JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant has filed this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as IPC), as ordered by the Trial Court vide judgment/order dated 23.12.2014 in FIR No. 195 dated 05.10.2012 registered at Police Station Saipau, District Dholpur under Section 143, 323, 341, 324 IPC. Offence under Section 302 IPC was added after the death of victim Anita on 18.10.2012. 2. Prosecution case was set in motion on the basis of the statement of Mukesh Singh, husband of the deceased. As per the FIR, prosecution story, in brief, is that on 04.10.2012 at about 10.00 p.m., complainant came home and his elder brother Ramprakash started abusing him. Munesh, Arvind, Sheru and wife of Munesh started giving beatings to the complainant and his wife. Ramu also joined them. Then all of them poured kerosene oil on Anita (wife of the complainant) and set her on fire. 3. During investigation of the case, statement of the victim was recorded by the Magistrate. As per Exhibit P-15, victim stated that her brother-in-law Munesh had poured kerosene oil on her and had set her on fire. At that time Munesh, Ramprakash, Arvind, Rajabeti, Ramu and Ashu were present in the house and nobody had made any effort to save her. Her husband Mukesh and neighbours had saved her. Her husband had come home later and she had been brought to the hospital by her husband. 4. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellant. 5. Charge was framed against the appellant under Section 302 IPC. Appellant did not plead guilty to the charge framed against him and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined twenty three witnesses, during trial. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.'), prayed that he was innocent and had been falsely involved in this case. 7. Appellant examined two witnesses in his defence. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove its case. Neighbours as well as mother of the deceased and the complainant had not supported the prosecution case, during trial. No reliance could be placed on the dying declaration of the deceased as the same was a tutored one. The contents of the FIR and the dying declaration were contradictory. Neighbours as well as mother of the deceased and the complainant had not supported the prosecution case, during trial. No reliance could be placed on the dying declaration of the deceased as the same was a tutored one. The contents of the FIR and the dying declaration were contradictory. In-fact, there was property dispute between the complainant (husband of the deceased) and the appellant and due to this reason, appellant has been falsely involved in this case by the complainant. Victim, in-fact, had accidentally caught fire and had suffered burn injuries. 9. Learned state counsel, on the other hand, has opposed the appeal. 10. Present case relates to murder of Anita. Anita had died on account of burn injuries. 11. PW-23 Dr. R.P. Singh deposed that on 18.10.2012, he had conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. He proved the postmortem report Exhibit P-20. A perusal of the postmortem examination report reveals that the cause of the death of the deceased was due to septicemic shock as a result of burn injuries. Thus, it is evident that the deceased Anita had died on account of burn injuries. 12. The question that requires consideration is as to whether Anita had suffered burn injuries at the hands of the appellant. 13. Prosecution has placed reliance on dying declaration of the deceased. 14. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty and Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N. in (2005) 9 SCC 113 , as under:- "Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1992) SC 1817: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164) (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994]. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021]. (vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519]. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839]." 15. As per the FIR, it is the case of the complainant that his brother Ramprakash, Munesh, Arvind, Sheru, wife of Munesh and Ramu had abused them and had set his wife on fire. On the other hand, as per the statement of the deceased Exhibit P-15, she had been set on fire by Munesh by pouring kerosene oil on her and the others present there had not made any effort to save her. She had also stated that her husband had come home later. Thus, there is a contradiction in the initial version disclosed by the complainant and the dying declaration of the deceased. She had also stated that her husband had come home later. Thus, there is a contradiction in the initial version disclosed by the complainant and the dying declaration of the deceased. As per the complainant, he had come home and thereafter, he had been abused by the appellant and others and they had poured kerosene oil on his wife and set her on fire, whereas, the victim has stated that when the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire, her husband was not present at the spot and had come home later. 16. Dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by PW-21 Vikram Sankhla. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the relatives of the deceased were present in the ward and he had asked them to leave the ward before recording the statement. 17. PW-4 Mohan Singh has deposed that there was dispute regarding partition between the Munesh(appellant) and Mukesh(complainant). 18. PW-15 Priya, daughter of the victim has also stated that there was some dispute between her father and the appellant. 19. PW-18 Jitendra, brother of the victim has also stated that there was some dispute between the appellant and the complainant with regard to the shops. 20. Victim was taken to the hospital by her husband. 21. Thus, a combined reading of the above facts leads to the inference that the possibility that victim might have been tutored to make a statement before the Magistrate against the appellant by her husband, who was having a property dispute with the appellant, cannot be ruled out, especially, because the neighbours, mother of the deceased and the complainant have not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 22. PW-1 Bharatsingh, PW-3 Ramwati (mother of the victim), PW-4 Mohan Singh (relative of the victim) and neighbours PW-6 Badami, PW-7 Ashok Kumar S/o. Mataprasad, PW-8 Ashok Kumar S/o. Chotelal, PW-9 Koksingh, PW-10 Sarita, PW-11 Shailendra and PW-22 Sonu have not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 23. Complainant while appearing in the witness-box as PW-2 has also not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 24. PW-15 Priya is the nine year old daughter of the victim. The said witness deposed that her mother had died. Her mother was sleeping and she had been set on fire by her uncle. 23. Complainant while appearing in the witness-box as PW-2 has also not supported the prosecution case, during trial. 24. PW-15 Priya is the nine year old daughter of the victim. The said witness deposed that her mother had died. Her mother was sleeping and she had been set on fire by her uncle. Her mother was sleeping in the Chappar and had raised hue and cry after she had been set on fire and her maternal uncle came there and he took her to the hospital. When her mother had been set on fire, she was sleeping alongwith her mother. However, in her cross-examination, she deposed that she was sleeping in her room, whereas, her mother was sleeping outside in the Chappar. Police had not recorded her statement. She had heard the cries of her mother inside the room and she had stayed inside the room due to fear. She had come out of the room when the villagers had come to the spot. When she came out of the room, she saw that her mother was ablaze. 25. Thus, statement of PW-15 fails to inspire confidence as the said witness was inside the room and had not actually witnessed as to how the incident had occurred. Moreover, the statement of PW-15 was not recorded by the police and she has been examined as a witness for the first time, during trial. 26. PW-18 Jitendra, brother of the victim deposed that he was present in the house of his sister on the day of incident. His brother-in-law Mukesh and the appellant had a dispute with regard to the shops. The dispute had occurred outside the shop. His sister Anita was sleeping in the Chappar alongwith her daughter. Appellant came running and gave beatings to his sister and thereafter, he set her on fire. He raised alarm and neighbours came to the spot and extinguished the fire. He could not save his sister as he had been caught by Ramprakash and Arvind. 27. Statement of PW-18 also fails to inspire confidence as his presence at the spot was neither disclosed in the FIR nor by the victim when her statement was recorded before the Magistrate. Statement of PW-18 was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 01.11.2012. The said statement is Exhibit D-1, wherein, he had stated that Ramprakash, Ramu, Arvind, Sheru and Ashu were not present at the spot. Statement of PW-18 was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 01.11.2012. The said statement is Exhibit D-1, wherein, he had stated that Ramprakash, Ramu, Arvind, Sheru and Ashu were not present at the spot. PW-18 was duly confronted with the said portion marked as 'A' to 'B' in Exhibit D-1, but he could not offer any explanation in this regard. Since, PW-18 has stated that Ramprakash and Arvind were not present at the spot in his statement Exhibit D-1, thus, it is evident that this witness has improved his version later during trial that he could not save his sister because he had been caught by Ramprakash and Arvind. Hence, the presence of PW-18 at the spot is rendered doubtful. Because, in case, this witness had been present at the spot he would made effort to save his sister. Moreover, his name has not been disclosed by the victim in her dying declaration. Rather, victim had stated that she had been taken to the hospital by her husband and neighbours. Hence, the version of PW-18 that he took his sister to the hospital with neighbours stands falsified and delay in introducing him as a witness in the facts and circumstances of the present case, gains significance. 28. Thus, the statements of PW-15 and PW-18 fail to advance the prosecution case. The dying declaration suffered by the victim also fails to inspire confidence as the same appears to be a tutored one. It is possible that the husband of the victim had tutored his wife to make a statement against the appellant in view of his property dispute with the appellant. Mother of the victim has stated in her statement during trial that her daughter had accidentally caught fire as a kerosene mud lamp had fallen on her. 29. It is a settled proposition of law that the prosecution is required to prove its case against an accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt by leading cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the present case, prosecution story is rendered doubtful. An accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty and whenever, there is doubt in the prosecution case, benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused. 30. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the charge framed against him by giving him benefit of doubt. 31. An accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty and whenever, there is doubt in the prosecution case, benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused. 30. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the charge framed against him by giving him benefit of doubt. 31. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. Appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him and the judgment/order dated 23.12.2014 passed by the Trial Court are set aside. Appellant who is in custody, be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, appellant Munesh S/o. Nanikram is directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/-, and a surety in the like amount, before the Registrar(Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.