JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of challenging the legality and validity of an order dated 16.3.2017 passed in Family Suit No.98 of 2016 below application Exh.12. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the present petitioner had filed the proceedings under section 13 of the Hindu marriage Act for the purpose of seeking divorce from the respondent. The marriage between the two took place on 16.2.1992 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. They were living in the joint family and one daughter named Rhiea was born out of the said wedlock. On account of rift between the two and the family, originally they started living separately for some time in the rented premises and the respondent was a working woman. It is further the case of the petitioner that on account of the rift, they started living separately since 2007 and the rift has resulted into filing of a complaint under sections 498-A, 313, 504 and 114 of IPC wherein an order of acquittal also came to be passed. Against the said order of acquittal, Criminal Appeal No.54 of 2011 was filed by the State Government but the said appeal came to be rejected on 3.7.2013. In the meantime, HMP Case No.44 of 2014 came to be filed as stated above, Resultantly, during the pendency o the said proceedings, an application was submitted under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act with a view to even reconcile for a period of two years. The same was kept pending but nothing positive occurred, resultantly, since the earlier HMP No.44 of 2014 was withdrawn in the hope of overall resolution, again, HMP No.28 of 2016 was filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kachchh which later on was transferred to Family Court, Bhuj-Kachchh. During the pendency of the said proceedings, for seeking interim maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month from the date of application, a request was made to award by submitting an application below Exh.15. The reply was submitted at Ex.12 by contesting the said application. It is the case of the petitioner that in parallel proceedings filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C., an amount of Rs.6000/- per month was awarded and being aggrieved by the said order, the revision application was also pending. The reply was submitted at Ex.12 by contesting the said application. It is the case of the petitioner that in parallel proceedings filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C., an amount of Rs.6000/- per month was awarded and being aggrieved by the said order, the revision application was also pending. But here, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, vide order dated 16.9.2017 was pleased to award an amount of Rs.4,000/- per month to be paid regularly in addition to the arrears which have been accumulated and it is this order which is made the subject of challenge by way of the present petition which is affirmed on 30.3.2018. 3. Pursuant to the notice having been issued on 11.6.2018, the matter has come up for consideration before this Court further wherein, to enable the parties to explore the possibility of settlement, time was granted and later on having found no resolution as it appears both the learned advocates have chosen to put up their case finally. 4. Mr. Nirav Sanghavi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the amount of maintenance which has been awarded is illogical and harsh particularly when in a separate proceeding under section 125 of Cr.P.C., already an amount of Rs.6000/- per month was awarded. It has been submitted that this application basically is under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act wherein the daughters are not entitled to seek any claim for maintenance and, therefore, the learned trial judge has committed an error. It has further been contended that wife is also having sufficient source of income and is serving at present and as such also, she is not entitled to seek any maintenance. Additionally, it has further been contended that the petitioner is facing a financial crunch and is hardly earning Rs.10-15000/- per month which is a very petty amount as compared to the award which has been passed and on the contrary, it is the case of no evidence since the independent income of the petitioner is not exactly ascertained and not supported by any valid document. It has further been contended that earlier, an amount of Rs.50,000/- has already been paid and out of the accumulated outstanding amount of Rs.96,000/-, an amount of Rs.20,000/- is already paid and, therefore also, continuance of this maintenance order will seriously prejudice the living of the petitioner. It has further been contended that earlier, an amount of Rs.50,000/- has already been paid and out of the accumulated outstanding amount of Rs.96,000/-, an amount of Rs.20,000/- is already paid and, therefore also, continuance of this maintenance order will seriously prejudice the living of the petitioner. In any case, the order passed by the learned judge is suffering from the vice of non-application of mind as no cogent reasons are assigned to arrive at a conclusion. No other submissions have been made. 5. To meet with the stand taken by the learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Kathan P. Gandhi, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has submitted that here is the case in which irrespective of maintenance amount which has been awarded, the petitioner is under a mood not to settle the issue, not to pay the amount and rather has developed a tendency to delay the proceedings. Huge amount of maintenance has remained unpaid and, therefore, the learned judge has not committed any error in passing the order. It is the settled position of law as contended that it is not correct to say that once in a different proceeding i.e. in a proceeding under section 125 of Cr.P.C. the amount is awarded, the same would not preclude a Family Court not to entertain the application under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. On the contrary, according to Mr. Gandhi, the husband is doing carpenter work and is earning a huge amount and a meager amount which has been projected of Rs.10-15,000/- is out of place and what has been observed by the learned judge while passing an order is absolutely well supported by the record. A tendency is adopted by the petitioner husband not to cooperate with the proceedings, not to pay any amount of maintenance but to continue the litigation. It is also not prohibiting that wife cannot submit an application if she is earning. Even if she is earning, the said work is not a secured work but is merely a contractual employment where there is no guarantee of continuing the earning. It is also not prohibiting that wife cannot submit an application if she is earning. Even if she is earning, the said work is not a secured work but is merely a contractual employment where there is no guarantee of continuing the earning. Apart from that, it is a settled position of law by now that the wife and the children are entitled to live in the same comfort zone in which the husband is residing and as such, when the learned judge has awarded a meager amount of Rs.4000/- per month by considering the additional amount which was ordered under section 125, there is no earthly reason for the petitioner to challenge such a reasonable amount which has been awarded. While contesting the petition, the reasons which are assigned by the learned judge from para 6 onwards are brought to the notice of the Court and has ultimately requested that this amount which has been awarded is very reasonable and hence, no interference in equitable jurisdiction be made. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material on record, the factum of marriage between the two is not in dispute. The birth of a child out of the wedlock is also not in dispute. Further, the rift between the two which has resulted into filing of Hindu Marriage Petition is also not in dispute and as such, so long as the relationship of husband wife exists, the husband i.e. the petitioner cannot shirk his responsibility of paying maintenance to wife and the family in the same comfort zone in which the petitioner is residing. 7. Additionally, it is clearly visible that this matter appears to have been argued on earlier occasion and with a view to give a chance to explore the possibility of setting the dispute, time was granted. However, while passing that order on 4.9.2018, the Court has observed that prima facie the impugned order may not call for any interference. Since the said order is relevant to the issue, the same is incorporated hereinafter: "1. The matter pertains to maintenance to be paid by the husband to the respondent. 2. The wife and daughter of aged about 21 years are not staying with the petitioner. Since the said order is relevant to the issue, the same is incorporated hereinafter: "1. The matter pertains to maintenance to be paid by the husband to the respondent. 2. The wife and daughter of aged about 21 years are not staying with the petitioner. The amount of Rs.4,000/- which is challenged in this petition, is towards maintenance of wife or daughter that is not clarified by the Court below. That is not even the subject matter. The point at issue before this Court is whether the payment of Rs.4,000/- by the husband calls for any interference. Prima facie, the impugned order may not call for any interference. 3. To enable the parties to explore any possibility of settling the dispute, list for further consideration on 18.09.2018." 8. In addition to this, the petitioner by way of this petition has challenged the order which has been passed way back in the month of September, 2017 and has affirmed the petition in month of March, 2018 and for a pretty long period, the proceedings have been dragged on, which is clearly visible from the order sheet and as such also, the conduct of the petitioner is not possible to be overlooked. 9. Yet another fact which is also taken note of by the learned Judge is that the petitioner has not produced any documentary evidence to establish that wife is a Government employee. Additionally, it has also been found by the learned Judge that the petitioner husband is paying regular maintenance which has been awarded in Criminal Misc. Application No.160 of 2009 and further, documents have not been produced on record to substantiate the denial of claim. In fact, the learned Judge after close scrutiny has found that some amount of reasonable figure deserves to be awarded and hence, after applying mind to the material on record and keeping in view the principles governing grant of maintenance, an order is passed and the figure of Rs.4,000/- appears to be quite reasonable, resultantly, this Court is also not inclined to entertain the grievance of the petitioner and on the contrary, the Court is of the opinion that main proceedings are required to be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. 10. 10. It appears from the bare reading of the order in relation to the submissions which have been made that no perversity is reflecting from the order nor any material irregularity of any nature is noticed, on the contrary, it has been found that the petitioner is not regular and is evading the responsibility of making the payment. When that be so, this Court is not inclined to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction which is equitable in nature. The Court found no perversity, hence, keeping in view the well defined proposition of law on the issue of exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction, the Court found no case in favour of the petitioner. The Court while coming to this conclusion is also mindful of the proposition of law laid down on exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction and one of such decisions delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court on that issue is reported in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta through PA Holder Vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, (2017) 1 SCC 568 and the relevant observations made paras 6 and 7 made therein are reproduced hereianfter: "6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: "(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in super-session or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held: "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 11. Considering the aforesaid background of facts and in view of the submissions, no merit is found in favour of the petitioner. Resultantly, the petition deserves to be dismissed accordingly and it stands dismissed with no order as to costs. However, while parting with this, the Court is also directing the petitioner husband to clear all the arrears of maintenance and continue to pay the amount which has been awarded on regular basis.