JUDGMENT : Debangsu Basak, J. 1. The petitioner has claimed tenancy rights in respect of an immoveable property. The petitioner has contended that, the petitioner as a tenant cannot be ousted from possession through the proceedings under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Security Interest Act, 2002. 2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, the petitioner had filed a title suit for declaration and injunction. The Bank is one of the party defendants in such suit. The Bank is contesting such suit. In such title suit, the petitioner had applied for an interim order of injunction. Upon such interim order of injunction being refused, the petitioner had preferred an appeal there from. The Appeal Court disposed of such appeal by a judgment and order dated September 12, 2012. While disposing of the appeal, the Division Bench did not enter into the merits of the claim and counter-claim of the parties. It had held that it was open to the learned Trial Judge to consider the issues raised in the suit, in accordance with law, uninfluenced by his order and the order of the Division Bench while disposing of the application for injunction. According to him, the claim of the petitioner that she is a tenant at the suit premises, is yet to be decided. The Division Bench has directed that, the petitioner should not be evicted from the suit premises except in due process of law. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002, does not override the provisions of the tenancy laws. Till such time a decision is not arrived at in such suit, the Bank cannot evict the petitioner through the Act of 2002. The Bank did not file any suit for eviction. The petitioner is protected by the order of the Division Bench. The Division Bench having granted the protection to the petitioner that the petitioner should not be dispossessed except in due process of law and the Act of 2002 not overriding any tenancy laws, the petitioner is entitled to the protection under the tenancy laws. The petitioner cannot be evicted under the Act of 2002. The Division Bench having granted the protection to the petitioner that the petitioner should not be dispossessed except in due process of law and the Act of 2002 not overriding any tenancy laws, the petitioner is entitled to the protection under the tenancy laws. The petitioner cannot be evicted under the Act of 2002. In support of such contention, he has relied upon (Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India & Ors., (2016) 3 SCC 762 ) and (Indian Bank v. Nippon Enterprises South & Ors., (2016) 15 SCC 79 ). 3. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has relied upon (Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 223 ) in support of the contention that, the action taken by the District Magistrate stands vitiated by breach of principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not heard by the District Magistrate. Had the District Magistrate been made aware of the pendency of the title suit the District Magistrate may not have passed such an order. It is not for the Court to substitute the orders passed by the District Magistrate after reprisal of the materials. 4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the order passed by the District Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. He has submitted that, in the order dated June 6, 2017, the District Magistrate has noted that, no Debts Recovery Tribunal Case, Title Suit/Case or any other cases in regard to the property was pending before any court of law. He has submitted that, the Bank had suppressed material facts before the District Magistrate. The Bank did not provide the particulars with regard to the pendency of the title suit. The Bank was well aware of the same. The Bank is contesting such suit. Therefore, the Bank is guilty of practicing fraud on the District Magistrate. According to him, fraud vitiates everything. Therefore, the order dated June 6, 2017 passed by the District Magistrate stands vitiated. 5. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Bank has submitted that, the claim of the petitioner that, the petitioner was a tenant in respect of the property concerned, was disbelieved by the Trial Judge at the interim stage. On appeal, the Division Bench has concurred with such finding of the learned Trial Judge. 5. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Bank has submitted that, the claim of the petitioner that, the petitioner was a tenant in respect of the property concerned, was disbelieved by the Trial Judge at the interim stage. On appeal, the Division Bench has concurred with such finding of the learned Trial Judge. The recording in the judgment and order dated September 12, 2012 of the Division Bench to the effect that, the petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises in question except in due process of law, does not mean that, the Act of 2002 cannot be applied for the purpose of evicting the petitioner. The petitioner having failed to establish its tenancy before the appropriate Forum, it cannot be said that, the petitioner needs to be protected as a tenant at the premises concerned. Apart from the tenancy, the petitioner is claiming to be holder of an agreement for sale. Therefore, the petitioner is claiming title through the borrower. The possession of the borrower at the immoveable property concerned is liable to be vacated under the Act of 2002. The petitioner claiming title through the borrower has no higher or greater right than the borrower. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the action taken by the Bank or by the District Magistrate. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Bank has relied upon (Arun Kumar Sarswat v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., (2010) 1 CalLT 385 (H.C.)) and (Nitin Gunwant Shah v. Indian Bank & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 305 ). 6. The petitioner is in possession of an immovable property in respect of which the Bank claim security interest and has invoked the provision of SARFAESI Act, 2002 to obtain possession. The petitioner has founded her possession on twin basis. The petitioner has claimed tenancy as one of the foundational basis for her right to occupy the premises. The petitioner has also claimed that, she has entered into an agreement with the owner to purchase the property pursuant to which the petitioner has been put into possession. The petitioner has filed a suit for declaration and injunction in respect of her tenancy rights which is pending in the First Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Paschim Medinipur being Other Suit No. 491 of 2010 (Smt. Tapasi Routh nee Sinha Roy v. Somnath Guin & Ors.). The petitioner has filed a suit for declaration and injunction in respect of her tenancy rights which is pending in the First Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Paschim Medinipur being Other Suit No. 491 of 2010 (Smt. Tapasi Routh nee Sinha Roy v. Somnath Guin & Ors.). The Bank is a party defendant in such suit. The petitioner had applied for interim injunction in such suit. Initially an ad interim order of injunction was granted. However, on contested hearing of the injunction application, the prayer for injunction was refused by the learned Trial Judge by the order dated June 22, 2011. By such order, the learned Judge has disbelieved the claim of tenancy of the petitioner. The learned Trial Judge has noted that, there were no documents in favour of the petitioner establishing the claim of tenancy. Learned Trial Judge has held that, the petitioner has failed to prove any concluded contract and as such the petitioner did not have any sufficient prima facie case to obtain an injunction. 7. The petitioner had preferred an appeal from the order dated June 22, 2011. Such appeal being F.M.A. No. 938 of 2012 with C.A.N. No. 6628 of 2012 was disposed of by a judgment and order dated September 12, 2012. The relevant portion of the judgment and order dated September 12, 2012 passed by the Division Bench is as follows:- “However, the learned trial judge found that the creation of tenancy in favour of the plaintiff was doubtful. The learned Judge came to the finding that there was some doubt as to whether the said agreement has ever acted upon or not. Since the learned trial judge was not satisfied with the prima facie case of creation of tenancy, he declined to grant any order of injunction. Mr. Roy strenuously argues that his client is in possession. A person without title cannot ask for an injunction against the rightful owner or preventing any authorities from proceeding with legal actions. We, therefore, hold that the learned trial judge while rejecting the application for injunction did not exercise his jurisdiction erroneously. However, we make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim and the counter claim of the parties as to whether the plaintiff was a tenant in relation to the property or not as it is an issue in the suit. However, we make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim and the counter claim of the parties as to whether the plaintiff was a tenant in relation to the property or not as it is an issue in the suit. It will be open to the learned trial judge to consider the issues in accordance with law uninfluenced by his order and the order of this court while disposing of the application for injunction inasmuch as the scope to consider the prayer for interim order of injunction and scope to consider the prayer for temporary injunction upon contested hearing are different. However, we make it clear that the plaintiff shall not be evicted from the premises-in-question except in due process of law.” 8. The Division Bench has held that, a person without title cannot ask for an injunction against the rightful owners or prevent any authorities from proceeding with any legal action. Such finding is binding upon the parties to the appeal which includes the petitioner herein and the Bank. The clarification given by the Division Bench in the judgment and order dated September 12, 2012 to the effect that, petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises in question except in due process of law, must be read and understood to mean that, the petitioner liable to be evicted, in accordance with law. Provisions of the Act of 2002 recognize eviction. The provisions of the Act of 2002 stands attracted so far as the property in question is concerned. The fact the property in question is a secured asset and that the Bank can claim security interest in respect of such property is undisputed. The claim of tenancy of the petitioner stands disbelieved, in the suit by the petitioner, by the learned Trial Judge and on appeal by the Division Bench. The petitioner is yet to establish her tenancy at the premises concerned. The other claim of the petitioner that, there exist an agreement by virtue of which, the owners agreed to transfer the ownership of the property in question to the petitioner, will vest the petitioner with a right of ownership, if such an agreement is specifically performed. Significantly, the petitioner did not claim specific performance of the agreement for sale in the suit. Therefore, the petitioner is claiming title of ownership through the owner who is the mortgager. Significantly, the petitioner did not claim specific performance of the agreement for sale in the suit. Therefore, the petitioner is claiming title of ownership through the owner who is the mortgager. The petitioner therefore in such context, cannot have a claim which is higher than the owner who is the mortgager. The mortgager is liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act of 2002. In such context, the petitioner is also liable to be evicted, as she claims to be an agreement holder, under the provisions of the Act of 2002. Her claim of tenancy as noted above, stands disbelieved. Therefore, she cannot be allowed to urge her tenancy rights in respect of the property in the present writ petition. The only right that she can urge at this stage in a writ petition filed by her, is the right to have title to the property concerned. Taking such right of hers at the highest, she is amenable to eviction under the Act of 2002. Therefore, when the Bank has invoked the Act of 2002 and the District Magistrate has passed an order under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 granting Police permission to evict the occupants, including the petitioner, then there is no error or material irregularity in law warranting an interference by a writ court with regard to the actions taken by the Bank or the District Magistrate. Eviction under the Act of 2002 is a due process of law and the same complies with the requirement of the Division Bench that the petitioner should be evicted by a due process of law. The actions taken by the Bank and the District Magistrate does not violate the judgment and order dated September 12, 2012 of the Division Bench. 9. Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. (supra) has noticed the doctrine of judicial review. It has held that, the doctrine of judicial review implies that the repository of power acts within the bounds of the power delegated and he does not abuse his power. He must act reasonably and in good faith. It is not only sufficient that an instrument is intra vires the parent Act, but it must also be consistent with the constitutional principles. He must act reasonably and in good faith. It is not only sufficient that an instrument is intra vires the parent Act, but it must also be consistent with the constitutional principles. It is held in paragraph 49 as follows:- “Where a question of law is at issue, the Court may determine the rightness of the decision on its own independent judgment. If the decision of the authority does not agree with that which the Court considers to be the right one, the finding of law by the authority is liable to be upset. Where it is a finding of fact, the Court examines only the reasonableness of the findings. When that finding is found to be rational and reasonably based on evidence, in the sense that all relevant material has been taken into account and no irrelevant has influenced the decision, and the decision is one which any reasonably minded person, acting on such evidence, would have come to, then judicial review is exhausted even though the finding may not necessarily be what the Court would have come to as a truer of fact. Whether an order is characterized as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, or, whether it is a determination of law or fact, the judgment of the expert body, entrusted with power, is generally treated as final and the judicial function is exhausted when it is found to have “warrant in the record” and a rational basis in law: see Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, see also Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation.” 10. Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra) has considered the question whether, a tenant is entitled to the protection of the tenancy laws and whether the provisions of the Act of 2002 will override the provisions of the Rent Control Act or not. It has taken note of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 1 ) and has held in paragraphs 35 to 37 as follows:- “35. It has taken note of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 1 ) and has held in paragraphs 35 to 37 as follows:- “35. The decision of this Court in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar cannot be understood to have held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act, and that the banks are at liberty to evict the tenants residing in the tenanted premises which have been offered as collateral securities for loans on which default has been done by the debtor/landlord. 36. As far as granting leasehold rights being created after the property has been mortgaged to the bank, the consent of the creditor needs to be taken. We have already taken this view in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar. We have not stated anything to the effect that the tenancy created after mortgaging the property must necessarily be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act and the Stamp Act. 37. It is a settled position of law that once tenancy is created, a tenant can be evicted only after following the due process of law, as prescribed under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. A tenant cannot be arbitrarily evicted while using the provisions of the SARFAESI Act as that would amount to stultifying the statutory rights of protection given to the tenant. A non obstante claws (Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act) cannot be used to bulldoze the statutory rights vested in the tenants under the Rent Control Act. The expression “any other law for the time being in force” as appearing in Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act cannot mean to extent to each and every law enacted by the Central and State Legislatures. It can only extent to the laws operating in the same field.” 11. Nippon Enterprises South & Ors. (supra) has taken note of Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra) and has held that, a tenant cannot be arbitrarily evicted by using the provisions of the Act of 2002. In the present case, the petitioner after having filed a suit, and having tried to obtain an order of injunction on the basis of the claim of tenancy, was unable to establish tenancy upto the Division Bench stage. In the present case, the petitioner after having filed a suit, and having tried to obtain an order of injunction on the basis of the claim of tenancy, was unable to establish tenancy upto the Division Bench stage. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be treated as a tenant requiring a protection under the Rent Control Act and not being amenable to a eviction under the provisions of the Act of 2002. 12. Nitin Gunwant Shah (supra) has considered the provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 as the unamended provisions of the Act of 1993 stood at that material point of time. Arun Kumar Sarswat (supra) has held that, where a tenant coming into possession of a property after the creation of a mortgage is not entitled to a process of judicial adjudication before being dispossessed by the secured creditor under the Act of 2002. 13. The District Magistrate by his order dated June 6, 2017 passed under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 has noted that, the Bank has claimed that there was no title suit lying or pending before any Court of Law. Bank ought to have been more careful while disclosing the true state of affairs before the District Magistrate. It should have disclosed the pendency of the title suit before the learned Civil Judge and the orders passed therein. The non-disclosure of the same, however, in the facts of the present case, is not fatal to the application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. There is no material placed on record to suggest that, had the District Magistrate been apprised of the pendency of the suit or the orders passed in the suit and in the appeal, he could not have passed the order dated June 6, 2017. In such view, no interference with the order of the District Magistrate is called for. 14. In such circumstances, W.P. No. 7039 (W) of 2018 is dismissed. The interim order passed in the writ petition has expired due to efflux of time. Consequent upon the dismissal of the writ petition, the application for extension of interim order cannot be allowed. C.A.N. 1500 of 2019 is dismissed. No order as to costs.