Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 252 (CAL)

RIYA DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2019-02-21

ARIJIT BANERJEE

body2019
JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J. The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is a notification dated 28 September, 2018 which was posted on the Website of the Calcutta High Court inviting Online applications in the prescribed format from eligible Indian citizens possessing knowledge of the vernacular of the State for the preparation of a panel for filling up the existing and expected vacancies in 221 Group - 'D' posts on the Original Side and the Appellate Side of the High Court. 2. The petitioner has challenged the said notification on six grounds which are as follows:- (i) Examination Fee has been imposed on SC/ST candidates in violation of Section 4 (b) of the West Bengal Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and Posts) Act, 1976 (in short the Reservation Act). (ii) The educational qualification prescribed is irrational. There is no justification for making graduate candidates ineligible. (iii) No marks have been indicated for the interview. (iv) The recruitment process has not been published in two Newspapers of national importance one of which should be in the vernacular of the State. (v) The operation of Right to Information Act, 2005 (in short RTI, Act) has been suspended during the process of recruitment. (vi) There are no High Court Rules for recruitment of Group - 'D' Staff. 3. I will take up each of the ground separately, discuss the submissions of Learned Counsel for the parties on such point and record my opinion as to whether or not there is merit in the ground. Re:- Examination Fee. 4. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Dutta, Learned Counsel drew my attention to Section 4 (1) (b) of the Reservation Act which provides that fees, if any, prescribed for any examination for selection to any service or post shall not be charged in the case of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. He then drew my attention to Section 7 of the said Act which provides, inter alia, that if an Appointing Authority makes an appointment in contravention of the provisions of Sections 4 or 5, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of five years or fine of Rs. 2500/- or with both. Mr. He then drew my attention to Section 7 of the said Act which provides, inter alia, that if an Appointing Authority makes an appointment in contravention of the provisions of Sections 4 or 5, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of five years or fine of Rs. 2500/- or with both. Mr. Dutta submitted that the fact that penalty has been prescribed for acting in contravention of Section 4 of the Act indicates that the provisions of Section 4 are mandatory in nature. In this connection, Learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Kumar Singh and another-versus-State of U.P and others reported in, (2010) 3 SCC 119 . In particular, Learned Counsel relied on Paragraph 48 of the said judgment. 5. Appearing for the High Court Administration, Mr. Kar Learned Senior Advocate submitted that Section 4 of the Reservation Act pertains to appointment to services and posts in an 'Establishment'. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines 'Establishment' as any office of the State Government, a local or statutory authority constituted under any State Act for the time being in force, or a Corporation in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, and includes Universities and Colleges affiliated to the University, Primary and Secondary Schools and also other educational institutions which are owned or aided by the State Government and also includes an 'Establishment' in public sector. Section 2 (c) of the Act defines “Establishment in public sector” as any industry, trade, business or occupation owned, controlled or managed by - (a) The State Government or department of the State Government; (b) A Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a Corporation established by or under a Central or State Act, in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government; (c) a local or statutory authority, constituted under any State Act for the time being in force. 6. Mr. Kar submitted that the High Court is not an 'Establishment' within the meaning of the Reservation Act and as such, the Act does not apply to appointments to services and posts in the High Court. 6. Mr. Kar submitted that the High Court is not an 'Establishment' within the meaning of the Reservation Act and as such, the Act does not apply to appointments to services and posts in the High Court. Consequently, there is no bar in charging examination fees from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes candidates. 7. In reply, Mr. Dutta referred to the preamble to the Reservation Act and to Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 stipulates that the Act shall not apply to any employment under the Central Government, any employment in the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service or in the private sector or in domestic service or any single post cadre. He submitted that the High Court is not excluded and, therefore, the Act applies to the High Court. Further, Section 4 (1) (a) of the Act provides that for direct recruitment to services and posts in an 'Establishment', vacancies shall be reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the manner set out in Schedule (I) to the Act. Schedule (I) provides for hundred point roster. In the impugned notice, High Court Administration has followed the hundred point roster i.e. has acted in terms of Section 4 (1) (a) of the Reservation Act. Hence, Section 4 (1) (b) of the Act will also apply to the High Court. 8. Mr. Dutta also relied on an unreported decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered on 3 May, 2018 in Writ Petition Lodging No. 1137 of 2018 (The National Federation of the Blind Maharashtra and another-versus-The High Court of Judicature of Bombay), in support of his submission that the High Court is a Government establishment. 9. The provisions of the Reservation Act and in particular Secs. 4 and 5 thereof make it clear that the Act applies to an 'Establishment'. Sec. 4 provides the manner in which all appointments to services and posts in an establishment which are to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be regulated. Sec. 5 provides the manner in which reservation for members of the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes in vacancies to be filled up by promotion in any establishment shall be regulated. Sec. 4 provides the manner in which all appointments to services and posts in an establishment which are to be filled up by direct recruitment shall be regulated. Sec. 5 provides the manner in which reservation for members of the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes in vacancies to be filled up by promotion in any establishment shall be regulated. Sec. 2(b) of the Act defines 'Establishment' as follows:- “S. 2(b) 'establishment' means any office of the State Government, a local or statutory authority constituted under any State Act for the time being in force, or a corporation in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, and includes universities and colleges affiliated to the universities, primary and secondary schools and also other educational institutions which are owned or aided by the State Government and also includes an establishment in public sector;” Sec. 2(c) of the Act defines 'Establishment in Public Sector' as follows:- “S. 2(c) 'establishment in public sector' means any industry, trade, business or occupation owned, controlled or managed by- (i) The State Government or any department of the State Government, (ii) A Government Company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a Corporation established by or under a Central or State Act, in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, (iii) A local or statutory authority, constituted under any State Act for the time being in force;” Going by the aforesaid definitions, the High Court is clearly not an 'establishment' nor an 'establishment in public sector'. Hence, I have to accept Mr. Kar's submission that the Reservation Act does not apply to the High Court. Of course, it was open to the High Court to make the Act applicable to recruitments made in the High Court administration, but the same has not been done. Hence, I do not find anything wrongful or illegal in fees being charged from all candidates including those belonging to Schedule Castes or Schedule Tribes. 10. The decision of the Bombay High Court relied upon by Mr. Dutta, Learned Counsel for the petitioner does not advance the petitioner's case. Hence, I do not find anything wrongful or illegal in fees being charged from all candidates including those belonging to Schedule Castes or Schedule Tribes. 10. The decision of the Bombay High Court relied upon by Mr. Dutta, Learned Counsel for the petitioner does not advance the petitioner's case. In that case, the Bombay High Court had taken an administrative decision to make the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 applicable to recruitment of High Court staff and High Court had issued a notification to that effect. Subsequently, The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was enacted and additional categories of reservations were prescribed for persons with disabilities. The main question that fell for determination by the Bombay High Court was whether or not it was the choice of the High Court to adopt the 2016 Act and make it applicable. It was held that in view of the administrative decisions taken in the years 2004 and 2009 to make the 1995 Act applicable to recruitment of High Court staff, it could not be contended by the High Court administration that they had a choice in the matter of adopting 2016 Act. It was held that because of its administrative decisions, the High Court on its administrative side fell within the definition of 'Government Establishment' in Sec. 2(k) of the 2016 Act. In my opinion, this decision does not help the petitioner. In the present case, no such administrative decision has been taken by the High Court making the Reservation Act applicable to the High Court for recruitment of the High Court staff. 11. Mr. Dutta relied on the Apex Court decision in Jitender Kumar Singh & Anr.-vs.-State of UP (supra). Paragraph 48 of the said judgment on which reliance was placed reads as follows:- “48. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the considered opinion that the submissions of the appellants that relaxation in fee or age would deprive the candidates belonging to the reserved category of an opportunity to compete against the general category candidates is without any foundation. It is to be noticed that the reserved category candidates have not been given an advantage in the selection process. All the candidates had to appear in the same written test and face the same interview. It is to be noticed that the reserved category candidates have not been given an advantage in the selection process. All the candidates had to appear in the same written test and face the same interview. It is therefore quite apparent that the concession in fee and age relaxation only enabled certain candidates belonging to the reserved category to fall within the zone of consideration. The concession in age did not in any manner tilt the balance in favour of the reserved category candidates, in the preparation of final merit/select list.” With great respect to learned Counsel, I do not see how this decision is relevant to the facts of the present case. 12. The argument of Mr. Dutta that the Reservation Act applies to the High Court because Sec. 3 of the Act does not exclude High Court cannot be countenanced. First, it has to be seen whether the Act at all applies to a particular entity and only then the question of exclusion would arise. In my view, Sec. 3 of the Act merely clarifies that the Act shall not apply to certain employments even if such employments can be said to be in an establishment as defined in Sec. 2(b) of the Act. I find no merit in the first ground urged on behalf of the petitioner. Re:- Educational Qualification. 13. Mr. Dutta submitted that there is no rationale for debarring graduates from applying. This amounts to denial of equal opportunity to all prospective candidates. There is no procedure under which the qualification of a candidate could be restricted. Debarring a particular class of candidates, amounts to violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. He submitted that there is no such restriction imposed on qualification for recruitment to the post of 'Mali'. Hence, having such restriction for recruitment to other Group - 'D' posts is arbitrary and is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. Mr. Dutta relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rina Dutta and others versus Anjali Mahato and others reported in, (2010) 2 CalLJ 321 (Cal) at Paragraph 21 whereof it was held that if a particular qualification is laid down in an advertisement relating to a distinct class of candidates, the candidates possessing a qualification higher than that advertised can ordinarily not be debarred or disqualified. However, it is open to the employer to make a rule providing for disqualification of candidates possessing qualification higher than the prescribed qualification, but the burden of justifying such a rule would be on the employer. He also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti K.K. and others versus Kerala Public Service Commission and others reported in, (2002) Supp1 JT 85 (SC) in support of the same proposition. Reference was also made by him to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani and others versus District & Sessions Judge, Nagpur reported in, (2000) 2 SCC 606 in support of his submission that a criterion which has the effect of denying a candidate his right to be considered for a post on the principle that he has higher qualification than prescribed cannot be rational. Mr. Dutta further referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court delivered on 20th July, 2012 in A.P.O No. 279 of 2011, in the case of Bishnu Sarkar and others versus The Hon'ble Chief Justice, Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta and others. In the said decision, it was observed by the Division Bench that unfortunately, for the last 150 years of this Court, there has been no prescribed procedure for recruitment of Group - 'D' staff. Some persons are purportedly empanelled as Badli Workers and from such panel, from time to time they are absorbed against permanent vacancies. There is no open advertisement, there is no selection and there is no test. 15. Mr. Kar, learned senior Counsel submitted that the posts to which recruitment has been undertaken are Farash/Peon/Orderly/Barkandaz/Darwan/Night Guard/Cleaner. All the said posts entail menial jobs. Hence, qualification has been kept at the minimum. A candidate passing Class- VIII would be eligible to apply. Graduates have been debarred to keep competition at the same level. The past experience of the High Court Administration has been that the attrition rate of people with higher qualification in Group - 'D' posts is very high. This is one of the reasons for restricting candidates to non-graduates. It is ultimately the decision of the employer and even if there is some rationale, the Court sitting in judicial review will not interfere. Further, such restriction in qualification is not contrary to any Rules. 16. This is one of the reasons for restricting candidates to non-graduates. It is ultimately the decision of the employer and even if there is some rationale, the Court sitting in judicial review will not interfere. Further, such restriction in qualification is not contrary to any Rules. 16. Learned Counsel has relied heavily on the Full Bench decision of our Court in the case of Rina Dutta (supra). As I read it, that decision is not an authority for the proposition that when an advertisement for recruitment to a particular post specifies a minimum qualification that a candidate must possess then, invariably a candidate having higher qualification is eligible to apply for the post. Ordinarily, a candidate with higher qualification may be entitled to apply but the Recruiting Authority may impose a restriction on candidates having higher qualification than a particular level. Such restriction can be imposed in the advertisement inviting applications. However, such restriction must be a rational one and not arbitrary. The question that was referred to the Larger Bench in the case of Rina Dutta (supra) was when a particular qualification is laid down in an advertisement specially creating a distinct class of candidates that would be eligible, whether or not a candidate possessing qualification higher than that prescribed in the advertisement could be considered and appointed to the concerned post? The Hon'ble Bench observed that such question can be answered after examining the scheme for the trade and nature of the duties required to be performed and the nature of services to be rendered by the holders of the posts and the qualification prescribed. The decision itself recognizes that it is open to an employer to make a rule providing for disqualification of candidates possessing qualification higher than the prescribed qualification, but the burden would be on the employer to justify such a rule. 17. In the present case, the concerned posts are those of Farash/Peon/Orderly/Barkandaz/Darwan/Night Guard/Cleaner. In my view, having regard to the menial nature of duties that are required to be performed in such posts and the nature of services to be rendered, it was open to the High Court administration to take a decision that higher qualification of a candidate should be made a deterrent factor. In the impugned notification, graduate candidates were made ineligible to apply. The reason is not far to seek. In the impugned notification, graduate candidates were made ineligible to apply. The reason is not far to seek. Graduate or post-graduate candidates are unlikely to show much interest in the kind of work that are required to be done in the concerned posts. It is difficult to believe that e.g. a graduate or a candidate having a Master Degree shall perform his duties as a Cleaner/Peon/Night-guard with sincerity. He will not have his heart in such a job. His eyes will always be on a better job which will be more commensurate with his educational qualification. As has been submitted by Mr. Kar, the attrition rate of graduate employees in Group D posts is very high. There appears to be a reasonable nexus between the qualification prescribed in Clause 7 of the recruitment notification and the nature of duties to be performed by the appointees. In Kankan Dutta-vs.-State of WB,2015 2 CalHN 303, a Learned Judge of this Court held that a candidate who is aware that he/she is ineligible to apply because he/she possess qualification higher than that prescribed in the recruitment notification, cannot claim any right to be appointed. 18. I am also of the opinion that it was logical on the part of the respondents to disqualify graduate candidates to keep the competition at an even level. Further, a better spectrum of job opportunities is ordinarily available to graduate or more qualified candidates than the candidates having lesser qualification. Accordingly, more qualified candidates have greater options open to them. 19. The Apex Court decision relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner does not lay down any proposition of law that a recruiting authority cannot debar candidates having qualification higher than the prescribed level from applying. In Jyoti K.K. & Ors.-vs.-Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors. (supra) what was under consideration was appointment to the post of Sub-Engineers (Electrical) in the Kerala Electricity Board. In the recruitment notice or in the relevant rules there was no such restriction that candidates with qualification higher than the prescribed qualification would be ineligible to apply. One of the technical qualifications prescribed was Diploma in electrical engineering of a recognized institution after three years course of study. In the recruitment notice or in the relevant rules there was no such restriction that candidates with qualification higher than the prescribed qualification would be ineligible to apply. One of the technical qualifications prescribed was Diploma in electrical engineering of a recognized institution after three years course of study. The Apex Court held that the qualification of degree in electrical engineering pre-supposes the acquisition of the lower qualification of Diploma in that subject prescribed for the post and hence, a degree holder would also be eligible to apply. In Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani & Ors. (supra), the students had filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for quashing of selection of peons in the subordinate judiciary as contrary to the relevant rules for recruitment to Class III and IV services in subordinate judiciary service in the State of Maharashtra. The said writ petition was dismissed. The writ petitioners approached the Apex Court. At para 21 of the judgment the Apex Court observed that a criterion which has the effect of denying a candidate his right to be considered for a post on the principle that he is having higher qualification than prescribed cannot be rational. However, such observation was qualified by the Apex Court by stating that such observation was made in the facts of that particular case and should not be understood as laying down a rule of universal application. The other case of Bishnu Sarkar (supra) referred to by learned Counsel for the petitioner is not germane to the facts of the instant case. Learned Counsel relied on the observation of the Division Bench that for the last 150 years of this Court there has been no prescribed procedure for recruitment of Group D staff. That may be true, but the same in my opinion, has no bearing on the recruitment process initiated by the impugned notification. The notification itself lays down in detail the process/procedure for selection and the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court indisputably has the power to lay down the manner of recruitment under Art. 229 of the Constitution of India. Re:- Non-publication of recruitment notice in Newspapers having wide circulation. 20. Mr. Dutta submitted that the recruitment notice was published in the 'Eisohor' supplement of the newspaper 'Eisomoy'. This supplement does not have wide circulation excepting in Calcutta and 24 Parganas. Re:- Non-publication of recruitment notice in Newspapers having wide circulation. 20. Mr. Dutta submitted that the recruitment notice was published in the 'Eisohor' supplement of the newspaper 'Eisomoy'. This supplement does not have wide circulation excepting in Calcutta and 24 Parganas. Hence, the mandatory direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Renu and others versus District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari and another reported in, (2014) 14 SCC 50 to the effect that post shall be filled up by the High Court by issuing advertisement in at least two newspapers, one of which must be in vernacular language having wide circulation in the State, has not been complied with. Any vacancy fill up without advertising shall be void ab initio and would remain unenforceable and inexecutable. Mr. Dutta submitted that Article 16 of the Constitution has been violated by inadequate circulation of the recruitment notice. 21. In reply, Mr. Kar submitted that admittedly the petitioner downloaded the application form from the website. The recruitment notice provided only for online application. Posting the factum of recruitment on the website amounts to the widest form of circulation. The recruitment notice was made available in public domain. He submitted that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not consider online applications. Further, the petitioner having admittedly had access to the application form, she cannot have any reason for grievance. This is not a Public Interest Litigation that she can be permitted to champion the cause of others. In this connection, learned senior Counsel relied on the judgment and order dated January 13, 2014 delivered by a learned Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 34020 (W) of 2013 in the case of Dipankar Mukherjee versus State of West Bengal, in support of his submission that publication of a notice on the website now a days is by and large an acceptable practice. 22. I am of the opinion that Mr. Kar is right. Website publication of the recruitment notification is undoubtedly the widest possible form of circulation. The Apex Court was not considering online applications in the case of Renu & Ors (supra). In any event, the impugned notification was published once in 'Eisomoy', once in 'Times of India' and once in 'Sanmarg'. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that all the said newspapers have wide circulation. The Apex Court was not considering online applications in the case of Renu & Ors (supra). In any event, the impugned notification was published once in 'Eisomoy', once in 'Times of India' and once in 'Sanmarg'. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that all the said newspapers have wide circulation. Hence, in my view, no dictum of the Apex court in Renu's (supra) case has been violated. 23. Further, the petitioner has annexed to the writ petition a copy of the impugned notification which indisputably establishes that she had access to the same. I agree with learned Counsel for the respondents that the writ petition has not been initiated as a Public Interest Litigation nor has been filed in representative capacity. The writ petition has been filed for redressal of the petitioner's personal grievance. Unless the petitioner can establish that she had suffered prejudice by not having access to the notification or being kept in the dark about the notification by reason of inadequate circulation, the petitioner cannot be said to be having any legitimate grievance. 24. The observations made by the Apex Court in Renu's (supra) case must be understood to have been made in a larger perspective in view of the repeated complaints regarding irregularities and illegalities in the recruitment of staff in the subordinate courts throughout the country and to explore the feasibility of centralizing such recruitment and to make the process transparent. The Apex Court held that the Chief Justice's power of appointment under Art. 229(1) of the Constitution of India is subject to Art. 16(1) which guarantees equality of opportunity for a citizen in matters relating to public employment. It was held that the Chief Justice's power to prescribe the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court cannot be exercised in an unfettered or arbitrary manner and that all appointments should be made strictly in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and/or such rules as may be made by the legislature. Wide publication of the recruitment process is what was emphasized by the Apex Court. In the present case, in my opinion, such requirement has been satisfied. 25. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dipankar Mukherjee (supra). Wide publication of the recruitment process is what was emphasized by the Apex Court. In the present case, in my opinion, such requirement has been satisfied. 25. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied on an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dipankar Mukherjee (supra). In that case a tender notice issued by the Rabindra Bharati University was under challenge on the ground that the same had not been published in any newspaper and as such the writ petitioner could not participate in the process of selection of printers. The learned Judge observed that the tender notice had been uploaded on the website of the University and was, hence, in the public domain. Anybody could access the tender notice. The learned Judge observed that with the advent of time and advance in technology, website publication has become a universally acceptable mode of publication. I respectfully agree with such observation. I find no merit in this ground of challenge also. Re:- No marks was indicated for interview. 26. Mr. Dutta submitted that by failing to indicate the marks allotted for interview, the High Court administration has acted arbitrarily. 27. Mr. Kar referred to the notification under challenge which provides that on successful submission of the online application, candidates are required to undergo a competitive written examination (OMR Based) of 100 marks in Arithmetic, General Knowledge, General Intelligence and English. Candidates selected and short listed in the written test will be required to appear at a further test/interview for selection. Learned senior Counsel submitted that the stage of interview comes only after short listing the candidates. The stage of written examination is not the stage for disclosing the norms of interview or the marks allotted. In any event, this cause of action is not available to the petitioner who has not even participated in the written examination as she was not eligible to do so. In this connection, Mr. The stage of written examination is not the stage for disclosing the norms of interview or the marks allotted. In any event, this cause of action is not available to the petitioner who has not even participated in the written examination as she was not eligible to do so. In this connection, Mr. Kar relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B. Ramakichenin alias Balagandhi versus Union of India and others reported in, (2008) 1 SCC 362 wherein it has been held that even if there is no rule providing for short listing nor any mention of it in the advertisement calling for applications for the post in question, the Selection Body can resort to a short listing procedure if there are a large number of eligible candidates who apply and it is not possible for the authority to interview all of them. 28. The notification under challenge itself makes it clear under Clause 9 that candidates selected and short-listed in the written test are required to appear at a further test/interview for selection. Hence, the issue of allotting marks for the interview may well be addressed when the stage for interview comes. In my opinion, it is not essential nor is a requirement of law that marks for interview has to be published at the initial stage of the recruitment process. Further, being ineligible to apply in terms of the notification, I do not see how the petitioner can be legitimately aggrieved by non-disclosure of marks for interview in the notification. Re:- No High Court rules for recruitment to Group - 'D' posts. 29. Mr. Dutta submitted that in the absence of permanent rules for recruitment to any post in the High Court administration, recruitment to such posts becomes arbitrary. 30. Mr. Kar referred to Article 229 (1) of the Constitution of India which provides that appointment of Officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the High Court or such other Judge or Officer of the Court as he may direct. He submitted that there need not be any specific Rules. The Chief Justice or anybody else authorised by him can make ad hoc rules for a particular recruitment process. So long as the rules so framed are not arbitrary or unreasonable, no intending candidate can challenge the same. 31. He submitted that there need not be any specific Rules. The Chief Justice or anybody else authorised by him can make ad hoc rules for a particular recruitment process. So long as the rules so framed are not arbitrary or unreasonable, no intending candidate can challenge the same. 31. In my opinion, under Article 229 (1) of the Constitution the Hon'ble Chief Justice has complete freedom and independence in the matter of recruitment of officers and servants of a High Court so long as the procedure adopted does not offend the principle of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.-vs.-L.V.A. Dixitulu & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court observed that in regard to the servants and officers of the High Court Art. 229 of the Constitution of India makes the power of appointment, dismissal, removal, suspension, reduction in rank, compulsory retirement etc., including the power to prescribe their conditions of service, the sole preserve of the Chief Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with the exercise of that power by the Chief Justice or his nominee, except to a very limited extent, indicated in the Provisos. In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers on the Chief Justice, the object which the founder fathers had in view, was to ensure the independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciary. In M. Gurumoorthy (supra) the same view has been expressed. In the matter of appointment of officers and servants of a High Court the Chief Justice or his nominee is the supreme authority. I have not been able to appreciate as to what prejudice the petitioner has suffered by non-framing of permanent recruitment rules. The recruitment procedure has been detailed in the notification under challenge. While it may be desirable to have a permanent set of recruitment rules, non-existence of the same cannot be a ground for challenging the notification in question. It is not the petitioner's case that the procedure delineated in the impugned notification is arbitrary or unreasonable. I find no merit in this contention of the petitioner also. Re:- Suspension of the operation of the Right to Information Act. 32. Mr. It is not the petitioner's case that the procedure delineated in the impugned notification is arbitrary or unreasonable. I find no merit in this contention of the petitioner also. Re:- Suspension of the operation of the Right to Information Act. 32. Mr. Dutta submitted that by suspending the operation of the Right to Information Act during the recruitment process, the High Court administration has put in jeopardy the transparency of the recruitment process and the accountability of the administration to the public at large. 33. Mr. Kar submitted that the operation of the RTI Act has not been suspended. He drew my attention to Clause 15 (z) of the impugned notification which reads as follows: “Information uploaded on the website shall not be provided to the candidate under RTI act, 2005. The uploaded information on the website shall be retained for a specific period. Therefore, the candidates are advised to download the uploaded information and keep up with them for future. In course of the recruitment examination, no application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 shall be entertained nor any information provided. Factual information under RTI Act shall be provided only after declaration of final results. Replies to inferential (speculative) question shall not be provided.” Learned senior Counsel submitted that it is only reasonable to apprise all concerned that the information already uploaded on the website of the High Court will not be furnished further on any application under the RTI Act. However, after declaration of the result, application under RTI Act would be entertained. Hence, the contention that operation of the RTI Act has been suspended for the duration of the entire recruitment process is baseless. 34. This contention of the petitioner also has no merit. The operation of the Right to Information Act has not been suspended for the entire duration of the recruitment process. I have extracted above clause 15(z) of the impugned notice. It is only reasonable that the respondents have notified the interested candidates that the information uploaded on the website shall not be provided to a candidate under the RTI Act. Information that is already on the public domain can be accessed by everybody. Hence, there is nothing unreasonable about such stand being taken by the respondents. It is further stated that factual information under RTI Act shall be provided only after declaration of final results. Information that is already on the public domain can be accessed by everybody. Hence, there is nothing unreasonable about such stand being taken by the respondents. It is further stated that factual information under RTI Act shall be provided only after declaration of final results. Hence, the petitioner cannot have any legitimate grievance in this connection. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in any of the contentions of the petitioner. In any event, the petitioner being ineligible to apply, she has no locus standi to urge this point. 35. I do not find merit in any of the grounds on which the petitioner has challenged the notification in question. The writ petition is dismissed, without, however, any order as to costs. 36. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.