ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned ASGI and learned Amicus Curiae. 2. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 5th March, 2018 passed in R. C. Case No. 38(A) of 1996-Pat by learned Court of Special Judge-VII, C.B.I. (AHD Scam), Ranchi, whereunder learned Court has directed the CBI to obtain sanction for his criminal prosecution from the competent authority, whereafter an order of cognizance could be passed by learned Court. 3. In support of the challenge, learned counsel for the petitioner has inter alia urged both factual and legal grounds which are briefly summed up hereunder: It is submitted that the instant R.C. Case No. 38(A) of 1996-Pat relates to fraudulent withdrawal of an amount of Rs. 3,76,38,853/- from Dumka Treasury under AHD Department during the period December, 1995 to January 1996. Petitioner was an officer of Indian Administrative Service Cadre and posted as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka between June, 1993 and June, 1996. Prior to that, he was posted as Additional Secretary, Finance from 1992 to 1993. It is submitted that learned CBI Court after conclusion of the trial when the matter was being posted for pronouncement of judgment, on 5th March, 2018 proceeded to pass an order of arraignment of several persons as accused in purported exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In respect of this petitioner purport of the order is also to the same effect except that before passing formal order of cognizance, it has directed the CBI to take proper sanction from the competent authority in respect of his criminal prosecution. However, learned Court has, without any iota of evidence brought on record during trial or inquiry as against this petitioner, erroneously come to a finding that he and one V.S. Dubey, Finance Secretary were prima facie liable for criminal conspiracy in forged withdrawal of money from Dumka Treasury in December, 1995 and January, 1996. He submits that petitioner as Additional Commissioner had specifically instructed by his order dated 17th August, 1993 on a proposal placed by the Treasury Officer, Dumka that any bills above Rs. 1 Lakh relating to Animal Husbandry Department be placed before him. This letter was adduced as Ext.-39 to 44 in R.C. Case No. 39A/96 and also exhibited as Ext.-70/2 with objection and Ext. 71/10 in this R.C. Case by him as prosecution witness no. 126 on 30th August, 2007. 1 Lakh relating to Animal Husbandry Department be placed before him. This letter was adduced as Ext.-39 to 44 in R.C. Case No. 39A/96 and also exhibited as Ext.-70/2 with objection and Ext. 71/10 in this R.C. Case by him as prosecution witness no. 126 on 30th August, 2007. From the statement of this petitioner it has also come that the Divisional Commissioner, Sri S. N. Dubey had cancelled his order dated 17.08.1993, as a result of which the withdrawals under AHD Department from Dumka Treasury were not brought to his notice. Such order was passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Dumka on the proposal initiated by the Regional Director, AHD who was himself charge-sheeted by the CBI as an accused and faced conviction, Dr. Shesh Muni Ram. His successor Dr. O.P. Diwakar was the Regional Director during the period of this fraudulent withdrawal in December 1995 and January, 1996. This order of the petitioner dated 17th August, 1993 has been taken note of by learned Court in the impugned order also. The order of cancellation passed by the Commissioner Santhal Pargana Division is on the proposal of the Regional Director, AHD, Dumka dated 30th May, 1994. As such the bills relating to fraudulent withdrawals were never placed before the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka . 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has in particular referred to the statement of Brij Kishore Kishore Pathak, P.W.110 in the instant R.C. Case. P.W.110 was Executive Magistrate at Dumka and had instituted Dumka Town P.S. Case No. 16/96 on 2nd February, 1996, Ext.-64 on the specific instruction of this petitioner as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka against O.P. Diwakar Regional Director, AHD, R.P.Chaudhary and others AHD officials. This petitioner was also examined as P.W. 126 in the instant R.Case on 30th August, 2007 on behalf of the CBI and has fully supported the prosecution case. Letter dated 17th August, 1993 was exhibited with objection as Ext.- 70/2 and his signature as Ext.-70/10 was also exhibited. His deposition at paragraph nos. This petitioner was also examined as P.W. 126 in the instant R.Case on 30th August, 2007 on behalf of the CBI and has fully supported the prosecution case. Letter dated 17th August, 1993 was exhibited with objection as Ext.- 70/2 and his signature as Ext.-70/10 was also exhibited. His deposition at paragraph nos. 6, 7, 20 and 21 in particular also referred to the cancellation of his order by the then Divisional Commissioner, Dumka, as a result of which passing of the bills of AHD department were not brought or placed before him in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka However, after coming to know of these fraudulent withdrawals petitioner instituted an inquiry comprising five senior level officers who scanned through all available materials from the office of the Director AHD Dumka and other officials under AHD Department. This inquiry report was further scrutinized by Brij Kishore Pathak, Executive Magistrate, Dumka and placed before the petitioner. On the basis of this inquiry only Dumka Town P.S. Case No. 16/96 was instituted on 2nd February, 1996 itself. Petitioner as such was the initiator of the inquiry and investigation into the fraudulent scam under AHD Department at Dumka and could not have been treated as beneficiary thereof for being arraigned by the learned trial court as an accused. 5. Learned counsel has made reference to the letter dated 3rd February, 1996 bearing no. 337/Gopniya addressed to the Finance Commissioner under his signature which gave a graphic description of modus operandi followed by the AHD official in causing fraudulent withdrawals from Dumka Treasury. Petitioner also recommended action against the Treasury Officer and other officials of the AHD Department. Petitioner also indicated the manner in which financial rules were violated under the instruction of the AHD Department and the Regional Director, Dumka who was made both Drawing and Disbursing Officer and the Controlling Officer. This kind of arrangement was unheard of and facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals under the department. These materials on record and the facts and circumstances borne therefrom in fact go to show the role of this petitioner in uncovering the scam at Dumka under AHD department during the period in question. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that learned Court has committed an error of record while stating that the letter dated 16th May, 1994 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Deoghar was addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that learned Court has committed an error of record while stating that the letter dated 16th May, 1994 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Deoghar was addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. A mere perusal of the letter would show that it was addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, Dumka and not the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, the post which the petitioner was holding at that point of time. Therefore, on a complete misplaced impression and in absence of incriminating evidence on record brought during inquiry or trial in the instant R.C. Case, learned Court has proceeded to form an opinion to take cognizance against him and directed the CBI to obtain sanction for his prosecution from the competent authority. 7. Based on these submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following legal grounds: (i) The learned Court had become functous officio after conclusion of the trial and could not have passed an order of arraigning the petitioner and directing the CBI to obtain sanction for prosecution against him. (ii) The order impugned completely fails to satisfy the test for exercise of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C as laid down in the case of Hardeep Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 . The test for exercise of such power is one which is more than a prima-facie case required at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. (iii) There are no evidence at all in the eye of law either to support the opinion recorded by learned Court, in the light of the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh(Supra) (iv) Learned Court completely fell in error in directing the CBI to obtain an order for sanction of his prosecution. Such a direction is in teeth of ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (1997) 7 SCC 622 . (v) No opportunity of hearing or show cause has been given to him before passing of the impugned order in purported exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C Learned Trial Court has failed to follow the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (1997) 7 SCC 622 . (v) No opportunity of hearing or show cause has been given to him before passing of the impugned order in purported exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C Learned Trial Court has failed to follow the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2015) 9 SCC 244 para-9. (vi) There was no order of sanction either under Section 197 Cr.P.C or Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act from the competent authority. Since the petitioner was a serving officer of the Indian Administrative Service Cadre at the time the impugned order was passed, sanction for prosecution was a pre-requisite before any order of cognizance could be taken against him. Reliance is placed upon a judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Labh Singh reported in (2014) 16 SCC 807 , para 9, 10, 30 and 31 and Surinderjit Singh Mand & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2016) 8 SCC 722 , para 30 and 31. He submits that the order of arraignment dated 5th March, 2018 as against V.S. Dubey who was Finance Secretary, Government of Bihar during the relevant point of time has been quashed by this Court in Cr. M. P. No. 901 of 2018 by order dated 14th December, 2018. (vii) Learned counsel submits that only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be required is stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. Reliance is placed in the case of Brijendra Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706 para-13. 8. Based on these factual and legal grounds the impugned order has been assailed by the petitioner. It is submitted that the order shows complete non-application of mind, it is cryptic and vague and does not contain any reason. Such an order, if allowed to sustain, would lead to miscarriage of justice. Therefore it deserves to be quashed. 9. 8. Based on these factual and legal grounds the impugned order has been assailed by the petitioner. It is submitted that the order shows complete non-application of mind, it is cryptic and vague and does not contain any reason. Such an order, if allowed to sustain, would lead to miscarriage of justice. Therefore it deserves to be quashed. 9. Learned A.S.G.I. has at the outset stated that this petitioner was a vital prosecution witness upon whose testimony recorded in several Fodder Scam cases such as R.C. No. 38(A)/1996; R.C.No.68(A)/1996; R.C. No.20(A)/1996 relating to fraudulent withdrawal from Chaibasa Treasury where petitioner was examined as P.W.126, P.W.127 and P.W.109 respectively, conviction has been recorded against several accused persons. Petitioner is an important witness who has deposed in favour of the prosecution as P.W.128 in R.C. No.47(A)/96 relating to fraudulent withdrawals from Doranda Treasury under the A.H.D. Department where trial is still pending. During the course of investigation C.B.I. had not found any material against this petitioner to implicate him as an accused. No material has been brought on record during course of inquiry or trial in this case as against this petitioner, neither has any evidence been referred to or discussed by the learned trial court before passing the impugned order. The letter dated 17th August 1993 whereby the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka has categorically directed the Treasury Officer to place all bills above Rs.1 Lakh before such bills are passed has been exhibited during trial. However, such letter was cancelled by the then Divisional Commissioner, Dumka on a proposal mooted by then Regional Director, A.H.D. Department Dr. Shesh Muni Ram on 30th May 1994, who was also implicated as an accused in the Fodder Scam cases. The modus operandi adopted by the AHD officials were to pass bills which were below Rs.50,000/- to escape such scrutiny. Learned A.S.G.I. submits that the test for exercise of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 . The impugned order has to be tested as against the principles laid down therein. 10. Learned Amicus Curiae has assisted the Court and made his submissions both on points of law and facts. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 . The impugned order has to be tested as against the principles laid down therein. 10. Learned Amicus Curiae has assisted the Court and made his submissions both on points of law and facts. Learned Amicus has also referred to the judgments rendered by the Apex Court i.e. Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 which lays down the test for exercise of the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. He has placed the case of Jogendra Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2015) 9 SCC 244 para-9 in particular which mandates that a person is necessarily required to be heard before an order of arraignment is passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Learned amicus has also made reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of R. Dineshkumar @ Deena vs. State reported in (2015) 7 SCC 497 para- 44 and 45. It is submitted that the Apex Court has observed that statement made by a witness in course of trial cannot be treated as self-incriminating in view of the protection granted under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 132 of the Evidence Act. He submits that perusal of the impugned order of course does not reveal any specific discussion of material evidence, if any, as against the petitioner which has come up during inquiry or trial. Learned Amicus Curiae has also referred to a recent judgment rendered by Apex Court in the case of Labhuji Amratji Thakor Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2018 (15) Scale 39 which follows the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh(Supra). Discussion: 11. In the background of these material facts and circumstances, the legal and factual grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner and the submission of learned A.S.G.I. and Amicus Curiae, that the correctness and legality of the impugned order is to be tested. Exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. which is an extra-ordinary and a discretionary power has been the subject of judicial scrutiny over a period of time. The legal position stands crystalized by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). The Apex Court has in the subsequent decisions such as in the case of Brijendra Singh and Ors. Vs. The legal position stands crystalized by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). The Apex Court has in the subsequent decisions such as in the case of Brijendra Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706 and Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak & Ors. reported in (2017) 16 SCC 226 followed the ratio and further explained it. The following questions were framed for answer by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra): “6.1. (i) What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr PC can be exercised? 6.2. (ii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr PC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? 6.3. (iii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr PC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? 6.4. (iv) What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr PC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? 6.5. (v) Does the power under Section 319 Cr PC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged?” 12. The Apex Court has summed up its conclusion on each of these issues / questions at para-117 of the report, quoted as under :- “117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) and (iii) — What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr PC can be exercised? AND — Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr PC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. AND — Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr PC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr PC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence” under Section 319 Cr PC becomes available for summoning an additional accused. 117.2. Section 319 Cr PC, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr PC, and under Section 398 Cr PC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr PC. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr PC, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet. 117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 Cr PC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial. Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) Cr PC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr PC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr PC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination. Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr PC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr PC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr PC the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr PC would be the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different. Question (v)—Does the power under Section 319 Cr PC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not chargesheeted or who have been discharged? Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr PC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr PC has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.” 13. In answer to Question nos. (i) and (iii) it has been held that ‘evidence’ used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and has to be understood in the wider sense both at the stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Relevant extracts of the opinion at Para-84 and 85 of the report are quoted as under: “84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 Cr PC ………………. (emphasis supplied). 85. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn hereinabove, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that apart from evidence recorded during trial, any material that has been received by the court after cognizance is taken and before the trial commences, can be utilised only for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. The “evidence” is thus, limited to the evidence recorded during trial.” 14. The material question relevant for determination in the instant case is whether learned trial court had before it ‘evidence’ as meant under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner to summon him as an accused; and whether it was able to reach to a satisfaction as required in terms of the ratio rendered in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra). The Apex Court while answering Question no.(iv) has laid down the test as to the nature of satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused. At para-106 of the report it has been held as under :- “106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr PC. ………………………………(emphasis supplied to the original text) 15. The principles laid down in Hardeep Singh (supra) have been further explained in the case of Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak & Ors. reported in (2017) 16 SCC 226 para-29 wherein the Apex Court has quoted the opinion rendered in the case of Brijendra Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706 as well. The principles laid down in Hardeep Singh (supra) have been further explained in the case of Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak & Ors. reported in (2017) 16 SCC 226 para-29 wherein the Apex Court has quoted the opinion rendered in the case of Brijendra Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706 as well. It is profitable to quote the relevant extract of the judgment at paragraph-13 hereunder :- “13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh case5 may be recapitulated: power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial i.e. before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial court finds that there is some *“evidence”* against such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of the offence. The *“evidence”* herein means the material that is brought before the court during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. No doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, since it is a discretionary power given to the court under Section 319 CrPC and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.” 16. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.” 16. As quoted above, the Apex Court has sounded a note of caution in exercise of the discretionary power given to the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is an extra-ordinary power which has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction required is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. 17. The concept of a fair trial and the object that the real culprits should not get away unpunished is contained in the doctrine Judex damnatur cum nocens obsolvitur and is the underlying object behind conferring such an extra-ordinary power on the trial court. It has been mandated that a constructive and purposive interpretation should be adopted so as to advance the object and cause of justice. Keeping in view the aforesaid scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C., I now proceed to examine the case of the present petitioner. 18. It is proper to extract the relevant part of the impugned order at paragraph-A so far as it relates to the present petitioner hereunder :- “(A) The then D.C, Dumka Mr. Anjani Kumar Singh do not taken any action since a long time and fraudulently money withdrawn from Dumka Treasury. The Deputy collector, Dumka Sri Brij Kishore Pathak conducted an inquiry in Treasury, Dumka and found that in financial year 1995-96 non-planning 2403 allotted Rs. 1,50,000/- only by letter no. 7559 dated 30-12-1995 to Animal Husbandry Department whereas in two months December- 1995 and January- 1996, the Regional Director withdrawn Rs. 3,76,38,853/- illegally. The D.C, Sri Anjni Kumar Singh, who was the Addl. 1,50,000/- only by letter no. 7559 dated 30-12-1995 to Animal Husbandry Department whereas in two months December- 1995 and January- 1996, the Regional Director withdrawn Rs. 3,76,38,853/- illegally. The D.C, Sri Anjni Kumar Singh, who was the Addl. Secretary Finance, Government of Bihar during 1992-93, later on posted as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka and passed an order on 17.08.1993 that bills of above Rs. 1,00,000 (One Lakh) be placed before him, when bills of AHD were send to him by the District Treasury seeking the approval for payment. From perusal of record it appears that the Finance Secretary Sri V.S. Dubey taking charge in August- 1995 and illegally withdrawn money in the month December-1995 and January -1996, above both public officers do not perform his duty so legal way and remain negligent regarding his powers duty as allotted by Indian Constitution. From perusal of oral and documentary evidence as on record, court found Anjni Kumar Singh and V.S. Dubey prima facie liable for criminal conspiracy in forged withdrawal of money from Dumka Treasury in the month December- 1995 and January- 1996. From perusal of records it is transpired that Anjni Kumar Singh, the then D.C, Dumka is presently posted in some wherein Bihar State. The C.B.I. is directed to take proper step for sanction in respect of criminal prosecution in this case and order relating to cognizance pass after Sanction Order from proper authority.” 19. A perusal of the order indicates that the learned court took into account the inquiry conducted by the Deputy Collector, Dumka Shri Brij Kishore Pathak who was adduced as P.W.110 in the instant R.C. Case on behalf of the C.B.I. The learned court has also taken note of the letter dated 17th August 1993 passed by the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka requiring that the bills of Rs.1 lakh be placed before him for seeking his approval for payment. The learned court has found that this petitioner was posted as an Additional Secretary, Finance, Government of Bihar during 1992-93 and thereafter as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. That V.S. Dubey had taken charge as a Finance Secretary in August 1995 and that illegal withdrawal took place in December 1995 and January 1996. Therefore, both these Public Officers did not perform their legal duty and remained negligent. That V.S. Dubey had taken charge as a Finance Secretary in August 1995 and that illegal withdrawal took place in December 1995 and January 1996. Therefore, both these Public Officers did not perform their legal duty and remained negligent. As noted above, the learned court has come to the opinion that V.S. Dubey the then Finance Secretary was also prima-facie liable for criminal conspiracy along with this petitioner in causing forged withdrawal of money from Dumka Treasury in the month of December 1995 and January 1996. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of arraignment dated 05.03.2018 of Mr. V.S. Dubey has been quashed by this Court vide order dated 14.12.2018 passed in Cr.M.P. No.901 of 2018. 20. Statement of the P.W.110 adduced by C.B.I in the instant R.C. Case has been referred to on behalf of the petitioner. He was part of the inquiry team constituted by the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka to inquire into the fraudulent withdrawals under AHD Department at Dumka during the relevant period. It was pursuant to the said inquiry that on instructions of the petitioner as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, Brij Kishore Pathak, P.W.-110 an Executive Magistrate at Dumka instituted Dumka Town P.S. Case No. 16/96 on 2nd February, 1996, which has been adduced as Ext.-64 in the instant case, as against Regional Director, AHD, Mr. O.P. Diwakar, Mr. R.P. Choudhary and other AHD officials. Petitioner, who was examined as P.W. 126 on behalf of the CBI also stated that the letter dated 17th August, 1993 issued by him was cancelled by the Divisional Commissioner, Dumka on a proposal mooted by the Regional Director, Dumka on 30th May, 1994. As a result of cancellation of his order, bills initiated by the AHD Department above Rs. 1 Lakh were not placed before the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. It was the outcome of the inquiry conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka i.e., petitioner herein through Senior Level Officers that the modus operandi of the fraudulent withdrawal under the department were revealed. It was under the orders of the petitioner that Dumka Town P. S. Case No. 16/96 was instituted on 2nd February, 1996 as against the officials of the AHD at Dumka including the Regional Director, Mr. O.P. Diwakar. It was under the orders of the petitioner that Dumka Town P. S. Case No. 16/96 was instituted on 2nd February, 1996 as against the officials of the AHD at Dumka including the Regional Director, Mr. O.P. Diwakar. On 3rd February, 1996 petitioner issued a confidential letter to the Finance Commissioner, Bihar Mr. V.S. Dubey describing the modus operandi followed by AHD officials in causing fraudulent withdrawals from Dumka Treasury and recommended action against the Treasury Officer and other officials of the AHD Department. It was also pointed out that financial rules were violated under the instruction of AHD Department and the Regional Director, Dumka was made both Drawing and Disbursing Officer and Controlling Officer. It was contrary to the financial rules and unheard of earlier. This letter is enclosed as Annexure-5 to the supplementary affidavit. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that this letter was exhibited during trial. 21. It is also pertinent to mention here that no application was made on behalf of the prosecution Agency CBI or by any other accused to show that any incriminating material was brought during trial or inquiry against the petitioner which required his arraignment as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C 22. In the above conspectus of facts and circumstances, the material question for consideration is whether there were ‘evidence’ on record as adduced during trial or inquiry which if remained unrebutted, could lead to conviction of the petitioner. Learned Trial Court in the discussions made in the impugned order has completely failed to refer to any such incriminating material evidence of such nature. In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, the test that has to be applied in summoning a person in exercise of the extraordinary and discretionary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C is one which is more than a prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that evidence if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr PC. 23. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr PC. 23. From the discussions made hereinabove, it appears that learned Court not only failed to refer to any such incriminating material evidence found against the petitioner during the inquiry or trial but at the same time completely failed to record a satisfaction that if such evidence, if any, went unrebutted, it would lead to his conviction. Time and again, it has been observed by the Apex Court that such power should not be exercised in a casual or cavalier manner. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. The impugned order suffers from serious legal infirmity on that score. 24. It is also apparent that learned Court failed to issue any notice to show cause to the petitioner in order to accord opportunity to be heard before such an opinion was formed by it. A perusal of the order shows that the learned Court directed the CBI to obtain a sanction order from the competent authority since the petitioner was serving officer of IAS Cadre so that order of cognizance could be passed thereafter. 25. The approach of learned Court was in teeth of two well settled principles: (i) that a person who is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C is necessarily heard before being so added as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244 , para-9. (ii) that the sanctioning authority has to apply its independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not on the basis of the evidence and materials placed before it. It could not be denuded of his discretion by specifically directing him to issue a sanction order. 26. In the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 , the Apex Court held that the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or acrimonious exercise, but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecution. Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution. It is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution. It is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. Sanction would therefore dependent upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant material facts and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. In the present case, learned court overstepped its jurisdiction in directing the CBI to file a sanction order. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter. In the present case, in the face of such a direction, the sanctioning authority had been practicably left with no discretion to deny sanction, even if, on its independent consideration, it was not satisfied that such sanction is necessary for prosecution of the officer concerned. 27. I have carefully dealt with the contentious issues involved in this matter, as discussed hereinabove in detail. On the sake of repetition, it needs to be reiterated once again that exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C being both extraordinary and discretionary has to the exercised sparingly and only in those cases where circumstances of the case so warrants. The degree of satisfaction is more than that warranted at the time of framing of charges against others in respect of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. 28. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and in the light of the discussions made and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the order impugned suffers on more than one counts. It deserves to be quashed, lest it may result in miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the impugned order so far as it relates to the petitioner is quashed. The instant petition is allowed. 29. While parting, this Court records its appreciation to the valuable assistance accorded by the learned Amicus Curiae during hearing of the case. The Member Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee shall bear the admissible fee/legal remuneration of the learned Amicus Curiae.