 shows that she was told by A-1 at about 8.00 am in the morning of 11.08.2013 that the deceased had left his house in the night before, after quarrelling with him. Such un-assailed evidence of PW-2, weighed together with the evidence that he had removed the dead body along with A-2 in the morning of 11.08.2013, coupled with the fact that A-1 called his brother (A-2) at about 4.12 am and 4.13 am on 11.08.2013 and thereafter, both of them removed the dead body from the place of occurrence, loaded in the said car and came back home at about 8.00 am, after disposing of the dead body, squarely implicates A-1 of the offence of murder. Though there is no evidence about the exact time of occurrence, the evidence as a whole reveals that the murder took place while the victim was on the bed, suggesting that quarrel must have taken some time before the deceased went to bed. Therefore, this circumstance apparently suggests that there was a huge time- gap between the alleged quarrel between A-1 and the deceased and the murder of the deceased. Thus, the plea taken by the learned amicus curiae that offence took place at the spur of the moment, under grave and sudden provocation from the deceased/wife is not found to be sustainable in any view of the matter. 38. Now, on analysis of the circumstances indicated above, we find that it has been cogently and firmly established and the circumstances are also of a definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused-appellants. If the above circumstances are taken cumulatively, it forms a chain, so complete, that there is no escape from a conclusion that within all human probability, the murder of the deceased was committed by A-1 and none else, and that they are incapable of explanation of any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused-appellants. If the above circumstances are taken cumulatively, it forms a chain, so complete, that there is no escape from a conclusion that within all human probability, the murder of the deceased was committed by A-1 and none else, and that they are incapable of explanation of any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused-appellants. Whether provocation is grave and sudden, even if the murder had taken place immediately after the alleged provocation, the same needs to be examined on the basis of evidence available in the record, this being a question of fact. But, there is no such evidence, as discussed earlier, and hence this plea taken by A-1 is bound to fail. 39. The learned amicus curiae has further argued that there was no intention on the part of A-1 to commit the murder, and therefore, his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC be converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. However, from the modus operandi of A-1, as appears from the materials on record, and the circumstances narrated above, and the fact that the fatal assault was caused by a heavy object, hammer in the instant case, on the vital part i.e. on the head of the deceased, amply speaks that he intended to kill her. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence on record, we have failed to persuade ourselves to agree to the submission made by the learned amicus curiae to convert the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC to one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 40. The fatal injuries resulting in death can be termed as cruel, not falling under the exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC, because, as per the post mortem examination report, there were blunt force impact injuries on the bilateral parietal, temporal and frontal region of the head. The victim was in a helpless condition/position as she was in bed and could not resist the sudden attack on her. 41. In light of the discussions of evidence on record and the observation made therein, the order of the learned trial Judge, recording conviction of A-1 under Section 302 and 201 of the IPC and in respect of A-2, under Section 201 of the IPC, is found to have based on proper appreciation of evidence on record requiring no interference. 42. In light of the discussions of evidence on record and the observation made therein, the order of the learned trial Judge, recording conviction of A-1 under Section 302 and 201 of the IPC and in respect of A-2, under Section 201 of the IPC, is found to have based on proper appreciation of evidence on record requiring no interference. 42. So far the substantive sentence imposed upon A-1 under Section 302 of the IPC also, no interference is called for, the same being the statutorily prescribed minimum punishment. So far the fine of Rs.10,000/- imposed and the default clause thereof also, no interference is called for. In respect of punishment to both A-1 and A-2 for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC, the substantive punishment imposed upon each of them is Rigorous Imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation, in this regard, the punishment prescribed for an offence under Section 201 of the IPC in respect of capital offence is imprisonment, which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. The offence involved in this case is a capital offence. Therefore, against the maximum substantive punishment of seven years, both of them are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each, which appears to be lenient in the facts and circumstances of the case, and therefore, requires no interference. So far the fine and the default stipulation is concerned in respect of the offence under Section 201 of the IPC, the same appears to be reasonable and therefore, not interfered with. 43. The period of detention of the appellants, A-1 and A-2 during investigation, trial and after conclusion of the trial be set off against the substantive sentence. That apart, the punishment in respect of A-1 for both the offences shall run concurrently as ordered by the learned trial Court. 44. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 45. Send down the LCR with a copy of this judgment. 46. A copy of the judgment shall also be furnished to the Special Superintendent, Central Jail, Aizawl for furnishing a copy thereof to the accused/ appellants. 47. This court records its appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Victor L. Ralte, the learned amicus curiae. The learned amicus curiae be paid an honourarium of Rs.9,000/- by the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority on production of a copy of this judgment.