JUDGMENT : K.S. JHAVERI, J. 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the action of the opposite parties whereby rejecting the lowest offer of the bid given the petitioner, the authority accepted the bid of opposite party no. 5. 2. Pursuant to the tender call notice under Annexure-2, the petitioner being eligible contractor with Class-B license applied for the work in question along with bid documents. The petitioner in course of argument drew our attention to the Details of the Documents to be Furnished for Bidding, which reads as under: “DETAILS OF THE DOCUMENTS TO BE FURNISHED FOR BIDDING. Details of documents to be furnished. 1.2.1 The following documents to be submitted along with the Tender paper. 1.2.2 DD towards tender cost 1.2.3 Duly pledged EMD 1.2.4 VAT clearance certificate 1.2.5 PAN Card 1.2.6 Registration certificate 1.2.7 Affidavit regarding correctness of information/ certificate 1.2.8 Affidavit regarding no relation certificate. 1.2.9 The Engineer contactors desirous of availing exemption of EMD should submit an affidavit as regards the fact of availing award of work without submission of EMD/ISD during the current financial year, otherwise their tenders will be liable for rejection. 1.2.10 Labour license Xxx xxx xxx 4. No Relation Certificate The contractor shall furnish a certificate along with the tender to the effect that he is not related to any officer in the rank of an Assistant Executive Engineer & above in the state Panchayati raj dept. or Assistant/Under Secretary & above in the Panchayati raj Department. If the fact subsequently proved to be false, the contract is liable to be rescinded. The earnest money & the total security will be forfeited & he shall be liable to make good the loss or damages resulting for such cancellations. The proforma for no relationship certificate is contained in a separate sheet vide Schedule-A.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus contended that although the language used in Clause-4 (supra) is ‘shall’, it should be read as ‘may’, since the petitioner is also required to file an affidavit regarding ‘No Relation Certificate’. Thus, filing of separate certificate in Schedule-A is directory and not mandatory and the same can be given subsequently also. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus contended that although the language used in Clause-4 (supra) is ‘shall’, it should be read as ‘may’, since the petitioner is also required to file an affidavit regarding ‘No Relation Certificate’. Thus, filing of separate certificate in Schedule-A is directory and not mandatory and the same can be given subsequently also. For our ready reference, format of certificate in Schedule-A is reproduced below: SCHEDULE-A CERTIFICATE OF NO RELATIONSHIP “I/We hereby certify that I/We “am/are” related/not related (*) to any officer of the rank of Assistant Executive Engineer & above and any officer of the rank of Assistant/Under Secretary and above of the P.R. Department, Govt. of Orissa I/We “am/are” aware that if the facts subsequently proved to be false, my/our contract will be rescinded with forfeiture of E.M.D. and security deposit and I/We shall be liable to make good the loss or damage resulting from such cancellation. I/We also note that, non-submission of this certificate will render my/our tender liable for rejection.” He further contended that pursuant to the judgment passed by this Court on 24.07.2017 in W.P.(C) No. 7120 of 2017, the Government of Odisha in Works Department have come out with the amendment in Clause-3.5.5(v) of OPWD Code, Vol-I, which reads as under: “Government of Odisha Works Department *** Office Memorandum File No.07556900012013-14299/W. dated,03.10.2017 Sub: Amendment to Para-3.5.5.(v) of OPWD Code, Vol-I After careful consideration Government have been pleased to make amendment to Para-3.5.5.(v) of OPWD Code, Vol-I with following modification. “Additional Performance Security shall be obtained from the bidder when the bid amount is less than estimated cost put to tender. In such an event, only the successful bidder who has quoted less bid price/rates than the estimated cost put to tender shall have to furnish the exact amount of differential cost i.e. estimated cost put to tender minus the quoted amount as Additional Performance Security (APS) in shape of Demand Draft/Term Deposit Receipt pledged in favour of the Divisional Officer within seven days, otherwise the bid shall be cancelled and the security deposit shall be forfeited. Further proceeding for blacklisting shall be intimated against bidder.” 1. This amendment shall take effect from 24th July, 2017. 2. The Works Department Office Memorandum No.5288/W dt.04.05.2016 (Annexure-I-A) stands modified accordingly pursuant to the judgment dated 24.7.2017 of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa. 3. Further proceeding for blacklisting shall be intimated against bidder.” 1. This amendment shall take effect from 24th July, 2017. 2. The Works Department Office Memorandum No.5288/W dt.04.05.2016 (Annexure-I-A) stands modified accordingly pursuant to the judgment dated 24.7.2017 of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa. 3. This has been concurred in by the Law Department and Finance Department vide their U.O.R. No.1668/L. dt.19.8.2017 & U.O.R. No.56-WF-I dt.24.8.2017 respectively. Sd/- EIC-cum-Secretary to Government.” Thus, non-furnishing of Additional Performance Security is not fatal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken us to the counter affidavit filed by opposite party nos.2 and 4 wherein it has been stated at paragraph-4, the relevant portion of which reads as under: “………The Block Level Tender Committee consisting of five Members examined all the tender documents of the four bidders and the comparative statement of bids submitted by bidders was prepared. Out of four bidders, the petitioner has quoted-7-2 % less over the estimated cost. But the petitioner has not submitted the Additional Performance Security as per Clause No.8 of DTCN which is a mandatory requirement. The petitioner has also not furnished the “No Relation Certificate” separately in Schedule ‘A’ which is also mandatory requirement as per Clause-1.2.8 of the DTCN. Hence, the Block Level Tender Committee unanimously decided to reject the bid of the petitioner and decided to place order in favour of 2nd lowest bidder (Opp. Party No.5) who has quoted-1% less over the estimated cost and already deposited the Additional Performance Security as per DTCN.” It is also submitted that the successful bidder (Opp. party No.5) has been intimated vide letter No.5388, dtd. 28.12.2018 regarding acceptance of his tender by the Tender Committee (Annexure-C/3). Till date, no agreement has been executed. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the Block Level Tender Committee has not done any illegality and arbitrariness in selecting the Opp. Party No.5 as the successful bidder. Hence, the contrary allegations made by the petitioner is baseless, based on facts and being devoid of any merits, is liable to be rejected.” 5. Till date, no agreement has been executed. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the Block Level Tender Committee has not done any illegality and arbitrariness in selecting the Opp. Party No.5 as the successful bidder. Hence, the contrary allegations made by the petitioner is baseless, based on facts and being devoid of any merits, is liable to be rejected.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further taken us to the rejoinder filed by him and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Sri Kaustava Sahu –v-State of Odisha and others in W.P.(C) No.3572 of 2017, which was disposed of on 27.03.2017, wherein it has been held that the deposit of E.M.D. is not sine qua non and is not mandatory. 6. He has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mr. B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. -v-Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 437 , wherein it has been observed at paragraphs-57 and 71 as under: “57. It may be true that a contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer but it is equally true that the employer is the best judge therefor; the same ordinarily being within its domain, court's interference in such matter should be minimal. The High Court's jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record. 71. While saying so, however, we would like to observe that that having regard to the fact that a huge public money is involved, a public sector undertaking in view of the principles of good corporate governance may accept such tenders which is economically beneficial to it. It may be true that essential terms of the contract were required to be fulfilled. If a party failed and/or neglected to comply with the requisite conditions which were essential for consideration of its case by the employer, it cannot supply the details at a latter stage or quote a lower rate upon ascertaining the rate quoted by others. Whether an employer has power of relaxation must be found out not only from the terms of the notice inviting tender but also the general practice prevailing in India. Whether an employer has power of relaxation must be found out not only from the terms of the notice inviting tender but also the general practice prevailing in India. For the said purpose, the court may consider the practice prevailing in the past. Keeping in view a particular object, if in effect and substance it is found that the offer made by one of the bidders substantially satisfies the requirements of the conditions of notice inviting tender, the employer may be said to have a general power of relaxation in that behalf. Once such a power is exercised, one of the questions which would arise for consideration by the superior courts would be as to whether exercise of such power was fair, reasonable and bona fide. If the answer thereto is not in the negative, save and except for sufficient and cogent reasons, the writ courts would be well advised to refrain themselves in exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu –v-Union of India, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3353 , wherein it has been observed at paragraph-21 as under: “21. The use of the word “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. 8. Therefore, the petitioner contended that hyper technicalities should not come on the way of rendering substantial justice. Thereby, the Government will also save public money. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. 8. Therefore, the petitioner contended that hyper technicalities should not come on the way of rendering substantial justice. Thereby, the Government will also save public money. The offer given by the opposite party no. 5 is only 1% less of the estimated cost and the petitioner has offered 7.2% less of the estimated cost. As such, the Government will be benefitted by 6.2% of the tender cost. 9. Learned counsel for the opposite parties-State has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal –v-Union of India and others, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 315 more particularly at paragraph-6, which reads as under: 6. It is settled law that when an essential condition of tender is not complied with, it is open to the person inviting tender to reject the same. Whether a condition is essential or collateral could be ascertained by reference to the consequence of noncompliance thereto. If non-fulfilment of the requirement results in rejection of the tender, then it would be an essential part of the tender otherwise it is only a collateral term. This legal position has been well explained in G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka [ (1990) 2 SCC 488 ]. 10. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 5 has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Coal Fields Limited and another –v-SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and others, reported in AIR 2016 (SC) 3814 , more particularly at paragraphs-4, 36, 37, 52 and 55, which read as under: “4. The question for our consideration is generally whether furnishing a bank guarantee in the format prescribed in the bid documents is an essential requirement in the bidding process of Central Coalfields Ltd. and specifically whether a bid not accompanied by a bank guarantee in the format prescribed in the bid documents of Central Coalfields Ltd. could be treated as non-responsive in view of Clause 15.2 of the general terms and conditions governing the bidding process? The answer to the general and the specific question is in the affirmative. 36. The answer to the general and the specific question is in the affirmative. 36. It was further held that if others (such as the appellant in Ramana Dayaram Shetty case [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] ) were aware that non-fulfilment of the eligibility condition of being a registered IInd class hotelier would not be a bar for consideration, they too would have submitted a tender, but were prevented from doing so due to the eligibility condition, which was relaxed in the case of Respondent 4. This resulted in unequal treatment in favour of Respondent 4 — treatment that was constitutionally impermissible. Expounding on this, it was held: “ … It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some privilege.” (emphasis supplied) Applying this principle to the present appeals, other bidders and those who had not bid could very well contend that if they had known that the prescribed format of the bank guarantee was not mandatory or that some other term(s) of NIT or GTC were not mandatory for compliance, they too would have meaningfully participated in the bidding process. In other words, by rearranging the goalposts, they were denied the “privilege” of participation. 37. For JVC to say that its bank guarantee was in terms stricter than the prescribed format is neither here nor there. It is not for the employer or this Court to scrutinize every bank guarantee to determine whether it is stricter than the prescribed format or less rigorous. The fact is that a format was prescribed and there was no reason not to adhere to it. The goalposts cannot be rearranged or asked to be rearranged during the bidding process to affect the right of some or deny a privilege to some. 52. The fact is that a format was prescribed and there was no reason not to adhere to it. The goalposts cannot be rearranged or asked to be rearranged during the bidding process to affect the right of some or deny a privilege to some. 52. There is a wholesome principle that the courts have been following for a very long time and which was articulated in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : (1935-36) 63 IA 372 : 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41] , namely: (SCC OnLine PC) “….. where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.” There is no valid reason to give up this salutary principle or not to apply it mutatis mutandis to bid documents. This principle deserves to be applied in contractual disputes, particularly in commercial contracts or bids leading up to commercial contracts, where there is stiff competition. It must follow from the application of the principle laid down in Nazir Ahmad [Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : (1935-36) 63 IA 372 : 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41] that if the employer prescribes a particular format of the bank guarantee to be furnished, then a bidder ought to submit the bank guarantee in that particular format only and not in any other format. However, as mentioned above, there is no inflexibility in this regard and an employer could deviate from the terms of the bid document but only within the parameters mentioned above. 55. On the basis of the available case law, we are of the view that since CCL had not relaxed or deviated from the requirement of furnishing a bank guarantee in the prescribed format, in so far as the present appeals are concerned very bidder was obliged to adhere to the prescribed format of the bank guarantee. Consequently, the failure of JVC to furnish the bank guarantee in the prescribe format was sufficient reason for CCL to reject its bid.” 11. He also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR India Ltd. –v-Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 , more particularly at paragraph-7, which reads as under: “7. He also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR India Ltd. –v-Cochin International Airport Ltd. and others, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 , more particularly at paragraph-7, which reads as under: “7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] , Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 568 ], CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. [ (1985) 1 SCC 260 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 75] , Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 134 ] and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. [ (1999) 1 SCC 492 ] The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene. 12. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal Electricity Board –v-Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. & others, reported in AIR 2001 SC 682 , more particularly at paragraphs-24, 25, 26 and 32, which read as under: 24. The mistakes/errors in question, it is stated, are unintentional and occurred due to the fault of computer termed as “a repetitive systematic computer typographical transmission failure”. It is difficult to accept this contention. A mistake may be unilateral or mutual but it is always unintentional. If it is intentional it ceases to be a mistake. Here the mistakes may be unintentional but it was not beyond the control of Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the same before submission of the bid. Had they been vigilant in checking the bid documents before their submission, the mistakes would have been avoided. Further, correction of such mistakes after one-and-a-half months of opening of the bids will also be violative of clauses 24.1, 24.3 and 29.1 of the ITB. 25. The controversy in this case has arisen at the threshold. It cannot be disputed that this is an international competitive bidding which postulates keen competition and high efficiency. The bidders have or should have assistance of technical experts. The degree of care required in such a bidding is greater than in ordinary local bids for small works. It is essential to maintain the sanctity and integrity of process of tender/bid and also award of a contract. The bidders have or should have assistance of technical experts. The degree of care required in such a bidding is greater than in ordinary local bids for small works. It is essential to maintain the sanctity and integrity of process of tender/bid and also award of a contract. The appellant, Respondents 1 to 4 and Respondents 10 and 11 are all bound by the ITB which should be complied with scrupulously. In a work of this nature and magnitude where bidders who fulfil prequalification alone are invited to bid, adherence to the instructions cannot be given a go-by by branding it as a pedantic approach, otherwise it will encourage and provide scope for discrimination, arbitrariness and favouritism which are totally opposed to the rule of law and our constitutional values. The very purpose of issuing rules/instructions is to ensure their enforcement lest the rule of law should be a casualty. Relaxation or waiver of a rule or condition, unless so provided under the ITB, by the State or its agencies (the appellant) in favour of one bidder would create justifiable doubts in the minds of other bidders, would impair the rule of transparency and fairness and provide room for manipulation to suit the whims of the State agencies in picking and choosing a bidder for awarding contracts as in the case of distributing bounty or charity. In our view such approach should always be avoided. Where power to relax or waive a rule or a condition exists under the rules, it has to be done strictly in compliance with the rules. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that adherence to the ITB or rules is the best principle to be followed, which is also in the best public interest. 26. For all these reasons, in such a highly competitive bid of global tender, the appellant was justified in not permitting Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the errors of the nature and the magnitude which, if permitted, would have given a different complexion to the bid. The High Court erred in directing the appellant to permit Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the errors in the bid documents. 32. The High Court erred in directing the appellant to permit Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the errors in the bid documents. 32. The submission that remains to be considered is that as the price bid of Respondents 1 to 4 is lesser by 40 crores and 80 crores than that of Respondents 11 and 10 respectively, public interest demands that the bid of Respondents 1 to 4 should be considered. The Project undertaken by the appellant is undoubtedly for the benefit of the public. The mode of execution of the work of the Project should also ensure that the public interest is best served. Tenders are invited on the basis of competitive bidding for execution of the work of the Project as it serves dual purposes. On the one hand it offers a fair opportunity to all those who are interested in competing for the contract relating to execution of the work and, on the other hand it affords the appellant a choice to select the best of the competitors on a competitive price without prejudice to the quality of the work. Above all, it eliminates favouritism and discrimination in awarding public works to contractors. The contract is, therefore, awarded normally to the lowest tenderer which is in public interest. The principle of awarding contract to the lowest tenderer applies when all things are equal. It is equally in public interest to adhere to the rules and conditions subject to which bids are invited. Merely because a bid is the lowest the requirements of compliance with the rules and conditions cannot be ignored. It is obvious that the bid of Respondents 1 to 4 is the lowest of bids offered. As the bid documents of Respondents 1 to 4 stand without correction there will be inherent inconsistency between the particulars given in the annexure and the total bid amount, it (sic they) cannot be directed to be considered along with the other bids on the sole ground of being the lowest. 13. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. –v- Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation & others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2272 , more particularly at paragraphs-2 and 12, which read as under: 2. 13. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. –v- Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation & others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2272 , more particularly at paragraphs-2 and 12, which read as under: 2. Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation issued a notice inviting tenders for appointment of agents for collection of octroi subject to the terms and conditions set forth therein fixing 4 p.m. on 23-3-2000 to be the time of submission of the tender and fixing 5 p.m. on the same day for opening of the tenders. On 21-3-2000 Millennium Infrastructure (P) Ltd. filed Writ Petition No. 1456 of 2000 in the High Court at Mumbai challenging the imposition of two conditions contained in clauses 6(a) and 6(b) of the Tender Booklet as unconstitutional and seeking deletion of these two conditions as prerequisite for its participation in the tender. On 21-3-2000, a Division Bench of the High Court having heard the parties adjourned the matter till 24-3-2000 at 11 a.m. by making it clear that there shall be no interim relief except that Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation shall not issue work order till further orders. However, on 23-3-2000 Millennium Infrastructure (P) Ltd. withdrew the aforesaid writ petition. Five persons tendered their documents and papers and they are Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd., appellant in civil appeal arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 6717-18 of 2000, Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd., appellant in civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6298 of 2000 and Respondent 3, Jai Krishna Infrastructure (P) Ltd., Respondent 4, Oriental Veneers (P) Ltd., Respondent 5, M/s Sample Infrastructure, Respondent 6 in the appeal filed by Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The Commissioner of Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation, however, intimated the tenderers that as the High Court was seized of a writ petition he did not propose to open the tenders until further orders from the High Court on 24-3-2000. However, he sought for information of the number of the tenders filed and the tenderers qualifying and not qualifying conditions clauses 6(a) and 6(b) of the Tender Booklet. On 24-3-2000 the tenders were opened and an objection was raised that Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. did not fulfil the conditions either under clause 6(a) or clause 6(b) in spite of which, it is stated, the Commissioner insisted on opening the same. On 24-3-2000 the tenders were opened and an objection was raised that Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. did not fulfil the conditions either under clause 6(a) or clause 6(b) in spite of which, it is stated, the Commissioner insisted on opening the same. The Commissioner informed the parties that clause 6(a) had been waived of by reason of the order made by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 451 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The Commissioner allowed Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. to furnish a certificate as to clause 6(b) by a chartered accountant as to its networth which discloses Rs 4.5 crores approximately. The Commissioner proceeded to finalise the tenders on the basis that clause 6(a) had stood waived or deleted in view of the order of the Government issued under Section 451 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and awarded the contract in favour of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The appellant Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. filed a writ petition challenging the award of contract to Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. on various grounds. 12. If we bear these principles in mind, the High Court is justified in setting aside the award of contract in favour of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. because it had not fulfilled the conditions relating to clause 6(a) of the Tender Notice but the same was deleted subsequent to the last date of acceptance of the tenders. If that is so, the arguments advanced on behalf of Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. in regard to the allegation of mala fides of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation in showing special favour to Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. or the other contentions raised in the High Court and reiterated before us are insignificant because the High Court had set aside the award made in favour of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The only question therefore remaining is whether any contract should have been awarded in favour of Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The High Court had taken the view that if a term of the tender having been deleted after the players entered into the arena it is like changing the rules of the game after it had begun and, therefore, if the Government or the Municipal Corporation was free to alter the conditions fresh process of tender was the only alternative permissible. Therefore, we find that the course adopted by the High Court in the circumstances is justified because by reason of deletion of a particular condition a wider net will be permissible and a larger participation or more attractive bids could be offered. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 15. On the first issue, we can safely conclude that in view of the circular which was issued with regard to Additional Performance Security, in our considered opinion, is binding on the Government and that cannot be a ground to reject the bid of the petitioner. However, having participated in the tender, it will not be open for the petitioner to challenge the tender condition of submission of Additional Performance Security at this stage. But that will not make much difference inasmuch as the other issue which is more important, i.e. the language of Clause-4 ‘No Relation Certificate’ shall be furnished by the contractor along with tender to the effect that he is not related to any officer in the rank of an Assistant Executive Engineer & above in the State Panchayati Raj Department or Assistant/Under Secretary & above in the Panchayanti Raj Department is mandatory. Format of Schedule-A clearly envisages that the fact given in the formant ‘Schedule-A’ subsequently proved to be false, the contract is liable to be rescinded. The earnest money and the total security will be forfeited and he shall be liable to make good the loss or damages resulting for such cancellation. It is also the requirement that the proforma for no relationship certificate has to be furnished separately vide Schedule-A. In that view of the matter and the language employed in Clause-4 ‘No Relation Certificate’, we are of the considered opinion that the same is mandatory, which cannot be made a directory and diluted under any circumstance. 16. In that view of the matter, the decision taken by the opposite parties cannot be said to be erroneous and we find no fault with the same. Thus, the writ petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed. No cost. K.R. Mohapatra, J. : I agree