JUDGMENT : PRATAP KRISHNA LOHRA, J. 1. Appellant-defendants, remaining unsuccessful before this Court as well as Apex Court in their attempts to get favourable orders on their applications including under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and being aggrieved by concurrent findings of two Courts below decreeing the suit filed by respondent-plaintiffs, have laid the present second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC. The Addl. District Judge No. 1, Bhilwara (for short, 'Appellate Court') vide impugned judgment & decree dt. 08.05.2018 has dismissed their appeal against judgment and decree dt 28.04.2004, passed by Additional Civil Judge, Bhilwara (for short, 'learned trial Court'). 2. Brief facts of the case are that original respondent-plaintiffs Smt. Sosar Bai (since deceased) filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against original defendant Ratanlal on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable & bona fide necessity stating therein that the suit premises shop is needed for business of her two unemployed sons Rameshwar and Badrilal. The original defendant Ratan Lal contested the suit by filing a written statement refuting all the averments made in the plaint and denied the claim of plaintiffs in respect of default and reasonable & bona fide necessity. Original defendant Ratanal expired on 06.05.2000 and an application was moved on 20.07.2000 to implead his legal representatives and one Dalpat Singh also, who was carrying on business in the disputed shop at the time of death of original defendant and learned trial Court allowed impleadment of legal heirs of original defendant Ratan Lal as party defendants to the suit. One more application was filed before the learned trial Court for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 on 17.04.2001 for adding para No. 4A in the plaint to the effect that defendant acquired another shop, therefore, not in need of the suit shop. In reply to that application, original defendant inter-alia stated that his business cannot be carried out at the indicated place. Thereafter, learned trial Court added one more issue as Issue No. 4A to the already framed four issues stemming from the pleadings of the parties and recorded evidence of rival parties. Learned trial Court, after hearing the parties, decreed the suit as aforesaid. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, legal representatives of original defendant filed an appeal before appellate Court. 3. Learned trial Court, after hearing the parties, decreed the suit as aforesaid. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, legal representatives of original defendant filed an appeal before appellate Court. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, original-plaintiffs Smt. Sosar Bai expired and her legal representatives were brought on record. The defendants moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC on 10.08.2005 and claimed that respondent plaintiffs have another shop in Somani Katla, which is also a commercial place and referred to their reply to application under Order 6 Rule 17 stating that the mentioned shop came to the share of their brother Lalit Kumar, which has been demolished and there remains only vacant plot and prayed for taking the documents on record. The learned appellate Court, vide order dt. 11.11.2005, dismissed the application of appellant defendants filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC against which the appellant-defendants filed a writ petition bearing SBCW Petition No. 7257/2005 but same was later on not pressed and withdrawn on 22.08.2007 with liberty to challenge the impugned order on appropriate grounds in the appeal pending before appellate Court. The appellant-defendants also filed another application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the written statement on 04.03.2004 stating therein that the suit was filed for necessity of Rameshwar Lal and Badrilal and as Rameshwar Lai expired on 05.05.2011 and before his death he had filed a suit for partition against his brother Badrilal, in which partition of the suit premises also sought, in view of subsequent events amendment application may be allowed. 4. The appellant-defendants further filed one more application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and sought to produce certain documents of partition suit and prayed for taking the same on record. The learned appellate Court, while rejecting the application filed by appellant-defendant under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 03.05.2014 observed that the application of appellant defendants under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC would be decided at the time of hearing of the appeal. Against that order, appellant defendants filed another writ petition No. 2583/2016 before this Court but that too was dismissed on 13.01.2016. Thereafter, on 08.04.2015 an application on behalf of LRs of Rameshwar Lal, was filed that they do not want to proceed with the matter and they also filed further application on 08.05.2014 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statement. Thereafter, on 08.04.2015 an application on behalf of LRs of Rameshwar Lal, was filed that they do not want to proceed with the matter and they also filed further application on 08.05.2014 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in the written statement. Subsequently further application was filed by them on 21.07.2015 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and it was prayed that since LRs of Rameshwar Lal have filed an application on 08.05.2015 to the effect that they wished not to proceed in the matter, the subsequent events be taken on record. The applications dt. 08.05.2014 and 21.07.2015 were dismissed by the learned Court below vide order dt. 01.09.2015. On 02.02.2016, other applications filed by LRs of Rameshwar Lal dt. 08.04.2015 and 01.09.2015 were also dismissed by the learned Court below. 5. The appellant-defendants moved further application under Order 6 Rule 17 & Order 41 Rule 27 on 26.02.2016 and inter-alia stated that LRs of Rameshwar Lal, the co-owner of suit premises, sold out half portion of the suit premises to Lalit Kumar Dangi on 28.01.2015 through registered sale deed and sought amendment in the written statement and for taking on record certified copy of the registered sale deed. Those applications were dismissed by learned appellate Court on 29.02.2016. Against that appellant-defendants filed writ petition bearing No. 2583/2016 before this Court which was dismissed vide order dt. 06.02.2017 and against that the appellant-defendant filed SLP before Supreme Court but their effort proved abortive as the same was also dismissed. The matter did not end here and before the appellate Court Lalit Kumar also filed an application on 07.12.2017 under Sec. 151 CPC praying therein that he has purchased the suit property and he be also impleaded as a Legal Representative of Ratan Lal Dangi. The learned appellate Court dismissed that application on 21.02.2018. Further application filed by appellant-defendants on 24.03.2018 Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was also dismissed by the appellate Court on 27.03.2018. 6. That apart, an application was filed on 02.04.2018 with the prayer that since suit for partition between legal representative of Rameshwar Lal and Badri Lal & Ors. The learned appellate Court dismissed that application on 21.02.2018. Further application filed by appellant-defendants on 24.03.2018 Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was also dismissed by the appellate Court on 27.03.2018. 6. That apart, an application was filed on 02.04.2018 with the prayer that since suit for partition between legal representative of Rameshwar Lal and Badri Lal & Ors. is pending before the Court and Lalit Kumar, who has purchased half share in the suit shop of Rameshwar Lal has already moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC in partition Suit No. 126/2011, the suit No. 126/2011 it be consolidated with the aforesaid appeal. The appellate Court, vide order dt. 03.04.2018, dismissed that application also. The appellant-defendants on 23.04.2018 also filed an application under Sec. 3(vii) of the Act of 1950 read with Section 107 and 151 CPC with the prayer that after death of Ratan Lal, the tenancy right devolves in whom has to be determined. 7. Ultimately, the appeal was heard and by impugned judgment and decree dt. 08.05.2018, it was dismissed so also the application filed by appellant-defendants dt. 01.05.2014 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and application dt. 23.04.2018 under Sec. 3(vii) of the Act of 1950 affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. Mr. Suresh Shrimali, learned counsel for the appellant defendants, submits that the findings of learned Courts below are perverse and not in consonance and conformity with the evidence and other materials on record. Learned counsel would contend that both the Courts below have not examined the lis involved in the matter in right perspective and, while non-suiting the appellant-defendants, material facts were completely overlooked. Mr. Shrimali urges that even if mere is a concurrent finding of fact, this Court is not loathed with the power to examine the perversity of the findings recorded by the Courts below. Mr. Shrimali has strenuously urged that the issue of reasonable and bona fide necessity was not decided in right perspective by the learned first appellate Court. Learned counsel submits that as Rameshwar Lai expired on 05.05.2011 and his legal heirs moved an application on 08.05.2015 to the effect that they are not interested to proceed in the matter, was completely overlooked by the Court. Learned counsel submits that as Rameshwar Lai expired on 05.05.2011 and his legal heirs moved an application on 08.05.2015 to the effect that they are not interested to proceed in the matter, was completely overlooked by the Court. Elaborating his submission in this behalf, learned counsel contends that on account of death of Rameshwar Lal necessity of disputed premises for him ceased to exist/vanished but that subsequent event was not taken on record and the application filed in this regard was wrongly rejected by the appellate Court. 9. Mr. Shrimali has vehemently argued that learned appellate Court has seriously erred in rejecting applications of the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Harping on proposed substantial questions of law, learned counsel submits that these questions require consideration & adjudication. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has argued that the two situations in which interference in findings of fact is permissible are that; first, when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion; second, where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence with which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. He has contended that in either of these two situations, a substantial question of law would arise. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has then very strenuously argued that the learned Court below has committed grave illegality in dismissing the applications filed by appellant-defendants and the same has vitiated the findings of the learned Court below and has rendered the findings perverse and unsustainable in law. 10. Learned counsel, in support of his submissions, has relied on following judgments: * Kanhiya Singh Santok Singh (M/s.) & Ors. vs. Kartar Singhm, 2009 DNJ (SC) 810. * Navneet Rai vs. Otmal, 1995 (2) WLC (Raj.) 190 * Gopi Kishan vs. Bajrang Lal & Anr., 1996 (2) WLC (Raj.) 585 * Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & Ors. vs. Tehmatan Irani & Ors., 2014 AIR SCW 3015 * Kalpana Vyas vs. Raj Kumar Rangwani, 2018 AIR SCW 5282 * C. Venkata Swamy vs. H.N. Shivanna (D) by L.R. & Anr. etc., 2017 AIR SCW 5604 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. vs. Tehmatan Irani & Ors., 2014 AIR SCW 3015 * Kalpana Vyas vs. Raj Kumar Rangwani, 2018 AIR SCW 5282 * C. Venkata Swamy vs. H.N. Shivanna (D) by L.R. & Anr. etc., 2017 AIR SCW 5604 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. A.K. Babel, on the other hand, while supporting the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the learned Courts below, has argued that no interference with the impugned judgment is called for. While referring to the applications filed by appellants, learned counsel would contend that they were prima facie not entertainable inasmuch as necessary grounds on which additional evidence could be allowed to be taken on record were not at all available. He has also argued that the documents, which are sought to be placed on record as additional evidence, were neither admissible in evidence nor relevant for decision of the appeal. Learned counsel strenuously urged that the appellant-defendants have utterly failed to show as to how these documents are in any way relevant for pronouncement of judgment by the learned lower appellate Court in the backdrop of lis involved in the matter. Learned counsel submits that it is a pure and simple case of concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below, and therefore, the impugned judgments require no interference in this second appeal as both the learned Courts below have recorded the concurrent findings based on sound appreciation of documentary and oral evidence. 12. It is contended by learned counsel that involvement of substantial question of law is sine qua non for maintaining second appeal and the present appeal is bereft of any question of law much less substantial question of law, therefore, no interference is warranted in exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 100 CPC. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments: * Lrs of Ratan Lal vs. Lrs of Sosar Bai (SBCW Petition No. 5126/2014, decided on 13.01.2016). * Lrs of Ratan Lal vs. Lrs of Sosar Bai (SBCW Petition No. 2583/2016, decided on 06.02.2017). * LRs of Ratan Lal vs. Lrs of Sosar Bai (Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 19490/2017, Dismissed by Supreme Court on 08.08.2017). * Pramod Kumar Jaiswal & Ors. vs. Bibi Husn Bano & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2857 * M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. * LRs of Ratan Lal vs. Lrs of Sosar Bai (Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 19490/2017, Dismissed by Supreme Court on 08.08.2017). * Pramod Kumar Jaiswal & Ors. vs. Bibi Husn Bano & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2857 * M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. vs. Bhagabandel Agarwalla (Dead) by L.R.S. & Ors., ( AIR 2004 SC 1321 ) * Kedar Lal & Ors. vs. LRs of Ram Dayal, 2007 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 1103. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the judgments of Courts below and the authorities cited at Bar. 14. The main thrust and plank of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant-defendants is that learned appellate Court has wrongly decided the applications filed under Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 6 Rule 17 as well application under under Sec. 3(vii) of the Act of 1950 read with Section 107 and 151 CPC, and thereby, has committed grave illegality' and jurisdictional error, therefore, substantial questions of law are involved in this case requiring adjudication by this Court in second appeal. By filing applications time and again before the appellate Court, the appellant-defendants infact wanted to get their evidence reopened which was closed and the learned appellate Court below in dismissing the applications has not committed any illegality or jurisdictional error. The endeavour made by the appellants to file plethora of applications before the learned lower appellate Court is a glaring example of dispersion and an abuse of the process of law. A litigant while pursuing legal remedy is well within his right to take shelter of procedural and substantive law for authenticating case set up or vindicating defence but then he cannot be allowed to misuse judicial process with all impunity. Nature of the suit and lis involved therein are relevant for consideration of various applications. 15. In a suit for eviction based on default as well as reasonable and bona fide necessity, the requisite evidence is to be tendered by the landlord. Defending its cause, the tenant is also well within his right to disprove the case set up by plaintiff with cogent evidence. While determining reasonable and bona fide necessity, normally, crucial juncture/date is filing of the suit and subsequent event, more particularly death of the incumbent for whose bona fide need eviction is sought cannot be attached undue significance. Defending its cause, the tenant is also well within his right to disprove the case set up by plaintiff with cogent evidence. While determining reasonable and bona fide necessity, normally, crucial juncture/date is filing of the suit and subsequent event, more particularly death of the incumbent for whose bona fide need eviction is sought cannot be attached undue significance. Reliance can be placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Naresh chand vs. Smt. Premlata Bakshi, 2009 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 423, wherein it has been concluded that bona fide need of plaintiff as on the date of filing of the suit has to be established and same continues even after death of person for whose requirement eviction was desired. The Court held: "10. Since bona fide need was claimed by the landlord - plaintiff for her husband as well as her son as stated above on the date of filing of the suit and the Courts below concurrently found, that the said bona fide need existed on the date of filing suit and while the trial Court granted the decree for partial eviction, the first appellate Court granted the decree of entire residential house in question, the said findings of facts which are based on relevant evidence and material did not deserve to be disturbed at all and the second appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as no substantial question of law could be said to be arising in the present appeal. However, the fact remains that since this appeal came to be admitted by this Court by framing the aforesaid question of law and which remained pending here for long number of 18-years in this, Court, subsequent developments in the form of death husband of the plaintiff and sale of property by her arose. However, the fact remains that since this appeal came to be admitted by this Court by framing the aforesaid question of law and which remained pending here for long number of 18-years in this, Court, subsequent developments in the form of death husband of the plaintiff and sale of property by her arose. The question which Arises now in these circumstances for consideration by this Court in the changed circumstances is as to whether now the purchaser of the suit property can get fruits of the decree passed by the Courts below and can get the suit premises evicted or not or whether the defendant-tenant should be allowed to remain in the property for next 20 to 30 years after the new purchaser of the property is asked to file a fresh suit establishing his own bona fide need of the said suit property or on other grounds of eviction as specified in the Rent Control Act. 19. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that not only the question framed by this Court while admitting the present appeal deserves to be answered against the appellant defendant by holding that the bona fide need of the plaintiff continues even after death of her husband as the bona fide need was claimed for her husband as well as her son and it deserves to be further held that the purchaser of the suit property during the pendency of present second appeal who steps into the shoes of the plaintiff shall be entitled to vacant possession of the suit property in pursuance of the decree passed by two Courts below which is liable to be upheld by this Court as no perversity in those findings is found by this Court. In view of the fact that the bona fide need of the plaintiff-landlord on the date of filing of the suit is relevant, subsequent events in the form of sale of said property does not ipso facto up-set the decree of eviction. The attornment in favour of purchaser was automatic and did not depend upon the acceptance of the same by the defendant-tenant. The appellant-defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief in the present second appeal, which is found to be devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs." 16. Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Ramkubai Deceased by Lrs. & Ors. The appellant-defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief in the present second appeal, which is found to be devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs." 16. Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Ramkubai Deceased by Lrs. & Ors. vs. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak & Ors., (1999) 6 SCC 540 , while considering bona fide necessity law on the anvil of subsequent event, held: "The second reason given by the Appellate Court is that at the time of filing of petition the son of the landlady was unemployed but later on he started doing work as a contractor in construction field, so he did not really want to run a Kirana shop in the suit premises. The Appellate Court was of the view that had he really intended to take up Kirana business he would not have started a business like that of a contractor. The third reason given by him is that the landlady was a partner, after the death of her husband, in the Kirana business run by her husband's brother. It Was also noted that another son of the landlady is in possession of another shop and doing Kirana business and thus the family is engaged in Kirana business in two shops and if Bhikchand wanted to do Kirana business he could have joined existing business. From this the Appellate Court concluded that the landlady did not require the suit premises for establishing Bhikchand in Kirana business. The learned Counsel for the respondents strongly supported these reasons. It is correct that Bhikchand was unemployed on the date of filing of the suit but he could not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case is finally decided. It has already taken about 25 years. Therefore, we do not think that taking up contractor work, in the meanwhile, will militate against his carrying on the business of Kirana which is his family business, which was carried on by his father and is being carried on by his brother independently. The facts that the landlady during her lifetime was a partner in the firm carrying on Kirana business and her elder son is carrying on Kirana business do not disentitle Bhikchand to establish his own business. The facts that the landlady during her lifetime was a partner in the firm carrying on Kirana business and her elder son is carrying on Kirana business do not disentitle Bhikchand to establish his own business. We are not impressed by the other reasoning and conclusion of the Appellate Court which are confirmed by the High Court. In our view, none of the reasons leads to the inference that Bhikchand cannot be denied to the landlady to recover the suit premises for personal requirement of Bhikchand to establish Kirana business independently". 17. Later on, in case of Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava, 2001 (2) SCC 604 , Supreme Court, while considering bona fide requirement of the landlord, held as under: "We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his fattier seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the even of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 18. The same view has further been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in case of Hukum Chandra (D) Thro' LR's vs. Nemichand Jain & Ors., reported in 2019 DNJ (SC) 24 : AIR 2019 SC 60 . 19. The present matter arises out a legal battle launched way back in the year 1984 about three and half decades ago at the instance of a widow landlady in her quest to get the tenanted shop evicted for her sons, which has not still fructified and during this prolonged period, she lost one of her sons and was subjected to various frivolous methods of causing delay on one pretext or other by the appellant-defendants by filing numerous applications time and again at various stages of the litigation and even after losing their case before trial Court as well as appellate Court they have approached this Court in the present second appeal mainly on the ground that the applications moved by them were not properly considered despite the fact that earlier in connection with their applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC matter was twice brought before this Court and on failure once upto the Apex Court, which too proved abortive. It was only because of the delaying tactics of appellant-defendants that they have succeeded in lingering the disposal of the suit as well as first appeal, may it be by filing applications for bringing irrelevant documents on record or amendment of the written statement or some other pretext, it undoubtedly caused continuous mental agony and harassment to the respondent-plaintiff landlady who too died during the pendency of proceedings. The conduct of the appellant-defendants speak volumes about their intention to delay disposal of the case, which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be fair rather the same is complete misuse of legal process and cannot be countenanced. 20. The conduct of the appellant-defendants speak volumes about their intention to delay disposal of the case, which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be fair rather the same is complete misuse of legal process and cannot be countenanced. 20. Upon perusal of the judgments rendered by both the Courts below, in my opinion, the Courts below have not committed any error much less manifest error in appreciation of evidence. As per Section 3(vii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, the definition of tenant means-that 'upon the death of tenant, only surviving spouse, sons, daughter and heirs according to the personal law in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, the persons who had been ordinarily carrying on business with deceased tenant in suit premises as a member of his family, as per definition those persons would only come in the definition of tenant. In the instant case, the person Dalpat Singh, who was running business of the original appellant-defendant was impleaded to which objection is raised by the appellant defendants on the ground of misjoinder of parties but that objection is of no avail in view of the fact that legal heirs of original defendant Ratan Lal contested the suit and Dalpat Singh also did not oppose-it by tendering oral or documentary evidence. The factum of not opposing prayer of substitution of the original tenant by the proposed legal representatives even after receipt of notice cannot be ignored by the Court Moreover, even otherwise also, impleadment of any legal representative who may not fall within the ambit of a tenant by legal fiction, as per Section 3(vii) of the Act of 1950 has no ramification on the merit of the case set up by the respondent-defendant. Misjoinder of party cannot be categorized as substantial question of law in the light of lis involved in the matter inasmuch as Order 1 Rule 9 CPC is crystal clear. Reliance in this behalf can be profitably made to a decision of Supreme Court in Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt vs. Yashram Vasta (Dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1993 SC 1587 . 21. As regards issue relating to partial eviction, suffice it to observe that both the Courts below have recorded concurrent finding based on sound appreciation of evidence. Reliance in this behalf can be profitably made to a decision of Supreme Court in Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt vs. Yashram Vasta (Dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1993 SC 1587 . 21. As regards issue relating to partial eviction, suffice it to observe that both the Courts below have recorded concurrent finding based on sound appreciation of evidence. The learned trial Court, while deciding issue No. 4A has taken into account lack of pleadings and evidence tendered by the appellants and in concurring with this finding, learned lower appellate Court has discussed all the aspects. Learned lower appellate Court has not only recorded a finding that division of rented shop is not possible besides agreeing with the comparative hardship of respondent landlord. 22. This Court in Hansraj vs. L.Rs. of Jeetmal (S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 152/1990 & 2/1991, decided on 28.10.2014), while examining the said issue, laid emphasis on comparative hardship and observed that for proving the same onus lies on tenant. The Court held: "So far as the issue of partial eviction is concerned, under Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the Act a restriction has been put on eviction based on comparative hardship and the law further provides that where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bentool Steel Products Private Limited vs. O.M.A. Mohammed Omar & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 679 while dealing with the issue of comparative hardship relying on judgment in the case of Badrinarayan Otunilal Bhutada vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 held that onus is on the tenant of bringing relevant factors which would enable a finding as to comparative hardship being arrived at in his favour and he should discharge the onus". 23. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for appellant-defendants on the issue of partial eviction, in absence of any concrete evidence cannot be entertained, more so, when it is for the plaintiff to say that partial eviction would meet the need or not. 24. 23. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for appellant-defendants on the issue of partial eviction, in absence of any concrete evidence cannot be entertained, more so, when it is for the plaintiff to say that partial eviction would meet the need or not. 24. The judgments, cited by learned counsel for appellant-defendants being distinguishable on facts are of no avail to the appellant-defendants and the exception provided under Sec. 107(1)(d) CPC has not been made out in the instant case and, therefore, this contention of learned counsel for the appellant-defendants having no force deserves to be disallowed. The so called substantial questions of law are apparently questions of fact and not questions of law and, therefore, concurrent findings with regard thereto cannot be gone into in second appeal even if they are erroneous. In absence of any substantial question of law involved in present appeal, no interference is warranted in exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 100 CPC. 25. In this view of the matter, the instant appeal is bereft of merit and substance and same is hereby dismissed.