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Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2570 (ALL)

Bengali v. A. D. C.

2019-11-16

J.J.MUNIR

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition seeks to impugn an order dated 09.04.1987, passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur, Camp Office, Ballia in Revision No. 362. The petitioner is chak holder No. 666, whereas contesting respondent Nos. 2 to 9 are all chak holders no. 714. The petitioner had an original holding, comprising 88 plot numbers admeasuring a total of 12.83 acres, of which after excluding Chakout land, the area that was in hand of the Consolidation Authorities, is a figure of 10.88 acres. The petitioner was proposed two Chaks by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The first Chak comprised 20 plots with an area of 4.31 acres. This Chak included seven plots from the original holding of the petitioner. The second Chak, proposed, carried 12 plots with an area of 3.37 acres, where four plots came from the original holding. 2. It is the petitioner's case that he filed no objections and was satisfied with the proposal. The contesting respondents, however, filed objections under Section 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, the 'Act') against the ACO's proposal. On the basis of those objections Case Nos. 2011 and 2100 were registered before the Consolidation Officer, Khadsara, District Ballia. The objections filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 9 that were registered as Case No. 2011 were rejected but objections that gave rise to Case No. 2100 were partly allowed, granting a reduction of value of land allotted to respondent Nos.2 to 9, leading to an increase in area on their original holding. 3. Aggrieved, respondent Nos. 2 to 9 filed an Appeal to the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, where it was registered as Appeal No. 558. Respondent Nos. 5 to 9 claimed relief of further reduction in value and allotment of a chak on their original holding, that would include plot Nos. 3248 and 3260. 4. The Appeal aforesaid came to be partly allowed, vide order dated 24.03.1981, in terms that valuation of Plot No. 499/2 admeasuring 11 links was reduced in value from 10 annas to 7 annas. The resultant increase in area was made part of a third Chak allotted to respondent Nos. 2 to 9. 5. The grievance of respondent Nos. 2 to 9, that still survived was that they were not given a Chak on their original holding, comprising Plot Nos. 3248, 3260 and 3033. The resultant increase in area was made part of a third Chak allotted to respondent Nos. 2 to 9. 5. The grievance of respondent Nos. 2 to 9, that still survived was that they were not given a Chak on their original holding, comprising Plot Nos. 3248, 3260 and 3033. The respondents, therefore, went up in Revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, after a delay of six years applying for condonation. The Revision was numbered as 362. It was consolidated with Revision Nos. 360 and 145/402 by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and decided by a common judgment and order dated 09.04.1987, treating Revision No. 145/402 as the leading case. The said Revision was allowed by the order last mentioned, and hereinafter referred to as the 'impugned order' in terms that the contesting respondents were given one Chak admeasuring 4.31 acres, a second chak admeasuring 2.79 acres, and a third of 1.14 acres. 6. The petitioner's first Chak as carved out by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was almost completely altered and reduced in area, though with an increase in one plot number in the manner that all the original holding of the petitioner, comprising seven plots, were taken away and entered in the contesting respondent's Chak, and the area of the petitioner's chak was reduced from 4.31 acres, as determined by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, to an area of 3.56 acres. The original holding that was taken out of the petitioner's Chak includes Plot Nos. 3033/10, 3033/11, 3033/17, 3033/18, 3244, 3245 and 2246. All these plots comprising original holding of the petitioner went to the contesting respondents and made part of their Chak admeasuring 4.31 acres. The second Chak of the petitioner was not altered much, except that some area in two plot numbers was increased in order to adjust the loss in area of the first Chak. The area of the second Chak was increased from 3.31 to 3.54 acres. 7. Heard Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 7 to 9 and Sri Satish Mohan Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. 8. The area of the second Chak was increased from 3.31 to 3.54 acres. 7. Heard Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 7 to 9 and Sri Satish Mohan Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1. 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is manifestly illegal, inasmuch as it makes a cryptic re-determination of Chaks without assigning reasons why it has made that drastic an alteration where the petitioner has been deprived of all his original holding, in his first Chak. It is argued by Sri Arun Kumar that the Deputy Director of Consolidation despite his wide powers under the newly added 3rd Explanation to Section 48 of the Act, is still a Court of Revision, who must deal with what has been determined by the two Authorities below. He must, for reasons howsoever briefly recorded, reverse or affirm their findings and bring about a recarvation of Chaks, if he has to do that, for intelligible reasons. 9. It is argued that the impugned order does not do that; it just orders a rejigging of the two Chaks much to the prejudice of the petitioner where all his original holding has been excluded and given to Chak holder No. 714, who are respondent nos. 2 to 9 here. It is further argued that the first Chak carried the largest part of the petitioner's original holding and what the Deputy Director of Consolidation has done on recarvation of it in Revision is to place the petitioner at a completely different location, giving him a flying Chak. Learned counsel, however, hastens to add that his Chak as carved out by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is located adjacent to his original holding. Still he says that the order prejudices him much because he has been completely removed from whatever comprised the largest part of his original holding. 10. It is also urged that the first Chak that has been allotted to him is asymmetrical. It is not rectangulated but is 'L' shaped. He has invited the attention of the Court to a supplementary affidavit filed by the respondent, dated 24th January, 2011 to which a sketch map of the relative location of Chaks allotted to the parties here, is shown. It is not rectangulated but is 'L' shaped. He has invited the attention of the Court to a supplementary affidavit filed by the respondent, dated 24th January, 2011 to which a sketch map of the relative location of Chaks allotted to the parties here, is shown. Indeed, Chak No. 666 after recarvation by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, is a 'L' shaped plot which by the Settlement Officer's determination, was a well rectangulated and compact area. It is also argued that the petitioner's area comprising his first Chak, which was his largest, has been reduced, whereas that of the contesting respondents has been increased with no corresponding adjustment of equities between parties. 11. It is further argued by Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner that on a juxtaposition of the total area the petitioner has in hand, in consequence of the impugned order, there is a decrease by more than 35%. The original holding of the petitioner, as already said, was an area of 10.88 acres, whereas the holding comprising the two Chaks in terms of the impugned order, is a total area of 7.10 acres. It is emphasized that a decrease in area by more than 25% is frowned upon under the Act, and it is for this reason that the Consolidation Authorities have been forbidden from reducing the consolidated area below 25%, without prior permission of the Director of Consolidation. It is urged that no such permission was taken in this case. It is also argued that if that permission be not required, the policy of the law is clear that reductions more than 25% are to be avoided. 12. It is also argued that the area of Chak holder No. 714 has been increased from 6.96 acres to 9.24 acres which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is again a very inequitable carvation done by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 13. In reply, Sri Santosh Kumar Singh has submitted that there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner, inasmuch as he has been given a Chak that is not far-flung from his original holding. It is located almost on the door-steps of his original holding. In this connection, Sri Santosh Kumar Singh has invited the attention of the Court to a decision of this Court in Asbaran vs. DDC and another, 1986 RD 430. It is located almost on the door-steps of his original holding. In this connection, Sri Santosh Kumar Singh has invited the attention of the Court to a decision of this Court in Asbaran vs. DDC and another, 1986 RD 430. In Asbaran (supra) it has been held by this Court thus: “…..The requirement of allotting original plot of the holding to the tenure holder in his chak has been mandated only in Section 19(1)(f), according to which, if there exists private source of irrigation or other improvement on the plot in question, then it has got to be allotted in the chak of the tenure holder. The allotment of chak in violation of the provisions contained in Section 19(1)(f) would certainly make allotment illegal being violative of specific provisions. But in my opinion, an allotment of a ‘Urban’ chak cannot be taken to be illegal and without jurisdiction if such a chak has been allotted at a place quite near the original land held by the tenure holder in its vicinity and not excessively exceeding the valuation of his original plots in that sector. Thus, in view of the above, I find that no interference is called for with the impugned order by this Court in exarches of powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution merely on the ground that the tenure holder has been allotted a ‘Uraa’ chak although he has been allotted a chak of compact area at the place where he had held original land of his holding. A ‘Urban’ chak can be said to be irregular in those cases where the tenure holder is not allotted chak at a place in the vicinity of original land held by him in the Sector Area, but the allotment of a ‘Urban’ chak to a tenure holder at a place quite near to his original plot of the holding cannot be said to be invalid merely on the ground that being a ‘Urban’ chak it could not be legally allotted. I find that there exists no legal bar to the allotment of a ‘Urban’ chak or prohibiting allotment of such a chak.” 14. It is on the strength of the aforesaid decision that Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 7 to 9 has stressed that what has been allotted to the petitioner cannot be said to have prejudiced him. It is on the strength of the aforesaid decision that Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 7 to 9 has stressed that what has been allotted to the petitioner cannot be said to have prejudiced him. It can hardly be called a Udan Chak, in the sense it is understood under the Consolidation Law. It is further argued that so far as the prohibition against a decrease in area by more than 25 % under Section 19(1)(b) of the Act is concerned, the said prohibition is applicable to subordinate consolidation Authorities alone. It is applicable to the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. He submits that this prohibition carried in under Section 19(1)(b) is not at all applicable in a case where the Deputy Director of Consolidation decides to exceed this limit of 25% of reduction. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Shri Nath vs. D.D.C., Sultanpur reported in 1986 RD 209. In Shri Nath (supra) on the point being canvassed, it has been held: “….The permission of the Director of Consolidation, as envisaged under the aforesaid proviso to Section 19(1)(b) would be necessary if the subordinate consolidation authorities would make allotment of a chak having difference of more than 25 percent without obtaining prior permission. But where the Director of Consolidation or the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who exercises delegated powers of the Director of Consolidation under the Act, has made allotment of such a chak to a tenure holder having a difference of more than 25 per cent in area, it would in my opinion, not be invalid because the permission for such an allotment would be inherently manifest therein. If the Authority which is required to give permission to an allotment of chak having a difference in area by more than 25 per cent itself makes the allotment of such a chak in the process of making appropriate adjustment in chalks of parties while deciding a revision it cannot be taken to be invalid and without jurisdiction and no interference would be called for by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. ” 15. ” 15. It is also argued that what has weighed with the Deputy Director of Consolidation in disturbing what has been consistently done by the Authorities below is that the first Chak given to the contesting respondents, taking away plots from the petitioner's first Chak, including his original holding was to meet an objection from the contesting respondents that he had been given a Chak that was far away from the village with no source of irrigation. It was also urged that the valuation of land that was basis of the carvation of Chaks done by the Authorities below, was on the lower side, disadvantaging the contesting respondents. It is argued that it was bearing in mind all these considerations that the Deputy Director of Consolidation adjusted equities between parties. It is, in the last, submitted that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is the last Court of fact as well as law under the statute. He is invested with exceptional powers, particularly, after addition of the 3rd Explanation to Section 48 of the Act with retrospective effect from the year 1980. The impugned order passed by him brings about a determination in exercise of all those powers that have been exercised on valid considerations and strikes equity between parties. In the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is for all these reasons not liable to be disturbed. 16. The Court has given a thoughtful consideration to the contentions advanced on both sides. 17. So far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner goes that the impugned order is bad as it does not assign any reasons, it is required to be tested with reference to the contents of the order impugned. A reading of the impugned order shows, so far as consideration of the petitioner's rights are concerned, find mention in paragraph 4. 18. A perusal of paragraph 4 of the impugned order shows in great detail how the Deputy Director of Consolidation has gone about adjusting Chaks of parties and ordering their recarvation, but it does not show even a word for a reason, why those changes or adjustments are being made. 18. A perusal of paragraph 4 of the impugned order shows in great detail how the Deputy Director of Consolidation has gone about adjusting Chaks of parties and ordering their recarvation, but it does not show even a word for a reason, why those changes or adjustments are being made. A reading of the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation leaves an impression that the Chaks have been modified or redone only because the Deputy Director of Consolidation has thought it fit to do so. It does not show why he has done it. 19. It is trite to say for a legal principle that an order passed by any judicial or quasi-judicial Authority, or for that matter even Administrative Authorities, where rights of parties are decided ought to disclose reasons for the decisions reached. As is often said, reasons are the soul and heart of a decision and convey to the persons affected, as also a superior Authority or a Superior Court, the considerations that have weighed with the decision maker in arriving at his conclusions. Bereft of reasons, the decision is inherently arbitrary. On howsoever good and valid consideration a decision may have been rendered, the absence of reasons would make it foul of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court rendered in Sheo Pal vs. Basu Deo & others, 2017 (135) RD 335. The said case also involved a writ petition against an order passed by a Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation had reversed the orders of the Authorities below. In the context of those facts, it was held: “1. …..The only argument advances is that without giving any reason by a totally non-speaking order revision has been allowed by DDC. 3. A bare perusal thereof would leave no manner of doubt that it is totally a non-speaking and unreasoned order. The issues raised by petitioner has not been discussed at all and straightway conclusion have been recorded by DDC. 4. It is well known that "conclusions" and "reasons" are two different things and reasons must show mental exercise of authorities in arriving at a particular conclusion. The issues raised by petitioner has not been discussed at all and straightway conclusion have been recorded by DDC. 4. It is well known that "conclusions" and "reasons" are two different things and reasons must show mental exercise of authorities in arriving at a particular conclusion. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor MANU/SC/0405/1973 : (1973) 2 SCC 836 , as under: "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached." 10. Since the impugned order passed by DDC is wholly unreasoned and non-speaking the same cannot be sustained....” 20. Again, in Rajvinder Singh vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2014 (123) RD 76, this Court emphasized the necessity for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to record reasons while reversing a finding or writing a judgment of reversal. To like effect is a decision of this Court sitting at Lucknow in Arjun vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Faizabad and another, 2015 (129) RD 205 , where it has been held thus: “14. Further, From the perusal of the impugned order passed by D.D.C., Faizabad, the position which emerges out is that he has not given any valid reasons that under what circumstances, the finding given by the Court below/Settlement Officer Consolidation has been reversed only the reason which has been given while passing the impugned order is that the same has been done only on the statement given by the villagers while the said statement is neither on record nor supplied to the petitioner, so the case of the revisionist/Mewa Lal deserves to be allowed and on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed. 15. Thus, from the record, it is established that no valid reasons has been given by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad while passing the impugned order, rather it is based on no evidence and has not scrutiny the whole case again to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. ” 21. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. ” 21. This aspect of the matter as to how the Deputy Director of Consolidation, while exercising his powers of Revision, should exercise those powers fell for consideration of this Court in Gulab Chandra vs. DDC, 2019 (143) RD 783, where dealing with the manner in which the Revisional Court ought to write its judgment, in addition to the obligation of assigning reasons, it was held: 22. This Court is rather disconcerted to find that a reading of the judgment of the Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Settlement Officer, and particularly, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision, read like three original judgments, all written in exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction. The judgment of a Revisional Court cannot proceed to address the issues laid before it by parties, deal with them and decide, for that is to be done by the Court or Authority of first instance. The judgment of a Re-visional Court has to open, go through and end like a judgment of reappraisal of what the two Courts or Authorities below have done. The approach of reappraisal has to be supervisory, and not open appellate. May be, in the case of a revision under section 48 of the Act, the standard of reappraisal is wider than that traditionally associated with exercise of Revisional jurisdiction. But, all the same, a Revisional Court cannot decide and write its judgment as if it were a Court of first instance, without referring to and affirming or reversing the findings of the two Authorities below, in the context of the present Act. In the present case, the impugned judgment has precisely done that. It reads like an original judgment written in the third instance. It does not give any reason to disagree with what the Appellate Court has said, though it may have given its own reasons. In the present case, the impugned judgment has precisely done that. It reads like an original judgment written in the third instance. It does not give any reason to disagree with what the Appellate Court has said, though it may have given its own reasons. In the context of dealing with criminal appeals and revisions, concerned about the trappings of an Appellate or Revisional Court's judgment or order, and how it should read and proceed, their Lordships of the Supreme Court In Re: To issue certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials (Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No. 1 of 2017 vide order dated 30.3.2017, issued the following guidelines regarding the manner in which Appellate and Revisional Courts in criminal matters ought to write judgments, and what are the essentials to be adhered to while writing an Appellate or Revisional judgment. The said guidelines hold equally good in case of exercise of any Appellate or Revisional Authority by a Court or other Authority in any other jurisdiction. Guideline No. 7 in Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No. 1 of 2017 (supra) reads thus: "7. Repetition of pleadings, evidence, and arguments in the judgments and orders of the Trial Court, Appellate and Revisional Courts be avoided. Repetition of facts, evidence, and contentions before lower Courts make the judgments cumbersome, and takes away the precious time of the Court unnecessarily. The Appellate/Revisional Court judgment/order is the continuation of the lower Court judgment and must ideally start with "in this appeal/revision, the impugned judgment is assailed on the following grounds" or "the points that arise for consideration in this appeal/revision are". This does not of course, take away the option/jurisdiction of the Appellate/Revisional Courts to re-narrate facts and contentions if they be inadequately or insufficiently narrated in the judgment. Mechanical re narration to be avoided at any rate." 23. Particularly, relating to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under section 48 of the Act, the aforesaid issue though in the context of a title matter was considered by this Court in Haridas and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and another 2005 (98) RD 593, where dealing with the obligations of a Revisional Court while writing its opinion, it was held thus: "8. It is well settled that, while setting aside the judgment of inferior Court or Tribunal a Revisional Court or higher Tribunal has to deal with the findings given by the inferior Court or Tribunal and is required to consider the entire evidence on record. Thus while recording the contrary findings the Deputy Director of Consolidation was under obligation to consider entire evidence on record and also to record reasons of differing with the findings of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation......" 24. In the conspectus of the above facts and the law, this Court is of firm opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the Revisional Court suffers from a manifest error of law in ignoring from consideration material evidence, that is part of its own record, in particular, CH Form-2-A and CH Form-41, and also in exercising its jurisdiction, where it has proceeded to decide a revision so much like a Court of original jurisdiction that it has lost its character of a Revisional order. On both these counts, the impugned order is found to be flawed and vitiated and, thus, liable to be quashed with a remit of the matter to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to hear parties afresh, consider relevant evidence on record with opportunity to parties to place such evidence on record as may be relevant and to decide the revision afresh, all to be done within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 22. It has been recorded above that the revisional order does nothing more than to order about changes in the Chaks of parties with no reference at all to the determinations made by the two Authorities below. There is no indication of reasons that weighed with the Deputy Director of Consolidation to reach the conclusions that he has done. More importantly, he has not made any reference to the orders of the two Authorities below, much less reverse their findings to record his own which renders the impugned order bad; it makes it bad at least about the decision making process. 23. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been given a Chak, so far as his first Chak is concerned that does not include any part of his original holding and is a Udan Chak, carries some substance. 23. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he has been given a Chak, so far as his first Chak is concerned that does not include any part of his original holding and is a Udan Chak, carries some substance. While it is true that the Chak is not truly speaking a Udan Chak in the sense of the term that it sends away the petitioner to a far flung location from his original holdings, it certainly has the effect of completely depriving the petitioner of the major part of his original holding in the first Chak, comprised of seven plots. This would not be much to his prejudice as urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, had the petitioner been given a compact Chak, well rectangulated. But it appears from a perusal of the map that has been placed before the Court that the petitioner's Chak has been rendered 'L' shaped. It has become asymmetrical. A perusal of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not show that he has bestowed any consideration to this aspect of the matter. 24. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Deputy Director of Consolidation must be imputed, knowledge of all these facts and further an assumed consideration of all these factors while recording his decision, cannot be accepted. This is so because it does not reflect in the order impugned that he has considered any of these facts. 25. The next submission of the petitioner that his area has been reduced by 35% which is contrary to what the law provides under Section 19(1)(b) may have been successfully repelled by the learned Counsel for the respondent for a proposition of law by placing reliance upon the decision in Asbaran (supra), which holds that the inhibition does not apply to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the fact remains that the law does frown upon reduction in area beyond 25%. This is but obvious and for good reason. It is for the reason that the object of the Act is to provide tenure holders with compact rectangulated and consolidated holdings, where they can carry on their agricultural activities with greater convenience. This is the entire scheme of the Act. A drastic reduction in area would militate against the aforesaid object. This is but obvious and for good reason. It is for the reason that the object of the Act is to provide tenure holders with compact rectangulated and consolidated holdings, where they can carry on their agricultural activities with greater convenience. This is the entire scheme of the Act. A drastic reduction in area would militate against the aforesaid object. A prohibition on reduction in area beyond 1/4th appears to embody a legislative policy to prevent an ex-propriety carvation of Chaks that would deprive a tenure holder of his valuable property in the garb of consolidation. 26. This Court does not intend to say that in appropriate circumstances, the subordinate Authorities with the permission of the Director of Consolidation or the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot reduce the area beyond 25% or the Deputy Director cannot in fit cases exercise that power. However, before that power to reduce the area beyond 25% is exercised, even by the Deputy Director, there must be valid reasons assigned to take this drastic step. In this case, no such reasons have been assigned. It is the last limb of the submissions of Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the area of Chak holder No. 714 has been increased from 6.96 acres to 9.24 acres whereas his area has been reduced from 10.88 acres to 7.10 acres. It is a very inequitable adjustment of Chaks, done by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. This submission is not required to be gone into by this Court, in view of what has already been said above. The submission of Sri Santosh Kumar Singh on the other hand that no prejudice to the petitioner has been caused, inasmuch as, he has been provided a Chak that is not far flung from his original holding, does not appeal to this Court for reasons of the indicated prejudice that has been caused to the petitioner. 27. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and his allowed. The impugned order dated 09.04.1987 passed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur Camp Office Bareilly in Revision No. 362 is hereby quashed. 28. The Revision shall stand restored to the file of the concerned Assistant Director/Deputy Director of Consolidation, who will determine it afresh after hearing both parties in accordance with law. Both parties will appear before the District Deputy Director of Consolidation/Collector, Ballia on 09.12.2019. 29. 28. The Revision shall stand restored to the file of the concerned Assistant Director/Deputy Director of Consolidation, who will determine it afresh after hearing both parties in accordance with law. Both parties will appear before the District Deputy Director of Consolidation/Collector, Ballia on 09.12.2019. 29. The District Deputy Director of Consolidation will assign the matter to the competent Deputy Director of Consolidation (unless he chooses to take up the Revision himself) who will proceed to decide this Revision as directed hereinabove, within a period of six months of the parties first appearing before him. 30. There shall be no order as to costs.