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2019 DIGILAW 2581 (ALL)

Pramod Kumar Jain v. State of U. P.

2019-11-18

RAM KRISHNA GAUTAM

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Vakalatnama filed today by Sri Manoj Vashisth on behalf of O.P. No. 2 is taken on record. 2. The applicants Pramod Kumar Jain and Rajendra Jain, have filed this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., against State of U.P. and Maghchandra Jain with prayer to quash the summoning order dated 27.9.2018 passed by A.C.J.M., Court No. 1, Meerut, summoning applicants u/s 418, 506 I.P.C. in Complaint Case No. 6863 of 2016, Maghchandra Jain Vs. Pramod Kumar Jain and others, pending before A.C.J.M., Court No. 1, Meerut, as well as entire proceedings of aforesaid complaint Case and also order dated 28.9.2019 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Meerut, in Criminal Revision No. 493 of 2018, Pramod Kumar Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another. 3. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 and learned A.G.A. for the State. Perused the records. 4. Learned counsel for applicants argued that it was eleven years old case for which this complaint was filed, whereas matter relates to mediation. Complainant witnesses, who are pocket men of complainant, made the same statement, as was stated by complainant in the complaint and in his statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C. Hence this was misuse of process of law. But the learned Magistrate as well learned revisional court failed to appreciate it. 5. Learned counsel for complainant-O.P. No. 2 opposed the above argument with this contention that the applicants being office bearers of Jain Sabha, a registered society, continued in power for nine years and all through there was cheating and embezzlement thereby making loss to Jain Samaj for which this complaint was filed wherein complainant and his two witnesses were examined by the Matistrate, thereafter summoning order u/s 418, 506 I.P.C. was passed against applicants. 6. Learned AGA too oppose the arguments of learned counsel for applicants. 7. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and gone through material place on record, it is apparent that the complaint was filed wherein accusation of cheating and embezzlement resulting loss to Jain Samaj was made by complainant. This was said by complainant in his statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C. This was further corroborated by the statements of two witnesses examined u/s 202 Cr.P.C. On the basis of above material on record, the impugned summoning order was passed by the Magistrate. This was said by complainant in his statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C. This was further corroborated by the statements of two witnesses examined u/s 202 Cr.P.C. On the basis of above material on record, the impugned summoning order was passed by the Magistrate. It was challenged in revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Meerut, u/s 397 Cr.P.C. and the revision too was dismissed. 8. At the time of passing of summoning order meticulous analysis is not required. Rather prima-facie evidence is to be seen and in this case there was sufficient prima-facie evidence for proceeding u/s 418, 506 I.P.C. Thereby impugned summoning order was passed, which was challenged before the court of revision and the revisional court did not found any illegality in the order and the revision was dismissed. In exercise of inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. meticulous and splitting analysis of fact is not to be made because it is matter of trial to be seen by trial court. 9. Saving of inherent power of High Court, as given under Section 482 Cr.P.C, provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Meaning thereby this inherent power is with High Court (I) to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any other order under this Code (II) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (III) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588: (2010) 6 SCALE 767 : 2010 Cr. LJ 3844 has propounded that "While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court". LJ 3844 has propounded that "While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court". In another subsequent Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474 , hon'ble Apex Court propounded that "Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which after filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, or to delay the trial which enable to win over the witness or may disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of Justice". In again another subsequent Monica Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781 , the Apex Court has propounded "Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." While interpreting this jurisdiction of High Court Apex Court in Popular Muthiah v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 has propounded "High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings". 10. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings". 10. Regarding prevention of abuse of process of Court, Apex Court in Dhanlakshmi v. R.Prasana Kumar, (1990) Cr LJ 320 (DB): AIR 1990 SC 494 has propounded "To prevent abuse of the process of the Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive" as well as in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1989) Cr LJ 1005: AIR 1989 SC 1 , Apex Court propounded "In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not". 11. Meaning thereby, exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is within the limits, propounded as above. 12. There seems no ground for indulgence by this court. 13. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. 14. However, it is directed that if the applicants appear and surrender before the court below within 30 days from today and apply for bail, their prayer for bail shall be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 15. For the aforesaid period of 30 days from today, which shall not be extended further in any case, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants.